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Beyond borders
The role of the Netherlands Army in public security 
during crisis management operations
Peter Neuteboom
 At the beginning of a crisis management operation, the international 
community is often confronted with a poorly functioning or absent local police 
force. Within the chaos that reigns over the crisis area, an inadequate police 
force is a prelude to an explosive growth of crime and public order problems. 
The question then arises who could deal with these problems. In the absence of 
a local police force the only alternative at hand is that the military temporarily 
intervene as interim police, an activity that is not only beyond the primary 
tasks of the military but that is also likely to meet resistance of the troops. 
On the basis of relevant police literature, this thesis has investigated and 
analysed how the Royal Army of the Netherlands has contributed to improving 
public order and security during crisis management operations in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo and Iraq. The thesis draws the conclusion that, although 
the army did do interim policing during these missions, these tasks were 
only to a limited extent institutionalised in the organisational and operational 
concepts of the army. This means that the army to some extent ignored a 
reality typifying contemporary crisis management operations, namely that 
public order and security need to be restored quickly to ensure that the civilian 
reconstruction process can begin and be completed successfully. 
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Foreword and acknowledgements 
 
As an officer of the Koninklijke Marechaussee, I participated in two crisis manage-
ment operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the Dutch presidency of the 
Western European Union (WEU), I served as WEU liaison officer and adviser to 
the Dutch Police Commissioner (1994-1995) and was tasked with drafting the 
blueprint for a multi-ethnic police force in Mostar. In 1997, I worked as SFOR 
liaison officer to the regional headquarters of the Office of the High Representa-
tive and the UN International Police Task Force in the same town. During both 
missions, there was a security gap due to the inabilities of the local police forces 
to provide security and the international police mission lacking an executive 
mandate and, in my view, the ability to supervise the local police effectively. This 
had a negative impact on society and on the peace-building efforts.  
 
My interest in public security issues during crisis management operations 
continued also after having left the Koninklijke Marechaussee, with a particular 
focus on the deployment of international police and military in countries where 
there is a security gap.  
 
Fascinated with the subject, I decided to study the security gap phenomenon in 
depth. It has been a long journey, starting with the study of a large body of 
literature, phrasing and rephrasing my research question. While civilian police 
missions have been the subject of many studies, the role of the military forces as 
an alternative force that can perform public security tasks has not. There is little 
available in Dutch literature or military doctrine on the possible role of the 
military in performing public security tasks, despite the impact this could have in 
ensuring the success of crisis management operations. This has inspired me to 
study how the Netherlands Royal Army in fact has dealt with security gaps 
during three specific crisis management operations. Through this study I hope 
that I can contribute to increasing the awareness of decision and policy makers 
on the possibilities a review of the role of the Netherlands Royal Army in public 
security could offer, and the impact the Army could have in this area.  
 
My research leading to this dissertation would not have been possible without the 
help of several persons. First, I would like to thank Brigadier General Nico 
Geerts for his support and logistical assistance. I also want to thank Lieutenant 
Colonel (ret.) Harry Konings for the discussions we had on military involvement 
in public security and his feedback and advice on the doctrinal issues discussed in 
the dissertation. Rokus van den Bout of the Semi-Statisch Archief of the Dutch 
Ministry of Defence helped me with the research of the archives of 
IFOR/SFOR, KFOR and SFIR, for which I am grateful. I thank Hans Hovens 
for the many discussions we had, both sharing the fascination with the security 
gap phenomenon, leading to challenging ideas and research concepts. I owe a lot 
of gratitude to all the officers who agreed to be interviewed about their experi-
ences in the field of public security during one of the three selected crisis 
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management operations. Without their participation and input, this dissertation 
would not have been possible. I owe special thanks to Sjo Soeters and Paul 
Ducheine for supervising my research and their dedication to my project. They 
helped me through the various stages of the study by sharpening my ideas, and 
critically reviewing and extensively discussing my findings and analyses. I thank 
Mary-Teresa Moran for proof-reading and correcting this thesis. Finally and 
foremost, I want to thank my wife Anette. She helped me a lot, not only through 
her love and moral support during the entire process but also for her sharp and 
inspiring feedback on the various parts of the thesis.  
 
I dedicate this book to my son Patrick. 
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1  Introduction 
1.1  Contemporary military missions and challenges 
The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
the early 1990s ended the Cold War and diminished the direct threat of a nuclear 
or large-scale conflict between the democratic West and the communist East. 
The Cold War had a deep impact on international relations and security, and 
resulted in a military standoff through a nuclear and conventional arms race and 
mutual deterrence. After the end of the Cold War, the immediate threat of an 
all-out, total war more or less disappeared. New threats such as intra-state war 
and regional armed conflicts, international terrorism, and organised crime have 
instead come to dominate the international security agenda. These threats cannot 
be seen as a singular phenomenon as the distinction between these threats has 
become blurred, being dynamic, trans-national, and diverse.1 None of these 
threats is purely military or can be solved by military means alone. 
 
The new security threats have changed the character of military conflicts.2 Van 
Creveld describes the new conflicts that may arise from contemporary security 
threats as “non-Trinitarian wars”. He argues that there has been a shift from 
traditional “Trinitarian wars” – in which state-controlled, national mass armies 
were fighting opposing armies – to “non-Trinitarian” wars that involve irregular 
warriors without any state affiliation.3 Kaldor defines these conflicts as “new 
wars” that ‘draw on the experience of both guerrilla warfare and counter-
insurgency’4 and in which the distinction between war, organised crime and 
large-scale violations has become blurred.5 
 
These conflicts take place in dysfunctional, collapsing or disintegrating states. 
These so-called failed states regularly lack a central authority or government to 
take on responsibility for maintaining internal security and providing a stable 
political and economic infrastructure.6 In the absence of a functioning central 
government, warlords and armed groups (e.g. militias, terrorists, separatists, 
guerrillas, rebels, and criminal gangs) fight a conflict that goes beyond the control 
of a government.7 As opposed to regular armies, these groups are built on 
charismatic rather than institutional leadership. They are often motivated by 
                                               
1 See for example: Despiegeleire, Frinking, Bearne, Van het Loo & Thomson (2005), p. 1; 
Gemengde Commissie Veiligheid en Rechtsorde (Commissie Brinkman) (2005), p. 8; 
Middendorp & Princen (2006), p. 537; Welten (2006), p. 491. 
2 Buruma (2003), p. 19. 
3 Van Creveld (2002), p. 8. 
4 Kaldor (2006), p. 8. 
5 Kaldor (2006), p. 2. 
6 Moelker & Soeters (2003), p. 427. 
7 Holt & Berkman (2006), p. 16; Kaldor (2006), p. 9. 
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fanatical, ethnic or ideologically-based loyalties rather than by professional 
standards.8 
Another characteristic of the new conflicts is the absence of a clear-cut distinction 
between regular and irregular combatants, and between civilians and soldiers. 
Civilians have become deliberate targets of violence, resulting in human rights 
violations, crimes against humanity or other breaches of the laws of war. In 
addition to death, civilians face displacement, social disruption, disease, starvation, 
and massive refugee migrations.9 
The means of financing conflicts have also changed. In the absence of state 
financing, warlords or militias tend to finance their operations through criminal 
activities like drug-trafficking, human trafficking, smuggling of for example cars 
and weapons. Sometimes, these conflicts are financed by rogue states or by 
individuals sharing ideological views with the warlords or insurgents.10 
Finally, contemporary conflicts tend to be timeless, as Sir Rupert Smith argues.11 
He notes that ‘the trend of our recent military operations is that the more the 
operation is intended to win the will of the people, the more the opponent 
adopts the methods of the guerrilla and the more complex the circumstances, the 
longer it will take to reach the condition in which a strategic decision can be 
made and a solution be found.12 
 
Contemporary conflicts and threats have also changed the character of military 
operations, as there are no longer clear demarcations between the various levels 
of force as the level of security can vary in time and place within one single 
operation.13 As such, the military have to be capable to deploy a wide variety of 
military activities varying from offensive to defensive and stabilising activities,14 in 
which, for example, they can deploy to prevent or end armed conflicts, to 
enforce the law and restore public order; to fight terrorism, to mediate in on-
going conflicts, to protect the vulnerable; to assist in cases of humanitarian 
catastrophes, to help displaced persons and refugees, and to reconstruct infrastruc-
ture.15 
 
To cover this wide range of military action, this study applies the term ‘crisis 
management operation’. The Netherlands Defence Doctrine defines a crisis manage-
ment operation as ‘an operation which comprises political, military and civil 
activities, and which is initiated and conducted in accordance with international 
law (including international humanitarian law), whereby a contribution is made 
to the prevention and resolution of conflicts as well as to the management of  
                                               
8 Van Creveld (1991), p. 197. 
9 Holt & Berkman (2006), pp. 16-17. See also: Osinga (2009), pp. 58-59. 
10 Moelker & Soeters (2003), pp. 30-33. See also: Buruma (2003), p. 19. 
11 Smith (2005), p. 289. See also: Buruma (2003) p. 19. 
12 Smith (2005), p. 292. 
13 Koninklijke Landmacht (2008), footnote 5, p. 19. See also: Advisory Council on 
International Affairs (2009), footnote 6, p. 7. 
14 Koninklijke Landmacht (2009), pp. 94-95; Koninklijke Landmacht (2014), pp. 7-3 -7-4; 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2009), p. 1-6. 
15 Haltiner (2003b), p. 159. See also for example: Koninklijke Landmacht (2009), pp. 79-80 
& pp. 94-95. 
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crises in order to achieve the internationally determined objectives.’16 
 
During a crisis management operation, the international military force may 
encounter an environment in which local authorities have lost their power and 
credibility or legitimacy as the representatives of the local population. 
Furthermore, they may enter an environment in which the national security 
system, including the military and police, have been part of the conflict and 
therefore have lost the trust of substantial parts of the local population. The 
residual security forces often lack the qualifications or knowledge to serve the 
population and to maintain public security effectively. 
 
The deficit of a legitimate political and security system often results in a power 
and security vacuum. The reconstruction of a country’s institutions is therefore 
one of the priorities in a larger and long-term programme of nation building and 
peace-building. The establishment of a basic level of public order and security is 
therefore widely seen as the international community’s first priority, as it is 
generally one of the preconditions for achieving peace, stability and 
development.17 Without a basic level of security, economic reconstruction and 
governance assistance programs are likely to fail.18 As such, security tends to be 
the platform on which the international community bases its programmes for 
social-economic development, reconstruction of vital infrastructure, and the 
reinstitution of governance.19 
1.2  Public security and crisis management operations 
This study deals with the subject of public security, which involves the 
establishment of law and order in society. As such, public security differs from 
“general” security, which largely involves the establishment of peace and stability. 
Although public security is a commonly used term, the literature does not 
provide a commonly agreed definition. 
 
                                               
16 Ministerie van Defensie (2005), p. 72. Crisis management operations coincide with what 
NATO defines as non-Article 5 crisis management, which involve a holistic approach of 
military and non-military measures to ‘prevent crises, manage crises, stabilise post-conflict 
situations and support reconstruction’ (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-6733A336-
D42495E5/natolive/topics_56626.htm?; accessed December 1, 2011). 
17 See for example: Bayley (2001); Call (2007b), p. 8; Dobbins, Jones, Crane & Cole 
DeGrasse (2007), pp. 12-15; Durch & Berkman (2006), p. 19; Dziedzic (1998); Dziedzic & 
Hawley (2005), p. 9; Feil (2002), p. 98; Hills (2009), pp. 7-8; Jones, Wilson, Rathmell & 
Riley (2005), p. 1; Smith, Holt & Durch, (2007), p. 1; Voorhoeve (2007), p. 53; US De-
partment of the Army – Headquarters (2008b), p. vii. 
18 See for example: Advisory Council on International Affairs (2009), p. 13; Dobbins, Jones, 
Crane & DeGrasse (2007), p. 13; Hills (2009), p. 7; Jones, Wilson, Rathmell & Riley 
(2005), p. 12; Smith, Holt & Durch (2006), p. 8; US Institute of Peace (2009), p. 3.12; 
Voorhoeve (2007), p. 54. 
19 See for example: Advisory Council on International Affairs (2009), p. 13; Dobbins, Jones, 
Crane & DeGrasse (2007), p. 13; Hills (2009), p. 7; Jones, Wilson, Rathmell & Riley 
(2005), p. 12; Smith, Holt & Durch (2006), p. 8; US Institute of Peace (2009), p. 3.12; 
Voorhoeve (2007), p. 54. 
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NATO, for example, defines security as the ‘freedom from persecution, want and 
fear; adequate provision of essential commodities such as water and food; broader 
environmental security; and the protection of private property, public assets and 
cultural values.’20 In relation to the well-being and safety of citizens, NATO 
makes a distinction between human security and personal security. NATO 
characterizes human security as the ‘freedom from persecution, want and fear; 
adequate provision of essential commodities to sustain life; broader 
environmental security; and the protection of cultural values.’ NATO defines 
personal security as the ‘protection of an individual from persecution, 
intimidation, reprisals and other forms of systematic violence’.21 
 
The Dutch government makes a distinction between public security and public 
order and security. In the National Plan for Crisis Management 2004-2007 
(Beleidsplan Crisisbeheersing 2004-2007), for example, the Dutch government 
defines public security as an equivalent of physical security, i.e. the ‘protection of 
persons and goods,’ for example the protection of public health and the 
environment. 22 Public order and security, on the other hand, relates to the 
maintenance of public order and the maintenance of public security.23 Public 
security in this sense relates rather to law enforcement than to physical security. 
In its National Security Strategy (Strategie Nationale Veiligheid), the Dutch 
government has identified five vital interests that relate to the security of the 
state: (1) territorial security (integrity of the national territory); (2) economic 
security (freedom of economic trade); (3) ecologic security (a safe environment); 
(4) physical security (public health and protection against accidents or (natural) 
disasters); and (5) social and political stability (social cohesion and respect for 
democratic values and the rule of law). As such, the Dutch government does not 
mention public security as one of its vital interest. Public security must rather be 
seen as a subset of social and political stability for that includes the preservation of 
the rule of law.24 
 
Hills links the term security to public and individual safety. She defines security as 
a multifaceted social phenomenon, which involves individual and public aspects 
and domains.25 In her view, ‘security means that inhabitants are not forcibly 
displaced, raped, robbed, kidnapped, mutilated, tortured or killed.’26 
 
Call also relates security to physical security and defines it as ‘the safety of 
individual citizens, social groups, and the state from physical violence.’27 He 
regards security as being part of the wider concept of human security. He refers 
to the Commission on Human Security to define the term human security as the 
                                               
20 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2011), p. 2-2. 
21 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2011), p. 2-2. 
22 Kamersstukken II, 2003/04, 29 668, nr. 1, p. 7. 
23 Kamersstukken II, 2003/04, 29 668, nr. 1, p. 10. 
24 Strategie Nationale Veiligheid, Kamerstukken II, 2006/07, 30 821, nr. 1, p. 10. 
25 Hills (2009), p. 8. 
26 Hills (2009), p. 8. 
27 Call (2007b), p. 8. 
14
INTRODUCTION 
 
protection of ‘the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human 
freedoms and human fulfilment.’28 
 
The Dutch Chiefs of Police refer to social security too when defining the term 
security. However, in contrast to Hills and Call they also include the safety of 
civilian properties. They define security as social security, which they view as the 
provision of an ‘orderly state in the public domain and the protection of people 
against the (perceived) threat to their physical safety and the safety of their 
property.’29 According to the Board, social security means ‘that people can walk 
the streets without fear; that they can safely send their children to school; that 
they can start up a business and be protected against crime and anti-social 
behaviour.’30 
 
Feil rather expands the concept of public security to address the establishment of 
a safe and secure environment. He includes the development of legitimate and 
stable security institutions. He defines security as ‘the provision of collective and 
individual security to the citizenry and to the assistors [and] concerns securing the 
lives of citizens from immediate and large-scale violence and restoring the state’s 
ability to maintain territorial integrity.’31 
 
Like Fail, the United States (US) Department of the Army uses the terms public 
safety to mean the establishment of a safe and secure environment ‘in which (…) 
civilians can live their day-to-day lives without fear of being drawn into violent 
conflict or victimized by criminals.’32 In addition to Fail’s definition, they also 
relate the establishment of public safety to the establishment of the rule of law, 
which entails the security of individuals and accountability for crimes committed 
against them.33 As such, security is also related to the provision of law and 
order.34 
 
As literature does not provide a common definition of public security, this study 
will define it as the condition in which law and order are enforced, a safe and 
secure environment is established, civilians and their property are protected 
against physical violence or intrusion of integrity, and where criminal suspects are 
arrested, detained, and prosecuted in accordance with the law.35 
                                               
28 Commission on Human Security (2003), cited in Call (2007b), p. 23, endnote 17. 
29 Raad van Hoofdcommissarissen. Projectgroep Visie op de politiefunctie (2005), p. 38. 
30 Raad van Hoofdcommissarissen. Projectgroep Visie op de politiefunctie (2005), p. 38. 
31 Feil (2002), p. 98. 
32 US Department of the Army – Headquarters (2008b), p. 1-16. 
33 US Department of the Army – Headquarters (2008b), p. 1-17. 
34 US Department of the Army – Headquarters (2008b), p. 1-17. 
35 Although the term public order and security could also include wider aspects of security in 
society, such as the protection against accidents, fire, natural calamities, crises, and disasters, 
in this study the term public order and security refers to law and order in society. 
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1.3  New military challenges 
The establishment of public security in the aftermath of a military intervention 
can be problematic (see Box 1). So-called security gaps occur due to a ‘relative 
lack of professional police capacity’.36 The reason for this deficit can be two-fold. 
First, the local police could be unable to police society either because they have 
disintegrated or they have lost their credibility due to their conduct before or 
during the conflict.37 Second, the deployment of international police could suffer 
from long deployment lead-times and/or scarcity of resources in donor coun-
tries.38 If no sufficient international police resources are available in the short-
term and local security institutions fail to provide public security, the intervening 
international military forces may be required or expected to offer an alternative 
and to provide some sort of policing on a temporary basis, such as the provision 
of basic law enforcement (e.g. arrest and detention of criminal offenders), public 
order maintenance (e.g. crowd and riot control and protection of high-risk 
persons and groups), and public assistance (e.g. problem-solving and providing or 
facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid).39 
 
Troops have not always been successful in establishing sustainable public security, 
as demonstrated by the US military in Iraq after the defeat of the Iraqi forces in 
2003. Winning a war with an overwhelming power and state-of-the-art 
technology may not be sufficient to ensure a sustainable peace.40 Several authors 
have argued that the provision of public security does not fit the structure, 
culture, training and competences of the military organisation and its members, 
or argue that such activities would reduce their war-fighting skills.41 Others see 
military involvement in public security during the initial stages of crisis 
management operations as inevitable. They support some sort of military 
involvement in policing, as long as the military are willing to fulfil these tasks and 
train for it.42  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
36 Voorhoeve (2007), p. 59. 
37 Dobbins, Jones, Crane & DeGrasse (2007), p. 24. 
38 See for example: Call & Barnett (2000), pp. 50-51; Dziedzic (1998), p. 9; Linden, Last & 
Murphy (2007), p. 159; Voorhoeve (2007), p. 54. 
39 See for example: Dobbins, Jones, Crane & DeGrasse (2007), p. 26; Jones, Wilson, 
Rathmell & Riley (2005), p. 212; Voorhoeve (2007), p. 59. 
40 Clark (2003), p. 97. 
41 See for example: Bronson (2002), pp. 122-132; Call & Barnett (2000), pp. 43-68; Clark 
(2001), p. 462; Haltiner (2003b), pp. 162-164; Hillen (2001), pp. 16-20; Hills (1998), pp. 
26-41; Hills (2001), pp. 79-98; Smith (2005), p. 9. 
42 See for example: Bailey (2001), p. 54; Bildt (2005); Jakobsen (2000), p. 48. 
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Box 1: The essence of public security in (post) conflict areas: the case of 
Iraq 
On April 9, 2003, US forces captured the capital of Baghdad and toppled 
Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath regime. Three weeks later, on May 1, 2003 President 
George W. Bush announced the end of “major combat operations”. While he 
addressed the American people and the international community from the 
aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, a banner titled “Mission Accomplished” 
was displayed behind him.43 Bush’s declaration and the phrase “Mission 
Accomplished” both turned out to be premature. Shortly after, Iraqis started to 
loot government Ministries, public offices, and museums. When US soldiers did 
not intervene, these lootings turned out to be the prelude of public disorder, 
widespread criminality, sectarian violence, insurgency, and terror in the 
following years. In not intervening, the Americans had lost the so-called “golden 
hour” to close the security gap that arose after the end of combat. In not 
restoring public security, the American forces also lost the support of the Iraqi 
population.44 In addition, the standing Iraqi security sector was unable to turn the 
tides and restore public order after Administrator of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) Bremer dissolved the Iraqi armed forces on May 23, 2003, in 
order to create a new ‘national self-defence capability for a free Iraq.’45 Although 
the Iraqi police were not officially dissolved, the majority of Iraqi police officers 
in Baghdad had abandoned their posts immediately after the Iraqi defeat.46 Those 
who remained lacked quality and the popular support of the population who 
connected the police with the corruption and brutality of the Ba’ath regime.47 
The absence of a reliable and well-functioning security sector resulted in a long-
term security gap. The reconstruction of the Iraqi police turned out to be a slow 
and incremental process. It took until the end of 2003 for the US to start a 
training program for new police officers. Implementation was hampered by a 
lack of sufficient professional police trainers, competent recruits, and equip-
ment.48 In the following years, the Iraqi Police Service remained a poorly- 
performing institution. The police were unable to protect the population and to 
fight crime and turned out to be a source of corruption, sectarian violence and 
organised crime.49 
 
 
                                               
43 See for example: Woodward (2004), p. 412; Woodward (2006), pp. 186-187. 
44 See for example: Perito (2005), p. 4; Pirnie & O’Connell (2008), pp. 69-70. 
45 Coalition Provisional Authority (May 23, 2003). Order No. 2: Dissolution of Entities. 
Available at http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/ia/docs/dissolution-English.pdf; accessed January 
6, 2011. 
46 Perito (2005), p. 4. 
47 Perito (2005), p. 9. 
48 Perito (2005); Moss, M & D. Rohde (May 21, 2006). Law and Disorder. Misjudgements 
Marred US Plans for Iraqi Police. New York Times. Available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2006/05/21/world/middleeast/21security.html?pagewanted=print; accessed January 
6, 2011. 
49 See for example: Moss & Rohde (May 21, 2006); Perito (2005); Ricks (2009), Woodward 
(2008). 
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If troops have to provide public security during a security gap, the question 
remains whether every soldier needs to be trained for operations along the full 
continuum of military force or if there should be some organisational differentia-
tion depending on the kind of operation assigned to him. This question has 
fuelled a discussion on the transformation of the military into constabulary 
forces.50 In general, the term constabulary force refers to ‘a force organised along 
military lines, providing basic law enforcement and safety in a not yet fully 
stabilised environment.’51 Largely, there are three different concepts of the 
constabulary force. 
The first and most well known version of the constabulary force was introduced 
by the American sociologist Janowitz in 1960.52 In this view, the constabulary 
force is a military force committed to the minimum use of force, focused on the 
achievement of viable international relations and able to operate in a great variety 
of situations, ranging from humanitarian support and peace operations at the 
lower end towards counter-insurgency and war-fighting at the higher end of the 
spectrum of military force.53 This constabulary force thus has a pragmatic mission 
focusing on practical conflict resolution or crisis management,54 to deal with a 
wide range of different security scenarios varying from the classical warfare tasks 
to providing security and stability in (post) conflict environments.55 
A second version involves the transformation of the military into a hybrid force 
capable of performing tasks that fall between those of the military and the 
police.56 Literature provides different options that could lead to such hybrid 
forces. Geser suggests the establishment of a cosmopolitan “third force” which 
combines high-standing police capabilities – like flexibility and community 
responsiveness – with full-range conventional, goal-oriented military characteris-
tics.57 Kaldor pleas for the establishment of a “cosmopolitan law enforcement 
force” being ‘a professional service which would include both civilian and 
military personnel, ranging from robust peacekeeping troops, through police and 
gendarmerie, administrators, accountants, human rights monitors and aid work-
ers.’58 Kaldor argues that such cosmopolitan law enforcement force cannot be 
based on current organisational structures and concepts but must be built on ‘a 
new kind of soldier-cum-policeman’59 tasked ‘to protect civilians, before, during 
and after conflicts.’60 
                                               
50 See for example: Armitage & Moissan (2005); Brouse (2006); Dziedzic (1998); Haltiner 
(2003b), Jones et al; Kernic, Klein & Haltiner (2005); Neuteboom (2004); Perito (2004); 
Shin (2009); Snyder & Field (2000). 
51 Schmidl (1998), p. 22. 
52 Janowitz (1960), pp. 418-440. 
53 Janowitz (1960), pp. 418-419. 
54 Born & Metselaar (2003), pp. 88-89. 
55 Manigart (2003), p. 329. 
56 See for example: Däniker (1995), p. 104; Geser (1996a, p. 48); Haltiner (2003b), p. 178; 
Kaldor (2006), p. 133. 
57 Geser (1996a), p. 48. 
58 Kaldor (2003), p. 156. 
59 Kaldor (2006), p. 138. 
60 Kaldor (2003), p. 156. 
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A third version of the constabulary force focuses on organisational differentiation 
and recommends the assignment of public security tasks to specialised military 
forces, for example the Military Police (MP) or police forces with a military 
status such as the French Gendarmerie and the Dutch Koninklijke Marechaussee.61 
 
The coverage of the full range of military activity – from all-out military warfare 
to military assistance to local authorities – puts a high pressure on the military 
organisation and its personnel. In order to cover the full range of military activity 
effectively, the professional soldier will need additional diplomatic, psychological, 
sociological, and linguistic competences to interpret and to solve ambiguous 
situations and to cooperate with a local population in unknown cultural 
settings.62 Soldiers will also need to be able to vary and adjust the intensity of 
force required and to escalate and de-escalate the application of force within a 
short period of time, and over short intervals,63 using competences similar to 
those of police officers dealing with public order disturbances, deployed in riot 
squads or special intervention teams. Furthermore, they would need to acquire 
situational awareness in relation to public security needs and the ability to interact 
and cooperate with various local actors and agencies, and to build networks to 
achieve basic levels of public security.64 These relationships can provide 
information and help to focus and direct security activities, such as to maintain 
public order, protect individual citizens, ethnic groups and refugees, solve 
problems between ethnic groups, arrest alleged war criminals, support electoral 
processes, gather criminal intelligence, break up criminal gangs, prevent inter-
ethnic intimidation and violence, and support the nation and institution building 
processes.65 
1.4  Research questions 
Research subject 
The subject of this study is the provision of public security by the military during 
a security gap in a crisis management operation. As described above, in (post) 
conflict environments, national security and justice structures often have ceased 
to exist or are dysfunctional, unable to restore a law and order and to protect the 
population against disorder, violence and criminality. If the international police 
are not available in the short term or in sufficient qualities and quantities, the 
military may be required to step into this gap to provide some sort of interim 
policing until local or international police are in place, although these tasks may 
not fall within their initial mission and purpose. 
 
Since the 1990s, Dutch troops operated in a number of crisis management 
operations like UNTAC in Cambodia, UNPROFOR, IFOR, SFOR, and 
                                               
61 See for example: Armitage & Moisan (2005); Field & Perito (2003); Hovens (2008), Pacek 
(2008). Perito 2004a; 2004b); De Weger (2009). 
62 Haltiner (2003a), pp. 182-183. 
63 See for example: Soeters (2008), p. 120. 
64 Kilcullen (2006), p. 136. 
65 Easton (2001), pp. 36-37 & 47. See also: Haltiner (2003b), p. 159; Bayley (2001), p. 53. 
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EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, KFOR in Kosovo, SFIR in Iraq, and ISAF 
in Afghanistan.66 As Dutch troops have contributed to these operations from their 
earliest beginnings, they have faced the consequences of a security gap.67 To 
determine the extent to which those troops provided some sort of public security 
to overcome the consequences of such gaps, this study focuses on three different 
crisis management operations: IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(December 1995 – December 2004), KFOR in Kosovo (April 1999 – August 
2000) and SFIR in Iraq (August 2003 – March 2005).68 These three missions 
then serve to provide findings on how the Dutch military generally operate and 
organise within the context of a security gap. 
 
Research object 
To define how Dutch troops operate in a security gap, this study chooses the 
Netherlands Army (NL Army) as its main research object. In particular, it focuses 
on the operational and organisational concept of NL Army as applied in the 
context of crisis management operations. The choice of the NL Army is relevant 
for three reasons. 
First, from the early 1990s on, the NL Army has acquired extensive experience in 
crisis management operations. This experience makes it plausible that the NL 
Army has operated in security gaps where it had to deal with public security 
issues. The role of the NL Army in providing public security during a security 
gap has only occasionally been the subject of scientific research or discussion in 
professional military literature.69 This study therefore seeks to contribute to 
further academic and professional debate on this subject. 
Second, the need to reduce national public expenditure has fuelled the debate on 
the future mission and structure of the defence forces. This debate may result in a 
structural reform and a redefinition of the military’s mission and force structure. 
This study seeks to contribute to this debate. As security gaps seem to be a 
structural feature of crisis management operations, prioritising public security 
during missions and in doctrines may be required. 
Finally, the choice to focus the research on the NL Army is a pragmatic one. 
This focus limits expenditure and time spent on travelling to interview experts 
abroad and in research archives in various countries. The focus on the NL Army 
allows the researcher to utilise his extensive network within the NL Army. 
 
                                               
66 See for example: Klep & Van Gils (2005); http://www.defensie.nl/ nimh/ geschie 
denis/internationale_operaties/missieoverzicht; accessed January 6, 2011. 
67 The security gaps in Cambodia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (see for example: Oakley, 
Dziedzic & Goldberg (1998)), Kosovo (see for example: Hansen (2002a & 2002b)) and Iraq 
(Perito (2005) have been largely documented. 
68 For a further explanation of the sampling criteria, see Chapter 5: Research Methodology. 
69 A few studies or articles have described Dutch military involvement in public security 
during recent crisis management operations. De Weger, Grashof and Douma (2007) for 
example have explored the application of crowd and riot control by the Dutch armed 
forces during crisis management operations. Brocades Zaalberg (2006) and Van Loon 
(2000) has characterised the public security role of 1 (NL) Battalion KFOR 1 during the 
early stages of the security gap in Kosovo. Lastly, Brocades Zaalberg and Ten Cate (2010, 
2012) published on Dutch military involvement in interim policing in Iraq. 
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To define the provision of public security by the NL Army during crisis 
management operations, the operational and organisational concept of Dutch 
police will serve as the conceptual lens through which the achievements of the 
NL Army in this matter is observed. The rationale for using the Dutch police as 
reference point is twofold. 
First, by doing so, this study ensures that it compares two organisations that are 
rooted in the same national social and cultural context.  
Second, and closely related to the first, is that any lessons learned and further 
development of the NL Army’s policing capabilities would likely rely on close 
cooperation or alignment with the Dutch police. However, the characteristics 
and mode of operations of the Dutch police cannot be seen in isolation from 
international developments, theories and studies. Notions like community 
policing, problem-oriented policing, and intelligence-led policing have influ-
enced the Dutch police and policing.70 Therefore, international police literature 
and theories are the starting point for the description of operational and organisa-
tional concepts of the Dutch police and Dutch policing. Examples and views of 
the Dutch police practice complement these international theories and shows 
commonalities or differences. 
 
Research questions 
Following the research object and subject, this study is based upon two assump-
tions. 
First, when deployed in an international crisis management operation, and in the 
absence of an international police force or a reliable local police, the armed forces 
will face a security gap. In a security gap, there is an urgent need to restore law 
and order and to protect the local population. To establish a sustainable level of 
security quickly, the military will need to take on certain police tasks until a local 
or international force is able to take over. The fulfilment of these tasks is 
important to create a basic level of security at community level so that citizens 
can feel safe and will engage in a wider process of reconstruction and social and 
economic development. The military will have to take on tasks that are tradition-
ally not part of their formal assignment, but that are indispensible for the overall 
success of the operation. 
Second, if the military have to deal with public security tasks during crisis 
management operations, these tasks and activities need to be incorporated in its 
planning, training, operations and organisation. In other words, the military may 
have to act and organise accordingly and adopt operational and organisational 
principles comparable to the police in order to be able to deal with these tasks 
                                               
70 In the Netherlands, police practice largely develops bottom-up (Punch 2009), p.95). The 
notion of community police was introduced in the report Politie in verandering (The Chang-
ing Police) that was published in the late 1970s by a group of young police officers inspired 
by experiments with community policing in the United States (Projectgroep Organisatie 
Structuren (1977). Since the 1980s, community has become the corner stone of Dutch 
policing Punch, Van der Vijver & Zoomer (2002); Wiebrens (2004). Regarding intelli-
gence-led policing, experiments in the police in Kent, England, inspired the police in Rot-
terdam in the 1990s to introduce a Dutch version of intelligence-led policing which later 
became a national programme (Kop & Klerks (2009), p. 15). 
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effectively and efficiently. The military may therefore need to expand its 
professional orientation, and be willing to adopt tactics, techniques and proce-
dures currently unknown to them. The police organisation could serve as a 
reference point, not only in operational and organisational terms, but also in 
creating a wider understanding and awareness of public security situations and 
requirements to deal with interim policing tasks effectively. Based upon these 
two assumptions, the central research question of this study is twofold: 
 
Did the NL Army operate and organise to promote public security during a security gap in 
its crisis management operations and how did the operational and organisational concept 
during these operations compare to those of the police organisation in terms of providing 
public security? 
 
This central research question can be further refined into six sub-questions:  
 
1. What kind of crisis management operations could be discerned and how have they 
evolved over time? 
2. What is a security gap and what is the role the military could or should play to bridge 
that gap? 
3. What are the main characteristics of the police and military organisation and what are 
their differences and commonalities? 
4. Has the NL Army encountered security gaps during crisis management operations and 
what has been the character of these gaps? 
5. Has the NL Army performed tasks to bridge the public security gap during these crisis 
management operations and if so, how could these tasks be characterised? 
6. Did the NL Army’s operational and organisational concept enable the provision of 
public security during these crisis management operations? 
 
The first three sub-questions will be answered in the theoretical part of this 
study. The answer to the first research question will serve as a general introduc-
tion on crisis management operations while the answers to sub-questions 2 and 3 
will serve as theoretical framework for the empirical stage of the research. The 
answer to sub-question 2 will serve to define the theoretical characteristics of a 
security gap to be applied in the empirical stage in order to answer sub-question 
4. It will identify and interpret the public security environments in which the NL 
Army deployed, contributing to the IFOR/SFOR, KFOR and SFIR missions. 
The answer to sub-question 3 will set the theoretical framework for defining the 
operational and organisational concept applied by the NL Army during these 
missions, and serves as the analytic framework to answer sub-questions 5 and 6. 
1.5  Demarcation 
As mentioned above, this study exclusively deals with the execution of public 
security activities by the NL Army during crisis management operations over the 
last fifteen years. It therefore excludes a number of subjects and aspects: 
First, the main body of the study is descriptive. Literature on the role of the NL 
Army in the field of public security during crisis management operations is 
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limited and no empirical theories have been developed to evaluate and test the 
effectiveness and efficiency of Dutch military involvement in policing and public 
security in contemporary military missions. In the absence of such empirical 
evidence, the study does not apply a dedicated theoretical framework on policing 
strategies in international crisis management environments to test the results of 
the Army’s efforts in the field of public security. Instead, this study serves to 
create an overview of how the NL Army operated in the area of public security 
and how the troops were organised to deal with these issues. General theories on 
police organisation will serve as a reference point or as a conceptual lens. 
Although the study is primarily descriptive and does not intend to develop new 
theories, the conclusions based on the results of the study will also have an 
explanatory and exploratory purpose in order to explain identified patterns and 
generate new ideas for future operations. 
Second, the study focuses exclusively on the role of the NL Army in public 
security during crisis management operations. The role of other elements of the 
Netherlands Armed forces that have been engaged in crisis management 
operations, such as the Dutch Marines in Iraq, are not included in this study. The 
rationale for this exclusion is that this study intends to describe and explain the 
consequences of public security challenges in one defined and exclusive Service 
of the Armed Forces in order to draw conclusions regarding the organisational 
and operational concepts of that Service, namely the NL Army. 
Third, the study is – apart from a general observation of developments and 
conceptualisations – not an international review or comparison of modes of 
operation of Western armed forces when dealing with public security in crisis 
management operations. 
Fourth, the study involves public security in an international setting and 
environment. It therefore does not focus on military assistance to civilian 
authorities in law enforcement, public order assistance, crisis management and 
disaster relief in the Netherlands itself. It also excludes the national police tasks as 
assigned to the Koninklijke Marechaussee regarding Article 4 of the Dutch Police 
Act of 2012, as well as the Dutch military’s involvement in national and 
international law enforcement activities combating drug-trafficking and terrorism 
outside the context of a crisis management operation. 
Fifth, the study has primarily an organisational and institutional character and 
refrains from legal questions. It examines what has been done in practice in the 
provision of public security rather than assessing its legal basis or jurisdiction. 
Sixth, the study’s primary scope is the perspective of the NL Army and deals with 
the question how commanders and troops have dealt with public security issues. 
The study does not assess the question of public security from the perspective of 
individual civilians or communities. It thus excludes normative questions 
regarding the perceptions of individual citizens or communities about military 
contributions to public security in their environment.  
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1.6  Structure of the study 
This study is divided into three separate parts (see: Figure 1). 
The first part is a literature review and answers the first sub-questions of this 
study. It reviews material produced by others such as publications, articles, studies 
and reports and gives an overview of the existing knowledge on the subject of 
this study. Chapter 2 to 4 constitute the theoretical part of this study. Chapter 2 
explains the development of crisis management operations from traditional peace-
keeping operations to today’s full spectrum operations in which different types of 
operations can be conducted at the same time and place. Chapter 3 describes the 
security gap. It discusses the role the military could play to bridge that gap 
independently or in support of the police. Chapter 4 compares military and 
police organisation. It discusses the differences and similarities between these two 
organisations and outlines the function and mission of the police. This chapter 
serves to develop an understanding of the operational and organisational 
requirements for the effective and efficient provision of public security duties. 
Chapter 5 constitutes the second part of the study and presents the research 
methodology. 
The third part of the study is the empirical phase based on a multiple-case study. 
Chapters 6 to 8 cover the analysis and conclusions of three separate case studies, 
namely that of IFOR/SFOR, KFOR and SFIR in which the NL Army 
deployed from 1995 to 2005. 
Chapter 9 forms the last part of the study, involving the synthesis and discussion 
of the empirical findings through a cross-case analysis, and finally answers the 
central research question. 
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Figure 1: Structure of the Study 
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2 Crisis management operations 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the 1990s, the character of military conflict changed significantly. Whereas 
before and during the Cold War, military conflicts largely had an inter-state 
character and were fought by regular armies, nowadays conflicts are largely intra-
state. They may involve irregular combatants without any state affiliation and 
occur among the population in dysfuntioning, collapsing or disintegrating states.71 
Over the years, international military forces have contributed to various forms of 
crisis management in order to find a lasting solution to such situations. 
 
This chapter discusses the evolution of crisis management operations, since they 
have been subject of political and professional debate in order to find suitable 
arrangements to deal effectively with international conflicts, crises and 
humanitarian catastrophes. As such, it answers the second research question and 
outlines what crisis management operations are and how they have evolved over 
time, from the classical UN peace-keeping operation to contemporary 
stabilisation activities. The chapter begins by outlining the political and legal 
frameworks that enable and authorise crisis management operations. Next, it 
describes the conceptual development of peace operations as examples of classical 
crisis management operations: traditional peace-keeping, wider peace-keeping 
and peace support. Then, it reflects on counter-insurgency as an example of a 
contemporary crisis management instrument, especially to deal with volatile 
environments, followed by a characterisation of stabilisation activities as a 
comprehensive, multi-agency approach to stabilise a (post) conflict environment 
by providing security, support for governance and reconstruction. 
2.2  Political and legal foundation of UN peace operations 
The history and development of peace operations is strongly related to the 
United Nations (UN).72 The rationale for UN peace operations can be found in 
the general provisions in Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. These 
Chapters are governing the powers of the Security Council to maintain 
international peace and security. Chapter VI deals with the “Pacific Settlement of 
Disputes” and outlines the UN’s first step to seek peaceful resolutions to disputes 
between parties which continuation could endanger international peace and 
security. It provides the UN Security Council with the authority to call upon the 
parties involved to settle their dispute by ‘negotiation, enquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.’73 Chapter VI 
activities are commonly known as peacekeeping operations although the UN 
                                               
71 See for example: Burema (2003), p. 19; Van Creveld (2002), p. 8; Kaldor (2006), pp. 8-9; 
Smith (2005), pp. 16-17. 
72 Bellamy, Williams & Griffin (2004), p. 45. 
73 UN Charter (1945), Article 33. 
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Charter does not provide an explicit reference to this term.74 Moreover, Chapter 
VI does not refer to any involvement by the military, nor does it provide a clear 
and effective political or strategic guidance, or provisions to conduct low-level 
military UN peace operations.75 
 
If measures based upon Chapter VI prove to be ineffective, Chapter VII offers 
the UN a framework for non-military and military measures to maintain or 
restore peace and security. Contrary to Chapter VI, Chapter VII measures do not 
need the consent of the parties concerned. They provide the Security Council 
with the instruments to impose economic and diplomatic sanctions.76 If these 
sanctions fail, the Security Council ‘may take action by air, sea or land forces as 
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such 
action may include demonstrations, blockade and other operations.’77 The 
emphasis of this action is, therefore, on coercive military operations.78 
 
The emphasis on coercive military operations is in strong contrast to Chapter VI 
operations. As such, there is a gap between the pacific, diplomatic measures of 
Chapter VI and the coercive, military action of Chapter VII. Former UN 
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld therefore argued that peace-keeping 
missions are in fact “Chapter Six and a Half” operations because they ‘fall short of 
the provisions of Chapter VII and at the same time they go beyond purely 
diplomatic means of those described in Chapter VI of the Charter.’79 In order to 
find a solution to bridge this gap, some commentators focus on either Article 36 
in Chapter VI – which speaks of ‘appropriate procedures or measures of 
adjustment’ – or on Article 40 in Chapter VII – which speaks of provisional 
measures – to identify a formal ground for UN action to maintain international 
peace and security. The emphasis on voluntary cooperation of the concerned 
parties makes Article 40 the most explicit justification for peace-keeping missions, 
which are then viewed as provisional measurers deployed with the consent of the 
concerned parties.80 
 
                                               
74 Peacekeeping was the term coined to describe the tasks of the UN mandated troops 
deployed after the Suez Crisis of 1956. It gained official status when the UN General As-
sembly set up the “Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations” in February 1965, just 
after the UN forces finished their first operation in the former Belgian Congo (Rikye 
(1984), p. 1). However, the term was not defined in any UN document until it appeared in 
An Agenda for Peace in 1992 as part of the formal UN terminology (Durch & Berkman 
(2006a), p. 5). 
75 Bellamy, Williams & Griffin (2004), p. 46; Hillen (2000), p. 9. 
76 UN Charter (1945), Article 41. 
77 UN Charter (1945), Article 42. 
78 Hillen (2000), p. 11. 
79 United Nations (2000a), p. 5. 
80 Hillen (2000), pp. 9-10; Kirsch (1993), pp. 18-19; White (1993), p. 201. 
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2.3  Traditional peace-keeping: first generation peace-keeping: 
Characteristics of traditional peace-keeping 
Early UN peace operations are generally addressed as “traditional peace-keeping” 
or as “first generation peace-keeping” operations.81 Traditional peace-keeping 
operations are ‘intended to assist in the creation and maintenance of conditions 
conducive to long-term conflict resolution by the parties themselves, often in 
conjunction with international mediation.’82 In these operations, UN forces 
observe, monitor, supervise, or verify cease-fire and related agreements. The 
purpose is then to prevent further outbreaks of the conflict and to facilitate 
conflict resolution by creating a degree of confidence between the belligerents 
that opens up a space for political dialogue leading to long-term conflict 
resolution.83 
 
Traditional peacekeeping has three fundamental principles: consent, impartiality 
and the minimum use of force.84 This so-called “holy trinity” of peace-keeping 
involves ‘non-coercive, consent-based activities, usually to support a peace 
process or interim ceasefires, to help prevent the resumption or escalation of 
violence and establish a stable peace.’85 As such, the success of the traditional 
peace-keeping depends upon the cooperation and consent of the disputing 
parties.86 Following the principles of the “holy trinity”, in traditional peace-
keeping operations peace-keepers typically form an objective and non-partisan, 
inter-positional buffer zone between the opposing parties.87 These operations fit 
with the “Westphalian” tradition of international law. This tradition recognises 
the sovereignty of territorial states and presumes that states resolve their 
differences based on consent. Consequently, the internal issues of a sovereign 
state are beyond the scope of traditional UN peace-keeping.88 To express their 
neutrality, the traditional peace-keepers are usually lightly armed, and function 
under rules of engagement that permit them to use arms only in self-defence or if 
the execution of the mission is seriously jeopardised.89 
 
Most traditional peace-keeping operations were initiated during the Cold War.90 
These “Westphalian” operations also fitted well with the Cold War atmosphere 
                                               
81 See for example: Bellamy, Williams & Griffin (2004), pp. 96-110; Hillen (2000), pp. 79-
107; Holt & Berkman (2006), p. 18; Koninklijke Landmacht (1996), pp. 185-186; 
Koninklijke Landmacht (1999), p. 77; Schmidl (1998), pp. 29-35. 
82 Bellamy, Williams & Griffin (2004), p. 95. 
83 Bellamy & Williams (2004), p. 3. 
84 Bellamy, Williams & Griffin (2004), p. 95. 
85 Bellamy, Williams & Griffin (2004), pp. 95-96. 
86 Bellamy, Williams & Griffin (2004), p. 96; Hillen (2000), p. 22. 
87 Bellamy, Williams & Griffin (2004), p. 97; Hillen (2000), p. 22; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse 
& Miall (2005), p. 134. 
88 Bellamy, Williams & Griffin (2004), pp. 21-32. 
89 Klep & Van Gils (2004), p. 398. 
90 Hillen (2000), pp. 22-23. For example: UNEF-1 in Egypt (1956-1967), UNSF in West 
New Guinea (1962-1963), UNFICYP in Cyprus (1964-present), UNEF-2 in Egypt 
(1973-1979), UNDOF in the Golan Height between Syria and Israel (1974-present), 
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of non-intervention. Interventions within one of the super-powers’ hemisphere 
were especially inconceivable. Moreover, peace-keeping operations were not 
ambitious enough in their characteristics to provoke or challenge super-power 
interests. On a strategic, geo-political level, traditional peace-keeping focused on 
maintaining the balance between the Cold War super-powers. On a micro level, 
it focused on achieving and maintaining compliance with peace agreements 
between warring parties.91 
 
Not every peace operation conducted by the UN was of a “Westphalian” or 
peace-keeping nature, however. The UN undertook two peace enforcement 
operations at the opposite end of the spectrum: the Korean War in 1950 and the 
Congo mission in 1960. Within the Cold War context, these two operations 
could be viewed as anomalies in comparison with the vast majority of peace 
operations during that period.92 Unlike peace-keeping, peace enforcement 
operations are undertaken without the consent of (one) the parties involved and 
entail the explicit authorisation to use force by military forces to restore or 
maintain international peace and security.93 In addition to the restoration of peace 
and security, these operations could also focus on enforcing sanctions, defending 
the personnel of peace-keeping operations, providing physical protection to 
civilians in conflict zones, protecting humanitarian or facilitating activities and 
intervening in so-called internal conflicts.94 
2.4  Wider peace-keeping: second generation peace-keeping 
The end of the Cold War and the success of the UN-sanctioned operation 
Desert Storm in 1990-1991 fuelled the idea that the Security Council could play 
a more active role in international security affairs through UN-managed 
operations.95 The end of the Cold War also changed the nature of the conflicts 
that traditional peace-keepers faced.96 Whereas the traditional peace operations of 
the Cold War period, such as UNIFIL in Lebanon and UNFICYP in Cyprus, 
were limited to the deployment of an interposition force between consenting 
                                               
UNIFIL in Lebanon (1978-present), UNPREDEP in Macedonia (1995-1999), and UNO-
SOM in Somalia (1992-1993). 
91 Eide (2001), p. 6. 
92 In Korea the UN Security Council mandated the United Nations Command (UNC), a 
US-led coalition to enforce the withdrawal of North Korean troops from South Korea in 
order ‘to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area’ 
(UNSCR 83/S/1501 (1950). Available at http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/ 
1950/scres50.htm; accessed June 13, 2007. The UNC operation was made possible due to 
the temporary Soviet boycott of Security Council in the early 1950s. (Klep & Van Gils 
(2004), p. 403). The UN Operation in Congo (UNOC) was mandated to maintain law 
and order following decolonisation after Belgian rule. The disintegration of the security 
situation forced UNOC into a more enforcement role in order to defend Congo’s territo-
rial integrity (Hill & Malik (1996), pp. 37-41). 
93 Koninklijke Landmacht (1999), p. 17. 
94 Bellamy, Williams & Griffin (2004), p, 147. 
95 Hillen (2000), p. 139. 
96 Call & Barnett (2000), p. 48. 
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warring factions, the conflicts from the early 1990s onward were intra-state rather 
than inter-state. These internal conflicts, such as in the Balkans, Somalia and 
Chechnya, lacked clear front lines or cease-fire lines, they were complex and 
dynamic, involved many parties, and comprised not only military but also an 
increasing number of civilian and humanitarian aspects.97 
 
These conflicts revealed a gap between the Chapter VI and VII peace operations 
and confronted the international community with new challenges. According to 
Jakobsen, the ‘key problems with peace-keeping operations in the 1990s were 
caused by military weakness: the traditional principle of impartiality and the 
restrictive rules of engagement, which prevent troops from using force to protect 
civilians and to implement the mandate.’98 These new demands made traditional 
peace-keeping increasingly obsolete. The UN operations in Cambodia 
(UNTAC), former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), and Somalia (UNOSOM II) 
already represented a transformation in the pattern of UN peace operations, as 
they were significantly larger and more complex military enterprises than any of 
their traditional peace-keeping predecessors.99 
 
To deal with these new challenges, in 1992, then UN Secretary-General 
Boutros-Ghali released a conceptual framework, called An Agenda for Peace. In 
this framework, the UN recognised the gap between traditional peace-keeping 
and the complexity of the post-Cold War security demands and categorised four 
types of conflict intervention: preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace-
keeping, and peace-enforcement, which the UN regarded as interrelated 
concepts.100 The framework aired a plea for the establishment of an international 
rapid-reaction peace-enforcement capability to undertake more complex and 
robust UN military operations in order to ‘fill the gap between traditional UN 
peacekeeping units (…) and large-scale operations.’101 These peace-enforcement 
units ‘would have to be more heavily armed than peace-keeping forces and 
would need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their national 
forces. Deployment and operation of such forces would be under the 
authorisation of the Security Council and would, as in the case of peacekeeping 
forces, be under the command of the Secretary-General.102 
 
Despite the international post-Cold War optimism, and Boutros-Ghali’s attempts 
to give the UN an enduring prime role in international conflict resolution, the 
UN failed to do so. 
                                               
97 Hillen (2000), pp. 140-141. 
98 Jakobsen (2000), pp. 38-39. 
99 Hillen (2000), p. 142. 
100 In An Agenda for Peace peacekeeping was described as ‘the deployment of a United Nations 
military presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned (United 
Nations (1992), §20). However, An Agenda for Peace did not provide a definition for peace-
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First, ‘An Agenda for Peace did not provide a coherent blueprint or practical 
guidance needed to deal with the new peacekeeping challenges within 
environments of on-going conflict (…) and failed to provide a coherent blueprint 
for peacekeeping.’103 
Second, the UN did not succeed in fulfilling its ambitions to respond adequately 
to international crises and to conduct complex UN peace operations. For 
example, the UN showed unable to stop civil war, crimes against humanity, 
starvation, and/or ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda and 
Somalia. These missions failed not only because the prevailing concept of 
peacekeeping could no longer be applied to these kinds of complex crises, but 
also because of a lack of international political will to intervene, insufficient 
resources and funding, ambiguous rules of engagement and/or bad operational 
management.104 
 
In its position paper Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, the UN recognised these 
problems, emphasising that contemporary, complex intra-state conflicts were of 
another nature than the classical conflict that enabled peace-keeping solutions 
which ‘were mainly to monitor cease-fires and control buffer zones with the 
consent of the States involved.’105 It acknowledged that the UN had to downplay 
its role in leading large, complex, and sometimes coercive military peace 
operations and underlined that it did not hold the monopoly on conducting 
peace operations. It therefore needed the cooperation and support of member 
states, and regional and non-governmental organisations to achieve an integrated 
approach to conflict control and resolution.106 However, the paper itself did not 
provide a political and functional framework to close the gap between the two 
different kinds of UN peace operations.107 Nevertheless, it did open the way for 
others to find new solutions and arrangements to the prevailing security 
challenges. 
 
The UN retreat from their peace operations and the lack of a functional 
conceptual framework fuelled the debate over the definition and classification of 
post-Cold War crisis management operations during the mid-1990s. Various 
actors were involved in this debate, varying from national governments and 
governmental organisations to individual scholars. Solutions more-or-less 
materialised bottom-up, often referred to as “wider peacekeeping” or “second-
generation peacekeeping”.108 These terms had in common that they 
conceptualised the need for a more “robust” kind of peacekeeping.109 In 1992, 
                                               
103 Bellamy, Williams & Griffin (2004), p. 109. 
104 See for example: Bellamy, Williams & Griffin (2004), p. 180; Hillen (2000), p. 240; Klep & 
Van Gils (2004), p. 402; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall (2005), pp. 137-138. 
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Mackinley and Chopra introduced the term second-generation peacekeeping.110 
Since then, the term is widely accepted and has also become an official UN 
term.111 
 
Bellamy, Williams and Giffin further conceptualised the concept and identified 
six characteristics of wider peacekeeping operations. First, wider peacekeeping 
operations ‘occur within a context of on-going violence.’ Second, they ‘tend to 
take place during “new wars” rather than traditional inter state conflicts.’ Third, 
soldiers engaged in wider peacekeeping are given tasks beyond those of 
traditional peacekeeping, including the separation of forces, disarming the 
belligerents, organising and supervising elections, delivering humanitarian aid, 
protecting civilian UN personnel and those from other governmental and non-
governmental organisations, guaranteeing freedom of movement, host-state 
capacity building, monitoring ceasefires and enforcing no-fly zones.’ Fourth, they 
include a wide variety of civilian actors ‘that peace-keepers [have] to coordinate 
their activities with.’ Fifth, wider peace-keeping operations ‘have frequently 
changing mandates.’ Sixth and last, ‘there is a gap between means and ends. 
Although wider peace-keeping entails the adoption of more tasks by peace-
keepers, they are not accorded the necessary [resources] to accomplish those 
tasks.’112 
 
However, according to Bellamy, Williams and Giffin, wider peace-keeping still 
preserved the “holy trinity” of traditional peace-keeping, ‘including the notion of 
that the preservation of consent was a prerequisite for a successful mission.’113 As 
such, it maintained the clear line between peace-keeping and peace-enforcement. 
An operation therefore could not ‘move from wider peace-keeping to peace 
enforcement and back again.’114 As a result, wider peacekeeping obliged 
peacekeepers to remain impartial and to refrain from a more robust use of force 
to protect civilians when needed. That these restrictions had become obsolete 
within intra-state conflicts became painfully clear in 1995 during the fall of the 
so-called “safe area” of Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the ethnic 
cleansing and genocide in Rwanda in 1994 that since have become to symbolise 
the failure of wider peace-keeping. 
2.5  Peace support operations: third generation peace-keeping 
Background 
The failure of wider peace-keeping resulted in an international need to rethink 
the concept of UN peace operations in order to fill the grey area between peace-
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keeping and peace-enforcement. This was achieved by conceptualising a third 
concept of UN peace operation: “peace support operations”.115 This new 
concept created a fundamental shift in the thinking of peace operations. It 
resulted in the recognition of a need for a wider international inter-agency 
approach (…) in which the traditional trinity of consent, impartiality, and 
restrained use of force was being replaced by ‘a concept of campaign authority, 
vested in an international coalition or regional security alliance and derived from 
a mandate.’116 
 
The new concept was first set out in the Report of the Panel on United Nations 
Peace Operations, the so-called Brahimi Report from 2000. This report outlined a 
strategy for improving UN peace operations. The aim of the report was to avoid 
the failures of the past, for instance those in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in 
Rwanda. It made three specific recommendations that provided a framework for 
peace support operations.117 
First, the report underlines the need for clear, credible and achievable mandates: 
‘UN peacekeepers [must] be able to carry out their mandates professionally and 
successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components 
and the mission’s mandate with robust rules of engagement, against those who 
renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine 
it by violence.’118 Hereby the Brahimi report ‘increases the conceptual distance 
between neutrality and impartiality.’119 Bellamy, Williamson and Griffin further 
clarify this distance noting that ‘[w]hereas neutral peacekeepers play no political 
role whatsoever, impartial peacekeepers discriminate between belligerents 
according to their adherence to the mandate and treat breaches in similar 
ways.’120 In other words, the use of force does not challenge impartiality as long 
as this force is directed against specific breaches of the mandate and is linked to 
clearly defined outcomes.121 As a result, military peacekeepers must be able to 
move swiftly from traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement and vice versa, 
if required.122 
Second, in order to close the gap between ambitious goals and limited resources, 
‘the Security Council should leave in draft form resolutions authorising missions 
with sizeable troop levels until such time as the Secretary-General has firm 
commitments of troops and other critical mission support elements including 
peace-building elements, from Member States.’123 
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Third, the report recommended that future UN peace operations should have 
clear chains of command, especially when forces were deployed in potentially 
dangerous environments.124 
 
The UN’s formal answer to the Brahimi report followed in 2008 when it 
published its peacekeeping capstone doctrine.125 However, this doctrine does not 
recognise peace support operations as such. Instead, it presents the concept of 
“multidimensional peacekeeping” as a contemporary answer to the changed 
security environment since the end of the Cold War.126 In the view of the UN, 
multi-dimensional peace-keeping operations are ‘deployed in the dangerous 
aftermath of a violent internal conflict and may employ a mix of military, police 
and civilian capabilities to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace 
agreement.’ The UN notes that the prime objective of these operations is to 
create a secure and stable environment ‘with full respect for the rule of law and 
human rights.’127 With the concept of multi-dimensional peace-keeping 
operations, the UN intends to help filling the security gap in (post) conflict 
environments, for example by contributing to a wider process of ‘establishing 
legitimate and effective institutions of governance.’128 Finally, it offers a 
framework in which donor countries are able to coordinate their efforts within a 
comprehensive approach.129 
 
In general, multi-dimensional peace-keeping and peace support could be 
regarded as synonyms; however, they do not involve the same activities. The 
UN recognises that the ‘boundaries between conflict prevention, peace-making, 
peace-keeping, peace-building and peace enforcement have become blurred,130 
and ‘rarely occur in a linear or sequential way.’131 Nevertheless, the UN regards 
multidimensional peacekeeping as a separate activity among the other activities 
undertaken by the UN or other international organisations ‘to maintain interna-
tional peace and security throughout the world,’132 whereas peace support 
explicitly includes these activities. As such, multi-dimensional peace-keeping can 
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be regarded as a synonym to second generation peacekeeping rather than to 
peace support. 
 
Definition 
Although the UN does not define peace support operations, the international 
military community has widely adopted its concept and has, with variations, 
provided a doctrinal foundation for recent crisis management operations,133 such 
as the IFOR/SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the KFOR mission in 
Kosovo, and the INTERFET mission in East Timor.134 However, military 
literature does not provide a commonly agreed definition. 
 
NATO underlines the long-term character of peace support operations. The 
NATO doctrine defines a peace support operation as an ‘operation that 
impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit 
of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. 
Such operations may include conflict prevention, peace-making, peace-
enforcement, peacekeeping, peace-building and/or support to humanitarian 
assistance.’135 
 
US military doctrine does not recognise the term “peace support operation”. It 
rather uses the term “peace operations” which largely involve the same activities 
as included in NATO’s peace support operations: peacekeeping, peace-
enforcement, peace-making, peace-building, and conflict prevention efforts.’136 
According to the US doctrine, peace operations ‘encompasses multiagency and 
multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all 
instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress 
the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding 
and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance.’137 According to the US 
doctrine, peace operations are primarily conducted through the execution of 
“stability operations”.138 
 
The Dutch definition of peace support operations draws on the NATO 
definition. The Netherlands Defence Doctrine of 2005 defines a peace support 
operation as ‘an operation that is conducted with the objective of achieving a 
lasting political solution to a conflict and in which the deployed military force 
stands above the parties involved in the conflict. The force’s mandate is generally 
based on a UN resolution or a corresponding decision by another international 
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135 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2010), p. 1-5 
136 US Department of the Army – Headquarters (2008a), p. 2-8. 
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organisation, such as the OSCE.’139 In line with British and NATO doctrines, the 
Netherlands Defence Doctrine distinguishes between five peace support activities:140 
 
1. Conflict prevention: activities involving a range of diplomatic and military 
efforts, such as the identification of potential causes of conflict, the 
monitoring of conflict indicators and the early deployment of activities to 
prevent the development or the (re)emergence of a conflict between states or 
within a state. 
2. Peacekeeping: operations under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which are 
conducted after a peace agreement or cease-fire, have been agreed. They 
need the consent and compliance of the parties involved. 
3. Peace-enforcement: operations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which 
are conducted to restore peace between warring parties. These operations do 
not necessarily need the consent of the warring parties. Peace-enforcement 
operations can be intra- or inter-state and often involve the use or threat of 
force. 
4. Peace-building: activities conducted by civil organisations, if necessary with 
military support, to sustain a fragile peace after the settlement of an armed 
conflict. They include nation and institution building and establishing the 
rule of law.  
5. Humanitarian activities: activities such as the deployment of medical relief 
teams or aid to refugees or displaced persons. They can be conducted 
independently or as part of a peace support operation.141 
 
Peace Support as operational theme 
Today, peace support is defined as an “operational theme”142 or a “campaign 
theme”143 rather than as a separate operation.144 For example, like NATO, the 
NL Army doctrine Land Operations places peace support along with peacetime 
military engagement, security, and major combat at an ascending scale of conflict 
ranging from stable peace to general war.145 Within this spectrum of conflict, 
there are four campaign themes: “peace-time military engagement”, “peace  
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support”, “security” and “major combat”.146 The individual campaign themes are 
not monoliths as they increasingly overlap and merge and contain characteristics 
of other themes because of changing operational conditions or political guidelines 
(see Figure 2).147 The Dutch doctrine regards the operational themes container 
notions in which contemporary operations are deployed.148 In these operations, 
there is neither a clear distinction between the various levels of force nor a clear 
distinction between the various modes of military activity.149 As a result, the 
objective of the campaign theme “peace support” is not only focused on the 
return to a peaceful situation in a country or a region, for example through 
prevention, intervention and/or peace-building, but can also include peace-
enforcing (offensive activities) to fight and disrupt insurgents and/or warring 
parties.150 
 
 
Figure 2: Campaign themes within the spectrum of conflict (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (2013), p. 1-9). 
2.6  Counter-insurgency 
Introduction 
During the Cold War, Western armed forces primarily focused on preparation 
for conventional and large-scale military conflicts while during the 1990s they 
mainly engaged in peace operations. Throughout these years, counter-insurgency 
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received little or no attention from military commanders and planners.151 Since 
the early 2000s, counter-insurgency faced a revival in military thinking. Con-
fronted with irregular warfare, terrorist attacks, armed criminal gangs, and 
organised crime during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Western military 
forces had no effective or efficient answers to neutralise these threats and to win 
the hearts and minds of the population at the same time. Commanders in the 
field realised that that they could not achieve military success by conventional 
strategies. During these missions, they understood that they were conducting a 
counter-insurgency operation, which required a combination of hard power to 
fight the insurgents and soft power to support the population and to sustain 
reconstruction and development.152 
 
Doctrine 
The immediate need for answers and guidelines on the ground fuelled debates 
between military experts and initiated the development of new doctrines, which 
is still evolving. Between the military doctrines of, for example, the United 
States, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and NATO there is not yet a 
consensus of how to situate counter-insurgency within the spectrum of conflict. 
In fact, this lack of consensus does not provide a lot of clarity on the status of 
counter-insurgency in relationship to other types of military activity and 
operations, which may lead to some confusion. Like NATO, the NL Army 
doctrine regards counter-insurgency as part of the campaign theme “security”.153 
The British doctrine describes counter-insurgency as a subset of counter-irregular 
activity,154 while the US doctrine considers counter-insurgency as a subset of 
irregular warfare.155 How these two doctrines relate counter-insurgency to stability 
operations is, however, confusing. The British Army doctrine Countering Insurgency 
places a counter-insurgency operation ‘within the three major sectors of a 
stabilisation campaign: governance, security and development.’ The contribution of 
counter-insurgency in a stabilisation campaign then depends on the scale of the 
insurgency and could therefore vary in size as the campaign develops.156 As such, in 
the British doctrine counter-insurgency is a subset of a stabilisation campaign. The 
US doctrine Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency, on the other hand, describes 
counter-insurgency as ‘a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability 
operations,’157 which implies that a counter-insurgency campaign involves a full-
spectrum operation, of which a stabilisation campaign is then a subset.158 
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Despite conceptual differences, there is some common understanding regarding 
its definition. The US military doctrine defines counter-insurgency as ‘military, 
paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a 
government to defeat insurgency.’159 The definition used by NATO is quite 
similar as it defines counter-insurgency as ‘the set of political, economic, social, 
military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities with the aim to 
defeat insurgency and address any core grievances.’160 This definition differs from 
the American version by changing the word “paramilitary” into “law enforce-
ment” and adding the importance of addressing the primary problems of 
insurgency and underlining its multifaceted background. The definition used in 
the British doctrine largely follows that of NATO as it describes counter-
insurgency as ‘military, law enforcement, political, economic, psychological and 
civic actions taken to defeat insurgency, while addressing the root causes’161 The 
NL Army does not provide a definition of counter-insurgency of its own. Nor 
has it produced a separate counter-insurgency doctrine. Instead, it adopted 
NATO’s counter-insurgency doctrine as its own leading concept.162 
 
Classic principles 
Counter-insurgency theory has a long history. Contemporary counter-insurgency 
principles are largely based upon the lessons learned of British and French colonial 
counter-insurgency campaigns during the 1950s and 1960s. In particular, the 
influence of the British military officers Robert Thompson and Frank Kitson, and 
the French military officer, diplomat and scholar David Galula has been notice-
able.163 Their views show some common principles. 
 
Thompson and Galula for example both point at the importance of focusing 
counter-insurgency operations on the security of the civilian population in order to 
assure popular support. The counterinsurgents should prioritise the protection of 
the population, for example, by separating civilians from insurgents and restraining 
the use of force in order to prevent popular resentment and the creation of 
martyrs.164 
 
Next, Thompson and Galula prioritise the achievement of political objectives in 
counter-insurgency operations.165 Galula for example notes that counter-
insurgency is ‘20 percent military action and 80 percent political.’166 Military 
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action is therefore secondary to political, which means that “political action 
remains foremost throughout the war” and “every military move has to be 
weighed with regard to its political effects, and vice versa.”167 
 
Thompson and Galula also emphasise the need for unity of effort, or a compre-
hensive approach towards the resolution of insurgency, involving a multifaceted 
approach that addresses the political, economic, social, cultural, and security 
dimensions of the root causes of the insurgency. They also argue that successful 
counter-insurgency requires a long-term political and military commitment. 
Therefore, counterinsurgents need to understand their environment, engage in 
the local communities they secure and build networks.168 For that purpose, 
Galula suggests that counter-insurgency forces must live among the population 
on a 24/7 basis: ‘The units must be deployed where the population actually lives 
and not in positions deemed to possess a military value.’169 
 
Kitson and Galula underline that counter-insurgency is all about gathering 
intelligence and creating a solid information position.170 Intelligence requires a 
good understanding of the environment and a good relationship with the local 
population. If the counterinsurgent wants the population to share information, they 
have to make sure that the population feels protected, as Galula notes.171 Kitson 
also suggests that a counter-insurgency force should explicitly organise for 
intelligence activities. He underlines that the military should reinforce its intelli-
gence organisation at all levels in conducting ‘operations designed to develop 
information by special means’. He also stresses the importance of linguists in 
developing an in-depth understanding of the local situation and problems.172 
 
Finally, Kitson and Galula point at the importance of organisational change. They 
argue that armies should reform their structure, capabilities and training in order 
to adapt to the requirements of low-intensity conflict. Therefore, they recom-
mend the establishment of specialised units trained and equipped for counter-
insurgency.173 They also underline that these units should be able to take on 
civilian tasks.174 Galula argues that ‘to confine soldiers [in a counter-insurgency 
campaign] to purely military functions while urgent and vital tasks have to be 
done and nobody else is available to undertake them would be senseless.’ 
Therefore, he adds, ‘the soldier must then be prepared to become a propagandist, 
a social worker, a civil engineer, a school teacher, a nurse, a boy scout.’175 In line 
with Galula, Kitson underlines that counterinsurgents must be prepared to 
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perform civilian tasks effectively, arguing that officers not only need command 
their soldiers, but also to direct the activities of local police officers.176 
 
Contemporary views 
In addition to the classic views on counter-insurgency, contemporary doctrines also 
adopted lessons learned from recent experiences, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan.177 
 
One of these principles is the use of an appropriate level of force. Like in peace 
operations, the principle of minimum use of force has become a central value to 
gain and maintain popular support.178 According to Aylwin-Foster, a counter-
insurgency force must have two skills not required for conventional war fighting. 
First, issues and action have to be addressed from the perspective of the local 
population. Second, the relative value of force has to be understood and that 
excessive force can undermine popular support.179 As a result, in counter-
insurgency operations, defeating the opponent is not the central goal. Instead, the 
military should focus on the elimination of the root causes of the conflict in order 
to establish long-term stability and peace.180 The US doctrine therefore under-
lines that in counter-insurgency it is important to adopt levels of force appropri-
ate to accomplish the mission without causing unnecessary loss of life or 
suffering, or collateral damage: ‘Sometimes, the more force is used, the less 
effective it is.’ Using substantial force not only risks the loss of popular support, it 
also ‘increases the opportunity for insurgent propaganda to portray lethal military 
activities as brutal.’ 181 ‘Having a cup of tea with the locals seems to be less heroic 
than an armoured patrol but is often much more effective.’182 On the other hand, 
restrained force does not only enhance popular support, it may also increase 
troop vulnerability. According to Baker this must be seen as a short-term risk, 
which pays off in the long term in order to isolate the population from the 
insurgents.183 However, restrained use of force does not imply that fighting and 
elimination of insurgents will not be necessary. Kinetic action will remain a 
substantial element of counter-insurgency.184 In this regard, counter-insurgency 
differs from classical peacekeeping operations in which kinetic action is only 
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allowed in terms of self-defence while in counter-insurgency, force is sometimes 
a necessary option to achieve a military goal.185 
 
“Learn and adapt” is another principle in contemporary counter-insurgency 
doctrines.186 The US doctrine emphasises that ‘an effective counterinsurgent 
force is a learning organisation.’187 It regards the process of learning and adapta-
tion to be an ongoing process being a continuous race between the insurgent and 
counterinsurgent. The actor who has the fastest cycle of adaptation will ulti-
mately win the campaign.188 In counter-insurgency “learn and adapt” is not 
limited to tactical operations or the tactical level. It applies to all echelons of the 
military organisation, from the individual to the institutional level, as both the 
British and US counter-insurgency doctrines underline.189 In counter-insurgency, 
all parts of the military organisation require an effective learn and adapt mecha-
nism, and a mind-set to select, implement and institutionalise best practices.190 As 
such, learning and adapting, in counter-insurgency, implies institutional change. 
As Petraeus notes, counter-insurgency requires flexible and adaptable command-
ers who are able to innovate and take risks in order to achieve change.191 Military 
organisations are ‘inherently conservative organisations, however, and cautious 
about change,’ especially when it affects its structure and dominant culture.192 
Nagl also notes that ‘military organisations often demonstrate a remarkable 
resistance to doctrinal change because of their organisational cultures.’193 He adds 
that this is especially true if the dominant culture is attuned to conventional 
warfare: ‘an organisation optimised to succeed in one [kind of warfare] will have 
great difficulty in fighting the other.’194 “Learn and adapt” may therefore be the 
most difficult principle to incorporate as it challenges the very basis of the 
military’s organisational cultures.195 
 
A final contemporary principle involves the empowerment of the tactical level. 
Several experts emphasise that counter-insurgency requires a decentralised approach 
and tactical flexibility to find local solutions to local problems.196 Counter-
insurgency is basically a ‘corporal’s and a subaltern’s war’ in which junior officers 
and non-commissioned officers need discretion to take ‘appropriate action in the 
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field without asking up the chain of command.’197 The US doctrine also 
emphasises that in counter-insurgency operations ‘many important decisions are 
not made by generals’ but require the competence and judgment of soldiers at all 
levels.198 According to Petraeus, ‘the strategic corporals and strategic lieutenants’ 
will often take decisions with strategic consequences leading to success.199 Counter-
insurgency operations are thus vertically integrated operations. Efforts at the lowest 
organisational level are a condition for the success of the overall mission.200 
2.7  Stabilisation activities 
Introduction 
Stabilisation activities can also be seen as an example of crisis management 
operation as they primarily focus on deploying political, military and civil action 
to prevent or resolve an (armed) conflict. The doctrinal development on 
stabilisation activities is still young. The US military published its first doctrine in 
2008 followed by the military doctrines of the United Kingdom in 2009 and the 
Netherlands in 2009 and 2014. 
 
US Doctrine 
Traditionally, the US government has been hesitant to deploy soldiers for 
stabilisation operations. In their view, soldiers must be trained and equipped to 
fight high-intensity wars and offensive operations to achieve quick military 
victories, with overwhelming force, with as few friendly casualties as possible in 
order to free manpower and resources for future operations.201 As a result, peace 
operations and stability operations were seen as secondary to combat operations 
because they could distract the military from their primary task of fighting 
wars.202 However, the difficulties to provide a safe and secure environment in 
Iraq and Afghanistan created a need to develop a different military approach to 
achieve enduring peace and stability in conflict environments.203 The US Army 
‘recognized that shaping the civil situation through stability operations is often 
more important to lasting success than winning battles and engagements,’ as 
Caldwell and Leonard point out.204 
 
In 2008, two publications were published that underlined the increasing 
importance of stabilisation operations. 
The first involved the US “capstone doctrine” FM 3-0 Operations, which 
explicitly elevated stability operations to being of equal importance to offensive 
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and defensive operations. This doctrine gave stability operations equal leverage to 
combat operations. Stability operations have since become an integral part of 
“full spectrum operations”. These “full spectrum operations” are at the core of 
US Army doctrine.205 In these operations, US Army forces are supposed to 
‘combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultane-
ously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the 
initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive 
results.’206 While offensive and defensive operations emphasise the employment 
of (lethal) combat power to defeat the enemy,207 stability operations shape the 
conditions ‘to establish a safe and secure environment’; ‘facilitate reconciliation 
among former adversaries’; ‘establish political, legal, social, and economic 
institutions; and facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civil 
authority.’208 
The second publication involved FM 3-07 Stabilization Operations, which further 
specified the doctrinal guidance concerning stabilisation operations.209 The 
doctrine defines stability operations as operations that ‘encompass various military 
missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination 
with other instruments of national power to maintain or re-establish a safe and 
secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency 
infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.’210 
 
These doctrines involve a fundamental change of paradigm in US soldiering. 
They not only elevate stability operations to equal importance with offensive and 
defensive operations; they also underpin the importance of a comprehensive 
approach towards establishing security; justice and reconciliation; humanitarian 
and social well-being; governance and participation; and economic stabilisation 
and infrastructure.211 The rationale of the comprehensive approach is that the 
solution of modern conflicts involves a long-term endeavour in which various 
(international) governmental, non-governmental organisations and private 
companies cooperate to ‘support a host-nation government or a transitional civil 
or military authority when no legitimate, functioning host-nation government 
exists.’212 Military forces are then supposed to establish, restore or provide basic 
civil functions ‘until a civil authority or the host nation is capable of providing 
these services.’213 As such, stabilisation operations involve the performance of 
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public security duties in case a host nation fails to do so. These tasks include a 
wide range of activities, such as the protecting of civilians, law enforcement, 
public order maintenance, crowd control, and the securing of critical infrastruc-
ture.214 It also involves “security force assistance” which falls under the umbrella 
of security sector reform and which focuses on building and training local 
security forces.215 This means that, if needed, the US military can be assigned to 
interim policing duties in order to establish, restore or provide public security if 
local security forces fail to do so.216 
 
British doctrine 
In 2009, the UK Defence Forces published their first joint doctrine on stability 
operations, called Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution. The doctrine 
underlines that the development of stabilisation theory is still evolving and has yet 
not fully materialised.217 The doctrine therefore notes that the British military is 
currently not yet fully structured, equipped and trained to provide the full range 
of stabilisation tasks and emphasises that the armed forces have to adapt to the 
new situational requirements and need to include new qualities and capabilities 
that that go beyond the classical characteristics of the military.218 
 
The British doctrine defines stabilisation as a process that involves a wide range of 
military and non-military activities to support ‘states which are entering, 
enduring or emerging from conflict, in order to prevent or reduce violence, 
protect the population and key infrastructure, promote political processes and 
governance structures [necessary for] a political settlement that institutionalises 
non-violent contests for power and prepares for sustainable social and economic 
development.’219 To achieve this, the British doctrine discerns three major 
stability activities: “building human and national security”, “stimulating eco-
nomic and infrastructure development”, and “fostering host-government capacity 
and legitimacy”.220 The doctrine regards “building human and national security” 
primarily as a military responsibility in order to shape the conditions for the 
wider, civilian stabilisation efforts.221 The other activities are largely civilian. 
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Nevertheless, the doctrine stipulates that all activities require an integrated, 
comprehensive approach of both civilian and military organisations and institu-
tions to achieve the desired end-goal.222 
 
Dutch doctrine 
The Dutch military does not (yet) have dedicated doctrine on stability opera-
tions, although it has established a relevant body of expertise during recent crisis 
management missions. The 2009 Land Doctrine Publicatie 1: Militaire Doctrine voor 
Landoperaties (Land Doctrine Publication 1: Military Doctrine for Land Action) 
and the 2014 Doctrine Publicatie 3.2: Landoperaties (Doctrine Publication 3.2: Land 
Operations) provide some general guidelines on this subject, which are largely 
based upon NATO’s classification and interpretation of stability activities.223 
 
Like NATO, the NL Army does not regard stabilisation as an independent 
operation, but rather as an activity at the tactical level that could occur in one 
single military operation possibly in combination with offensive, defensive, and 
enabling activities.224 These four activities may occur simultaneously or subse-
quently in one single operation whereby kinetic and non-kinetic activities 
alternate with each other or occur in parallel at some moment in time.225 Like 
NATO, the Dutch doctrine discerns four clusters of stability activities: “security 
and control”; “support to Security Sector Reform”; “initial restoration of 
services”; and “support to initial governance”.226 During “stability and control”, 
the military focus on achieving a stable and secure environment in order to 
enable civilian initiatives and activities for reconstruction and development. 
Although the doctrine underlines that if local security forces are not available or 
unable to take on their responsibilities, the (international) military may have to 
deploy security and control activities in order to achieve a basic level of secu-
rity,227 it does not explicitly mention the option of interim policing when local 
security forces are not available. The doctrine rather focuses on providing public 
security through Security Sector Reform, which means that the NL Army 
prioritises the (re)establishment of the local security sector above interim 
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policing. As such, the Dutch doctrine fails to conceptualise how public security 
could be achieved in case of a security gap. 
The Dutch doctrine also regards stabilisation as a comprehensive, multi-agency 
approach.228 The four stabilisation activities thus have a hybrid character and 
require both military and civilian involvement, although the level of this 
involvement may differ from situation to situation and activity to activity. For 
example, activities in the field of “stability and control” and “support to Security 
Sector Reform” are in majority military based while initial restoration of services; 
and support for initial governance activities are basically civilian in which the 
military can only fulfil a supportive role.229 Nevertheless, as the doctrine 
underlines, all four stabilisation activities require close cooperation and coordina-
tion with various organisations and agencies, both local and international and 
governmental and non-governmental, in order to create the conditions necessary 
for development and reconstruction.230 The Dutch doctrine finally stipulates that 
the execution of stabilisation activities must not be seen as a military specialisa-
tion: every military unit must be able to plan, prepare and deploy them. This 
implies that the military need to train and equip for these activities already in 
advance of an operation so that troops are able to deploy them immediately after 
an initial entry or as a follow-up to a defensive or offensive activity.231 
2.8  Conclusions 
After the end of the Cold War, the character of UN peace operations changed 
significantly. Conflicts in the early 1990s, like those in the Balkans and in 
Somalia, revealed that traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping operations, in which 
peacekeepers were supposed to take on an impartial role and were assigned to 
separate belligerents or monitor a UN sanctioned cease-fire, had become 
obsolete. Since the 1990s, conflicts now have an intra--state rather than inter-
state character. These conflicts are often too complex and dynamic to be solved 
by cease-fires and by separating warring parties along clear demarcation lines. As 
such, the post-Cold War conflict has become a “war amongst the people”.232 
 
As a result, in contemporary crisis management operations there are no strict 
dividing lines between offensive, defensive and stability activities. In fact, these 
activities increasingly overlap and blur. Crisis management operations have 
therefore developed into a “comprehensive approach” in which organisations 
and agencies, international and national; governmental and non-governmental; 
and civil and military cooperate to achieve a common political goal. In this 
approach the military contribution may vary from civil support to civilian 
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institutions and organisation to offensive activities to combat military opponents 
or insurgents which provides military commanders the options to respond in a 
more flexible or even robust way to breaches of a peace agreement or UN 
Security Council resolution. 
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3  Security gap 
3.1  Introduction 
As soon as a regional or internal armed conflict has ended, one of the top 
priorities is to break the cycle of impunity and violence and to provide a basic 
level of public security.233 The need for immediate public security ‘is the lesson 
of recent international interventions,’ as Kaldor notes.234 Another reason for 
establishing stability and public security as soon as possible is that these needs are 
key determinants for short-term reconstruction of basic infrastructure and public 
services, and long-term nation-building and social and economic development.235 
Public security should therefore be established in what is called the “golden 
hour”.236 The “golden hour” is the ‘timeframe of several weeks to several 
months, during which external intervention may enjoy some popular support and 
international legitimacy, and when potential spoilers may have insufficient time 
to organise.’237 The “golden hour” is especially important to prevent conflict 
escalating into a widespread insurgency.238 
 
In case an international coalition has ended an internal armed conflict and 
removed the local authorities from power, the coalition becomes de facto 
responsible for providing public security and for maintaining law and order from 
day one.239 This often faces the international community with a dilemma. Ideally, 
there is a clear division of tasks and responsibilities between an international 
military and the police, either local or international. The international military 
will then be responsible for establishing overall security and stability,240 whereas 
the police are responsible for providing law enforcement and public order.241 
However, the provision of public security in (post) conflict environments is often 
problematic. There is often no clear division between conflict and peace; and 
violence tends to continue after a cease-fire.242 The availability of (automatic) 
firearms is often a common feature and people have become accustomed to using 
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them. Being disposed to lawlessness and violence, people may lack the moral 
threshold to refrain from it. It is also possible that the police are part of or the 
source of the problem, for example if they are closely tied to criminal gangs or 
warring parties and can be seen as politically, ethnically or religiously biased.243 
 
In terms of criminality, Hansen discerns four different types of crime that may 
occur in a (post) conflict area (see  Table 1). These can be divided into “political 
or non-political” and “individual or collective” crimes. On the “individual-
political” divide, there is ethnically or politically-motivated harassment. These 
crimes can also relate to acts of retaliation because of unmet grievances from the 
conflict. At the “collective–political” divide, there is politically motivated 
terrorism and insurgency, which in the worst case could result in a renewed 
outbreak of hostilities. At the “individual–non-political” divide, there is petty 
crime, such as theft, black marketing, corruption, muggings, kidnappings, and/or 
rape. These types of crime are often committed by opportunists who take 
advantage of the existing power and security gap. Finally, at the “collective–non-
political” divide there is organised crime, which is mostly trans-national and 
deeply rooted in the structures of society. 
 
Table1: Types of crime in (post) conflict societies (Hansen (2000b), p. 91) 
 
Hansen notes that these four types of crime are often related and blur into one 
another. For example, terrorist groups often finance their political activities 
through organised crime and criminal organisations often have political links.244 
 
In terms of public order, (post) conflict environments often suffer from wide-
spread social disorder and chaos. Public order ‘implies a degree of predictability, 
regularity and stability to social and political relationships, institutions and 
behaviours,’ as Hills notes.245 Ideally, public order refers to arrangements that 
ensure that each element in the political and social equilibrium is in balance and 
that each element exercises its proper function. In case of a (post) conflict society, 
the equilibrium fails to exist and the absence of agreed rules could result in public 
disorder,246 notably public quarrels, (political) gatherings and rallies, protests and 
demonstrations, violation of curfews, looting and riots. 
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Motivation 
Manner of organisation 
Individual Collective 
Political Politically or ethnically 
motivated 
Terrorism/insurgency 
Non-Political Petty crime (Transnational) 
organised crime 
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The local police are often unable to solve these problems effectively. The local 
security infrastructure (police, justice, and penal system, etc.) has often disinte-
grated or has lost their legitimacy. The police are often ill trained and poorly 
equipped and may even have criminal offenders in their ranks.247 Police officers 
may even have taken active part in the conflict against parts of the population.248 
In such cases, the local police do not receive the trust and respect of the 
population.249 Therefore, as Bayley notes, an intervening coalition ‘must be 
prepared to provide some interim police presence.’250 He argues that ‘it is 
irresponsible, even immoral, to intervene militarily to stop conflict and then not 
to use that presence to protect the public after initial pacification.’251 A preferable 
alternative to replacing or assisting the local police is an early deployment of 
international police officers.252 However, the implementation of such an 
alternative is not always feasible. International police are either not available in 
sufficient numbers and qualities at short notice or the security situation in the 
crisis area may be too dangerous for civilian police to function properly.253 
 
As a result, crisis management operations often face a so called “security gap”. 
Although each security gap is different,254 since the 1990s, a security gap ‘has 
been one of the few constants’ in international crisis management operations.255 
The phenomenon of a security gap has been introduced and conceptualised by 
Michael Dziedzic. In 1998, he published a conceptual framework to analyse 
disorder problems during crisis management operations. In this framework, he 
divides the security gap into three separate gaps: the deployment gap, the 
enforcement gap and the institutional gap (see Figure 3). Although these gaps can 
be seen as subsequent phases, they often overlap or even occur in parallel.256 
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Figure 3: Security gap (Dziedzic (1998), p. 16) 
 
This chapter discusses the characteristics of the security gap. It describes and 
explains the backgrounds and manifestations of the various security gaps. It 
discusses the role the military could play in overcoming these gaps. As such, this 
chapter answers the study’s third sub-question.  
 
This chapter has four sections. The first section presents an overview of public 
security tasks the military may have to provide during a security gap. The second 
section describes the deployment gap, while the third and fourth deal with the 
enforcement gap and the institutional gap. The chapter ends with conclusions. 
3.1.1  Public security tasks in a security gap 
The execution of the police function during a security gap brings with it certain 
tasks that are critical to establish basic public security. Law enforcement, for 
example, involves criminal investigations and the collection of evidence (e.g. in 
relationship to war crimes), the execution of high-risk search operations, arrest 
and detention of key criminal offenders; combating of political violence and 
extremism, as well as protection of high-value persons and witnesses. Public 
order maintenance may involve street patrolling in urban areas, managing public 
gatherings, providing crowd and riot control, ensuring free movement of the 
population, and protection of high-value facilities to prevent looting or 
destruction. Public assistance, finally, may involve the provision and facilitation of  
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humanitarian aid and the resolution of community problems.257 Because the 
provision of public security by the international community can only be a 
temporary solution, a public security gap requires institutional reform of local 
police forces. Security Sector Reform (SSR) therefore can be seen as the fourth 
function within the framework of public security provided by the international 
community during crisis management operations. Tasks within the framework of 
SSR are, for example, vetting recruits, and training, advising and mentoring local 
police forces.258 
3.2  Deployment gap 
3.2.1  Background 
Closing the security gap is under normal circumstances a responsibility of the 
local authorities and police.259 However, they commonly lack the authority, 
capacity, motivation and discipline to cope with public security effectively in 
(post) conflict situations.260 The police, for example, may either not be available, 
such as in Kosovo where Serbian police withdrew after KFOR forces took 
control;261 or may be distrusted by parts of the population, such as in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina where the police were divided along ethnic lines.262 Under these 
circumstances, continued and significant use of a distrusted police force could 
undermine international efforts to establish the rule of law and police reform.263 
The choice of the international community is then either to reform the previous 
force or to create a completely new police force, possibly keeping the old one as 
an interim solution. In most cases, the choice has been for the latter.264 
 
However, reforming and training of local police is not a short-term solution to 
solve the public security gap. It takes months, if not years, to build or reform 
police organisations and to recruit, vet, and train credible police officers for the 
job.265 Perito subscribes to the view that the establishment of a professional police 
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force is a process that requires a long-term investment and commitment: ‘Police 
training is a resource-intensive process that takes at least five years under optimal 
conditions and requires civilian experts with specialised skills and extensive 
foreign experience. Attempts to rush the training of local police forces and to put 
“uniforms on the street” inevitably fail to meet either the short-term need for 
immediate security or the long-term requirement for professional law 
enforcement personnel.’266 
 
In addition, successful police reforms not only involve police reform in itself; it 
also ‘requires transforming the relationship between police institutions and 
society.’267 In Bosnia and Herzegovina by 2004, nine years after the Dayton 
Agreement, the overall structure of policing still prevented the police from 
operating effectively and efficiently.268 The police were still divided along ethnic 
and political lines and did not work within a single legal framework, resulting in 
a ‘fragmented and ineffective system of law enforcement.’269 In Kosovo, the 
establishment of a Kosovo Police Service (KPS) took at least five years to replace 
the UN Police and become responsible for providing ‘an indigenous, multi-
ethnic, and professional police force, operating under democratic principles and 
representing the community in terms of ethnic and gender proportions.270 In 
Iraq, a security gap arose because the Coalition failed to prioritise the reform of 
the police immediately after the defeat of Saddam Hussein. This delayed the 
professionalisation and modernisation of the police for several years, which – 
among other causes – contributed to the emergence of large-scale criminality and 
disorder.271 
 
If the local police have become dysfunctional and unable to protect all groups 
and individuals in society and to enforce the law effectively and impartially, the 
alternative is to deploy international police to replace, assist, monitor and/or train 
the local police. Because public security is a problem in most crisis management 
operations, the involvement of civilian police in international crisis management 
operations has increased significantly since the end of the Cold War. The first 
post-Cold War international police operation was the United Nations Transition 
Assistance Group (UNTAG) mission in Namibia in 1989-1990.272 During this 
mission, approximately 1,500 international police officers deployed to monitor 
the South West African Police (SWAPOL).273 Ever since, the number of 
international police deployed in crisis management operations has increased 
considerably.274 
                                               
266 Perito (2005), p. 2. 
267 Call (2007a), p. 387. 
268 Doyle (2007), p. 246. 
269 Doyle (2007), p. 246. 
270 Rausch (2007), p. 294. 
271 Jones, Wilson, Rathmell & Riley (2005), pp. 110-111; Perito (2005), p. 10. 
272 Hansen (2002b), p. 17. 
273 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untagFT.htm#Structure; accessed 
May 16, 2011. 
274 On January 2011, for example, the UN had dispatched up to 14,377 international police in 
thirteen different missions (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ contributors/ docu 
56
SECURITY GAP 
 
 
However, the deployment of international police in most crisis management 
operations has been slow and problematic. Dziedzic defined this phenomenon as 
the “deployment gap”, which is the lag time between the arrival of international 
military and the international police.275 As such, a deployment gap results from 
unsynchronised reaction and deployment times.276 
3.2.2  Nature of the deployment gap 
In general, there are two reasons for the development of a deployment gap. 
First, a deployment gap can be of quantitative nature. Whereas the military has 
the capacity to deploy soldiers rapidly for crisis management operations in other 
countries, the police, almost by definition, have not.277 Police officers are 
employed in their domestic capacity at all times and cannot be spared easily for 
periods of several months.278 Most Western countries are therefore reluctant to 
deploy police abroad, especially if they are already short-handed due to increasing 
domestic public security demands.279 In addition, countries do not tend to 
recruit, train, or hold large numbers of police officers in reserve for international 
police missions.280 Governments also have to rely on volunteers since they 
normally cannot order police officers to deploy in (post) conflict environments 
abroad.281 Finally, donor governments could perceive the security situation on 
the ground as too dynamic, which prevents them from deploying their (un-
armed) international police officers until the international military has created a 
relatively secure environment.282 As a result, sufficient numbers of police officers 
are rarely available at the outset of an operation.283 On average, it takes almost a 
year to build up and deploy an international police force after a conflict has 
ended.284 
Second, a deployment gap can also be of qualitative nature. On several occasions, 
donor countries have seconded international police officers unqualified for the 
job because they were unable to meet the formal UN recruitment standards.285 
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Call and Barnett add that even if ‘personnel are perfectly adequate police officers 
in their countries of origin, they often fail to meet the multiple requirements for 
the mission.’286 For example, they `may lack the basic policing and language skills 
to work and communicate in a country with a different culture.287 Language 
problems are by far the most compelling. Although the UN requires that 
international police officers must be able to communicate in the official mission 
language, this requirement is not always met.288 In addition, the ability to work 
in a multicultural environment is sometimes neglected and puts a heavy burden 
on the intra-organisational cooperation. Occasionally, during police missions, 
international police officers from various nationalities and cultures work together 
within the same police station, all bringing in their own agendas, policing 
traditions, work ethics, religious beliefs, eating habits etc.; all potential causes of 
cultural and professional tensions.289 The deficit of professional policing and 
intercultural skills of some personnel deployed in international police missions 
can have a devastating effect on the operation as a whole.290 The UN therefore 
established a more stringent selection process including interviews, pre-
deployment assessment and language tests.291 
 
The deployment gap has become a likely feature of international police missions. 
In Cambodia, the deployment of the UNTAC Police did not reach full strength 
until approximately nine months after the formal start of mission,292 which 
seriously affected the effectiveness and credibility of the overall mission.293 In 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, IPTF suffered from initial delays in deployments of 
police personnel after the implementation of the Dayton Accords in December 
1995. It was not until April 30, 1996 that the UN Secretary General declared the 
IPTF as operational and it took until September 1996 to reach its full strength of 
approximately 1,700 police officers.294 The initial deficit of international police 
resulted for example in the inability of the international community to intervene 
when militant Serbs forcefully evicted Serbian occupants from their 
neighbourhoods within Muslim territory to the Republika Srpska and looted and 
burned their apartments.295 In Kosovo, inadequate staffing of the police force of 
the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMiK) also constrained the 
effectiveness of the police mission during its first year. Until May 2000, almost a 
year after the deployment of KFOR, UNMiK Police had only reached a 
deployment of 75 percent in strength.296 The understaffing undermined the 
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credibility of the UNMiK Police as they were unable to meet the security 
demands of the local population regarding the level of crime on the streets.297 
3.2.3  Initiatives to bridge the deployment gap 
To prevent or overcome a deployment gap, several governmental institutions or 
international security experts have presented initiatives to increase the availability 
of international police capacities suited for deployment in the early stages of an 
international crisis management operation.298 
 
In 2000, the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations presented the Brahimi 
Report in which it presented a ‘clear set of specific, concrete and practical 
recommendations’ to improve the UN’s performance in those operations. The 
report also looked at improving the deployment of the of UN police. It 
recommended that each member state would ‘establish a national pool of civilian 
police officers that would be ready for deployment to UN peace operations on 
short notice, within the context of the UN standby arrangements.’299 The report 
also recommended to create an ‘on-call list of about 100 police officers (…) to be 
available on seven days notice’ which could serve as a pool from which the UN 
police component of a new peacekeeping operation could be assembled.300 This 
recommendation was met in 2004, when the UN General Assembly approved 
the establishment of a UN Standing Police Capacity (UNSPC) of 50 to 100 
officers. As of October 2007, the UNSPC had become operational.301 
 
                                               
297 Hartz, Mercean & Williamson (2005), p. 169. 
298 See for example: Langille (2002); Smith, Holt & Durch (2006); Solana (1997); United 
Nations (2000b), §86-91; United Nations (2001), §132-139; Wilton Park Conference 
(2004). 
 The Dutch government endorsed the idea of a UN Standby Police Force too. See for 
example the address of Minister of Defence J.J.C. Voorhoeve at the Seminar on UN 
Peacekeeping Operations. Improving UN Peacekeeping Operations. A Proposal for a UN Standby 
Police Force. New York, November 17, 1997; In May 1998 the Netherlands took further 
steps on this issue and drafted a proposal to establish a UN Standby Police Force within the 
UN Standby Arrangements System. The Dutch proposal was presented to Argentina, 
Ghana, Ireland, Pakistan and Portugal to reach a broad geographical representation. The 
idea was to create a capacity of at least half a dozen nations that would add up to a total of a 
few hundred police officers with basic training in post-conflict peace support and monitor-
ing duties. The standby force would preferably consist of various types of police, ranging 
from regular civilian police officers to gendarmerie-type forces. (Ministerie van Defensie, 
Directie Algemene Beleidszaken (1998). Oproepbare vn-politiemacht. Nota D98/578, 28 ok-
tober 1998. Den Haag: Ministerie van Defensie). In the end, however, this Dutch initiative 
failed. 
299 UN General Assembly & Security Council (2000), p. 21. 
300 UN General Assembly & Security Council (2000), p. 21. 
301 Following the earthquake in Haiti in early 2010, the UN was able to deploy half of the 
SPC to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) within the time-
frame of one week  
         (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/capacity.shtml; accessed March 18, 
2011). 
59
BEYOND BORDERS 
The EU also initiated a sort of standby arrangement for civilian police personnel. 
During a European Council Meeting in 2000, EU Member States decided to 
‘provide up to 5,000 police officers for international missions across the range of 
conflict prevention and crisis management operations,’ of which 1,000 police  
officers should be deployable within 30 days.302 
 
However, none of these initiatives or recommendations has yet resulted in a final 
or viable solution in order to deploy international police on short notice in an 
emerging security gap. 
The UN, for example, still does not have a large standing force of qualified and 
trained police and law enforcement officers in either form, despite the police 
officers seconded to the UNSPC.303 It not only does not have the ability to 
recruit forces without Security Council authorisation and the cooperation of 
donor countries.304 Therefore, planning, organising, mobilising and deploying a 
UN police force continues to be a challenge as ‘the demand for skilled police 
personnel to implement the mandates of contemporary crisis management 
operations in public-security sector reform, re-establishment of the rule of law 
and local capacity building far outstrips current capacities.’305 
 
Therefore, the question remains whether international police arrangements will 
ever be sufficient to provide a sustainable solution to the deployment gap. Carl 
Bildt, the former High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina also expressed 
his doubts stating that: 
 
It is an illusion to believe that there will ever be international police forces ready to 
deploy in anything resembling necessary numbers or that it will be enough with 
lighter carabinieri-type units. Any serious security effort must be able to have 
escalation dominance in any possible situation, and that effectively means that 
military forces will have to be the critical part.306 
 
So, if donor countries are not able to deploy sufficient international police in the 
early stages of a crisis management operation, there seems to be no other alternative 
than to task the military to provide public security until the international commu-
nity provides a civilian alternative or competent local police are in place.307 
However, the deployment troops as interim police is disputed and has fuelled a 
discourse between “vacuum-fillers” and “minimalists”.308  
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The minimalists argue that soldiers do not have the professional skills for law 
enforcement and that they are not trained for maintaining public order.309 In 
other words, the military and police are trained for different tasks and the areas of 
responsibility of police and military should not be mixed. Call and Barnett, for 
example, argue that: ‘We generally do not ask the police to perform a soldier’s 
job, and we should not be asking soldiers to perform the police’s job.’310 Last 
supports their view. He says that ‘military forces are effective at guaranteeing 
security against military opposition. They are much less effective against riots and 
civilian disturbances.’311 Former Supreme Allied Commander Central Europe 
(SACEUR) General Clark also considers most soldiers incapable of performing 
police tasks effectively, noting that policing should ‘not be the primary element 
responsible for them.’312 General Sir Rupert Smith also disagrees with military 
involvement in interim policing. He stipulates that the basic purpose of the 
military to deploy force has become obscured and misunderstood after the end of 
the Cold War. As a result, politicians, he notes, have sought ‘to both deploy and 
employ military forces for humanitarian and policing purposes for which they are 
neither trained nor intended.’313 Although he agrees that troops can be deployed 
for other than purely military purposes, he argues that, ‘it is necessary to 
understand that in many of the circumstances into which we now deploy, our 
forces as a military force we will not be effective.’314 He notes that the US troops in 
Iraq have been dragged into stabilisation and reconstruction duties they were 
neither trained nor equipped for and therefore have not been able to fulfil these 
tasks effectively.315 Bing West, finally, follows Smith’s views and rejects the 
measures the US Army has taken to cope with public disorder in Iraq more 
effectively. He argues that the US Army ‘did not do a good job of modifying 
military training and force structure to include police methods and measures.’316 
West is quite clear in his views, stating that soldiers should avoid interim policing 
simply because ‘Soldiers are not policemen.’317 
 
The vacuum-fillers, on the other hand, argue that soldiers are obliged to police a 
(post) conflict environment until the international police or local security forces 
are operational. In their view, military involvement in public security will be an 
inherent element of contemporary and future crisis management operations. The 
vacuum-fillers reason that the military ‘must take decisive action to close any 
public security vacuum as soon as it arrives in the mission area.’ As such, the 
military must be prepared to arrest, judge and jail criminals and armed elements 
in the initial stage of a peace operation if no one else can.’318 Accordingly, the 
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military must take immediate action to close that gap because such action is ‘key 
to mission success and only military forces will have the capacity to accomplish 
this task in the initial phase.’319 General Sir Michael Jackson, the first KFOR 
commander, underlined the importance of filling the gap with military assets: 
 
For those who say this is not for the military, my next question to them would 
be, for whom is it when there is nobody else there? (…) Or do you just let it 
go? Do you allow anarchy? What do you do when a foot patrol of soldiers in 
Pristina comes across a Serb about to murder an Albanian? (...) You do not have 
a secure environment with murderers running around.320 
 
Former High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina Bildt agrees with 
Jackson, noting that in security gaps there is ‘no alternative to the use of military 
force to establish [a] secure environment.’321 Bronson also does not see any 
another solution, albeit grudgingly. She faces the hard truth that the military will 
likely become more rather than less involved in police missions. To her, the 
reason for this is obvious: ‘there is no one else to do the job.’322 Her view is 
shared by Kaspersen, Eide and Hansen who also consider the military to be the 
only institution ‘that can effectively move in, see to its own security and still 
provide basic [security] services.’323 Bayley too regards the military as the only 
institution able to intervene in a security gap successfully; even if they have to 
exceed their rules of engagement.324 Bayley stipulates that in terms of restoring 
public order and fighting crime, it is ‘better to do some good than to do none at 
all.’325 
 
However, the military cannot perform police tasks without preparation and 
adaptation.326 Baylay notes that if military have to act as interim police, they 
‘must organise and train accordingly.’ ‘This requires the development and 
standardisation of policing doctrine for military contingents both among 
international donors and within the branches of each country’s military.’327 In 
addition, it has to be kept in mind that filling the security gap with military 
capabilities is always a second-best solution.328 Military involvement in interim 
policing is also a temporary solution. It must be limited and should be handed 
over to the police as quickly as possible when feasible.329 Its duration and 
magnitude will largely depend on the dynamics of security situation on the 
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ground. According to Rausch, a swift transition of responsibilities will be 
unlikely and not be clear-cut: ‘even after some functions have been transferred 
from international military forces to the civilian police, the police may find 
themselves obliged to call on the international military for assistance in extreme 
situations.’330 
3.3  Enforcement gap 
3.3.1  Background 
Whereas the deployment gap is about timing, the enforcement gap is about 
function.331 It refers to a gap in the ability to use force. An enforcement gap 
occurs when military forces are required to perform functions that fall between 
the so-called inner shell of public security related to crime and small-scale 
disturbances, and the outer shell of security related to armed violations of a peace 
accord or UN resolution.332 In other words, an enforcement gap occurs if the 
local or international police lack the capabilities or skills to enforce the law and to 
maintain public order along the full spectrum of policing. 
 
The role of the international police in an enforcement gap is largely determined 
by their mandate.333 In general, there are two kinds of mandates: the classical 
international police mandate, which is limited to monitoring and advising the 
local police, and an executive mandate whereby the international police covers 
the whole range of police tasks and often replaces the local police. Both can be 
placed on a continuum. 
 
Traditional international police missions work according to the SMART 
concept, which, in policing, stands for “supporting human rights”, “monitoring 
the performance of local forces”, “advising local forces”, “reporting of incidents”, 
and “training local forces”.334 Traditional police missions have been deployed in 
Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Haiti and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 
traditional missions, the international police are generally unarmed and do not 
have (large) executive powers to enforce the law. Their role is limited to 
monitoring, training and reforming the local police, including vetting new police 
officers. The overall weakness of traditional international police missions is that 
they do not allow international police officers to become involved in daily 
policing. The local police maintain full responsibility while the international 
police lack the authority to intervene in practical situations and replace the local 
police when appropriate. 
 
In executive police missions, the international police are authorised to replace the 
local police and to assume full responsibility for maintaining law and order until a 
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reformed local police is operational. The first executive police missions started in 
1999 in Kosovo and East Timor. Executive policing places high demands on 
international police missions, as it covers the whole range of police tasks. 
First, it discharges the host state by taking over its monopoly on legitimate 
violence.335 This means that the international police are accountable for all aspects 
of the police function, from traffic control to community policing to large-scale 
crowd and riot control.336 Because the international police have to perform these 
functions in a foreign country, under foreign law, and under difficult conditions, 
the execution of the executive police function puts extra demands on the skills 
and experience of the international police.337 
Second, executive missions tend to be relatively large. A standing international 
police force must be large enough to carry out executive missions, which has 
serious cost implications for the contributing nations. Therefore, executive 
policing is considered feasible only in relatively small societies or countries in 
which the international community is willing to make a large investment.338 In 
large countries, however, the approach is likely to be less feasible. In 2005, a 
RAND study estimated that an ideal international police force should be at least 
150 officers for every 100,000 citizens for policing streets, defeating and deterring 
insurgents, patrolling borders, securing roads, and combating organised crime.339 
In Iraq, this would have resulted into a requirement of 46,500 police officers, a 
number far exceeding the total number of international police deployed by the 
UN worldwide.340 
3.3.2  Consequences of the enforcement gap 
The consequence of an enforcement gap is that the international police need the 
support and cooperation of the military. Normally there is a strict division of 
tasks and roles between the international military and police. Their respective 
tasks are formalised in a mandate or in rules of engagement. The “inner shell” of 
public security (e.g. dealing with individual crimes and small-scale disturbances), 
is provided by the local police while being monitored or assisted by the 
international police.341 However, if the local police (in terms of reliability or 
legitimacy) or international police (in terms of quality or quantity) proves 
incapable of enforcing the law, military forces could provide backup, engage in 
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counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, or help with crowd control.342 The 
military could also provide assistance to apprehend war criminals. Military 
support can thus provide relief to civilian police forces and contribute to 
maintaining public security.343 
 
In any case, there has to be a clear understanding of the respective mandates. 
Otherwise, the cooperation between the military and police may result in 
“mission creep”. Mission creep is for many military commanders and planners an 
unwelcome phenomenon. They fear the possibility that an operation with 
limited mandates and goals will expand to include an unreasonable variety of 
civilian tasks.344 For this reason, military commanders are often hesitant to 
cooperate with the police. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, IFOR feared 
a mission creep and did not want to fill the gap caused by the problems of the 
domestic police force failing to guarantee law and order.345 However, challenging 
the boundaries of mandates can be effective in terms of achieving public security, 
as a study by Brocades Zaalberg of crisis management operations in Cambodia, 
Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo has shown. Individual 
commanders who did not fear mission creep and stretched the boundaries of their 
mandates were able to re-establish the rule of law and to adapt effectively to the 
needs of the local population and the situation on the ground.346 
3.3.3  Initiatives to bridge the enforcement gap 
To relieve regular troops from providing assistance to the police and to prevent 
them from getting involved in high-end policing, the international community 
established so-called “Formed Police Units” (FPU).347 There are basically four 
versions of the FPU: NATO’s Multinational Specialised Unit (MSU), the EU’s 
Integrated Police Units (IPU), the UN’s Formed Police Unit (FPU), and the 
European Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENDFOR). 
 
NATO deployed its first MSU in Bosnia and Herzegovina in August 1998.348 
This battalion primarily consisted of Italian carabinieri (75 percent) and was 
augmented with personnel from the Argentinean gendarmes and the Romanian 
and Slovenian MPs.349 As police with military status, the MSU was supposed to 
fill the void between police and military in terms of equipment and training in 
the use of force against civilian opposition.350 The MSU was intended to operate 
as police rather than as military force. Its main tasks were to promote public 
security by utilising its ability to serve as strategic reserve; to perform crisis 
management to maintain public order, including the use of force in riot and 
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crowd control; to collect intelligence for operational purposes; and to assist in 
refugee return by establishing area security. It was not supposed to engage in law 
enforcement, unless directly ordered by the commander of SFOR.351 In 1999, 
NATO also deployed a MSU Battalion in Kosovo,352 which consisted of 
(primarily) Italian carabinieri, French gendarmes and Estonian MPs. Its main mission 
was to ‘provide a security presence by conducting patrols in all [Multination 
Brigade] areas; it was also assigned the tasks of maintaining public order, crowd 
control, information gathering, antiterrorism activities, and obtaining intelligence 
on organised crime.’353 
 
The EU has also deployed formed police units after EUFOR took over from 
SFOR in December 2004. Like NATO’s MSU, the EU’s Integrated Police 
Units (IPU) operated at the higher ends of the police spectrum of force and were 
primarily tasked to fill the enforcement gap between the military and police.354 
Their main assignment was to execute crowd and riot control, high target arrests, 
and counterterrorism.355 
 
Another European initiative to fill enforcement gaps involves the EURO-
GENDFOR. This force was initiated in 2004 when the Ministers of Defence of 
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain356 signed a Declaration of 
Intent for the establishment of a European Gendarmerie Force (EUROGEND-
FOR). Within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy, 
these five countries created a robust and rapidly deployable force of approxi-
mately 800 persons,357 ‘capable of covering the full spectrum of police missions 
(…) during all the phases of a crisis management operation.’358 After it had 
become operational in 2006, EUROGENDFOR participated in three different 
crisis management operations: the EUFOR mission ALTHEA in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (from November 2007 until October 2010); the NATO-led ISAF 
mission in Afghanistan (from December 2009 onwards), and the United Nations 
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH; from February until December 2010).359 
 
The UN also institutionalised formed police units to fill the enforcement gap. 
Within the framework of UN peace operations mission, FPUs serve as ‘cohesive 
mobile police units, providing support to United Nations operations and 
                                               
351 Perito (2004), pp. 156-157. 
352 Friesendorf & Penska (2008), p. 687. 
353 Perito (2004), p. 187. 
354 Friesendorf & Penska (2008), p. 682. 
355 Friesendorf & Penska (2008), p. 684. 
356 Romania became a full member state of the EGF in December 2008. Lithuania and Poland 
are partners of the EGF (http://www.eurogendfor.org; accessed March 18, 2011). 
357 European Gendarmerie Force Declaration of Intent of September 17, 2004, Available at 
http://www.eurogendfor.org/referencetexts/EGF%20declaration%20of%20intent.pdf; 
accessed March 18, 2011. 
358 Treaty between the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Portuguese Republic establishing the European Gen-
darmerie Force; October 18, 2007, Article 3. 
359 http://www.eurogendfor.org; accessed March 18, 2011. 
66
SECURITY GAP 
 
ensuring the safety and security of United Nations personnel and missions, 
primarily in public order management.’360 As such, the FPUs are supposed to 
serve as a ‘coherent part of the United Nations police component (…) in support 
of the establishment and maintenance of safe, democratic and human rights 
abiding communities by delivering professional, responsive and more robust 
policing in accordance with the mandate.’361 The tasks of the FPU largely 
involve crowd and riot control, executing high-risk arrests, combating organised 
crime, and protecting the security of elections, prisons, sensitive facilities, VIPs 
and borders.362 Since the UN deployed its first FPUs in Kosovo in 1999, the 
importance of IPUs within UN peace operations increased as they comprised 
almost 50 percent of the overall police capacity deployed in UN peace operations 
in 2011.363  
 
The deployment of FPUs in crisis management operations does not solve the 
enforcement gap entirely.  
The first problem is that the FPU model has to deal with a deficit of available 
resources. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, the process of recruitment, 
training and deployment of the first MSU battalion took nearly eight months, as 
a result of which the first unit did not arrive in theatre until August 1998.364 In 
Kosovo, the recruitment and deployment of the UN FPUs took even longer. 
The first FPU unit did not arrive until April 2000, ten months after the start of 
the UNMiK mission; the last arrived in February 2002.365 The resources of the 
EUROGENDFOR are limited too.366 For example, each Member State retains 
the right to decide whether its units would participate in a EUROGENDFOR 
operation. National needs, available funding and personnel, and prestige may 
determine the depth and durability of national commitments to the 
EUROGENDFOR. Consequently, a gap could arise between the numbers of 
officers formally available in a database and the actual number available for a 
mission.367 Many countries have also committed police officers to other missions, 
such as of the UN and OSCE,368 which further limits their deployment capacity 
within the capacity of the EUROGENDFOR.369 
A second problem concerns the quality of policing. The functions of FPUs 
ideally need to be performed by police officers who are proficient in their normal 
police role. FPU units should therefore ideally be drawn from countries with 
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democratic traditions, as Wiatrowski, Pino and Pritchard note.370 However, given 
the nature of the UN system it is possible that FPUs might be dispatched from 
countries that have less sophisticated traditions regarding for example human 
rights and police accountability. The question is whether these police forces may 
have the required skills or experience to help reforming the local police into a 
democratically accountable force.371 
3.4  Institutional gap 
3.4.1  Background 
The institutional gap refers to the absence of a functioning local security sector, 
without which an international mission cannot withdraw without risking a return 
to lawlessness and violence.372 The host nation is in other words incapable of 
providing public order, especially when measured against international standards 
for policing and protection of human rights. The institutional gap could cover 
the time-period between the start of a conflict and the successful re-establishment 
of the rule of law and democratic security institutions. However, whereas the 
deployment and enforcement gaps are about security deficits on the ground, the 
institutional gap is about the re-establishment or reorganisation of the whole 
security sector and its institutions commonly known as Security Sector Reform 
(SSR).  
 
Security Sector Reform 
Today, SSR is generally seen as an indispensible part of the stabilisation activities 
during a crisis management operation.373 SSR can be defined as ‘the set of 
policies, plans, programmes, and activities that a government undertakes to 
improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice.’374 SSR programmes aim 
to achieve an effective and legitimate security sector that is firmly rooted within 
the rule of law.375 
 
The concept of SSR was introduced in 1998 by Clare Short, the then British 
Secretary of State for International Development, to get a more comprehensive 
and integrated approach towards the security sector as a whole in the develop-
ment context.376 The SSR concept was a further elaboration of the “rule of law 
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revival” during the 1990s, entailing donors making large investments in legal, 
judicial, police and correctional system reform in many developing countries and 
countries in transition. 
 
This revival has lead to an international rule of law consensus based on two 
elements. First, ‘the belief that the rule of law is essential to virtually every 
Western liberal policy goal,’ and second, ‘the belief that international interven-
tions (…) must include a rule of law component.’377 However, the rule of law 
concept tends to focus more on constitutions, legality, and enforcement and 
adherence of the law and less on military defence roles, citizens security, and the 
legitimacy of police and judicial institutions, and has proven to be imperfect in 
creating self-sustaining systems of justice and security in post-war societies.378 
SSR tries to overcome this imperfection by following a systems approach. 
 
After its introduction, other European countries adopted the SSR concept, for 
example the Netherlands, Germany and Norway.379 Nowadays, the international 
community has recognised SSR as a prime stabilisation task. For example, in 
2005 the UN Security Council acknowledged the importance of SSR stating 
that: ‘security sector reform is an essential element of any stabilisation process in 
post-conflict environments (…) that is linked with the promotion of the rule of 
law, transitional justice, DDR [Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration] 
and the protection of civilians.’380 Since, SSR has found its way in the military 
doctrines of, for example the US Army,381 the UK Army,382 NATO,383 and the 
NL Army384 to become one of their formal stabilisation activities. 
 
However, ‘SSR is still an evolving and contested concept and lessons learned 
from practical experience are still scarce,’ as Bryden and Hänggi note.385 There is 
no commonly accepted definition of what the security sector encompasses. In 
literature, there are two notions of the security sector. First, there is the narrow 
notion. In this view, the security sector consists of the state security and justice 
apparatus and the relevant civilian bodies responsible for the management and 
supervision of that apparatus.386 The second, wider notion differs from the first by 
including non-state security actors and non-statutory civil society groups.387 Box 
2 further defines and explains both notions. 
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In terms of the wider notion, Chanaa distinguishes four dimensions of SSR: 
political, instrumental, economic and societal. The political dimension involves 
the development of mechanisms to manage the security sector. The institutional 
dimension focuses on reform and capacity building within the security 
institutions. The economic dimension is concerned with the security sector’s 
consumption of resources, stressing the sustainability of reforms. Finally, the 
societal dimension accords a crucial role to civil society in the supervision and 
monitoring of security functions of the state.390 
 
The distinction between the narrow and wider notions of SSR seems only to be 
a conceptual one, however. A 2006 case-study of six SSR programmes – Haiti, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East Timor and Afghanistan – 
shows that these programmes have remained limited in scope and have been 
unbalanced in their focus. Donor efforts have tended to concentrate primarily on 
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Box 2: The two notions of the security sector 
 
An example of the narrow definition of the security is given by the RAND 
Cooperation. Here the (internal) security sector encompasses three areas: 
 
1. Police: Ministry of Interior, local police, border patrol, and counter-drug forces  
2. Military and other security bodies: Ministry of Defence (when it plays an internal 
security role), intelligence agencies, and paramilitary forces such as counter-
terrorist forces  
3. Justice system: Ministry of Justice, federal and local courts, corrections facilities, law 
schools, and the rule of law.388 
 
The British Government provides a good example of the wider variant, where the 
security sector covers a large spectrum of actors, bodies and institutions:  
 
1. Bodies authorised to use force (the armed forces, police and paramilitary units); 
2. Intelligence and security services; 
3. Civil management and oversight bodies (the President/Prime Minister, the 
legislature and legislative committees, national security advisory bodies, statutory 
civil society organisations, the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Finance and Foreign 
Affairs); 
4. Judicial and public security bodies (the judiciary, justice ministries, defence and 
prosecution services, prisons and correction services, and human right commissions 
and customary and traditional justice systems); 
5. Non-state security bodies (private security companies, political party militias, 
liberation armies, civil defence forces and militia groupings); 
6. Civil society bodies (Non-governmental organisations, advocacy, the media, 
professional and religious organisations).389 
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the efficiency of the statutory security actors and institutions rather than their 
accountability. They have favoured strengthening statutory security actors as 
opposed to bringing non-statutory ones under control. International efforts have 
thus primarily focused ‘on the security forces and the public part of the security 
sector at the expense of the non-statutory actors, and governance and 
management bodies’ capable of overseeing and monitoring the sector.391 
 
Holistic approach 
SSR requires a holistic approach.392 If not, the reform will not be sustainable.393 
This means adopting both a horizontal and a vertical approach to security sector 
reform.  
 
The horizontal approach focuses on the integration of separate security 
institutions within an SSR programme. The holistic horizontal approach is 
particularly important when security institutions are interdependent, as is the case 
with the police, judicial and penal agencies. These form a “three-legged stool”, 
which cannot stand without one of its legs.394 This view is shared by NATO, 
arguing that police forces ‘should operate as an integral part of the justice system 
and directly support other parts of the justice sector, including the courts and 
corrections institutions.’395 Reconstructing and reforming the police is therefore 
not enough to create a secure environment and protect civil liberties. Effective 
policing also requires a functioning justice system.396 In the past, the linkage 
between police and judicial reform was often ignored. Judicial reform was seen as 
nation-building, whereas police reform was not and was approached in an 
isolated manner. Consequently, police missions used to be carried out in an ad-
hoc and inadequate manner, without the necessary focus on institutional 
development and reform. According to Mobekk, this has now changed. Many 
scholars and experts see police and judicial reform as essential for the 
establishment of rule of law and public security, and a priority in peace-building 
operations.397 However, after studying several recent judicial reforms, Call 
concludes that in practice these reforms ‘are usually poorly linked to police 
reforms, continuing the disaggregation of the “triad” of police, judicial and 
prison reforms.’398 
 
The vertical approach primarily focuses on the governance of security sector 
institutions. Governance issues concern the ability of an organisation to steer 
itself, ranging from centralised control to self-regulation. Governance could 
improve by integrating civil management mechanisms and democratic 
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accountability into the security institutions. This part of SSR often seeks to 
strengthen and reform relevant ministries. 
 
Duration 
A security system cannot be changed overnight. Considering experiences from 
recent crisis management operations, Dziedzic and Hawley conclude ‘that simple 
reconstruction programs coupled with hasty exits will inevitably fail.’399 Their 
view is shared by several (military) scholars and analysts. There is common 
agreement that SSR programmes take at least five to ten years to complete.400 It 
takes even longer to fully internalise the changes within the national political or 
governmental systems.  
 
The long-term character of SSR requires a multi-annual involvement and 
commitment of the international community. Without this, SSR is likely to fail. 
Setting an end date to an international mission can be counterproductive, as 
argued by Hartz, Marcean and Williamson: ‘Declaring an intention to depart 
after a fixed period (…) undermines institution-building efforts by encouraging 
political extremists and their allies in the criminal underworld to persist in 
seeking to sabotage the peace process.’401 ‘Political “exit strategies” therefore 
need to be replaced by “transfer strategies” keyed to realistic and durable 
benchmarks.’402 
 
Local contribution and ownership 
SSR can be achieved by either reforming the “old” security sector or rebuilding 
the security institutions largely from scratch. In case of the police, the RAND 
Corporation defines three considerations that should be made when choosing 
between rebuilding and reforming the security sector. ‘First, is there enough left 
of the old police organisation to provide a basis for rebuilding? Second, how 
discredited and unpopular is the current police force with the local population? 
Third, how likely is it that the intervening powers will dispose of enough 
military and police resources to provide for public security during the lengthy 
time needed to build a new police force?’403 
 
Even the most incompetent and corrupt local police force will normally be 
regarded by an intervening power as better than nothing. ‘For practical purposes 
it is often impossible and imprudent to avoid involving traditional authority 
structures.’404 Pushing aside all local chieftains, or dissolving the state and its 
security forces, could for example lead to anarchy, violence and criminality, as 
happened in Iraq. Thus, ‘the choice of the donors is not between the “bad old 
and the good new,” but between different levels of what might be feasible and 
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meets minimum standards of the population,’ such as meeting basic rule of law, a 
more stable domestic order with greater personal security for the population, a 
lower level of violence and a higher level of legal conflict settlement.405 
 
Forming entirely new security forces may sometimes be difficult or even 
impossible because it would take more time than the international community is 
willing to invest in terms of funds and resources. For example, the fact that the 
US and UK dissolved large sections of the Iraqi security forces immediately after 
their defeat made their purpose of reconstructing Iraq more difficult than 
necessary, as Voorhoeve notes.406 
 
In all cases, however, the international community has to take domestic demands 
and desires into account. Nation-building is not a matter of applying a ‘one-size-
fits-all’ template. Ignatieff raises substantial questions about the universal 
applicability of Western ideas of nation-building or governance to poor, 
ethnically divided religious societies and societies without state traditions.407 
Nevertheless, recent stabilisation efforts ‘have all been driven by the utopia of 
[the] liberal democratic model, Ignatieff writes.408 To avoid this, he suggests 
‘giving power, even in the transitional stages of nation building exercises, back to 
the local political actors (...) to take responsibility for making their states work.’409 
Ignatieff’s opinion is supported by Voorhoeve, who thinks that nation building 
programmes ‘should not be judged only by the high ideals and standards of 
[Western] states, but by the desire of the population to be more secure than 
during the war period.’410 ‘If Western values and conditions like individualism, 
liberalism, personal responsibility and ambition would be necessary preconditions 
for establishing the rule of law, efforts to import rule of law in non-Western 
societies, or imposing a “Western” rule of law system, would be short-lived and 
fail after external actors leave.’411 
 
However, local ownership is not an obvious policy, as Sedra notices. He warns 
that the projection of Western democratic norms and values inevitably results in 
‘a donor-driven [SSR] process that is not adequately synchronised with local 
needs.’ Moreover, SSR programmes are commonly ‘undertaken with a poor 
understanding of local political, security and socio-economic dynamics.’412 
Scheye and Peake therefore suggest that ‘it may be more productive to be less 
rather than more ambitious to achieve effective, measurable SSR results for an 
identifiable beneficiary.’413 On the other hand, local interests and culture may be 
at odds with international human rights standards and values. In case of SSR, this 
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means that the local authorities and the former disputants must support the idea 
that the new security structures should function in an impartial manner and in 
accordance with good governance.414 
 
The development of local ownership is seen as critical in security sector 
reform.415 First of all, local ownership is crucial to restore faith in the police and 
other security forces in failed states. Civil society involvement is needed to 
‘narrow the gaps between the security institutions, the newly elected political 
authorities and the populace, through demystifying a sector traditionally 
characterised by secrecy.’416 In addition, local actors need to be involved to build 
security institutions that reflect the particular circumstances, history, culture, 
sociology and legal system of the country in question.417 This is what Van 
Dinten, from a sociological point of view, defines as “organising in social 
cohesion”. Societal and organisational changes should, according to him, reflect 
and respect in their design and effect what is meaningful to people. The designs 
should reflect people’s cultural and social orientation. If people cannot recognise 
themselves in these designs, Van Dinten states, they will feel disconnected from 
the context they live in and will ultimately lose interest.418 
 
Consequently, a dialogue must be conducted with the local population as to 
what type of security institutions they prefer. Without civil society involvement 
there is a high risk of failure. In case of the police, ‘there is heightened risk that 
upon international withdrawal the local police will not have legitimacy, because 
they will not reflect local needs or desires of how policing should be conducted. 
The most negative outcome could be a return to previous styles of policing.’419 It 
must also be understood that consultation is needed to design security institutions 
that reflect the technological standards of the country in question. State-of-the-
art technologies and concepts may be common for Western countries, but might 
be over the top for security institutions elsewhere in the world.  
 
Although local ownership has become a strong demand during stabilisation, Call 
concludes that efforts to involve civil organisations and individual citizens in 
military, police and justice reform processes have so far been difficult or absent.420 
According to Call, there are two reasons underlying this problem. First, SSR 
programmes are generally top-down reforms, either initiated by the state or 
directed externally by the international community, which leaves little room for 
citizens’ participation or input. Second, in most failed states civil society 
organisations are absent or badly organised. They lack the structure, power, or 
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means to participate in or contribute to the debate about how the security sector 
should be reformed and organised.421 
3.4.2   International military and Security Sector Reform 
In a peace-building operation, the international military’s first and most 
important task is to create a secure environment in which the international 
community can operate. Along with this task, the international military are 
usually involved in several SSR programmes. This involvement largely concerns 
three main activities: (1) the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
(DDR) of former combatants, militias, insurgent forces and that portion of 
regular troops that became redundant by peace, (2) reform of the military and its 
institutions, and (3) assistance for police reform. 
 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
Since the 1990s, DDR programmes have become a standard component of 
international peace-building programmes.422 These programmes are being 
conducted under supervision of the international armed forces, as part of a peace 
agreement.423 DDR is an important contributor to security in the short and long 
term. As the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate, without some form 
of DDR, there can be no lasting peace. Like in SSR, support, consent, and 
participation of local authorities, politicians and representatives of the former 
warring parties are therefore essential preconditions for success. This is the case 
particularly if former combatants and militias resist disarming and demobilising.424 
The three steps of DDR are:425 
 
1. Disarmament. Disarmament generally involves a weapon survey, weapon 
collection, and weapon storage, reutilisation, or destruction.426 
2. Demobilisation. The demobilisation of armed groups is both a first-order 
political problem and a first-order security problem.427 Demobilisation 
involves the dissolution of a formerly armed unit or reducing the number of 
combatants in an armed group. It can also involve dis-assembling, and then 
re-assembling, the host country’s armed forces.428 If the former combatants 
meet the qualifications and have acceptable backgrounds they can be 
incorporated into the official security forces, like the police and defence 
forces.429 This provides a mechanism for reintegrating former fighters. ‘In the 
short-run, it strategically fixes ex-combatants in a structure where they can 
be held accountable. Over time, (…) the capacity of local security forces to 
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maintain the peace against the obstructionist elements can increasingly 
expand.’430 
3. Reintegration. Reintegration is the process under which combatants re-enter 
the civilian workforce. The objective of reintegration programs is to assist 
ex-combatants in their social and economic reintegration into civilian society 
so that they do not return to violence, organised crime or private armies.’431 
There are two main constraints on an effective reintegration of demobilised 
combatants. First, a possible shortage of resources for DDR could hamper 
finding jobs for ex-combatants and reintegrating them into society. Second, 
high unemployment could drive the demobilised combatants back into 
violence or crime.432 
 
Reform of the military and defence institutions 
The international armed forces usually contribute to the reform of the local 
military. This can be achieved by either the reorganisation of the existing military 
or building a new military force.433 In small countries, and when there is a 
relatively large contribution by donor countries, it may be feasible to create new 
armed services. In larger countries, and in the case of little donor support, it 
would be better to purge only the war criminals and reintegrate the military by 
using as much as possible existing personnel.434 Military reform also includes the 
establishment or improvement of civil governance and management, and making 
them accountable to public and political mechanisms. Therefore, military reform 
includes restructuring the Ministry of defence, building command, control, and 
co-ordination capabilities, and improving management, personnel, and financial 
processes. Like police reform, these reforms will only be successful if supported 
by the host government, including the Ministry of defence and the armed forces 
themselves.435 
 
Assistance for police reform 
The military could also participate in reform of the local police, either by assisting 
international civilian police or independently. The Dutch armed forces, for 
example, have been involved in the vetting, training, monitoring of and assisting 
Iraqi and Afghan police. Military assistance to police reform is normally limited 
to those situations when there is a (international) political or strategic intention to 
establish a local police force and no international police are available, either due 
to a deployment gap or because the situation on the ground is still too volatile for 
international police officers to intervene.436 
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3.5  Conclusions 
This chapter defined the security gap and explored the role the military could 
play in resolving such a gap. A security gap exists if, during or after an armed 
conflict, the local police are unable to enforce the law or to maintain public 
order. The local police are either non-existent or they have lost their credibility 
to the population in due to the role they played during the conflict. A security 
gap divides into three separate characteristics. 
First, a deployment gap occurs when sufficient skilled international police officers 
are not available in the short term for rapid deployment in crisis environments to 
provide a basic level of public security. 
Second, an enforcement gap arises when the “robustness” of the police in terms 
of mandate, equipment, skills, and training does not match the requirements to 
operate effectively in (post) conflict societies to enforce the law or restore order. 
The institutional gap is the third characteristic of the security gap, which refers to 
the absence of a functioning local rule of law sector, including the police. 
Reform programmes such as SSR see to re-establish the security sector in order 
to overcome the institutional gap. To be successful, efforts to overcome the 
institutional gap need to be holistic, require local ownership and be long term in 
nature. 
 
A sustainable solution to bridge a security gap has not yet been found, however, 
and will continue to be a problem for the near future, as some observers note.437 
A solid standby system has not yet been established and alternatives in terms of 
FPUs have not yet proven to be a sustainable solution. Training and reforming 
local police, finally, is a long-term endeavour that does not provide a short-term 
solution to close the security gap. In absence of immediate and valid solutions to 
close a security gap, there is often no alternative than to ask the international 
military to deliver some sort of interim policing in the early stages of a crisis 
management operation.438 
 
Within a security gap, the international military is often the only security 
instrument available to provide a basic level of public security. It may therefore 
be tasked to perform some interim police tasks until the police are in place. A 
swift response to a security gap is crucial to establishing security during the 
“golden hour” of a crisis management operation and importantly defines its 
success on the long-term. 
 
Among experts, however, there are different views about whether or not the 
military should perform these tasks. Opponents, the so-called minimalists, argue 
that the military are not suited, trained or equipped for interim policing. They 
argue that the international community should therefore make an effort to create 
a police standby force or an international gendarmerie-based constabulary force. 
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The advocates of military involvement in public security, the “vacuum-fillers”, 
claim that there will never be sufficient numbers of international police of any 
kind to fill a security gap or prevent it from occurring. A turning point in this 
discussion may be the experiences in Iraq. The lessons that can be drawn from 
Iraq is that the military cannot stand aloof but have to act as de facto police if there 
are no other alternatives. The US military have now integrated the execution of 
public order and law enforcement duties in their stabilisation operation doctrine. 
This new American doctrine may inspire other governments to do the same. The 
consequence is, however, that troops need to train and equip for these duties and 
that the military organisation may have to adequately adapt to the requirements 
of these tasks. The question that arises is what these skills and characteristics are. 
The next chapter discusses these questions and describes the differences between 
the military and the police. 
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4  The police and the military: a comparison 
4.1  Introduction 
Chapter 3 discussed the characteristics of the security gap. It revealed that a 
deficit of sufficient local or international police during or in the aftermath of an 
armed conflict might require the provision of interim policing by a multinational 
military force. It also illustrated that military involvement in policing is debated 
among experts. While the “vacuum-fillers” argue for military engagement in 
policing, opponents underline that such a role is incompatible with the “existen-
tial” military function: the provision and application of combat power. They 
point at the differences between the police and the military and emphasise that 
soldiers are not suited for policing, which would distract them from their prime 
mission. 
 
If this is assumption is valid, the question is what these differences are and what 
exactly defines the military and police organisation? Several authors have 
elaborated extensively on the differences between the police and military 
organisation.439 The police and military are both the state’s strong arm tasked to 
protect its vital interests and citizens and to contribute to its stability and 
security.440 However, their institutional focus differs. The military organisation 
primarily exists to provide or restore external, international security, while the 
main purpose of the police is to maintain internal law and order.441 These 
differences have resulted in different missions, functions and geographical locus. 
In case of the military, its mission, function, and structure are adjusted to dealing 
with international security threats, and achieving geopolitical objectives of 
national governments, and/or international alliances.442 Police organisations on 
the other hand have rooted in the geographical territory of a sovereign state.443 
Their mission, structures and function therefore reflect the national political 
structure, characteristics and traditions of that state.444 
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However, difference in focus and locus of the police and military is not clear-cut 
and sometimes blurred. Some experts even observe a trend of divergence as the 
police and military increasingly operate and act outside their traditional bio-
topes.445 For example, the increasingly trans-national character of crime and 
terrorism has resulted in a more external focus of the police, leading to increased 
international cooperation and coordination, whereas the military increasingly 
assists the police nationally in the field of law enforcement, public order or crisis 
and disaster management if police capabilities turn out to be insufficient in terms 
of quantities or certain qualities.446 
 
This chapter serves to answer sub-question three. For this purpose, it describes 
the characteristics of the police and military organisation, and more in particular, 
that of the NL Army and the Dutch police447 in order to inventory differences 
and commonalities regarding their operational and organisational concepts. On 
the subject of their operational concepts, this chapter deals with their function, 
the collection, analysis and use of intelligence, inter-organisational cooperation, 
and the use of force. In terms of their organisational concepts, it describes the 
level of (de)centralisation, vertical differentiation; and geographical differentiation 
(deconcentration). 
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4.2   The police organisation 
4.2.1   Operational concept 
4.2.1.1 Function 
To define the function of the police, is important to make a distinction between 
the “police” as an institution and “policing” as an activity, as Reiner notes.448 He 
argues that “police” refers to ‘a particular kind of social institution,’449 while the 
concept of policing could be explained as a ‘set of activities aimed at preserving 
the security of a particular social control, or social order in general.450 
 
The distinction between police and policing implies that public and private 
institutions other than the police, such as local and national security inspectorates, 
private security companies, and neighbourhood watches could exercise elements 
of the police function.451 This means that the police organisation may be just one 
possible option within a set of various social institutions to engage in policing.452 
Therefore, Bayley and Shearing speak of the “multilaterisation of policing” 
which implies that the ‘auspices and providers of policing have become mixed 
in terms of being public or private.’453 According to Bayley and Shearing, 
“multilaterisation of policing” could lead to the end of the police’s monopoly on 
public policing which would turn the police in just one among many other 
providers of public safety and security.454 Crawford provides a similar observation 
as he describes this phenomenon as ‘policing beyond the police.’ Unlike Bayley 
and Shearing, he argues that that ‘a pluralised, fragmented and differentiated 
patchwork’ has already replaced the police as ‘the monopolistic guardians of 
public order.’455 The Dutch Chiefs of Police also observe a pluralisation of the 
police function, which they define as horizontal fragmentation.456 Nevertheless, 
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and unlike Bayley and Shearing, they regard the police as the prime supplier of 
public order and enforcer of the law: ‘The police are the authority in the public 
domain. They are the boss on the streets, the referee, and will enforce respect for 
their authority if necessary.’457 
 
When it comes to define the function of the police, in casu policing, there is 
some sort of consensus among police scholars that it largely involves three main 
activities: law enforcement, maintenance of public order, and assistance to the 
public.458 
 
Law enforcement 
Law enforcement deals with the prevention, detection and settlement of crime. It 
involves police tasks related to reporting of crimes, collection and analysis of 
criminal information, forensic research, criminal investigations, and the arrest and 
interrogation of criminals or law-offenders. Law enforcement activities either 
result from crimes reported to the police by the public or brought in by the 
police themselves. The first category comprises the majority of law enforcement. 
They entail crimes that have already been committed, which makes law 
enforcement basically an input-driven or even a “reactive activity” as Bayley 
notes.459 The second category results from crimes or offences detected by the 
police themselves. This can be done by uniformed police during their patrol 
duties or through (long-term) intelligence and investigation by specialised police 
investigators. The division of tasks between the uniformed and specialised police 
depends on the priority, magnitude and complexity of the crime.460 
 
Ideally, the police should be able to ‘investigate every situation in which a 
criminal law violation is suspected; to attempt to ascertain who violated the law; 
and to present the relevant information to the prosecutor for his further ac-
tion.’461 However, not every crime reported to or detected by the police is 
investigated. 
First, whether the police are to investigate every crime reported to them depends 
on the penal system of the state. In the Netherlands and Belgium, for example, 
the investigation of crime and prosecution of suspects is not obligatory in every 
case. Both countries apply the principle of appropriateness, which means that the 
Public Prosecutor is authorised to decide whether to start a police investigation 
or to bring a case to court. On the grounds of general interest, feasibility, or lack 
of evidence the Public Prosecutor can decide to abstain from prosecution. This 
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principle of appropriateness is opposed to the principle of legality as applied in, 
for example, Germany. The principle of legality implies that each case known to 
the police has to be investigated if there are sufficient grounds available for 
prosecution. There, the Public Prosecutor has no discretion to select crime cases 
he thinks are appropriate to prosecute. In a penal system that applies the principle 
of legality, the law itself determines whether a prosecution is started or not.462 
Second, the number of crimes known to the police regularly exceeds the 
available criminal investigation capacity. Because enlargement of law enforce-
ment capacity would be very costly, the police need to prioritise their investiga-
tion activities. Police departments use strategic or operational priorities or even 
rational decision-making models to determine what crimes will be investigated or 
not. Informal criteria, such as the attractiveness of the case, experience with 
comparable crime cases, or the perceived likelihood of success can also be of 
importance in the prioritisation process.463 These criteria imply a risk when the 
police, in their search for efficiency, focus on their own ends, or opt for a 
symptom-oriented approach rather than responding to community concerns and 
needs or investigating the root-causes of crime, as Manning notes.464 
Third, at the individual level of policing, police officers have a significant degree 
of discretion. In the context of policing, the term discretion refers to the freedom 
of the individual police officer to act according to his judgement in particular 
situations.465 In other words, police discretion is ‘the power to decide which rules 
apply to a given situation and whether or not to apply them.’466 Police discretion 
exists because police officers cannot respond to every situation. They are also 
confronted with complex tasks, confronting regulations, or ambiguous guide-
lines.467 According to Jones, ‘the idea of the full enforcement of the law is a myth 
because of the sheer breath and complexity of situational exigencies which police 
officers are required to deal with.’468 When police officers use discretion, the law 
serves as an ‘all purpose control device’ from which police officers can choose a 
range of alternatives appropriate to the situation.469 Recent developments, 
however, have influenced the scope of discretion. The implementation of New 
Public Management (NPM),470 Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) and information 
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technology have resulted in a more centralised supervision of policing, which has 
reduced the individual discretion of the police officer, and enlarged and strength-
ened the supervision and control mechanisms of police management.471 
 
Public order 
The second police function concerns the maintenance or restoration of public 
order. In maintaining public order the majority of police interventions involve 
communication or (the threat of) force rather than through law enforcement.472 
There are many definitions of public order. Bittner views public order as 
“keeping the peace” which involves ‘to direct, aid, inform, pacify, warn, 
discipline, roust, and to do everything without making arrests.’473 To Ericson, 
public order maintenance has a more corrective connotation. He defines it as an 
‘activity to transform troublesome, fragile situations back into a normal or 
efficient state.’474 As such, public order is not about producing new order, but to 
maintain and reinforce the existing one: ‘The mandate of the patrol officer is to 
employ a system of rules and authoritative commands to transform troublesome, 
fragile situations back into a normal or efficient state whereby the ranks in society 
are preserved.’475 The notion of the restoration of the normal state is also found 
in the definition of Van der Meulen who defines public order as the – to time 
and place restricted – normal state in a public space.476 
 
What a disturbance of public order constitutes is difficult to determine. Legisla-
tion on public order is ambiguous, as it often does not provide objective and 
clear rules and guidelines for police action. The range of police powers therefore 
relates to offences that are deliberately framed broadly – such as a “breach of the 
peace”477 – in order to provide police officers with a flexible resource that can be 
deployed in attempting to achieve the broader objectives of public order 
management.478 Police discretion therefore also applies to public order mainte-
nance.479 
 
Under normal conditions, maintenance of public order or keeping the peace is 
part of the basic police function and is carried out by regular patrol officers, for 
example to manage small-scale disturbances such as night-life incidents or anti-
social behaviour of teenagers.480 However, public order policing often relates to 
large-scale disturbances that involve larger crowds and that take place within 
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larger areas.481 It is therefore usually distinguished by its scale and associated with 
large numbers of police officers deployed in riot squads dealing with large 
gatherings of members of the public,482 for example in the case of political 
demonstrations or football hooliganism. These riot squads are trained, organised, 
and equipped in a paramilitary fashion and can be tasked to re-establish public 
order by (threat of) the use of force. Adang notes that from an international 
perspective there are different styles of maintenance of public order, such as hard 
versus soft, reactive versus preventive, or repressive versus tolerant.483 McPhail 
also discerns two different approaches towards public order: escalated force versus 
negotiated management. In escalated force, the police focus on riot control and 
apply paramilitary tactics and instruments. Negotiated management, on the other 
hand, is based upon the principles of community policing and intends to establish 
communication and cooperation between the police and the protesters in order 
to prevent public disturbances.484 In either case, effective maintenance of public 
order is all about by achieving a balance between observed risks of further 
escalation and actual police action to keep or restore the peace. 
 
Public assistance 
The third function of the police is assistance to the public. According to Bittner, 
public assistance is all about stopping ‘something-that-ought-not-to-be-
happening-and-about-which-somebody-had-better-do-something-now!’485 The 
ability and willingness of police officers to provide help in those situations 
therefore largely determines the perception of the quality of daily policing.486 As 
such, public assistance could comprise an almost endless list of possible actions. 
Typical instances are for example: emergency aid at accidents with casualties; 
saving people from drowning; dispersing a crowd hampering the rescue mission 
of an ambulance; finding lost children, and interceding in (domestic) violence or 
quarrels. In many of these instances, the police act as surrogate aid workers, 
which also demands social and psychological expertise and competences.487 
 
In general, public assistance could be divided into two categories: emergency 
assistance and general assistance. In case of emergency (e.g. a life-threatening 
situation), assistance is seen as one of the most important assignments of the 
police. In order to guarantee police support at all times to those who are in 
danger, the Dutch police prioritise emergency assistance above other police 
tasks.488 If there is no imminent danger, and assistance has a more general 
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character, the police could accord it a lesser priority; meaning that the principle 
of ‘the urgent before the important’ is applied.489 
 
What the police actually do 
In most Western countries, law enforcement is considered by both citizens and 
police officials to be the basic function of the police.490 Research in different 
Western countries has shown that the police spend less than twenty percent of 
their time or capacity on law enforcement.491 Banton, for example, argues that 
the idea of a police that are primarily engaged in law enforcement is misleading: 
‘The policeman on patrol is primarily a “peace officer” rather than a “law 
officer”. Relatively little of his time is spent on enforcing the law in terms of 
arresting criminal offenders; far more time is spent on “keeping the peace” by 
supervising the beat and responding to requests for assistance.492 Reiner agrees 
with Banton noting that the assumption that the police’s main function is 
‘catching criminals’ is a myth and ignores most of their real functions.493 Bittner 
also argues that law enforcement should not be seen as characteristic of day-to-
day police work. He argues that ‘criminal law enforcement is something that 
most [uniformed police officers] do with the frequency located somewhere 
between never and very rarely.’494 Instead, he adds, policemen are ‘rushing to the 
scene of any crisis whatever, judging its needs in accordance with canons of 
common sense reasoning, and imposing solutions upon it without regard to 
resistance or opposition.’495 Several other police experts support the views of 
Banton, Reiner and Bittner. They agree that the majority of police work occurs 
in a grey area between law enforcement, maintenance of public order and service 
and involves keeping the peace, providing assistance, problem-solving, commu-
nicating and negotiating with the public, collecting information, and patrolling, 
and not to crime investigations and making arrests.496  
 
As such, policing is not to be seen only as “making arrests” but rather as a social 
issue in which the police serve as primus inter pares in the provision of public 
security. In sum, as Bittner writes, policing ‘is to address all sorts of human 
problems when and insofar as their solutions do or may possibly require the use 
of force at the point of occurrence. This lends homogeneity to such diverse 
procedures as catching a criminal, (…) evicting a drunken person from a bar, 
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directing traffic, crowd control, taking care of lost children, administering 
medical first aid, and separating fighting relatives.’497 
 
That policing goes beyond law-enforcement is underlined in community 
policing. Community policing is one of the most important developments in 
policing in the past thirty years, which greatly influenced the operational and 
organisational concepts of police forces around the world.498 The concept of 
community policing developed during the 1970s when various police 
departments in the United States implemented reform programmes to improve 
the quality and effectiveness of policing and to increase the level of safety in local 
neighbourhoods. Community policing replaced the traditional model of policing, 
which emphasised centralised authority, hierarchical structure, specialisation and 
bureaucratic rationality.499  
 
Also in the Netherlands, community policing has become the guiding principle 
for policing.500 A significant driver for its implementation was the report Politie in 
verandering (The Changing Police) published in 1977. The authors envisaged a 
police legitimised by their ability to take local circumstances and demands and 
interests of the community into account, and a police capable of initiating social 
change in society.501 The police had to leave its distant position and change into 
an organisation whose work is determined by the needs of society.502 Today, 
community policing is the core task, at the heart of Dutch police organisation.503 
However, in addition to the classic focus on geographical areas, e.g. villages or 
neighbourhoods in towns and cities, the police has also expanded their attention 
to “policing of communities” which also incorporates policing non-geographic 
communities such as social networks, the (organised) business sector (retailers 
associations, business centres, and trade organisations, etc.), social groups and 
social organisations (health care organisations, schools, cultural organisations, 
etc.).504 
 
Although community policing has become one of the leading Western police 
strategies, there is no commonly agreed definition,505 leading to various concepts 
or interpretations.506 Punch, Van der Vijver and Zoomer note that community 
policing has even become an ‘ill-defined concept that may mean different things 
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in different countries, or even within a country.’507 As a result, community 
policing varies from country to country, and from police force to police force.508 
Eck and Rosenbaum conclude community policing has become some sort of 
container-notion.509 According to Bayley, community policing therefore ‘means 
different things to different people.’510 Manning calls it a “semantic sponge”,511 
while Klockars refers to it as rhetoric.512 
 
Although community policing may mean ‘different things to different people,’513 
there are some useful and often cited characterisations. Friedmann describes 
community policing as: ‘a policy and a strategy aimed at achieving more effective 
and efficient crime control, reduced fear of crime, improved quality of life, 
improved police services and police legitimacy, through a proactive reliance on 
community resources that seeks to change crime causing conditions. It assumes a 
need for greater accountability of police, greater public share in decision-making 
and greater concerns for civil rights and liberties.514 Another characterisation is 
provided by the “intellectual founding fathers” of community policing, Troja-
nowitz and Buequeroux. They underline that community policing is primarily a 
police philosophy: ‘which emphasises the working partnership between police 
officers and citizens in creative ways in order to solve community problems 
relating to crime, fear of crime, and neighbourhood disturbances.’515 According 
to Skogan, this cooperative, proactive, and problem-solving approach requires a 
decentralised organisational concept that empowers police officers to serve their 
communities effectively.516 Skogan and Harnett therefore relate community 
policing to ‘organisational decentralisation and a reorientation of patrol in order 
to facilitate two-way communication between police and public, [which] assumes 
a commitment to a broadly focused, problem-oriented policing and requires that 
the police will be responsive to citizens’ demands when they decide what local 
problems are and set their priorities. It also implies a commitment to helping 
neighbourhoods solve crime problems on their own, though community 
organisations and crime prevention programmes.’517 
 
In sum, in community policing the police seek to formalise the maintenance of 
order and crime prevention aspects of their work by increasing citizen involve-
ment and community familiarity, implementing geographical and organisational 
decentralisation including officers’ wider discretion to adjust their activities to 
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local conditions, and by adopting problem-solving techniques.518 Bayley captures 
these core elements in the acronym “CAMPS” which stands for: consultation, 
adaptation, mobilisation and problem solving. Communities are consulted. Police 
services adapt by becoming decentralised and locally responsive. The public and 
other partners and agencies are mobilised in efforts to address crime problems since 
the police cannot deal with them effectively on their own. Patterns of crime and 
disorder problems are identified and solved proactively in the aggregate rather than 
simply as a series of individual incidents calling for a response.519 
4.2.1.2 Intelligence 
Policing is largely an intelligence-driven activity. It focuses on the identification 
and analyses of significant problems involving criminality and community 
unsafety.520 The focus on the identification and analysis of public security 
problems evolved after Goldstein introduced the concept of problem-oriented 
policing in 1979.521 
 
Problem-oriented policing elaborated on community policing and supplied it 
with a clear methodology to approach those problems.522Whereas community 
policing stresses community engagement in identifying and prioritising a broad 
range of neighbourhood problems, problem-oriented policing focuses on the 
identification of patterns of crimes by using analytic data systems.523 It can be seen 
as complementary to community policing as it puts the community policing 
philosophy into practice.524 According to Goldstein, problem-oriented policing is 
helping the police to move towards a more proactive problem-solving attitude 
and approach.525 In his view, policing is all about dealing with behavioural and 
social problems that arise in a community.526 Goldstein does not expect the 
police to solve all those problems, however. Rather, he thinks ‘it is more realistic 
to aim at reducing their volume, preventing repetition, alleviating suffering, and 
minimising the other adverse effects they produce.’527 Because the police cannot 
solve or eliminate every problem that affects communal life, problem-oriented 
policing seeks to recognise and define the underlying causes of incidents of crime 
and disorder systematically. After their identification, these problems are 
thoroughly analysed and understood in order to develop and implement 
                                               
518 Bayley (1994), pp. 102-115; Crank & Langworthy (1996), p. 214; Rosenbaum (1998), p. 
7; Skogan (2004), pp. xxiv-xxv; Skogan (2005), pp. 74-76; Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 
(1990), pp. xiii-xv. 
519 Tilley (2003), p. 316. 
520 Versteegh (2005), p. 13. 
521 Goldstein (2005). 
522 Punch, Van der Vijver & Zoomer (2002), p. 61. 
523 Skogan (2005), p. 76; Tilley (2003), p. 320. 
524 Peak & Glensor (1999), p. 83. 
525 Goldstein (2005), p. 393. 
526 Goldstein (2005), p. 396. 
527 Goldstein (2005), p. 396. 
89
BEYOND BORDERS 
alternative response strategies. Finally, the police assess the effectiveness of its 
strategies.528 
 
Because problem-oriented policing requires information to produce intelligence 
for targeted action,529 it has become the forerunner of Intelligence Led Policing 
(ILP).530 ILP originated in the United Kingdom and dates from the early 
1990s.531 The essence of ILP is that it helps to prevent the police from operating 
with a short-term focus only.532 ILP first collects information in order to produce 
“intelligence” which is then used to direct the activities of police units and 
individual officers proactively to disrupt, disable, or undermine criminal behav-
iour.533 By analysing information first, it focuses the police to decide what courses 
of action they need to follow. ILP thus rationalises police work and directs 
individual policing on specified goals and targets, measured by specified out-
comes.534 
 
There are several definitions of ILP. According to Tilley, ILP involves ‘effec-
tively sourcing, assembling and analysing “intelligence” about criminals and their 
activities better to disrupt their offending, by targeting enforcement and patrol 
where it can be expected to yield highest dividends.’535 Like Tilley, Newburn 
defines ILP in terms of effectiveness. He regards ILP as ‘a model which serves to 
enhance the effectiveness of policing through a greater emphasis on the collection 
and analysis of intelligence and the development of targeted responses to that 
analyses.’536 Reiner places ILP within the wider concept of pre-emptive policing, 
which involves a strategy ‘of collecting and coordinating the low-level informa-
tion provided by patrolling.537 
 
The Dutch version of ILP is called Information-Driven Policing (Informatieges-
tuurde Politiezorg).538 The concept of Information-Driven Policing links the 
policing process and the information process and provides the police with a 
management tool that combines a problem-oriented approach of crime and 
insecurity with a process-oriented routine. It focuses on processing urgent public 
security problems by combining preventive and repressive tactics and involving 
citizens, local communities and governments, and public and private agencies and 
organisations. At the strategic top,539 data and information are used to formulate a 
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policy on crime-fighting while at the tactical level police management uses the 
information to prioritise investigations and other police interventions. At the 
operational level, problem-analyses are used to identify and analyse the magni-
tude, frequency and background of public security problems. As such, the police 
can obtain situational awareness of hot-spots, hot-areas and hot-times, as well as 
of frequent offenders and risk groups and individuals. At the police tactical level, 
information is processed and used to approach specific public security problems 
such as hotspots, individual criminal offenders or criminal groups. The opera-
tional information is used to brief and debrief police officers before and after their 
duties.540 
4.2.1.3 Cooperation 
To promote a safe and secure society, the police need to be capable of organising 
social action and mobilising other parties in society for cooperation if neces-
sary.541 This cooperation has two dimensions: police-citizenry cooperation and 
inter-agency cooperation. 
 
The focus on police-citizenry cooperation emerged with the introduction of 
community policing in the 1980s. Foremost, community policing draws on the 
cooperation, collaboration and partnership between police and citizens in the 
definition of crime problems and in focusing police activities to prevent and 
control crime and public disorder.542 To establish effective cooperation, the 
police have to consult the community, enhance constructive information sharing, 
build trust, and involve them in setting public safety priorities.543 A precondition 
for police-community cooperation and coordination is the establishment of 
structural relationships with key partners in the community,544 such as local 
government, social service and community agencies, families, schools, civic and 
community groups, and neighbourhood and merchants associations. 
 
Community policing is also based on the premise that crime cannot be prevented 
or solved without the active assistance of the public. Community policing 
therefore requires the mobilisation and empowerment of communities so that 
they can act in their own defence and to share policing responsibility with the 
police.545 This turns communities into active co-producers of neighbourhood 
safety and security.546 They serve as eyes and ears, and as auxiliary to the police.547 
They also participate actively in the definition of security needs, advise about 
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problems requiring attention, give information to the police about suspicious 
persons, patrol neighbourhoods, maintain the physical environment, mediate 
disputes and quarrels, install security devices, and persuade fellow residents to 
adhere to community norms of propriety.548 Community policing thus stresses 
policing with and for the community rather than policing of the community.549  
 
There are two major conditions for an effective police-community partnership, 
namely mutual trust and police legitimacy. Trust facilitates greater community 
interaction, which in turn facilitates police-citizenry communication, which leads 
to greater trust, and so on.550 Police legitimacy is established when the police take 
community needs and their problems into account in the execution of their 
duties and when the police are effective in their actions and communication.551 
 
Police-community partnerships could also involve some problems.  
The first problem – and perhaps the most fundamental weakness – is the 
definition of a “community”. In community policing, the term community is 
often defined or perceived as a ‘homogeneous entity, close-knit, non-schismatic 
and devoid of tension and conflict.’ In reality, this is seldom true, as Ellison 
notes.552 Communities are often divided, intolerant, and of heterogeneous social, 
ethnic or religious composition, especially in many Western societies. The 
collective feeling of responsibility for one’s neighbourhood is often low, which 
makes it difficult for the police to find and establish structural partnerships. 
Because the level of self-organisation of citizens turned out less than expected, 
partnerships have been established with institutionalised bodies, such as local 
government, public agencies, private organisations and public associations.553 
Second, communities nowadays are not bound to a specific geographical territory 
anymore. Communities have become virtual or interact in wider (international) 
networks that reach beyond local communities.554 
A third issue in community policing is that police officers have to be able to 
switch between cooperation with community members and enforcement of law 
and order, if required. It may then be difficult to re-establish and redefine the 
relationship in terms of community engagement.555 
 
Despite these problems, Bayley and Shearing are still convinced that community 
policing must be the “organising paradigm” of police and public partnership to 
prevent crime and disorder, especially in poor and high crime neighbourhoods.556 
Terpstra too adds that community policing must also be seen as the most likely 
and effective answer to an increasing diversification of life-styles and social 
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fragmentation in today’s society. Nowadays, society articulates the accountability 
and responsibility of individual citizens. Community policing could therefore 
help to hold citizens accountable for their relationship and cooperation with the 
police.557 
 
Fragmentation of policing further increased the need for institutional coopera-
tion. Since the 1990s, policing is part of a wider “security system” in which the 
police and other organisations cooperate in chains or in networks.558 These chains 
and networks draw on an inter-agency approach in which the police are just one 
of the providers of security and therefore requires the involvement of several 
other partners, both public and private, to deal with security related community 
problems effectively and efficiently.559 To create a safe and secure society, the 
police depend on the contributions and participation of those actors and these 
institutions. Working in networks and chains therefore demands that partners 
agree on their contributions, commit to their engagements, and are held 
accountable for their outcomes.560 In the Netherlands, for example, municipali-
ties have become a central actor in a network of public or private agencies to 
improve community safety and security.561 In that sense, security has become a 
“nodal security synthesis” in which security is provided through a network of 
public and private institutions and agencies, non-governmental organisations and 
civilian associations.562 According to Ericson and Haggerty, in these networks, 
the police are no longer primarily concerned with law enforcement and public 
order, but have moved towards information brokering within a patchwork of 
organisations and individuals.563 
4.2.1.4 Use of force 
In democratic societies, there is a “social contract” between the state and its 
citizens. In the tradition of Hobbes and Rousseau, citizens restrain from some of 
their individual liberties in return for security provided by the state through 
which every citizen is able to enjoy an “optimal” level of peace, prosperity and 
liberty.564 One of the most fundamental tasks of the state is thus to provide 
internal and external security to protect its vital interests, such as the continuation 
of democratic polity and values, and to guarantee the safety of its citizens and 
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integrity of its territory.565 Ideally, the state’s security is guaranteed through 
political, social, economical and legal arrangements. However, when the interests 
are at stake, a state could use force or coercion ‘to inflict, deter, and absorb 
physical violence when and if this should become necessary or advantageous.’566 
 
To absorb or eliminate these threats the state can use its coercive powers or 
strong-arm: the police and the military. In this capacity, they both have a 
monopoly on the use of force. According to Van Eekelen and Muller, however, 
there is a difference in the intensity and manner how these institutions apply their 
monopoly, noting that the armed forces are the ultimate instrument to preserve 
the state’s power: ‘Not the police, but the Army, Air Force and the Navy have 
the true monopoly of power in a more instrumental sense.’567 Rosenthal has a 
similar view of the division of powers between the police and the military: 
‘Within the institutional framework from which the state exercises its monopoly 
of power, the majority of the instruments of force are assigned to the military, 
the police follows in a considerable distance.’568 
 
Nevertheless, the police are the state’s internal monopolists in the exercise of 
legitimate force.569 According to Bayley, the democratic authorisation to use 
force is the most fundamental characteristic of the police. He emphasises that the 
authorisation to use force in society is exclusively assigned to the police and to no 
other institution. He regards this authorisation as one of the core characteristics of 
the police.570 Bittner also places the authorisation to use force as a central 
characteristic of the police: ‘The policeman, and the policeman only, is equipped, 
entitled, and required to deal with every exigency in which force may have to be 
used, to meet it.’571 
 
The use of force by the police is codified by international law, for example the 
UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials of 1979 and the UN Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force and Fire Arms by Law Enforcement Officials. Article 7 of 
the UN Code of Conduct demands that the use of force by police officers is only 
permitted in case of necessity and in relationship to their formal assignment.572 
 
In the Netherlands, Article 7 of the Police Act of 2012 authorises the police 
officer to use force in the lawful exercise of his duty only if the intended goal is 
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(2006), p. 7; Rosenthal (2007), pp. 40-41; Welten (2000), pp. 15-16. 
570 Bayley (1985), p. 7. 
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justified and cannot be achieved in an alternative way.573 In accordance with this 
article, the Dutch police are allowed to use force only when in accordance with 
the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity.574 Proportionality implies that 
‘the authorisation to use force is conferred upon the policeman with the mere 
proviso that force will be used in amounts measured not to exceed the necessary 
minimum of force, as determined by an intuitive grasp of the situation.’575 
Subsidiarity means that the necessity for the use of a particular instrument of 
force has to be weighed against other, less forceful means.576 This implies that the 
use of firearms is considered to be an extreme measure.577 Use of force also has to 
be fair and reasonable, which means that the integrity of persons and goods has to 
be respected as much as possible.578 Furthermore, police officers are authorised to 
use force only if they are trained in the use of force and the use of the particular 
instrument of force.579 Policing thus requires skills of ‘retaining resort to force 
seeking to avoid its use, and using it only in minimal amounts.’580 Finally, every 
instance in which force is used should be reported in the chain of command and 
to the competent authorities.581 
 
The Ambtsinstructie voor de politie (Professional Instruction for the Police) regulates 
the use of force for the Dutch police, and provides an exhaustive list of police 
weaponry and describes the conditions under which the police are authorised to 
use them. For daily policing, individual police officers are equipped with side 
arms and non-lethal weapons like truncheons and pepper-sprays.582 To restore 
(large-scale) public disorder the police may resort to the use of tear-gas, water 
cannons, and police dogs.583 To arrest armed criminals or terrorists the police 
may resort to “paramilitary” equipment and tactics and opt for a higher level of 
weaponry, such as automatic weapons or long-distance precision riffles.584 
4.2.2  Organisational concept 
An organisational concept relates to organisational design or the structure of the 
organisation. According to Mintzberg, an organisational structure is the set of 
arrangements to divide labour into separate tasks and the mechanisms necessary to 
coordinate these tasks.585 Heffron discerns three dimensions by which the 
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structure of an organisation can be characterised: formalisation, centralisation and 
complexity. Formalisation refers to the extent to which jobs, activities, and 
organisational behaviour are standardised. Centralisation relates to the degree of 
concentration of decision-making authority and control in the organisation. 
Complexity, finally, refers to the degree of horizontal and vertical differentiation 
and the level of geographical differentiation.586 Traditionally, the structure of the 
police organisations fit that of the machine bureaucracy, having formalised and 
standardised rules, procedures, regulations and job-descriptions to control action, 
a centralised, hierarchical top-down command-and-control structure to allocate 
resources and to manage the daily operations.587  
 
As mentioned earlier, the introduction of community policing influenced the 
traditional model of the police organisation significantly. The traditional police 
model turned out to be inadequate to deal effectively with fundamental changes 
in society that emerged during the 1970s.588 Apart from cooperating with the 
community to deal with crime and order related problems effectively, commu-
nity policing also emphasised organisational reform.589 This reform largely related 
to the dimensions of centralisation and complexity. In terms of centralisation, 
community policing focuses on decentralisation of authority to empower the 
individual police officers. In terms of complexity, community policing intends to 
reduce the level of vertical differentiation by minimising the length of hierarchi-
cal structure and by enlarging the geographical dispersion of police units.590 
Because the implementation of community policing influenced contemporary 
police and policing, this study applies the organisational characteristics of 
community policing to describe the organisational concept of the police 
organisation: decentralisation of authority, vertical differentiation and geographi-
cal differentiation. 
4.2.2.1 Decentralisation of authority 
Policing can be described as an individualistic activity. Individualism is ‘the 
degree to which individuals are integrated into groups.’591 Whereas the individual 
soldier is expected to function exclusively as part of a larger unit, the individual 
police officer has to do the job alone. Apart from exceptional situations, e.g., 
riots, arrests of armed criminals or large-scale public assistance, the police officer 
does not work as part of a larger unit in a military sense.592 In their everyday 
operations, they have to act more or less autonomously. They make their own 
decisions, relatively independent of others and from the formal chain of com-
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588 See for example: Easton (2001), pp. 54-57; Peak & Glensor (1999), pp. 13-14; Ponsaers 
(2001), pp. 473-479. 
589 Bayley & Shearing (1996), p. 604; Peak & Glensor (1999), p. 80. 
590 See for example: Easton (2001); Skogan & Freydl (2004); Skolnick & Bayley (1986); Tilley 
(2003). 
591 http://www.geert-hofstede.com; accessed March 1, 2011. 
592 Auten (1981), p. 72. 
96
THE POLICE AND THE MILITARY: A COMPARISON 
 
mand.593 This is what Crank and Langworthy, in this context define as “loose 
coupling”: ‘a loosely articulated relationship between the formal goals and the 
purposes of the organization, and the day-to-day behaviours of line-level 
personnel.’594 
 
An expression of individuality is the – almost universal – need of police officers 
to acquire professional autonomy or discretion to interpret and solve situations in 
what they find the most effective, irrespective formal regulations or policies.595 
Police officers can thus be characterised as “street-level bureaucrats”, who, 
according to Lipsky, are ‘public service workers who interact directly with 
citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion in the 
execution of their work.’596 
 
In community policing, police officers are further encouraged to develop 
individual awareness and responsibility, to move away from formal routines and 
procedures, and to use discretion and take initiative in finding solutions unique 
for the communities they serve.597 This discretion pushes operational and tactical 
decision making to the lower levels of the organisation and requires particular 
styles of supervision.598 Participative management is greatly increased, and fewer 
levels of authority are required to administer the organisation; middle-
management layers are reduced.599 In community policing, empowerment will 
result in loosely coupled relationships between the central authority and street-
level police officers. Crank and Langworthy warn, however, that such loose 
coupling may result in fragmentation of institutional authority and in decoupling 
with the formal organisational structure.600 
 
However, the level of autonomy of the individual police officers appears to be 
changing since the 1990s and police organisations tend to become more 
                                               
593 See for example; Haltiner (2003b), p. 166; Soeters (2000), p. 471. 
594 Crank & Langworthy (1996), p. 217. 
595 See for example: Lipsky (1980); Manning (1995); Punch, Tieleman & Van den Berg 
(1999); Reiner (1997); Sykes & Brent (1980); Van der Vijver & Terpstra (2007), pp. 369-
370. 
596 Lipsky (1980), p. 3. Street-level bureaucrats often face a huge caseload in combination with 
a deficit of adequate resources to execute the tasks assigned to them. They also have to deal 
with ambiguous and conflicting agency goals that also interfere with the practice of daily 
life. To deal with those situations effectively, ‘the decisions of street level bureaucrats, the 
routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work 
pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry out’ (Lipsky (1980), p. xii). 
597 Goldstein (2005); Peak & Glensor (1999), pp. 20-21; Skogan (2005), p. 75; Skogan & 
Hartnett (2005), p. 430. 
598 Bayley & Shearing (1996), p. 604. 
599 Peak & Glensor (1999), pp. 20-21. 
600 Crank and Langworthy note that community policing results in “fragmented centralisa-
tion”. They argue that however community policing is ‘intended to look local, it is central-
ist in origins, sponsorship, and intellectual leadership.’ Additional command structures are 
created to deal with geographical differentiation and functional complexity effectively 
(Crank & Langworthy (1996), pp. 223-224). 
97
BEYOND BORDERS 
centralised.601 The introduction of ILP, for example, enhanced the grip of police 
managers on operational policing. ILP ideally tries to increase public security and 
reduce crime and disorder in society through strategic choices based upon solid 
research and information analysis.602 It also intends to improve the flow of 
information up and down the chain of command.603 Authors like Ericson and 
Haggarty and Kampschreur argue that ILP and information technology reinforce 
directive control over police officers and hardly improves bottom-up processes. 
Rather, ILP strengthens top-down control and enhance bureaucratic tendencies 
due to fixed reporting rules and formats.604 The introduction of ILP also 
strengthened the position of the middle management. Through ILP, the middle 
management is directly involved in the management of daily policing, having a 
better insight into and influence on the activities and achievements of police 
officers. As such, middle managers have become a linking pin between the police 
managers at the top and the operational level at the bottom of the police 
organisation, which helps to reinforce operational control of policing.605 
 
Also the introduction of NPM in the 1990s enhanced centralising tendencies 
within the police organisation. Under the influence of NPM the leading 
management orientation shifted from input-oriented control to a focus on 
outputs and outcomes, and efficiency and effectiveness. Since, police work has 
been translated into products, quantitative targets and performance contracts.606 
Police officers are being tasked with achieving individual targets for which they 
are held accountable. As such, the introduction of NPM has helped to redefine 
the traditional gap between street and management officers as defined by Reuss-
Ianni and Ianni.607 According to Hoogenboom the focus on outputs, account-
ability and responsibility has increased the grip police management on operational 
policing and reduced the discretionary powers of street cops.608 
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4.2.2.2 Vertical differentiation 
The second organisational feature of community policing is the reduction of 
vertical differentiation.609 According to Heffron, vertical differentiation refers to 
the ‘nature and depth of the hierarchical structure created to coordinate the 
groupings achieved through departimentation.’610 Community policing intends 
to increase police responsiveness to community problems and expectations. For 
that purpose, it advocates a minimisation of the bureaucracy and a shortening of 
the lines of communications within the police organisation in order to speed up 
internal and external communication, and to improve internal consultation based 
upon expertise rather than seniority.611 The implementation of community 
policing therefore often resulted in flatter organisational structures, for example 
by compressing the rank structure, reducing the hierarchical chain of command 
within the organisation, and by declining social distance between top and base.612 
 
As of 2013, the Dutch national police force has five hierarchical levels.613 At the 
top, there is the national Chief of Police and his board who are responsible for 
the overall management and control of the police organisation. The second level 
consists of ten regional units. These regional units are assigned to fulfil the 
operational tasks in their area of responsibility. Each regional unit consists of a 
number of territorial districts and central departments, such as an Investigations 
Service and a Regional Operational Centre. A district further divides into local 
teams (basiseenheden). The local team (60 to 200 police officers) is the foundation 
for local policing and is responsible for performing independently the majority of 
the core tasks of the police, such as community policing, public order, law 
enforcement, emergency assistance, intake, and service. Finally, there is the 
individual police officer as the most basic level of the police force. The individual 
police officer has a general assignment and could, if required, be assigned to 
execute additional specialist tasks, for example related to frequent offenders or 
youth related problems.614 
 
Although five hierarchical levels in a national police force (with an overall 
strength of around 58,500),615 is not exceptional, Fijnaut argues that in compari-
son to some foreign modern police forces, these levels could be further re-
duced.616 Fijnaut considers the current structure over-organised, which to his 
opinion could lead to bureaucratic problems and hamper the effectiveness and 
innovation in the future. He argues that a force of four levels would have been 
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99
BEYOND BORDERS 
more appropriate. He therefore suggests reforming the regional units and districts 
into one level of robust districts in the twenty-five larger towns in the Nether-
lands in order to prevent operational disintegration and disorganisation within the 
larger cities, which would make these districts more congruent with the current 
structure and culture of the Dutch society and its public administration.617 By 
pointing at the option to further reduce the vertical differentiation of the Dutch 
police organisation, Fijnaut underlines the premise that policing requires a flat 
organisation and short lines of communication in order to serve public and other 
(municipal) stakeholders effectively and efficiently. 
4.2.2.3 Geographical differentiation 
The third important dimension of institutional change is related to deconcentra-
tion or geographic differentiation.618 Heffron defines deconcentration as ‘the 
extent to which the organisation is physically divided into geographically 
separated units.’619 Effective community policing requires the physical decentrali-
sation of police units or individual police officers to fixed and specific geographic 
areas for extended periods. It is assumed that deconcentration will create a “turf 
orientation”.620 It will facilitate the development of localised solutions to 
neighbourhood problems and will improve communication and relationships 
with neighbourhood residents. It is also believed that deconcentration increases 
the police officer’s ability to act proactively to community problems; to enhance 
their accountability to the citizens in that area for responding to those prob-
lems,621 and to increase public trust.622 
 
In the Netherlands, territorial police units (teams) and individual police officers, 
such as municipality officers, are assigned to distinct geographical areas, e.g. 
villages or neighbourhoods in towns and cities.623 According to the Dutch 
Referentiekader gebiedsgebonden politie (Frame of Reference for Community 
Policing), these areas are ideally as small as possible to enable an effective 
exchange of information and cooperation between the police and community 
members and public and private institutions and organisations.624 Within these 
areas, the police organise their ‘permanent availability for interventions, project-
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based work and supervision of the infrastructure,’ as Dutch Chiefs of Police 
note.625 
4.3  The military organisation 
4.3.1  Operational concept 
4.3.1.1 Function 
Together with the police, the armed forces serve to protect the vital interests, 
stability, security, and integrity of the state.626 There is a difference in focus and 
locus between the two institutions, however. Whereas the police serve to protect 
the states’ internal order by enforcing the law and maintaining public order, the 
armed forces traditionally defend and protect the state against external threats. For 
that purpose, they primarily organise, prepare and deploy for waging war and 
preserving the international rule of law.627 In the Netherlands, the function of the 
armed forces is formalised in Article 97 of the Constitution: ‘There shall be 
armed forces for the defence and protection of the interests of the Kingdom, and 
in order to maintain and promote the international legal order.’628 The Defence 
White Paper of 2000 has further specifies the function of the armed forces by 
defining its three main tasks: 
 
1. Protecting the integrity of national and Allied territory, including the 
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba; 
2. Promoting stability and the international rule of law; 
3. Supporting civil authorities in upholding the law, providing disaster and 
humanitarian relief, both nationally and internationally.629 
 
The first main task involves the traditional task of the armed forces: territorial 
defence. For this purpose, the Dutch armed forces contribute to the military 
capabilities of NATO and EU in order to safeguard the territorial integrity of all 
member states. So far, a conventional attack by a hostile government on the 
NATO territory has been less likely. Instead, contemporary threats tend to be 
more indirect. To protect the population and the territory of the NATO 
member states against these threats, NATO forces are now authorised to deploy 
outside the treaty area in so-called out-of-area operations.630 
The second main task relates to international crisis management operations, 
which focuses on the restoration or promotion of the international legal order. 
Usually, these operations are conducted by regional organisations (e.g. NATO 
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101
BEYOND BORDERS 
and the EU) or by ad hoc coalitions [preferably] under the authorisation of the 
UN.631 
The third main task involves military assistance and support to civil authorities.632 
After 2001, the armed forces have become an integrated national security partner 
of the police, regional fire departments and medical aid authorities in order to 
assist and support civilian authorities during crisis and disaster management. Also 
internationally, the armed forces can deploy to support civilian authorities, for 
example through providing humanitarian aid and/or crisis and disaster manage-
ment.633 
 
Public security and military doctrine 
Following the third main task, the Dutch armed forces have to support civil 
authorities in upholding the law during international missions. Consequently, it 
could be argued that providing public security tasks, such as law enforcement and 
public order management, is an indispensable part of the mission of the NL 
Army. As explained in Chapter 3, a security gap could require military action to 
establish a basic level of public security in a (post) conflict environment. In order 
to examine the extent to which Dutch troops were involved in ensuring public 
security during recent crisis management operations, this section describes and 
analyses relevant military doctrines,634 these being the primary source for 
providing clarity regarding public security during these operations, for example 
by defining basic (operational) principles and preconditions. 
 
NL Army doctrine 
The NL Army doctrine Peace Operations of 1999 considers the restoration of the 
rule of law essential to establishing internal stability,635 which is in accordance 
with the Army’s core task to “support for civil authorities in upholding the law”. 
The doctrine regards the restoration of the rule of law a subset of military 
assistance.636 Military assistance as such intends to stabilise a crisis so that the 
people can live a normal and independent life in peace. It focuses on restoring 
and maintaining the sovereignty of the state, order and authority, and public 
services and utilities.637 
Within the framework of military assistance, the doctrine Peace Operations 
underlines that the provision of public security is first of all a responsibility of the 
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civilian police. Only in case there are no local or international police in place to 
ensure a basic level of public security, the military could provide some sort of 
interim policing.638 Nevertheless, military involvement should only occur in 
extraordinary circumstances and for a short period of time, and must be trans-
ferred to international or local police forces as soon as possible.639 
The doctrine Peace Operations discerns seven military assistance activities of which 
three relate to public security: “support for elections”, “forming local police and 
security units”, and “protecting individuals, groups and installations”.640 How-
ever, with the exception of “support for elections”, which involves the protec-
tion of polling stations and monitoring the elections,641 the Army rather leaves 
public security activities to other agencies or militaries, such as gendarmerie forces. 
Regarding “forming local police and security units”, the role of the Army is for 
example limited to supporting the international civilian police force in its 
responsibility to reform and train the local police. Only in exceptional circum-
stances, the Army sees a direct involvement in training and equipping the local 
police.642 However, the doctrine does not specify what these exceptional 
situations entail. Furthermore, the doctrine explains that cooperation with the 
international police force may also involve providing protection in dangerous 
situations and exchanging information.643 Finally, the doctrine regards “protect-
ing individuals, groups and installations” as a possible task within the framework 
of military assistance. Nevertheless, it also emphasises that this task is primarily the 
responsibility of the civilian police, and if the police are incapable of providing 
protection, the doctrine suggests assigning this task to gendarmerie forces like the 
Koninklijke Marechaussee,644 which largely excludes the deployment of regular 
troops. 
At the end of the section on military assistance, the doctrine mentions a number 
of additional public security tasks, noting that during military assistance opera-
tions it may be necessary to take ‘collective control measures’ initially. These 
measures could involve for example the proclamation of a curfew, deployment of 
patrols and the search of premises in order to deter violence and crime, to restrict 
the possibilities for demonstrations, to limit the illegal transport of weapons and 
smuggling, and to take indicted persons into custody.645 The doctrine does not 
elaborate on these tasks, however. Nor does it mention if these tasks are to be 
executed by the Army or by other forces, like gendarmerie forces or international 
police. 
Although providing ‘support to civil authorities in upholding the law’ during 
international missions is a core task of the NL Army and restoring the rule of law 
is seen as an essential activity during crisis management operations, in the 
doctrine Peace Operations the subject of public security remains little discussed. In 
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fact, the extent of attention given is incongruent with the status of a core task. 
The doctrine does not label the issue of public security as a main topic nor does it 
provide an answer to the question what the military should do in case of a 
deployment or and enforcement gap. It can be concluded that the doctrine 
regards public security only a secondary rather than a core task. 
 
The NL Army doctrine Combat Operations Part A: Fundamentals of 1998 also 
mentions some public security tasks. It explains that these tasks could occur 
during a post-conflict operation, which may consist of two distinct parts, namely 
a transition operation and a follow-up operation.646 During a transition operation, 
troops can be assigned to restoring public order and reconstructing infrastruc-
ture.647 In case of a follow-up operation, the doctrine foresees two possible public 
security tasks, namely “security tasks” and “restoring and maintaining public 
order and safety in cooperation with civil authorities”.648 However, the doctrine 
does not explain the character of these tasks, nor does it mention the kind of 
activities that these tasks should entail. In addition, the doctrine mentions 
“assisting in the return and shelter of displaced civilians or civilian evacuees” as a 
military task in a post conflict environment. This task could potentially involve 
public security activities, but the doctrine notes that it should be limited to 
providing support in terms of transport and registration.649 
 
The NL Army doctrine Combat Operations Part C: Irregular Combat of 2003 also 
mentions tasks and activities related to public security. The public security tasks 
mentioned involve activities that may occur during the various stages of 
escalation during operations against an irregular combatant.650 The military could 
be tasked to assist the local police to maintain law and order, for example in 
situations where the police lack the required skills, capacities and/or equipment. 
The tasks mentioned, for example, are deploying checkpoints, crowd and riot 
control, assisting with border control, the imposition of a curfew, searching of 
vehicles and premises, and the arrest and search of individuals.651 The doctrine 
also mentions combating organised crime as a possible task regarding irregular 
warfare. The close relationship between organised crime and insurgents and/or 
terrorists requires a coordinated effort of the military and the police. The 
doctrine suggests assigning combating crime to specialised forces such as the 
Koninklijke Marechaussee.652 Although the doctrine lists several public security 
tasks, they are not labelled as such. They are found in different sections, under 
                                               
646 Koninklijke Landmacht (1998), p. 130. 
647 Koninklijke Landmacht (1998), pp. 131-132. The doctrine mentions that in case of a post 
conflict operation, a commander – if possible – should deploy other units than those used 
during the combat operations. The doctrine stipulates that post conflict activities require a 
different mind-set and training than required for combat operations (Koninklijke Land-
macht (1998), p. 131). 
648 Koninklijke Landmacht (1998), p. 132. 
649 Koninklijke Landmacht (1998), p. 132. 
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control (Koninklijke Landmacht (2003), p. 455). 
651 Koninklijke Landmacht (2003), pp. 455-456, p. 546, pp. 615-616 & p. 666. 
652 Koninklijke Landmacht (2003), p. 467. 
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different headings instead of capturing and in a dedicated, comprehensive section 
or chapter. 
 
The 2009 Doctrine Publication 1: Military Doctrine for Land Action and the 2014 
Doctrine Publication 3.2: Land Operations do not mention public security tasks 
when listing a number of stabilisation activities. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the 
Military Doctrine for Land Action and Doctrine Publication 3.2: Land Operations 
distinguish four clusters of stability activities: “security and control”, ‘support to 
Security Sector Reform”, “initial restoration of services”, and ‘support to initial 
governance”.653 Nevertheless, the two doctrines do not specify these tasks in 
terms of possible public security tasks. In that sense, the tend to be more 
conceptual of character. They only provide a general direction instead of 
identifying possible tactical activities. For example, Doctrine Publication 3.2 
mentions that military units must be prepared to execute Security and Control in 
case local security services are not available or unable to establish a required level 
of security,654 but does not explain what these activities are and what the 
conditions are. For that purpose, the Doctrine Publication 3.2 refers to NATO 
doctrines.655 
 
NATO doctrine 
NATO too considers restoring the rule of law an essential requirement to 
establish internal stability.656 In its Allied Joint Doctrine for Peace Support Operations 
of 2010, NATO notes that military operations ‘will contribute to the overall aim 
of maintaining law and order.’657 Although NATO considers public security to 
be ‘a responsibility that rests ultimately with the police and civil authorities,’ it 
also articulates that ‘if a situation is degenerating, military enforcement may be 
necessary to restore the peace and to provide direct support to the police.’658 
However, NATO considers that interim policing is not a military task noting 
that: ‘In normal conditions, it is a mistake to use a soldier as a police officer, and 
vice versa.’659 Interim policing should therefore only occur in extraordinary 
circumstances and for a very short period.660 And, if the military will have to 
perform interim policing, NATO underlines that ‘such situations should be 
‘planned, force-packaged and trained for in advance.’661 
 
                                               
653 Koninklijke Landmacht (2009), pp. 144-147; Koninklijke Landmacht (2014), pp. 7-8 – 7-
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654 Koninklijke Landmacht (2014), p. 7-8. 
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656 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2010), p. 1-12. 
657 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2010), p. 3A-8. The Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterin-
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criminality and disorder (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2010), p. 1-6). 
658 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2010), p. 3A8. 
659 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2011), p. 3-25. 
660 Koninklijke Landmacht (1999), p. 292 & p. 297; North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
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Figure 4 Examples of military tasks within stability activities (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (2010), p. 3-5) 
 
 
NATO places the provision of public security within the framework of stabilisa-
tion activities. These activities ‘encompass actions undertaken by or in coordina-
tion with indigenous national authorities, mandated authorities or other civil 
agencies to maintain or bring about a safe environment.’662 The military’s main 
effort during stabilisation is ‘to contribute, along with other actors, to a safe and 
secure environment to enable non-military efforts.’663 The NATO doctrine Peace 
Support Operations distinguishes four military stabilisation roles: “security and 
control”, “support to Security Sector Reform”, support to initial restoration of 
services”, and “support to interim governance” (see Figure 4).664 The doctrine 
also lists a number of public security tasks that could be performed during 
stabilisation, although the doctrine ‘is not intended to be prescriptive or exhaus-
tive.’665 For greater detail, it refers to ATP-3.2.1.1 Guidance for the Conduct of 
Tactical Stability, Activities and Tasks of 2010.666 
 
NATO guidance ATP-3.2.1.1 also underlines that public security primarily is a 
responsibility of the local authorities and police. In case the local police fail to 
                                               
662 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2010), p. 3-3. 
663 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2010), p. 3-3. 
664 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2010), p. 3-4. 
665 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2010), p. 3A-1. 
666 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2010), p. 3A-1. 
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restore law and order, the military may provide direct support to the police.667 
Ideally, NATO assigns public order assistance tasks to Formed Police Units 
trained and skilled in providing law enforcement and public order management 
in the upper segments of the spectrum of police operations.668 The guideline lists 
and specifies a large number of tactical policing tasks that can be performed in 
particular during “security and control” and “support for interim governance”. 
During “security and control” these tasks could involve: 
 
- Patrolling to demonstrate military presence, to gain the confidence of the 
population, to gather information, investigate and check incidents and re-
ports and to identify and apprehend individuals;669 
- Route control to detect, limit and avoid threats directed against specific 
routes;670 
- Establishing and monitoring the compliance with curfews, for example after 
riots and public disturbances, to prevent civil movement in an area where a 
search or investigation is carried out, or to limit the freedom of movement to 
disrupt hostile groups;671 
- Crowd control during demonstrations, elections, and public and religious 
events;672 
- Cordon and search to isolate a specific area in order to find targeted 
individuals, equipment and documents;673 
- Protection of population, organisations, objects and properties, borders, and 
areas against hostile action;674 
- Control of movement of population, refugees and internal displaced 
persons;675 
- Inspections, searches and confiscations as part of a verification process linked 
to demilitarisation and arms control.676 
 
During “support for interim governance” the military could be tasked to public 
security, noting that ‘tasks within this category provide a broad range of activities 
to protect the civilian population, provide interim policing and crowd control, 
and secure critical infrastructure.’ These tasks are to be executed ‘both during and 
after direct armed conflict to ensure the long-term sustainability of any reform 
efforts.’677 These tasks may involve the following: 
 
                                               
667 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2012), p. 1-37. 
668 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2010), p. 3-17; North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(2012), pp. 1-37-1-38 & p. 2-3. 
669 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2012), pp. 4-3 – 4-8. 
670 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2012), pp. 4-11 – 4-16. 
671 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2012), pp. 4-21 – 4-24. 
672 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2012), pp. 4-24 – 4-40. 
673 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2012), pp. 4-48 – 4-52. 
674 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2012), pp. 4-59 – 4-67. 
675 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2012), pp. 4-71 – 4-80. 
676 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2012), pp. 4-80 – 4-89. 
677 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2012), p. 4-125. 
107
BEYOND BORDERS 
- Protecting vulnerable elements of the population (refugees, women, 
children, internally displaced persons); 
- Performing civil police functions, including investigating crimes and making 
arrests; 
- Locating and safeguarding key witnesses, documents, and other evidence 
related to key ongoing or potential investigations and prosecutions; 
- Controlling crowds, preventing looting, and managing civil disturbances; 
- Protecting and securing places of religious worship and cultural sites; 
- Protecting and securing critical infrastructure, natural resources, civil 
registries, and property ownership documents; 
- Protecting and securing strategically important institutions such as govern-
ment buildings, museums, religious sites, courthouses; 
- Secure records, storage equipment, and funds related to criminal justice and 
security institutions; 
- Training and mentoring of local police forces.678 
 
Whereas NATO prefers the deployment of Formed Police Units to provide 
interim policing, it has to be noted that these assets are relatively scarce as only a 
few NATO countries deploy gendarmerie forces. The question remains whether 
these units will be sufficient to restore and maintain public security in a volatile 
(post) conflict environment. Therefore, it may be necessary to deploy additional 
regular troops for this purpose. NATO appears to leave that option open, noting 
that only as ‘an exception, soldiers can be trained in law enforcement techniques 
to understand policing requirements so that they can provide effective support to 
the police when necessary.’679 
4.3.1.2 Intelligence 
Intelligence forms the basis for military operations. The intelligence function 
intends to increase knowledge about the environment in which military 
operations are conducted. Traditionally, this function focuses on producing 
information on the foreign powers, hostile or enemy forces and geographical 
areas in which military operations occur.680 Crisis management operations have a 
wider intelligence requirement. They involve the collection and processing of 
information on civilian and political aspects that may influence military activities, 
such as the historical, ethnic and cultural background of the mission area, local 
public opinions, perceptions, and feelings, ethnic and local tensions, public order 
and criminality, potential hotspots, attitudes and longer-term objectives of 
national, regional, local and international actors, media activities, and socio-
economic developments.681 The majority of information and intelligence will 
come from Human Intelligence (HUMINT) sources, collected through social 
                                               
678 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2012), pp. 4-125 – 4-126. 
679 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2012), p. 3A-8. 
680 Koninklijke Landmacht (1999), p. 118. 
681 Koninklijke Landmacht (1999), p. 118 & p. 178; Koninklijke Landmacht (2014), p. 7-9; 
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patrolling and interaction with the local population and local leaders.682 How-
ever, sensitive information – e.g. on the whereabouts of criminal suspects – will 
ideally be collected by Special Forces, as the NL Army doctrine notes.683 
 
In comparison to policing, the military intelligence function is not essentially 
problem-oriented. The Dutch doctrine for Peace Operations, for example, does 
not mention the option of a problem-oriented approach towards information 
collecting efforts. These efforts primarily focus on acquiring situational awareness 
necessary for the planning of military operations rather than collecting informa-
tion primarily required to solve local community problems. NATO’s Allied Joint 
Doctrine for Counterinsurgency of 2011, however, stipulates that effective and 
successful counter-insurgency strategies should be based upon a ‘shared under-
standing of the problem’ underlying the insurgency.684 It underpins that all 
intelligence efforts should be focused on understanding the local population, 
‘including its political, social and cultural organisation.’685 It also emphasises the 
need for criminal intelligence, noting that a ‘careful analysis of major criminal 
activities will need to be made and incorporated into any theatre assessments’686 
Hereby, NATO adopts a intelligence strategy that focuses on comparable aspects 
to the police in terms of problem-oriented policing. 
 
A characteristic of contemporary crisis management operations is that the military 
to a large extent collect their information overtly and that they are inclined to 
share information and intelligence with civilian and military partners in the area 
of operations.687 The exchange of information can be seen as a positive gesture 
towards other parties and civilian agencies involved in order to improve and 
restore mutual trust.688 However, the Dutch doctrine Peace Operations underlines 
that complete openness cannot be guaranteed at all times and under all circum-
stances. Commanders are advised to be selective in the exchange of information 
with local military and civilian actors, for example to ensure the safety of their 
own personnel and success of sensitive operations.689 On the other hand, civilian 
authorities and international agencies, such as non-governmental organisations, 
may be reluctant to share information with the international military too in order 
not to jeopardise their own independence. Therefore, the military will have to 
take these sensitivities into account and plan and execute intelligence efforts 
carefully and ‘on a case-by-case basis’ not to endanger carefully established 
relationships and trust, as NATO notes.690 
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The process of collecting and processing information has a fixed and cyclical 
pattern. In the Dutch military, the collection of intelligence is primarily a 
decentralised activity for which purpose units can be augmented with additional 
intelligence assets.691 The intelligence cycle starts with an initial intelligence 
requirement. This requirement results in an intelligence collection plan, which 
explains and formalises the commander’s intelligence priorities. The execution of 
the intelligence cycle is a responsibility of intelligence specialists at the level of 
battalion and higher. They monitor, coordinate, and control the collection 
process at the subordinate levels. The intelligence cycle consists of the four 
iterative steps: 
 
- Initiation; implying ‘establishing the information requirement, making a 
collection plan, issuing orders, making requests to adjacent and higher com-
mand levels and bringing in other parts of the intelligence organisation.’ 
- Collection; involving all activities from collecting and transmission of ‘informa-
tion to the processing centres and cells within the intelligence organisation.’ 
- Processing; entailing ‘converting the information into intelligence by register-
ing, evaluating, analysing, integrating and interpreting the information.’ 
- Distribution; covering the ‘timely transmission of intelligence, in the required 
form, by means of any suitable channel to those who need it.’692 
 
This cycle shows a resemblance with that of ILP. Like in ILP, the military 
intelligence cycle directs the operational processes, focuses and prioritises (future) 
action and efforts to achieve designated objectives at all organisational levels based 
on identified issues and requirements. 
4.3.1.3 Cooperation 
Multi-national cooperation is an important characteristic of contemporary crisis 
management operations and a prerequisite for success.693 To achieve this success, 
the military and civilian organisations have to coordinate their activities and 
cooperate as much as possible.694 Crisis management operations require an 
integral, multi-disciplinary, multi-agency approach in which multinational forces, 
international organisations, foreign national governmental departments, non-
governmental organisations, and local authorities and citizens at all levels 
participate and focus their efforts on achieving the desired end-state.695 This 
multi-agency approach is referred to as the “comprehensive approach”.696 This 
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approach is to ‘proactively coordinate the activities of a wide range of actors’ and 
‘seeks to stimulate a cooperative culture within a collaborative environment, 
while facilitating a shared understanding of the situation.’697 A comprehensive 
approach requires proactive action, a shared understanding, outcome-based 
thinking and cooperation.698 Within the comprehensive approach, the military 
primarily focus on establishing a safe and secure environment in which civilian 
actors and agencies can engage in various nation-building activities.699 
 
Formally, the responsibility for achieving a shared understanding and unity of 
effort rests with the civilian leadership appointed by the international organisa-
tion, which authorised the operation.700 In practice, however, the civilian 
leadership lacks the overarching hierarchical command structure to control and 
focus the unity of effort of the various actors.701 Furthermore, some civilian 
organisations, especially non-governmental organisations, fear to lose their 
independence in case their cooperation with the military intensifies.702 The 
objectives, agendas, responsibilities, structure and culture of various (interna-
tional) organisations involved also may differ importantly; they could even 
conflict.703 Therefore, inter-agency cooperation is often limited to a tight or 
loose form of coordination, exchange of information and de-confliction of 
activities.704 For example, unity of effort can be achieved through a Memoran-
dum of Understanding between the organisations involved, co-location of staff of 
military and civilian organisations, establishing mutual liaison, and joint briefings 
and discussions to clarify each other’s objectives.705 
 
Besides inter-agency cooperation and coordination, public support is seen as a 
prerequisite for success and achieving the mission’s end-state.706 A “hearts and 
minds” campaign can contribute to creating civil support for the overall 
operation.707 A “hearts and minds” campaign may involve various activities such 
as providing (public) security and immaterial and material support (for example 
by improving conditions of life and reconstructing public services and utilities).708 
Obtaining the support of the population and winning their hearts and minds is 
mentioned in literature on counter-insurgency. NATO’s Allied Joint Doctrine for 
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Counterinsurgency notes that, above all, ‘the population is the critical dimension of 
successful [counter-insurgency].’709 It also underlines that a ‘successful [counter-
insurgency] strategy requires close cooperation between civil and military 
authorities at all levels,710 although the doctrine does not specifically elaborate on 
cooperation or interaction between the military and the local population or their 
representatives. 
 
The Dutch Military Doctrine for Land Operations also mentions the need for local 
contacts, underlining that in order to understand the needs of the population and 
various authorities, the military have to establish effective networks to get a clear 
view of the interests, relationships, and key leaders of the various ethnic, 
religious, cultural, political, or tribal entities within the area of operations.711 An 
important instrument in that matter is Civilian-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) 
which can be deployed at all levels of the military chain of command, either by 
specialists or by regular troops.712 CIMIC can, for example, help improving the 
relationship with the local civil authorities and the population. In this regard, 
CIMIC activities may help to win local hearts and minds in order to establish or 
increase the support and trust of the indigenous authorities and populace for the 
objective of the international mission.713 In addition to establishing local 
networks, CIMIC activities can also focus on enhancing interagency cooperation 
between the multi-national military force and the various international govern-
mental organisations, agencies, and authorities that are deployed within the 
mission area. 
 
Kilcullen also underlines the importance of military-community interaction.714 In 
his Twenty-Eight Articles he stipulates that military commanders should know their 
turf, meaning that they should invest in understanding the population and their 
leaders in terms of history, religion, and culture, and grievances.715 Then he 
advises commanders to deploy and live in close proximity of the population in 
order to ‘establish links with the locals.’ 716 He also emphasises the importance of 
building trusted networks to win the hearts and minds of the population. These 
networks should include ‘local allies, community leaders, local security forces, 
non-governmental organisations and other friendly or neutral actors in [the] area, 
and the media.’ To stress the importance of building local networks, Kilcullen 
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calls them ‘the true main effort’ of a counter-insurgency campaign. Everything 
else is of secondary importance, he notes.717 
4.3.1.4 Use of force 
The ability to use force is likely the most prominent characteristic of the military 
organisation,718 and provides the military its primary raison d’être.719 According to 
the Dutch Army doctrine Land Operations, it ultimately involves the use of deadly 
force in a military context.720 However, soldiering is more than fighting conflicts 
and applying force. Today, the leading principle during peace support, counter-
insurgency and stabilisation is to limit the use of force as much as possible.721 
Military action is about effects and a desired end-goal and is achieved by showing 
force rather than applying it. The use of force is therefore the ultimate remedy in 
case there are no other options left to solve a critical situation peacefully.722 
 
Legitimacy is a vital aspect for conducting military operations.723 The use of 
military force is therefore constrained by national and international law and 
regulations, and political arrangements.724 Legitimacy of military force implies 
that ‘(1) the military require a legal base for their (domestic and international) 
operations; and that (2) these operations, when conducted, comply with the 
applicable legal regimes.’725 
 
The legal base for the use of military force (ius ad bellum) is first and foremost 
found in the UN Charter of 1945. In principle, the use or threat of force in 
inter-state relations is prohibited, as Article 2(4) of the Charter notes: ‘All 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.726 The 
Charter urges states ‘to seek a solution by peaceful means, such as negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional 
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.727 
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Although Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the use of military force in 
international disputes, the UN Charter and International Human Rights Law 
provide three accepted exceptions when the use of force is legitimated:728 
 
1. Intervention with the consent of, or invitation by a (host) nation; 
2. Authorisation of the UN Security Council under Chapter 7 of the UN 
Charter; 
3. In case of individual or collective self-defence. 
 
The use of force during an armed conflict is regulated through legal regimes, such 
as international human rights law, the law of armed conflict, and the relevant rules 
of engagement.729  
International human rights law is the first regime that controls the use of force by 
the state. Ducheine and Pouw note that if states act outside their territory, their 
action may affect individual human rights. This may involve the action of “state 
agent authority”, for example when state agents are involved in the arrest, 
detention, or abduction of individuals outside the state’s territory; or in case of 
“effective control of an area”, for example during a military occupation or a UN 
mandated operation.730 During “state agent authority” and “effective control of 
an area”, human rights treaties will be applicable, and, consequently, ‘human 
rights obligations may influence the conduct of operations in general and, the use 
of force in particular.’731 
The second legal regime for the control of military force involves the law of 
armed conflict which are based upon a series of international agreements, 
conventions and treaties, such as The Hague Conventions of 1907, the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, and the Additional Protocols I and II of 1977.732 The Law 
of Armed Conflict form the primary legal regime regarding military activities 
during an armed conflict and once an armed conflict started, it automatically 
applies to all parties involved.733 Although contemporary crisis management 
operations are often not formally labelled as armed conflicts, NATO member 
states de facto apply the restrictions on the use of force as formalised by the Law of 
Armed Conflict.734 The Law of Armed Conflict provide five fundamental 
principles to control the use of military force during an armed conflict (or 
                                               
728 Dinstein (2005), p. 88; Simma (1999), p. 2. 
729 Ducheine & Pouw (2012a), p. 67; Koninklijke Landmacht (2009), p. 42. 
730 Ducheine & Pouw (2012a), p. 69. 
731 Ducheine & Pouw (2012a), p. 69. See also: Ducheine & Pouw (2010), p. 16-27. 
732 Koninklijke Landmacht (1998), p. 20; Kroon & Jacobs (1997), p. 127. See also: Ducheine 
& Walgemoed (2005), pp. 61-62. 
733 Ducheine & Pouw (2012a), p. 71; Eiting & Van Duurling (1998), p. 178; Kroon & Jacobs 
(1997), p. 127. 
734 Ducheine & Pouw (2010), p. 42; Koninklijke Landmacht (2009), p. 46. For example, in 
case of the SFIR operation in Iraq the Dutch government stated that Dutch troops were 
submitted to the rules of international humanitarian law (Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, 
nr. 117, p. 22). 
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military operation), namely military necessity, humanity, distinction, proportion-
ality, and chivalry.735 
Rules of engagement form the third instrument to control and direct the use of 
force by the military. The NL Army defines rules of engagement as the ‘rules for 
the application and use of force with military means, set for a specific opera-
tion.’736 Gill and Fleck provide another, more elaborate, definition. They 
describe the rules as ‘orders and directives that are intended to ensure command-
ers and their subordinates use only such force or other measures as are necessary, 
appropriate and authorised by higher command.’737 Rules of engagement always 
comply with the five fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict,738 
and are used in all types of operations: during an armed conflict as well as in a 
peace operation.739 The rules of engagement mainly serve two goals. First, they 
provide commanders a practical framework for the use of force. They inform 
troops about the restrictions and discretion in performing their tasks and use of 
force.740 Second, they help national authorities to supervise and control the use of 
military force within the political and legal framework.741 The rules of engage-
ment do not restrict the explicit authority and right of a soldier to use every 
available, necessary means and take all appropriate measures to ensure the self-
defence of his unit or of allied troops in the immediate vicinity,742 for example in 
case of self-defence against a hostile act or a hostile intent.743 In both cases, troops 
are authorised to use all necessary means to deter or neutralise the (potential) 
opponent as long the principles of proportionality and necessity are applied.744 
                                               
735 Military necessity implies that military operations must be focused at diminishing the 
military power of the opponent in order to achieve a military objective. Humanity means 
that those who do not participate in the conflict have to be spared and that all persons must 
be treated humanely. Distinction entails that attacks are permissible as long as they focus at 
military targets and/or military or armed opponents. Proportionality involves that the use-
of-force must be limited to the minimum required to achieve the military objective and 
that collateral damage must be prevented as much as possible. Chivalry implies that com-
mitting acts of subversion is prohibited (Koninklijke Landmacht (2009), p. 47. See also: 
Ducheine & Pouw (2012a), pp. 74-75; Ducheine & Pouw (2010), p. 42). 
736 Koninklijke Landmacht (1996), p. 276. 
737 Gill & Fleck (2010), p. 586. 
738 Koninklijke Landmacht (2009), p. 47. 
739 Ducheine & Pouw (2012a), p. 75; Koninklijke Landmacht (1999), p. 108. 
740 Koninklijke Landmacht (2009), p. 47. The rules of engagement can usually be found in a 
classified annex to the commander’s Operational Plan. Each individual soldier receives a so-
called Soldiers Card, which informs him on the rules and regulations regarding the use of 
force. (Ducheine & Walgemoed (2005), p. 59). 
741 Koninklijke Landmacht (1998), p. 21; Kroon & Jacobs (1997), p. 127; Ministerie van 
Defensie (2005), p. 34. 
742 Koninklijke Landmacht (1998), p. 21. Koninklijke Landmacht (1999), p. 99. See also: 
Ducheine & Walgemoed (2005), p. 59. 
743 The Dutch doctrine describes a hostile act as ‘the use of force by troops, a warring faction 
or terrorist unit (organisation or individual) against own or allied troops, fellow countrymen 
or possessions.’ A hostile intent is defined as ‘the threat of force by troops, a warring faction 
or terrorist unit (organisation or individual) against own or allied troops, fellow countrymen 
or possessions and, under a specific mandate, also against those of non-allied countries’ 
(Koninklijke Landmacht (1998), p. 21). 
744 Koninklijke Landmacht (1998), p. 21. 
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4.3.2  Organisational concept 
4.3.2.1 Decentralisation of authority 
The military can be seen as a hierarchical organisation. Lang explains that the 
hierarchical structure of the military organisations is needed to provide control 
and coordination of military capabilities and force in action.745 Within this 
hierarchy, the topcommand is concerned with broad questions of strategy and 
overall management. Directives and information flow from the top to the bottom 
of the organisation through a closed chain of command. Along this chain of 
command, plans are converted into specific orders and directives, progressively 
limiting the discretionary authority of commanders at junior levels.746 Lang’s 
description of the hierarchical character of the military organisation in 1965 is still 
valid. The Nederlandse Defensie Doctrine (Netherlands Defence Doctrine) of 2005, for 
example, also underlines the importance of a top-down structure of command 
and control: ‘At each level, the orders from above are translated into a number of 
coordinated actions which may in turn contain orders for the underlying levels. 
This ensures the synchronisation that is necessary to enable joint actions. A line 
also runs from the bottom to the top (…). The execution of the orders and the 
results are relayed back to the higher commander at each level. This enables him 
to make any necessary adjustments or to deploy extra assets.’747 Therefore, the 
hierarchical structure of the military organisation could be perceived as rigid and 
machine-like.748  
 
However, the military organisation intends to operate in a decentralised fashion 
and “mission-oriented command” has become the leading concept in the Dutch 
Armed Forces and other Western military forces.749 Mission-oriented command 
is a system of decentralisation that enables initiative and decision-making at the 
subordinate levels of the military organisation thus increasing its flexibility. The 
system is based on the German military doctrine of Aufragstaktik, which proved 
its effectiveness in earlier military history.750 Mission-oriented command is based 
on the principles of centrally formulated objectives and decentralised execution. 
Tasks are formulated in terms of what must be achieved and why to achieve the 
commander’s intent. The execution is, within certain conditions, empowered to 
the unit commander. It thus provides commanders at all levels with a high degree 
of discretion.751 The delegation of authority does not relieve the commander of 
his ultimate responsibility. He remains responsible for his own actions and for 
those of his subordinates. This means that he must monitor the execution of the 
                                               
745 Lang (1972), p. 58. 
746 Lang (1965), p. 852. See also: Geser (1996b); Haltiner (2003b), p. 167. 
747 Ministerie van Defensie (2005), p. 91. 
748 Heffron (1989); Soeters (2000); Soeters, Poponette & Page (2006); Teitler (1974). 
749 See for example for the US: United States Department of the Army – Headquarters (2003); 
for the UK: United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (2010), pp. 6-9 – 6-15; for Canada: 
Canadian Army – Chief of the Land Staff (2008), pp. 5-74 – 5-76. 
750 See for example: Van Creveld (1985), p. 275; Wilson (1989), pp. 3-6 & p. 14-18. 
751 Koninklijke Landmacht (1999), p. 110. 
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orders from a distance and, if there is no alternative, intervene if the objective of 
the operation is at risk.752 
 
Mission-oriented command is not obvious or appropriate for every mission, 
situation or soldier. It rather focuses on empowering junior commanders than 
individual soldiers. This is different to the police where the individual police 
officer is empowered to take decisions on the ground in order to solve public 
security problems. The Dutch Military Doctrine also emphasises that ‘command 
and control will be mission-oriented in theory, a higher or even the highest 
command level will in certain cases be required to decide how the mission is to 
be conducted, in which case it could still be necessary to impose directions and 
restrictions.’753 Discretion is an option; it is not an automatism within the military 
system. The NL Army leaves it up to the commander to determine which 
method of command he thinks is appropriate for the operation in question, 
although in principle he is expected to apply the philosophy of mission-oriented 
command.754 If, for example, great political importance is attached to the actions 
of a subordinate unit, a commander may exercise more directive command and 
control.755 
 
Based upon an empirical study of Dutch peace support operations in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Vogelaar and Kramer also conclude that mission-oriented com-
mand is not obvious in every situation, noting that these ‘missions were charac-
terised by varying degrees of autonomy of action for sub-commanders.’756 In 
their study, they distinguish several obstacles to the operationalisation of mission-
oriented command. In case of a lack of clear or coherent goals, a lack of means, a 
lack of mutual trust or in politically sensitive operations, commanders tend to 
reduce the autonomy of their junior commanders, in particular when the safety 
of their personnel is at stake or when they are uncertain about the quality of 
decision-making at the subordinate levels. Paradoxically, the study also revealed 
that the safer the mission, the more pressure commanders feel to reduce risk and 
to supervise and control their personnel. Furthermore, the extensive use of 
command and control networks intensifies the monitoring and supervision of 
subordinate units and commanders and undermines their operational autonomy. 
In addition, when a mission continues for a long time, standard operating 
procedures develop for dealing with and responding to different situations, which 
prevents sub-commanders from handling non-routine problems and learning 
from those experiences. The study shows that in politically sensitive situations 
commanders tend to decrease discretion since they want to control the situation 
                                               
752 Koninklijke Landmacht (1998), p. 39. 
753 Ministerie van Defensie (2005), p. 94 (italics added, PN). 
754 Koninklijke Landmacht (1998), p. 39. 
755 Koninklijke Landmacht (1998), p. 39. Weick and Sutcliffe note, however, that expertise on 
the ground should prevail in times of crisis, especially in high reliability organisations. Staff 
on the ground should be empowered to take all necessary decisions regardless of any hierar-
chical level. As such, they consider expertise and experience more important than rank 
(Weick & Sutcliffe (2001), pp. 74-75. 
756 Vogelaar & Kramer (2004), p. 422. 
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themselves, especially in case of media attention. Finally, they note that when a 
mission is composed of troops from different branches, such as infantry, cavalry, 
and engineers, and are put together shortly before the start of the mission, 
differences in procedures and cultures may occur which could make it difficult 
for commanders to decentralise autonomy.757 Vogelaar and Kramer conclude that 
the application of mission-oriented command ultimately depends on trust 
between the hierarchical levels: ‘Commanders will only permit substantial 
autonomy to their sub-commanders if they believe that they share an apprecia-
tion of the mission. This common appreciation should be formed by training 
together realistically for their missions and having frank and open evaluations of 
exercises and missions.’758 
4.3.2.2 Vertical differentiation 
In terms of vertical differentiation, military organisations have a hierarchical 
structure with extended chains of command.759 The NL Army consists of seven 
hierarchical levels. The most basic level of the Army is the individual soldier, 
followed by the section, platoon, company, battalion, brigade, and the Army 
Command at the top of the organisation.760 The NL Army currently has three 
brigades, which are combined arms formations, capable of conducting combat 
independently for a limited period in a joint, interagency and multinational 
operation.761 The battalion is the largest unit (400 to 1000 troops) of a single 
function of an arm or branch. Like brigades, battalions must be capable of 
conducting independent operations for a limited period. The next subordinate 
level is the company. A company is the army’s smallest manoeuvre element (60 
to 150 troops), usually of a single composition with integrated combat power and 
combat logistics. The platoon is the next hierarchical level (30-50 troops). 
Platoons, finally, consist of sections of eight to ten troops.762 
 
Because of its complexity and the variety of tasks that could be assigned to 
military units, contemporary operations require a high degree of organisational 
flexibility.763 The Netherlands Defence Doctrine emphasises that contemporary 
military operations are complex, unpredictable and do not follow a fixed pattern. 
Military forces thus have to be flexible and tailor-made in order to participate 
effectively in operations, varying from ‘conflict prevention by means of preven-
tive deployment to [crisis management] operations, from small scale to large-scale 
operations, under diverse conditions, from low to high in the spectrum of 
                                               
757 Vogelaar & Kramer (2004), pp. 422-426. See also: Vogelaar, Oltshoorn & Kramer (2005), 
pp. 82-89. 
758 Vogelaar & Kramer (2004), p. 427. 
759 Following Mintzberg’s classification of organisational configurations (Mintzberg (1991), the 
military organisation can be defined as a ideal-typical divisional structure, being a collection 
of quasi-autonomous formations organised around a specific military outputs or products 
(e.g. combat, combat support, and service support) under a central command. 
760 Koninklijke Landmacht (2014), p. 3-6. 
761 Koninklijke Landmacht (1998), pp. 108-109; Koninklijke Landmacht (2014), p. 3-6. 
762 Koninklijke Landmacht (2014), p. 3-6. 
763 Koninklijke Landmacht (2014), pp. 3-6 – 3-7. 
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force’.764 Modularity has become one of the central features of tailor-made 
military units.765 Bonin and Crisco, for example, consider modularity as the new 
military organisational paradigm.766 Modularity results in flexible, modular-built 
forces.767 Dandeker defines these forces as ‘a series of coherent, self-contained, 
mix-and-match sets of units borrowed from various organic commands for a 
given mission. Such modules can be assembled at short notice to form a mix of 
appropriate units for the specific demands of unforeseen crisis demanding the use 
of armed forces.’768 It creates a large and flexible military capacity of which 
specific configurations of resources can be composed and recomposed.769 The 
modules originate from a standing, or a “parent” organisation, for example a 
brigade, squadron or a frigate. The standing organisation can thus be seen as a 
flexible toolbox consisting of all kinds of modules with specific operational 
capabilities, such as command and control, communications, intelligence, 
manoeuvre, fire support, logistics, medical support, engineers, air support and air 
transportation. Modular forces can thus consist of elements of various branches 
(infantry, manoeuvre, support, logistics, command and control), different services 
(army, navy and air force), or several countries.770 
 
According to De Waard, in the Netherlands modularity has become a method 
for designing and building military capabilities adequate for specific situations.771 
The NL Army Doctrine Land Operations of 2013, for example, distinguishes two 
versions for modular forces relevant for the NL Army, namely the Battle Group 
and the Task Force.772 Through modularity, the Dutch armed forces combine the 
advantages of relatively fixed structures, such as sections, platoons, companies, 
                                               
764 Ministerie van Defensie (2005), p. 60. 
765 De Waard & Soeters (2007), p. 182; De Waard & Kramer (2008), pp. 3-4. There are 
several definitions of modularity in management literature. Baldwin and Clark, for example, 
describe modularity as ‘building a complex product or process from smaller subsystems that 
can be designed independently yet function together as a whole’ (Baldwin & Clark (1997), 
p. 84). Schilling and Paparone consider modularity as a general systems concept; a ‘contin-
uum describing the degree to which a system can be separated and recombined, and it re-
fers to both the tightness of coupling between elements and the degree to which the rules 
of the system enable (or prohibit) the mixing and matching of components’ capabilities 
(Schilling & Paparone (2005)), pp. 280-281  
766 Bonin & Crisco (2004), p. 26. 
767 Modular forces are often addressed as “tailor-made expeditionary task forces”. These forces 
are “tailor-made” because they are composed of different smaller units that together possess 
the necessary capacities to perform a specific mission. They are “expeditionary” because the 
units are sent to different parts of the world, and they are “task forces” because they are 
composed by assembling basic unit building blocks from the regular armed forces (De 
Waard & Kramer (2008), p. 7). 
768 Dandeker (2003), p. 414. 
769 De Waard & Soeters (2007), p. 182; Schilling & Paparone (2005), pp. 280-281. 
770 Dandeker (2003), p. 414. 
771 De Waard (2010), p. 206. 
772 A Battle Group is a unit of combined arms of battalion size, commanded by a separate head 
quarter and capable of conducting all relevant military operations. For that purpose, it is 
composed of combat, combat-support, and combat logistical units. A Task Force is a for-
mation of brigade size and composed of various components of battalion-size (Koninklijke 
Landmacht (2012), §3211). 
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battalions, and brigades with the flexibility to create different kinds of tailor-made 
forces.773 De Waard concludes however, that the Army units cannot be seen as 
“proper modules”. He rather speaks of components. ‘They are distinguishable 
organisational parts that, given their functional character, are not made to 
function autonomously. For each mission Army Command picks units from all 
over the organisation and composes a mixture of organisational functional parts 
that is capable of dealing with the specific operational demands of that particular 
deployment’.774 
 
In terms of vertical differentiation, it is unlikely that the process of modularity 
will reduce the length of the chain of command significantly. Units deployed 
consist of regular building blocks such as battalions, companies and platoons, 
which will likely operate under the formal hierarchical structure applied by the 
NL Army. 
4.3.2.3 Geographical differentiation 
Whereas geographical differentiation is a key feature of community policing, it 
has also become an important feature of military tactics in contemporary crisis 
management operations in order to protect the population and to encourage 
civil-military cooperation and exchange of information. However, Dutch 
military doctrines such as Peace Operations and Irregular Warfare do not specifically 
articulate deconcentrated troop deployment. 
 
The subject of deconcentration gained importance after the revival of counter-
insurgency theories. The NATO doctrine for counter-insurgency for example 
notes that ‘if military forces remain in their compounds, they risk to lose touch 
with the population.’775 Successful counter-insurgency therefore requires 
establishing ‘an enduring presence within the population in order to provide 
continuous security and development efforts’ in order ‘to assuring the popula-
tion’s sense of security and long-term outlook,’776 and involves ‘deep integration 
of the military forces into the population,’ unit dispersion, and dismounted 
patrols.777 Kilcullen shares this view noting that the ‘most fundamental rule of 
counterinsurgency is to be there.’ (…) ‘If you are not present when an incident 
                                               
773 Bonin & Crisco (2004), p. 21; De Waard & Kramer (2008), pp. 7-8. 
774 De Waard (2010), p. 209. Although modularity has its advantages in terms of flexibility, De 
Waard tends to be more cautious. He warns that the process of modular organising could 
also have a negative impact on the organisational stability of the Netherlands Armed Forces. 
First, the organisation has to invest heavily in coordination mechanisms to transform the 
mixture of different functional units into a well working machine. Second, in order to 
create tailored crisis response modules, the Netherlands Armed Forces have to cut through 
their organisational boundaries. In the medium and long run, this could lead to organisa-
tional fatigue. Third, the process of mixing and matching stimulates the feelings of turmoil 
within the organisation’s workforce. 
775 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2011), p. 5-10. 
776 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2011), p. 3-18. 
777 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2011), p. 3-21. 
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happens, there is usually little you can do about it.’778 Kilcullen therefore 
underlines the necessity of a “residential approach” in which troops live in close 
proximity to the population rather than in remote and secure bases.779 Also Fick 
and Nagel underline the importance of deconcentrated deployment of troops 
during counter-insurgency: ‘Soldiers (…) must get out among the people. (…) 
Persistent presence – living among the population in small groups, staying in 
villages overnight for months at a time – is dangerous, and it will mean more 
casualties, but it's the only way to protect the population effectively.’780 
 
In line with Fick and Nagel, the US Army counter-insurgency doctrine endorses 
the need for geographical troop dispersion: ‘The first rule of [counter-insurgency] 
operations is to establish the force’s presence in the AO [area of operations]. (…) 
This requires living in the AO close to the populace. Raiding from remote, 
secure bases does not work.’781 
 
In the Netherlands, Dimitriu and De Graaf discussed the issue of deconcentrated 
troop deployment in relation to the Dutch deployment in Uruzgan, Afghanistan. 
They write that, ideally troops have to live in a small and accessible patrol base in 
or in close proximity of a village in order to be able to protect the population 
and to win their trust. However, as they note, Dutch patrol bases in Afghanistan 
were located on high ground and relatively far from villages or urban settle-
ments.782 Dimitriu and De Graaf also argue that effective counter-insurgency 
requires prolonged troop deployment in a certain area in order to secure the 
population, getting to know the population and their problems, building trusted 
relationships, and establishing local networks. In addition, they perceive frequent 
troop rotations as ineffective.783 Rather, they recommend assigning platoons to 
fixed areas in order to provide 24/7 presence and security.784 Soeters and Johnson 
share these views. They underline that in order to develop and sustain close 
relations with the populace, troops have to leave their ‘gated communities’ and 
will need to live and operate in or in close proximity to urban areas or villages.785 
They conclude that military therefore need to adopt a strategy comparable to 
community policing enabling them to establish local security, trust, sustainable 
relationships and to overcome the fear of people to share information with them, 
or in other words to overcome “informer-phobia”.786 This notion, however, has 
not been translated into the Army doctrine Land Operations of 2013 to guide 
future troop deployment in this matter. 
                                               
778 Kilcullen (2006), p. 136. 
779 Kilcullen (2006), p. 136. 
780 Fick & Nagl (2009). 
781 Department of the Army – Headquarters (2006), p. A-4. 
782 Dimitriu & De Graaf (2009), p. 626. Swillens, for example, notes that the choice of a patrol 
bases is apart from being accessible for the population, largely based upon military criteria 
such as defensibility, optimal protection against direct and indirect enemy fire, and accessi-
bility by road and helicopter (Swillens (2009), p. 582). 
783 Dimitriu & De Graaf (2009), p. 626. 
784 Dimitriu & De Graaf (2009), pp. 628-629. 
785 Soeters & Johnson (2012), pp. 181-182. 
786 Soeters & Johnson (2012), p. 182. 
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4.4  Conclusions 
Function 
Both the military and the police are designed to protect the interests and security 
of the state and its citizens. To execute these tasks, they have the state’s monop-
oly to use physical and armed force. Traditionally, the police serve to protect the 
internal security of the state and its citizens whereas the military focus on 
defending the external security. The classical internal and external security divide 
has blurred, however. The police and military increasingly operate outside their 
traditional biotopes. The military operate in non-kinetic stability, peace support 
or humanitarian operations and closely cooperate with various civilian actors, 
while the police increasingly deal with expanding international organised crime 
and a higher level of social and criminal violence. Both organisations meet and 
cooperate in integrated organisational configurations in, for example, counter-
terrorism and SSR. 
 
Still, the mission and focus of the police and military differ in various respects. 
The essence of the police is their function. In democratic societies, the function 
of the police is threefold: law enforcement, public order maintenance and 
assistance to the public. Although the core function of the police involves 
maintaining law and order, the majority of police work occurs in a grey area 
between law enforcement, maintenance of public order and service and involves 
keeping the peace, providing assistance, problem-solving, communicating, 
negotiating and interacting with the public, collecting information, and patrol-
ling, and less to crime investigations and making arrests. Within this wider notion 
of policing, community policing has become the leading concept in many 
Western countries. It has been a driver for change and reform in introducing and 
articulating a problem-oriented approach, community interaction and involve-
ment to prevent and solve public security related problems, decentralisation of 
authority, vertical differentiation and deconcentration of police assets. 
 
The function of the military focuses on deploying operations along the full range 
of the spectrum of conflict. Within that spectrum, the military execute offensive, 
defensive, and stabilisation activities in different environments and for different 
purposes and interests. Although “supporting civil authorities in upholding the 
law” belongs to the third main task of the Dutch armed forces, public security 
receives little attention in the Dutch Army doctrine. It recognises the need for 
military involvement in public security if there are no civilian options available in 
the short-term, for example if the international or local police are unable to 
protect the population or to restore and maintain law and order during crisis 
management operations. However, the doctrine does not elaborate on these tasks 
nor does it make them explicit. As such, the doctrine portrays these tasks as 
secondary in nature, although public security has been a major problem during 
most crisis management operations. NATO, on the other hand provides a 
detailed list of possible public security tasks that could be assigned to the military 
in case of a security gap. Preferably, these tasks should be assigned to FPUs. The 
question remains whether these resources will be sufficient to provide public 
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security under all circumstances and in a large area for a longer period and will 
pre-empt the use of regular troops. 
 
Intelligence 
Both policing and crisis management operations are intelligence-driven. From a 
conceptual point of view, the police and military share the same principles and 
methods regarding collecting, analysing, processing and distributing intelligence 
up and down all levels of the organisation. In policing, intelligence primarily 
focuses on the identification and analyses of significant problems involving 
criminality and community insecurity. The concept of ILP provides the police a 
management tool that combines a problem-oriented approach with a process-
oriented routine. ILP focuses on ongoing urgent public security problems by 
combining preventive and repressive tactics and involving citizens, local 
communities and governments, and public and private agencies and organisa-
tions. 
 
In the military, the intelligence function traditionally focused on producing 
information on foreign powers, hostile or enemy forces and geographical areas in 
which military operations could be conducted. The shift in crisis management 
operations in primarily civilian environments created a wider and different 
intelligence requirement. Today the military focus their intelligence requirements 
on all civilian, political, social and economical aspects and problems that may 
influence their activities. Public security is not particularly articulated as an 
intelligence priority, but is one of the many aspects to be covered. 
 
Cooperation 
Ensuring public security has become an activity in which many actors, agencies 
and organisations cooperate to create safe and secure society and communities. 
This applies to both the police and the military in their respective activities. The 
police are no longer the sole provider of public security. Policing has become a 
fragmented activity in which responsibilities have been divided among many 
stakeholders, actors and agencies. Establishing structural relationships and 
cooperation with for example local government, public and private agencies, 
schools, community representatives, and merchants associations, are essential 
requirements for successful policing. 
 
In contemporary crisis management operations, the same pattern is visible. 
Soldiers operate in environments that are fundamentally civilian. Like in policing, 
the military need to seek the cooperation with civilian actors and organisations to 
establish meaningful results. To create a safe and secure civilian environment, 
they invest and participate in a comprehensive approach. In such approach, the 
military cooperate with international and national governmental and non-
governmental organisations, for example to achieve social-economic develop-
ment and to reconstruct governmental structures, vital infrastructure and public 
services. Community involvement and CIMIC activities are thereby important 
instruments. 
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Use of force 
The police and the military both own the monopoly on the use of force although 
they operate at different levels of the spectrum of force and their instruments of 
force differ in terms of power, magnitude and effect. Although they have 
legitimate powers to use force, its level is constrained by international and 
national law. The principles of proportionality and necessity apply to both the 
police and military. Because contemporary military operations are conducted in 
environments that are predominantly humanitarian in character, force should 
only be used with restraint and if there are no other options. Unmeasured use of 
force is considered to be counter-productive in winning the support of the 
population. 
 
Decentralisation of authority 
Policing is essentially an individual activity. Individual police officers are 
empowered to take decisions on the spot in order to solve public security issues, 
effectively irrespective of formal regulations or policies and without direct 
interference by the chain of command. Nevertheless, this individual discretion is 
under pressure. NPM and ILP focus on outputs, accountability and responsibility, 
allowing governments and police management to enhance their grip on the 
individual police officer; thus limiting discretion. 
 
Unlike policing, soldiering is a collective activity under a clear and hierarchical 
command-and-control structure. Military operations also require some level of 
tactical flexibility and empowerment to deal with uncertainty and the complexity 
of the battlefield. Mission-oriented command has become the leading principle to 
ensure that junior commanders can take decisions that are attuned to local and 
unique circumstances and without the formal consent of higher echelons. 
However, the principles of mission-oriented command do not apply to individ-
ual soldiers as the most junior level in the military organisation. 
 
Vertical differentiation 
Police organisations tend to have flat organisational structures in order to process 
information on local security issues swiftly up and down the chain of command. 
The Dutch national police have five hierarchical levels, while the NL Army – an 
organisation of comparable size – has seven. Although the NL Army applies the 
principles of modularity to compose tailor-made units fitted for specific opera-
tions, these task forces and battle groups do not have fewer organisational levels 
as they are based upon original building blocks. 
 
Geographical differentiation 
Policing, particularly community policing, requires a deconcentrated deployment 
of units or individual police to specific geographic areas for extended periods. 
Deconcentration helps to know and understand the community and its members, 
and to establish lasting relationships to solve community problems. 
 
Although not particularly articulated in the Dutch and NATO doctrine, 
geographical differentiation has become an important feature of military tactics in 
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crisis management operations, notably in counter-insurgency. By deploying and 
housing small and independent units in close proximity of local settlements, 
troops are supposed to provide direct security to communities, establish effective 
networks, and collect and exchange intelligence. 
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5 Research methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the research methodology used to answer the central 
research question. First, it presents the conceptual framework of the research and 
explains the choice for the holistic multiple-case study as this study’s research 
strategy, which is followed by a description of the criteria applied to define and 
select the cases. Methods for data collection and data analysis are outlined. Finally, 
it discusses the methods used to control the quality of the research. 
5.2 Conceptual framework 
According to Miles and Huberman, a conceptual framework explains ‘the main 
things to be studied – the key factors, constructs and the variables – and the presumed 
relationships among them.’787 They explain that conceptual frameworks can be 
theory-driven or commonsensical, and/or descriptive or causal.788 The framework 
applied in this study is theory driven and largely causal in character. It outlines a 
model based on theories on the security gap and on the police and policing. 
 
The theory on the security gap (Chapter 3) and on the (Dutch) military and police 
organisation (Chapter 4) serve as starting point for the empirical part of the study. 
Research is conducted to determine if there was a security gap during the 
deployment of the NL Army during their missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kosovo and Iraq. For that purpose, it describes and analyses the security situation 
and the extent to which police, either local or international, were effectively 
available or capable of providing public security to society and the public. The 
analysis of the security gap is thus broken down into three parts – analysis of the 
existence of deployment, enforcement and institutional gaps. 
  
Based upon that analysis, the operational and organisational concepts applied by the 
NL Army during their crisis management operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kosovo and Iraq will be described and analysed in order to determine to what 
extent the Army operated and organised to promote public security during the 
security gaps in those operations. The operational and organisational concepts of 
the Dutch police will largely serve as the terms of reference for this description and 
analysis, since these are tasks normally performed by the police. 
 
Regarding the operational concept, the study first looks at the extent to which the 
NL Army has planned and prepared for operating in a security gap and providing 
public security in these operations. Secondly, it will describe and analyse the actions 
that NL Army troops deployed to promote public security in terms of public order 
and law enforcement. Then it will look at how NL Army troops dealt with 
                                               
787 Miles & Huberman (1994), p. 18. 
788 Miles & Huberman (1994), p. 18. 
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intelligence, interagency cooperation and the use of force to promote public 
security. 
 
In terms of the organisational concept, the research will look at three defining 
aspects of the police model to analyse the extent to which the NL Army has 
organised to provide public security: autonomy and individuality, vertical differen-
tiation, and deconcentration. 
 
Figure 5 shows the graphical conceptualisation of the research design. 
5.3  Case studies 
This study is based upon the assumption that in case a security gap occurs during a 
crisis management operation, the international military have to provide public 
security in case there are no other alternatives. Second, this study assumes that in 
case the military have to provide some sort of interim policing, they have to 
operate and organise in a fashion comparable to the police in order to deal with 
these tasks effectively and efficiently. To test these assumptions, this study seeks to 
define and understand a possible causal relationship between the phenomenon of a 
security gap and the presumed need for the military organisation to adopt police-
like operational and organisational concepts to deal with such a gap successfully. 
 
 
Figure 5: Research design 
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This study is based upon qualitative research. According to Vennesson and 
Wiesner, the case study is the preferred strategy to conduct a qualitative re-
search.789 Yin identifies two main types of case study designs: the single-case and 
multiple-case study.790 He notes that the single-case study is related to a unique, 
single experiment or case,791 while the multiple-case study is of a comparative 
nature related to multiple experiments.792 The case study strategy applied in this 
thesis is the multiple-case study. The choice to study multiple cases enables a 
review of several units of analysis (e.g. operational and organisational concepts), 
each within their unique environments (e.g. different crisis management 
operations). As such, it will produce a deeper understanding of the performance 
of the NL Army during crisis management operations than if only one single case 
will be studied. Miles and Huberman add that the multiple-case study is 
especially helpful to recognise ‘processes and outcomes across many cases and to 
understand how they are qualified by local conditions, and thus to develop more 
sophisticated and more powerful explanations.’793 
 
Process tracing is an approach that can be applied to conduct case studies, as 
Vennesson and Wiesner note.794 They define process tracing as ‘a technique 
designed to reconstruct causal processes with the aim of developing or evaluating 
theoretical propositions about what accounts for an outcome in the specific 
phenomenon under study.’795 They note that in military studies, process tracing 
can be a useful tool ‘to illuminate specific events, make inferences about cause 
and effect relations that shaped the cases, uncover causal mechanisms, and finally, 
even make – with all caution involved – propositions about similar events,’796 for 
example, to explain ‘the adaptation of armies to changing circumstances during 
the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared, (…) the adoption 
of military concepts by military organisations, [and] the production of knowledge 
and ignorance within, and by, military organisations.’797 As such, the technique of 
process tracing can be helpful to define whether the NL Army has adapted to the 
contextual demands of a security gap in various crisis management operations and 
to what extent the knowledge acquired has been used to adapt its operational and 
organisational concepts. 
 
 
 
                                               
789 Vennesson & Wiesner (2014), p. 94. 
790 Yin (2003), p. 39. 
791 Yin (2003), p. 39. 
792 Yin (2003), pp. 46-47. 
793 Miles & Huberman (1994), p. 172. 
794 Vennesson & Wiesner (2014), p. 94. 
795 Vennesson & Wiesner (2014), p. 94. 
796 Vennesson & Wiesner (2014), p. 101. 
797 Vennesson & Wiesner (2014), p. 94. 
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5.4  Case design 
According to Swanborn, there are four methods to select cases: 
 
1. No selection (case of practice-oriented research in which the domain of the 
case is predetermined); 
2. Random selection (for example in extensive research like a survey or poll); 
3. Based upon pragmatic grounds (distance, time and budget); 
4. Theoretical sampling (based upon predetermined selection criteria).798 
 
Both Swanborn, and Miles and Huberman argue that the best way to select cases 
is theoretical sampling.799 To select the cases for this study, three selection 
parameters were used: 
 
 1. Likely presence of a security gap during a crisis management operation; 
2. NL Army as leading actor with operational autonomy in its area of opera-
tions; 
3. Deployment of NL Army troops of battalion-size or larger. 
 
Between 1995 and 2010, the NL Army participated in several international crisis 
management operations varying from individual observer missions to stabilisation 
missions of battalion size or larger. Based upon the three sampling criteria, four 
missions can be selected as a single case within the multiple-case study: 
 
- IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina (December 1995 - December 
2004); 
- KFOR in Kosovo (April 1999 – August 2000); 
- SFIR in Iraq (August 2004 – March 2005); 
- ISAF-3 in Afghanistan (August 2006 – August 2010). 
 
Security gap 
A security gap could require the intervention of the international military to 
restore and maintain public security. In all four selected crisis management 
operations, there was some sort of security gap. The Dutch troops were deployed 
in highly unstable civilian environments with an ill-functioning rule of law and 
security system. All four mission areas suffered from public unrest, sectarian or 
ethnic violence and widespread criminality. If present, the police had not been 
able to keep the peace or to enforce the law adequately. For example, at the 
onset of the missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan there was no police force at all, 
neither local nor international.800 In Bosnia and Herzegovina and Iraq, the host 
                                               
798 Swanborn (1996), pp. 55-61. 
799 Miles & Huberman (1994), p. 29. Swanborn (1996), p. 69. Note: instead of theoretical 
sampling, Miles and Huberman apply the term conceptual sampling. 
800 During the Russian occupation that lasted from 1979-1989, Afghanistan had a paramilitary 
police force. During the civil war and the period of Taliban rule there were no civilian 
police under national command deployed in Afghanistan (Perito (2009), p. 3). At the start 
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nation police was operational but mistrusted by large sections of the population 
mostly due to a lack of quality and professionalism.801 
 
Operational autonomy 
Efficient public security management requires operational autonomy within the 
area of responsibility, not only to prioritise operational options and troop 
movements but also to respond swiftly and adequately to changing operational 
conditions and situations. It is therefore important that within the framework of 
the mandate and the rules of engagement the force commander is empowered to 
set priorities to establish public security. In all four missions, the Dutch com-
mander had operational autonomy in his area of responsibility. 
 
Force size 
The third sampling criterion for this study has been the size of troop deployment. 
The troop deployment had to be sufficiently large that the force commander had 
been able to produce sufficient operational capacity to provide public security, 
when required within his area of responsibility. Force size is considered impor-
tant to win the hearts and minds of the population, which is all about being 
present and visible in urban areas and villages in order to protect citizens. This 
criterion assumed that the larger the military contingent, the more options a 
commander had to provide public security. It is assumed that a force of battalion 
size or larger has the capacity and flexibility to react effectively to breaches of 
public security. In the selected missions, the Dutch contribution was of battalion-
size or larger. 
 
All four missions meet the selected sampling criteria. Initially, the research 
involved these four missions. During the research the study has been reduced to 
the IFOR/SFOR, KFOR, and SFIR missions. Although twenty-three ISAF 
officers were interviewed and the process of data collection was almost com-
pleted, ultimately, the ISAF mission was not integrated in the study, for mainly 
three reasons.802 
First, the character of the operation differed significantly from the other three 
operations. Whereas IFOR/SFOR, KFOR and ISAF were predominantly 
stabilisation operations, ISAF took place in a violent, dynamic and unstable 
environment. The operation turned out to be largely offensive in character and 
focused at defeating widespread insurgency. This research is focusing on the 
security gap during stabilisation operations, and given that the ISAF mission in 
effect did not have the character of a stabilisation mission only, it was excluded as 
a case study. 
Second, the security gap of the ISAF mission differed from the other potential 
cases since civilian policing in Afghanistan during the ISAF mission had in fact 
                                               
of the Dutch ISAF operation in 2006, the deployment of police in Uruzgan was still lim-
ited (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken & Ministerie van Defensie (2010), p. 50). 
801 See for example: Jakobsen (2003), p. 140. 
802 Although the ISAF was not included into this study, the interviews have also helped to 
shape the researcher's thoughts regarding the NL Army’s role in public security during crisis 
management operations from 1995 until 2010. 
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been paramilitary of character. Therefore, public security was largely focused on 
protecting the population against external security threats rather than on policing 
through, for example, community policing or maintaining public order. In 
addition, before the US intervention in Afghanistan there had been few police-
men under central authority in Afghanistan, notably in rural areas.803 At the start 
of the Dutch ISAF operation in 2006, the was no police presence in Uruzgan.804 
From a historical point of view, a civilian police had been an anomaly in the 
Afghan society. Technically spoken there had been no security gap because the 
absence of police could be seen as normality from an Afghan point of view.805 
Third, and last, the ISAF operation is in terms of its magnitude, dynamics and 
diversity of activity a study in itself. Therefore, the analysis of the data and the 
description of four single missions would have enlarged the research substantially 
and would have gone beyond the time available to the researcher. 
5.5  Data collection 
The data required to answer the research question can be obtained by four 
different methods: participating in the setting, direct observation, in-depth 
interviewing and analysing documents and material.806 The data collection for 
this study is based upon in-depth interviews and analysis of documents and 
material. Techniques like direct observation and participant observation were not 
feasible because the selected cases involved crisis management operations that 
already had been completed. 
 
Interviews 
Yin notes that interviewing is one of the most important and essential sources for 
conducting a case study.807 In-depth interviewing, for example, provides the 
opportunity to develop a narrative approach to the research question.808 It also 
helps to acquire information that cannot be obtained from other sources. Finally, 
it provides additional information ‘about the actor’s motivations, decision-
making processes and paths not taken.’809 
 
Data collection for this study is mainly based upon the perceptions and/or first-
hand experiences of experts and professionals in three crisis management 
operations. The interviews had a semi-structured character and followed a certain 
set of questions derived from the interview protocol (see Appendix 2). The semi-
structured character enabled a flexible approach in order to adjust and adapt the 
                                               
803 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken & Ministerie van Defensie (2011), p. 15; Perito (2009), 
p. 3. 
804 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken & Ministerie van Defensie (2011), p. 50. 
805 During the Russian occupation that lasted from 1979-1989, Afghanistan had a paramilitary 
police force. After the withdrawal of Russian forces and the following civil war and the 
period of Taliban rule there were no civilian police under national command deployed in 
Afghanistan (Perito (2009), p. 3). 
806 Rietjens (2014), p. 133. 
807 Yin (2003), p. 89. 
808 Ruffa & Soeters (2014), p. 222. 
809 Vennesson & Wiesner (2014), p. 100. See also: Moore (2014), p. 123. 
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order and direction of the questions to what seemed appropriate for the data 
collection and research or to focus on the interviewee’s specific experiences and 
perceptions.810 
 
In total, 40 officers of the NL Army and Koninklijke Marechaussee have been 
interviewed, of which 36 were engaged in one of the selected crisis management 
operations. Four specialists in the field of lessons learned and doctrinal develop-
ment were interviewed regarding institutionalisation of public security within the 
NL Army. The 36 interviewees who participated in one of the three selected 
crisis management operations were equally divided between the three selected 
cases and belonged to the top and middle management of the deployments, such 
as battalion commanders, company commanders, heads of operations and/or 
their deputies and senior police advisors. These officers were interviewed as 
experts with relevant experience in the field of crisis management operations. 
Their accounts contributed to fact-finding regarding the provision of public 
security and its possible operational and organisational implications. Although 
their contributions mainly produced facts, these facts could not always be 
separated from values and opinions.811  
 
From a relativistic point of view, this is reasonable, for reality is always repre-
sented through the eyes of the interviewees as participants in crisis management 
operations.812 It must also be noted that the interviews involved retrospective 
accounts of situations that occurred six to fifteen years ago. Following the 
findings of Golden – who tested the reliability and validity of retrospective 
accounts of chief executive officers regarding past strategies – it must be taken 
into account that such accounts commonly suffer from retrospective errors and 
therefore have to be challenged by triangulation.813 
 
To select the interviewees, a long-list, per mission, of commanders and staff 
officers and additional specialists was produced. From this long-list, potential 
interviewees were contacted and asked to participate in the research. Based upon 
the willingness to participate and the availability of the potential interviewees, a 
shortlist was prepared.  
 
All interviews were one-on-one and were conducted by the researcher himself. 
The interview procedure has been standardised through the interview protocol, 
which describes the subject, purpose, background, process and questionnaire of 
the research and was explained to the interviewees prior to the interview. The 
interviews took on average 90 minutes. All interviews were audio recorded and 
fully transcribed. Transcripts were presented to the interviewees for verification 
and authorisation (so-called member-checks).814 
 
                                               
810 See for example: Moore (2014), p. 118 & p. 124. 
811 For an overview of interviewees, see Appendix 3. 
812 See for example: Robson (2005), pp. 24-25. 
813 Golden (1992). See also: Moore (2014), pp. 125-126. 
814 See for example: Rietjens (2014), p. 139; Ruffa & Soeters (2014), p. 224. 
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Documents review 
Document review served as the second data collection method. Documents were 
obtained from various sources, such as Dutch parliamentary archives, the Semi-
Statische Archiefdienst of the Ministry of Defence, UN databases, and memorial 
books published by the various deployed battalions. These sources provided 
documents such as parliamentary letters and reports, operational plans, mission 
evaluation reports, rules of engagement, and policy reports. The data retrieved 
from these sources was used to support or complete the data obtained from the 
interviews or to validate data through triangulation. Access to the archives of the 
Ministry of Defence was not unlimited, however. The Ministry restricted the use 
of some classified documents and some documents issued by international 
organisations, such as NATO, in relation to notably the IFOR/SFOR and SFIR 
missions. This restriction naturally posed a certain limit on the overall document 
research. 
5.6  Data reduction and display 
According to Miles and Huberman, data analysis is an iterative process of 
congruent “flows of activity” of data reduction, data display, conclusion drawing 
and verification.815  
 
Coding is used to organise and categorise the data obtained from the interviews 
and document review in order to ‘find, pull out and cluster the segments relating 
to (…) [the] research question [and] hypothesis.’816 Miles and Huberman define 
two levels of coding: first level coding, which helps to summarise segments of 
data, and pattern coding, which helps to ‘group those summaries into smaller 
numbers of sets, themes or constructs.’817 Both the interview transcripts and main 
documents were submitted to a process of manual coding. Initially, first-level 
codes were assigned to the texts in order to create segments of data with some 
sort of commonality. Further refinement of the analysis was obtained through re-
arranging and restructuring of the data material and by assigning pattern codes to 
segments at a deeper level of analysis. The analyses followed an iterative process 
of coding and grouping of data until trends, developments, modes of operations 
and common opinions were identified. The results of the coding process of each 
single case were finally presented in a data matrix. 
 
Based upon the three individual case reports, a cross-case analysis was executed. 
Here the results of the individual cases were compared and further analysed. The 
cross-case analysis served to identify differences and similarities per item between 
the cases and to identify relationships, themes, patterns or diachronic (historic) 
developments between the cases. The results of the cross-case analysis were 
presented in a data matrix and a case report. The cross-case analysis finally served 
to answer the central research question. 
                                               
815 Miles & Huberman (1994), pp. 10-12. 
816 Miles & Huberman (1994), p. 57. 
817 Miles & Huberman (1994), p. 69. See also: Rietjens (2014), p. 133. 
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5.7 Research quality 
Among researchers, there is an ongoing debate on what defines the quality of 
research.818 Interpretivist researchers, for example, argue that in research there is 
no “fact of the matter” and it is, rather, impossible to define proper standards for 
qualitative research.819 In fact, as Miles and Huberman note, ‘getting it all right’ is 
almost a mission impossible.820 Wolcot even argues that the main aim of 
researchers should be to ‘not get it all wrong.’821 However, Yin provides four 
commonly agreed tactics to judge the quality of the research: construct validity, 
internal validity, external validity and reliability.822 
 
Construct validity 
Construct validity refers to the establishment of ‘correct operational measures for 
the concepts being studied.’823 Construct validity can be created through 
triangulation.824 This study has applied three methods for triangulation.825 Data 
triangulation was established by using different sources of evidence such as 
interviewing different people on the same subjects. Methods of theory triangula-
tion were applied in the first stage of the study in which the various theories and 
views on crisis management operations, security gaps and the differences and 
similarities of the military and police organisation are described and compared. 
Methodological triangulation was obtained by using two different methods of 
data collection, namely interviewing and document review. Another way to 
achieve methodological triangulation had been “peer debriefing” by discussing 
findings with fellow researchers and getting feedback from the interviewees. The 
method of investigator triangulation, however, has not been met because the 
research was executed by one researcher only, which implies an inherent 
weakness of this research due to the possibility of bias on the part of the individ-
ual researcher. 
 
Reliability 
Reliability refers to the ‘extent to which a measuring device, or a whole research 
project, would produce the same results if used on different occasions with the 
same object of study.’826 The goal of reliability is to minimise errors and bias in 
                                               
818 Miles & Huberman (1996), p. 277; Rietjens (2014), p. 139. 
819 Miles & Huberman (1996), p. 277. 
820 Miles & Huberman (1994), p. 277. 
821 Wolcot (1990) as cited in Miles & Huberman (1994), p. 277. 
822 Yin (2003), pp. 33-39. Miles and Huberman discern five tactics to judge the quality of 
research of which three comply with those of Yin: reliability/dependability, internal valid-
ity/credibility, and external validity/transferability. In addition they present objectiv-
ity/conformability and utilisation/action orientation as other tactics (Miles & Huberman 
(1994), pp. 278-280). 
823 Yin (2003), p. 34. 
824 Robson (2005), p. 175. 
825 Denzin (1978); Miles & Huberman (1994), p. 267; Rietjens (2014), p. 139; Robson 
(2005), p. 174; Yin (2003), p. 98-99. 
826 Robson (2005), p. 551. 
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research.827 Yin mentions two methods to increase reliability: the use of a 
research protocol and the development of a case study database.828 These tactics 
were met by following a strict procedure for conducting the research. The 
research approach was formalised in a conceptual framework, methodology and 
an interview protocol, which were processed through several reviews. In 
addition, the outcomes of the research were submitted to frequent review by 
research supervisors and peers. Secondly, all data obtained through interviews and 
document reviews were archived in a database, both on hard copy and digitally 
in order to enable another researcher to repeat the procedures which had been 
followed and to produce comparable outcomes. 
 
Internal validity 
Internal validity refers to the establishment of causal relationships between 
incomes and outcomes.829 Both Yin and Robson note that internal validity 
largely applies to experimental and quasi-experimental research.830 As Yin argues, 
internal validity is thus strongly related to case studies with a quantitative or 
exploratory character and is therefore ‘inapplicable to descriptive or exploratory 
studies.’831 Because the character of this study is largely descriptive, the applica-
tion of internal validity is not considered and has therefore not been applied. 
 
External validity 
External validity refers to the extent to which the findings can be generalised 
beyond the immediate case study.832 External validity was achieved through the 
selection of three different case studies within the framework of Dutch crisis 
management operations. The selection of the cases was based upon a sampling 
strategy in order to study different crisis management operations in order to 
achieve conceptual generalisation. 
5.8  Pragmatic approach 
A research methodology serves to promote a study’s scientific quality. Still, doing 
research is more than just the ‘slavish adherence to methodological rules, as Miles 
and Huberman write.’ They emphasise that ‘no study conforms exactly to a 
standard mythology; each one calls for the researcher to bend the methodology 
to the peculiarities of the setting.’833 To keep their words in mind, this study 
applies the research methodology as presented, but it also chooses to be pragmatic 
if needed to deal effectively with practicalities during the empirical stage of the 
research.
                                               
827 Yin (2003), p. 37. 
828 Yin (2003), p. 38. 
829 Robson (2005), p. 103. 
830 Robson (2005), p. 104; Yin (2003), p. 36. 
831 Yin (2003), p. 34. 
832 Yin (2003), p. 37. 
833 Miles & Huberman (1994), p. 5. 
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6 IFOR/SFOR 
6.1  Introduction 
6.1.1  Background to the conflict 
The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina began on April 2, 1992 when units of the 
Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and Bosnian Serb militias attacked the Bosnian 
town of Bijelina. A few days later, on April 5, Serbian snipers fired at the 
participants of a peace demonstration in Sarajevo, followed by an artillery attack 
of the JNA on the city.834 These attacks occurred a month after Bosnia and 
Herzegovina declared independence from Yugoslavia.835 In the first year of the 
war, the Bosnian Army fought in alliance with the Bosnian Croat Army (HVO). 
The alliance broke down in 1993 resulting in a war between Bosnian and Croat 
forces in the northern Posavina region, Central Bosnia and in the Mostar region 
of Herzegovina.836 The Bosnian Serbs wanted to establish an autonomous 
Republika Srpska in the eastern part of Bosnia837 and started offensive operations 
to this end in early 1993.838 
 
To protect the population against Serbian aggression, the UN Security Council 
adopted UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 819 (1993) and UNSCR 
824 (1993), in which it proclaimed safe areas in Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Gorazde, 
Tuzla, Zepa and Bihac. As the conflict intensified, international mediators 
worked on several peace initiatives and cease-fires, but they all failed. A first 
success in turning the tide of the war was achieved when a cease-fire between the 
HVO and the Bosnian Army was established in March 1994. The cease-fire 
culminated in the signing of the Washington Agreement, which also resulted into 
the establishment of the Bosnian-Croat Federation.839  
 
After Serbian troops had overrun the safe area of Srebrenica early July 1995, 
resulting in the death of 7,000 Bosniaks840 and had mortared Sarajevo’s Markale 
marketplace on August 28, 1995, killing thirty-seven people, the international 
community decided to intervene and the paved the way for NATO’s air 
campaign “Deliberate Force” against Bosnian-Serb targets. Meanwhile, the Croat 
Army (HV) launched its Operation Storm against the Republika Srpska Krajina 
and Serb-held territories in western Bosnia, and the Bosnian Army started an 
offensive against the Bosnian Serb Army in the far west of the country. As a 
result, the power balance in Bosnia and Herzegovina shifted significantly, which 
                                               
834 Klep & Van Gils (2005), p. 299. 
835 See for example: Doyle (2007), p. 233; Klep & Van Gils (2005), p. 299. 
836 Doyle (2007), p. 234. 
837 Kaldor (2006), p. 54. 
838 Klep & Van Gils (2005), p. 301. 
839 See for example: Doyle (2007), p. 234; Klep & Van Gils (2005), p. 301. 
840 Cousens & Harland (2006), p. 59. 
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forced the Bosnian Serbs to start peace negotiations.841 These peace negotiations 
were held at the Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, USA, beginning on 
November 1, 1995, and reached a final settlement on November 21, 1995.842 
6.1.2   Dayton Peace Agreement 
On November 21, 1995 the presidents of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia agreed on 
the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
which ended the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.843 The Agreement, also 
known as the Dayton Peace Agreement, was signed on December 14, 1995. 
 
Annex 1-A of the GFAP settled the military aspects of the Peace Agreement and 
called for the establishment of a multi-national military Implementation Force 
(IFOR).844 According to Annex 1-A, NATO was to establish a force, which 
would ‘operate under the authority and subject to the direction and political 
control of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) through the NATO chain of 
command.’845 Annex 1-A also defined the tasks of IFOR. IFOR was tasked to 
ensure the implementation of the military aspects of the Peace Agreement. Its 
primary tasks involved monitoring and ensuring durable compliance of all parties 
with the cessation of hostilities, monitoring the withdrawal and redeployment of 
the former warring forces from the agreed cease-fire zone of separation back to 
their respective territories, authorising and supervising the selective marking of 
the Agreed Cease-Fire Line and its Zone of Separation and the Inter-Entity 
Boundary Line and assisting in the withdrawal of UN Peace Forces not trans-
ferred to IFOR.846 The Peace Agreement assigned IFOR also with additional 
“supporting tasks” that could be executed ‘within the limits of its assigned 
principal tasks and available resources, and on request.’847 These tasks, for 
example, involved establishing a safe and secure environment in which others 
could perform their tasks in accordance with the Peace Agreement, assisting 
civilian organisations in the accomplishment of their humanitarian activities, 
providing freedom of movement of civilians, refugees and displaced persons and 
monitoring the clearing of minefields.848 
 
                                               
841 See for example: Cousens & Harland (2006), p. 60; Doyle (2007), p. 234; Klep & Van Gils 
(1995), pp. 301-302. 
842 Cousens & Harland (2006), p. 61. At the end of the war over 200,000 people had died, 
20,000 were missing, 1.2 million were internally displaced, and 900,000 had fled Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (UN Doc S/1995/1031 (1995), p. 4; UN Doc S/2002/1314 (2002), p. 2). 
843 http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=379; accessed June 5, 2012. 
844 General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), Annex 1-A, Article I, §1. Available at 
http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=379; accessed June 5, 2012. 
845 GFAP, Annex 1-A, Article I, §1. 
846 GFAP, Annex 1-A, Article VI. 
847 GFAP, Annex 1-A, Article VI. 
848 GFAP, Annex 1-A, Article VI. 
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The Dayton Peace Agreement invited the UN Security Council ‘to adopt a 
resolution’ to authorise the establishment of IFOR.849 This request was granted 
on December 15, 1995, when the UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 
1031.850 UNSCR 1031 placed the IFOR operation under the umbrella of 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter (peace-enforcement) and provided a mandate for 
one year after which the continuation of the mandate could be reviewed ‘based 
upon the recommendations from the States participating in IFOR and from the 
High Representative through the Secretary-General.’851 
 
In December 1996, IFOR transferred its responsibilities to a smaller NATO 
force, called the Stabilisation Force (SFOR). Like IFOR, SFOR operated under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and had been responsible for the implementa-
tion of the military aspects as defined in Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Peace 
Agreement.852 The main mission of SFOR remained the establishment of a safe 
and secure environment in which civilian organisations could work to consoli-
date of a lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.853 
 
The Dayton Peace Agreement also covered civilian aspects of security in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Annex 4 established an international High Representative who 
was tasked with overseeing the implementation of the civilian aspects of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement. Article VIII of the Peace Agreement called for the 
establishment of an International Police Task Force (IPTF).854 Annex 11 of the 
Agreement further settled the tasks and responsibilities of the IPTF. The IPTF 
was tasked to monitor, observe, and inspect law enforcement activities and 
facilities; to advise law enforcement personnel and forces; and to train law 
enforcement personnel.855 Because the responsibility for local public security 
rested with the Parties themselves, the IPTF was not empowered to enforce local 
laws or to maintain public order.856 The authorisation of the IPTF mission in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was settled in UNSCR 1035 of December 21, 1995.857 
6.1.3  Dutch military contribution to the implementation of the 
Peace Agreement 
On December 9, 1995, the Dutch government decided to participate in 
IFOR.858 To support the land-based operation, the government deployed a 
mechanised battalion, a logistic element and a mortar company. The Dutch 
ground forces were assigned to the MND South West (SW) and operated under 
                                               
849 GFAP, Annex 1-A, Article I, §1. 
850 UN Doc S/RES/1031 (1995). 
851 UN Doc S/RES/1031 (1995), §21. 
852 UN Doc S/RES/1088 (1996). 
853 Kamerstukken II, 1996/97, 22 181, nr. 174, pp. 4-5. 
854 GFAP, Article VIII. 
855 GFAP, Annex 11, Article III, §2. 
856 See for example: Kamerstukken II, 1995/96, 22 181, nr. 145, p. 2; Doyle (2007), p. 238; 
Dziedzig & Bair (1998), p. 270. 
857 UN Doc S/RES/1035 (1995). 
858 Kamerstukken II, 1995/96, 22 181, nr. 137, p. 1 & p. 7. 
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British operational command.859 After SFOR had replaced IFOR, the Dutch 
contribution to the NATO mission continued and ultimately lasted until 
December 2004.860 For the chronology of the mission, see Appendix 1. 
 
The Netherlands also participated in the IPTF. After having received a formal 
request from the UN, the Dutch government decided in February 1996 to 
deploy fifty members of the Marechaussee for the purpose and the length of the 
IPTF mission.861 
6.1.4  Structure of the chapter 
This chapter provides an answer to sub-questions 4, 5 and 6 in relationship to the 
NL Army’s involvement in IFOR/SFOR from 1996 until 2003. This chapter 
first deals with the question whether the IFOR/SFOR mission encountered a 
security gap. Secondly, the chapter deals with the operational concept of the 
various battalions and answers the question whether the concept has contributed 
to public security. Thirdly, it describes their organisational concept and answers 
the question to what extent this concept supported the execution of police-like 
activities.862 
6.2  Security gap 
6.2.1  Public security situation 
Demographic composition of the area 
Given the ethnic and nationalist background to the conflict, the ethnic composi-
tion of the country was of significance for the security situation. In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, none of the ethnic groups comprised a majority. According to the 
1991 census, Bosnia and Herzegovina had a population of 4.3 million citizens, of 
which forty-four percent were Bosniak, thirty-one percent Bosnian Serb, 
seventeen percent Bosnian Croat, and eight percent “Yugoslav”.863 
 
Ethnic cleansing during the conflict forced half the population to flee their 
homes: 1.2 million people remained displaced inside Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
900,000 fled the country.864 As a result, the conflict changed the ethnic structure 
                                               
859 Kamerstukken II, 1995/96, 22 181, nr. 137, p. 8. 
860 Kamerstukken II, 1996/97, 22 181, nr. 174, p. 5; 
http://www.defensie.nl/nimh/geschiedenis/internationale_operaties/missieoverzicht; 
accessed June 25, 2013. 
861 Kamerstukken II, 1995/96, 22 181, nr. 145, p. 3. 
862 The main body of the case description is based on interviews with commanders and senior 
staff officers of various Dutch mechanised battalions who served in IFOR/SFOR. The 
interviews cover twelve different battalions grouped in four blocks of subsequent rotations. 
The interviews are complemented with data from the Dutch Defence Archives, policy 
documents issued by the NL Army, documentation and reports issued by the Dutch par-
liament, reports issued by the UN in relation to their mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and memorial books produced by the respective Dutch battalions. 
863 See for example Cousens & Harland (2007), p. 51; Klemenčič & Žager (2004), p. 311. 
864 UN Doc S/1995/1031 (1995), p. 4. 
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of Bosnia and Herzegovina into more or less ethnic homogenous and segregated 
areas. By the end of the war, the majority of the Bosnian Serbs lived in the 
Republika Srpska, while the majority of the Bosnian Croats lived in Herzegovina 
and the Bosniaks in Central Bosnia and in the Bihac pocket.865 
 
Government, public services and police and justice were basically organised and 
controlled along ethnic lines.866 Within the ethnically homogenous regions, there 
was a relative level of peace and order. Civilians could feel safe if they belonged 
to the ethnic majority of that region.867 Outside their region, their security was 
unclear. Their safety was negatively affected by a limited freedom of move-
ment.868 Civilians belonging to one ethnic group were regularly stopped, 
intimidated and harassed by the police when travelling to other parts of the 
country at what often were non-authorised checkpoints.869 
 
Criminality 
Criminality in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina was largely war-related. 
According to Hansen’s classification of crimes in war-torn societies,870 the most 
significant types of crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina were politically or ethni-
cally-related violence, organised crime and petty crimes (e.g. corruption).871 
 
Politically and ethnically-motivated violence was a serious problem in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, at least until 2003, close to the end of the SFOR mandate. 
Although the number of incidents decreased over time, in early 2002 one out of 
3,500 citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina still had been a victim of a violent act 
such as assault, rape, or murder.872 
 
Organised crime could expand for two main reasons. First, as a result of the 
conflict, the state had been weakened and fragmented and did not provide a 
structure to fight crime effectively.873 Second, there had been strong affiliations 
between political elites, the security forces and organised crime.874 During the 
war, all parties developed links with organised criminal networks, to fund and 
equip their militaries and militias.875 After the war, these criminal networks and 
alliances further expanded876 and, for example, engaged in smuggling, tax 
evasion, trafficking in women and stolen cars.877 According to Stojarová, these 
networks were ethnically affiliated triangles composed of political elites, members 
                                               
865 See for example: Klemencic & Žager (2004), pp. 318-319. 
866 Doyle (2007), p. 237. 
867 Interview July 6, 2011(a). 
868 Interview June 17, 2011. 
869 UN Doc S/2002/1314 (2002), p. 2. 
870 Hansen (2002b), pp. 90-91. 
871 See for example: Lovelock (2005), pp. 124-125; Rausch (2002), p. 24. 
872 Doyle (2007), pp. 260-261. 
873 Andreas (2009), p. 41. 
874 Stojarová (2007), p. 96. 
875 Doyle (2007), p. 237; Hills (2009), p. 121. 
876 Keller & Newman (2007), p. 57. See also: Stojarová (2007), p. 96. 
877 Andreas (2004), p. 5. See also: Hills (2009), p. 121. 
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of the police and the military, criminal groups and paramilitary units and they 
operated within their respective ethnic areas.878 
 
In terms of petty crimes, corruption was another issue that affected Bosnian 
society, government, politics and business sector. The collapse of the formal 
economy and high unemployment rates required many people to find alternative 
means to sustain.879 For example, many war-veterans had lost their means of 
living because of the demobilisation following the Dayton Peace Agreement.880 
Corruption could further flourish because the police and justice system were 
unable or unwilling to intervene and cases of corruption were rarely prose-
cuted.881 
 
Within the area of operations of the Dutch battalion, criminality followed the 
same pattern as nationally. Ethnically or politically oriented violence occurred 
through intimidation of minorities, violence against returnees, arson, and 
plundering of properties.882 Organised crime mainly involved illegal logging and 
smuggling of weapons, drugs and cars.883 Corruption was a problem within the 
Dutch area of operations too. In particular, police corruption, for example 
through cashing illegal fines, had a negative impact on the security perception 
and the freedom of movement of citizens.884 The high number of arms and 
ammunition among the population was considered a threat to public security in 
the area.885 By the end of the Dutch mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
however, Dutch commanders perceived local public security as relatively stable 
and normal, although they still regarded police corruption a serious problem that 
affected the public’s trust in the police.886 
 
Public order 
In general, riots had not been a major problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina.887 
However, a number of events escalated into public disturbances, notably the 
visits and returns of displaced persons and refugees (DPRE) and the Bosnian-
                                               
878 Stojarová (2007), p. 96. 
879 See for example: Hansen (2002b), p. 90; Kaldor (2006), p. 71; Stojarová (2007), pp. 95-96. 
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Croat initiatives to establish a third independent political and administrative 
entity. 
 
Visits and returns by displaced persons and refugees occasionally encountered 
problems and triggered ethnic tensions and resistance. The organisation and 
facilitation of the visits and returns had been the responsibility of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) while the local authorities 
and police were formally responsible for ensuring orderly and secure proceed-
ing.888 The IPTF had been responsible for assisting and monitoring the local 
police in the fulfilment of their duties,889 while in accordance with the Peace 
Agreement, IFOR/SFOR could assist the UNHCR in its humanitarian mission 
and prevent interference with the freedom of movement of displaced persons and 
refugees.890 
 
Until the end of 1997, visits and returns occurred rather ad hoc,891 while from 
1998, they started to become more coordinated and structured,892 and became a 
focal point of the Dutch battalion.893 According to some Dutch officers, Bosnian 
Croats sometimes paid unannounced visits to their homes of origin, often with 
the intention to provoke or to influence the international agenda.894 However, 
incidents also occurred in relation to planned returns as opponents used the 
opportunity to make a political statement, for example by staging a conflict or 
organising a demonstration.895 During 1997 and 1998, returns and visits regularly 
escalated into demonstrations and scrimmages as the local police failed to 
maintain order and the IPTF lacked the executive powers to intervene. As of 
1999, the visits and returns increasingly proceeded without serious incidents, 
although orchestrated resistance persevered until the end of 2000.896 At the end 
of the Dutch mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the monthly visits and returns 
passed off peacefully as the local authorities had assumed responsibility for their 
security.897 
 
Another incident that influenced the level of public order and stability had been 
the Bosnian-Croat initiative to establish a third independent political and 
administrative entity. The Bosnian-Croat initiatives had a destabilising effect on 
public security and resulted in a higher level of vigilance of the Dutch battalion. 
In 2001, for example, Dutch troops secured Bosnian-Croat weapon storage sites 
after the local guards left their posts in protest against the dismissal of Bosnian-
                                               
888 GFAP, Annex 7, Chapter 1. 
889 GFAP, Annex 11, Article III, §2. 
890 GFAP, Annex 1A, Article VI, §1(d). 
891 Interview July 6, 2011(a); Interview June 14, 2011; Interview June 17, 2011; Interview 
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892 Interview June 17, 2011. 
893 Interview August 24, 2011. 
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Croat generals by the High Representative. Dutch troops also cleared several 
weapon storage sites in order to prevent possible armed escalation.898 
6.2.2  Local police 
The Dayton Peace Agreement regulated that the authorities in the Federation 
and the Republika Srpska remained their responsibility for providing ‘a safe and 
secure environment for all persons in their respective jurisdictions, by maintain-
ing civilian law enforcement agencies operating in accordance with internation-
ally recognized standards and with respect for the internationally recognized 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.’899 As a result, at the end of the war the 
local police remained in place. At the end of 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina had 
44,750 active police officers, three times the pre-war strength.900  
 
There were basically three main issues that characterised the performances of the 
local police. 
First, the police was largely ethnically biased. The UN Secretary General 
reported that ‘the local police forces were mono-ethnic paramilitary units (…) 
entirely unsuited to civilian law enforcement. Instead of attempting to provide 
citizens of minority groups with some sense of security, police forces continued 
to discriminate against minority groups harass, and intimidate citizens who were 
not of their own ethnicity.’ 901 The police reinforced the ethnic division of the 
country through police checkpoints along the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) 
and between communities in the Federation.’902 In the pre-war era, police 
checkpoints had served as important instruments of state control, while during 
and after the war, the police used checkpoints to harass and intimidate ethnic 
minorities and limit their freedom of movement.903 Because of their ethnic bias, 
the police were unwilling to protect citizens of other ethnicities and to secure 
their safety.904 Ethnic bias also characterised police action in the area of operations 
of the Dutch IFOR/SFOR battalions. According to several of the interviewed 
commanders, the local police primarily protected citizens belonging to their own 
ethnic group; others rather feared the police.905 The police was perceived as 
acting against members of ethnic minorities, for example by fining or harassing 
them at checkpoints.906 The police showed a restraint in terms of ethnic violence 
and protecting refugees and displaced persons during the visits of their homes of 
                                               
898 Interview September 30, 2011(b). See also: Klep & Van Gils (2005), p. 373; Kamerstukken 
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899 GFAP, Article III, §2c. 
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origin.907 As such, the inability or unwillingness of the police to protect all 
citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to enforce the law at all occasions created 
an enforcement gap, as defined by Dziedzic.908 
Corruption was a second feature that plagued the quality and performance of the 
police of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Low police salaries and irregular payments 
made police officers vulnerable ‘to taking bribes, engaging in corruption and 
organised crime.’909 In the Dutch area of operations, police corruption had been 
a manifest problem and occurred during the full period of the Dutch presence. 
According to Dutch officers, corruption was deeply rooted in the local police 
organisation 910 and the police management failed to intervene and to confront 
corrupt police officers.911 Police corruption occurred for example at the check-
points where citizens had to pay bribes to police officers to be granted freedom of 
movement.912 
Third, the lack of professionalism further affected the police’s quality and 
performance. During the conflict the police of all three entities had expanded 
significantly through ‘an influx of personnel with little or no police training.’913 
The police of the Federation, for example, recruited police officers who often 
had a paramilitary or military background. As a result, the flow of personnel 
between the police and military had become fluid.914 
 
The local police’s failure to provide sustainable public security based upon 
democratic standards of policing and the rule of law resulted in an institutional 
gap.915 To overcome this institutional gap, the UN International Police Task 
Force (IPTF) launched a programme to reform and downsize the police of the 
Federation in 1996.916 This reform was based on the Petersberg Declaration of 
April 25, 1996 that agreed on creating local police forces that were ‘structured 
and operate according to generally accepted international standards for policing 
and guarantee respect for internationally accepted human rights.’ 917 
 
The Petersberg Declaration also compelled the Federation to downsize its police 
forces to ‘a level consistent with European standards.’918 In practice, the declara-
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tion forced the Federation to reduce its police strength to 11,500.919 Later, in 
1998 a similar agreement was achieved with the Republika Srpska to reduce its 
strength to 8,500.920 By the end of its mandate in 2002, the IPTF had managed 
to reduce the number of Bosnian police officers from about 44,000 in 1996 to 
15,786 of which 8,311 in the Federation, 5,692 in the Republika Srpska, 263 in 
the Brčko District, 169 in the Federation Court Police and 1,351 in the State 
Border Service.921 However, the police reforms did not remove corruption and 
incompetence completely from the police organisation. For example, when the 
IPTF removed police officers from their posts in law enforcement, local 
authorities sometimes transferred them to administrative or political positions 
elsewhere where they could continue to exercise their negative power and 
influence.922 
6.2.3  International police 
During the deployment of the Dutch mechanised IFOR/SFOR battalions three 
bodies of international police operated in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the UN 
IPTF, the EU Police Mission (EUPM), and NATO’s MSU. 
 
IPTF 
The Dayton Peace Agreement assigned the IPTF to monitor, train, advise and 
facilitate the local police.923 The Peace Agreement did not provide the IPTF with 
executive powers, for example to enforce the law, investigate crimes, make 
arrests and maintain public order.924 According to the UN Secretary-General, an 
executive mandate was not favourable for international police officers for it might 
jeopardise their personal security: 
 
Given the widespread availability to the population of long arms and even 
heavier weapons, I have given consideration to the possibility of arming the 
International Police Task Force monitors. The traditional side arms carried by 
police officers would, however, be no match for the type of weapons likely to 
                                               
919 Dziedzic & Bair (1998), p. 287; Perito (2004b), p. 122. 
920 UN Doc S/2002/1314 (2002), p. 2. See also: Hills (2009), p. 127. 
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922 Doyle (2007), p. 243. 
923 GFAP in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 11: Agreement on International Police Force. 
924 Prior to the peace negotiations in Dayton, there had been a discussion on the mandate and 
organisation of the IPTF between officials of the United States, EU members of the Con-
tact Group (United Kingdom, France) and Russia. While US diplomats preferred the de-
ployment of a robust and executive police force composed of West European civilian po-
lice and gendarmes and some Canadian and American augmentations, the EU members 
opposed such idea. The Europeans feared that a robust force with a strong mandate would 
lead to casualties, which would not be accepted by the European public. They also ques-
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be at the disposal of those who might threaten the monitors. The security of 
the Task Force must flow from the authority granted to it by all parties under 
the Agreement and from the fact that its personnel represent no threat to any 
armed element in that area of operation. I strongly recommend, therefore, 
that the Task Force monitors should not be armed.925 
 
In addition to a lack of executive powers, IPTF also suffered from a deployment 
gap at the outset. Initially, the authorised strength of the IPTF was set on 1,721 
police officers. This number was based upon a ratio of one international police 
monitor to thirty local police officers including personnel of judicial and prison 
systems and supervisory staff.926 After the UN Security Council had adopted 
UNSCR 1035 (1995) on December 21, 1995, the Secretary-General approached 
53 member states to find the required 1,721 international police officers.927 
However, the deployment of the IPTF turned out to be an incremental process. 
At the end of February 1996, only 400 police officers had arrived in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina of which 200 were stationed in Sarajevo. At the end of March 
1996, the number of police officers doubled to 798.928 In September 1996, IPTF 
finally approached its authorised strength when close to 1,700 IPTF police 
officers from 34 different countries were stationed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.929 
 
The IPTF not only suffered from slow deployments, it initially also encountered 
difficulties regarding the ‘professional suitability of police personnel offered by 
member states.’930 In particular, relatively large numbers of police officers 
deployed by member states were unable to meet the minimum professional 
criteria, such as ‘eight years of policing experience, ability to communicate in 
English and driving skills.’931 In March 1996, the Secretary General expressed his 
concern about the development that further delayed IPTF reaching its full 
capacity. He reported that: 
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Luka, Gorni Vakuf, Mostar and Mostar; seventeen police districts; and 109 local police 
stations (UN Doc S/1995/1031 (1995), pp. 7-8). 
927 UN Doc S/1995/1031 (1995), pp. 7-8. 
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[T]he number of those who failed to meet the criteria and to pass the required 
elementary tests upon arrival in the theatre has risen to alarming levels. In 
some cases, the majority of a contingent has failed in one or more tests, with 
the result that a large number of prospective monitors had to be repatriated.932 
 
The initial problems with the deployment of unskilled police officers were largely 
solved after the UN established so-called “selection assistance teams”. These 
teams organised pre-deployment selections by testing police officers’ professional 
and language skills in their home countries prior to their deployment.933 
 
EUPM 
When on January 1, 2003 the mandate of the IPTF ended it was succeeded by 
the EUPM.934 The EUPM consisted of 500 European police officers who, like 
their colleagues of the IPTF, lacked an executive mandate.935 The mission of the 
EUPM was twofold. First and foremost, the EUPM was tasked to mentor, 
monitor and inspect the high and middle management of the police forces.936 
Secondly, the EUPM was to direct and manage the reform of the entity-based 
police of Bosnia and Herzegovina into one single police force.937 Throughout its 
mission, the EUPM suffered from a lack of strategic focus and insufficient quality 
of staff. Contributing countries sometimes deployed ‘junior police officers or 
officers not qualified for positions they [would have to] fill,’ as Doyle notes.938 
Cousens and Harland add that, like the IPTF, also the EUPM had not been 
effective in reforming the local police. In particular, they note that the EUPM 
had failed to establish the necessary changes at the top of the police organisation 
in order to complete the required police reforms.939 The mandate of the EUPM 
ended on June 30, 2012.940 
 
MSU 
Because the IPTF had no executive powers to enforce the law and to maintain 
public order where the local police failed, and IFOR and SFOR initially focused 
on implementing the military aspects of the Peace Agreement rather than also 
engaging in public security, the international mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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need for repatriation (UN Doc S/1996/460 (1996), p. 2. 
933 UN Doc S/1996/460 (1996), p. 2. 
934 UN Doc S/RES/1396 (2002). 
935 Doyle (2007), p. 240. 
936 Doyle (2007), p. 240. 
937 Cousens & Harland (2006), p. 112. 
938 Doyle (2007), p. 240. 
939 Cousens & Harland (2006), p. 113. 
940 http://www.eupmbih.eu; accessed June 25, 2013. 
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suffered from an enforcement gap.941 In the early months of the operation, IFOR 
and SFOR followed a strict interpretation of the Peace Agreement.942 
 
However, the military’s narrow interpretation of the mandate ultimately changed 
early in the spring of 1997. Instead of focusing on the implementation of the 
military aspects of the Peace Agreement, SFOR increasingly shifted its focus to 
peace-building.943 This change occurred for three main reasons. 
First, SFOR faced public criticism for its reluctance to engage more in protecting 
returnees and arresting alleged war criminals.944 
Second, SFOR officers realised that a limited interpretation of the mandate could 
endanger the establishment of a “safe and secure environment”. The military 
therefore became more proactive towards public security, although the SFOR 
leadership continued to be cautious regarding public security tasks.945 
Third, at the international political level there had been changes that opened the 
way for a more maximalist interpretation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. In the 
United States, for example the new Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 
supported a more assertive approach toward peace-building. In the United 
Kingdom, Prime Minister Tony Blair followed a political agenda in which he 
emphasised the protection of human rights. At NATO, finally, then Secretary-
General Solana pushed NATO’s SACEUR, General Clark to expand the scope 
of SFOR’s military tasks in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to include some sort of 
policing.946 
 
An initiative to close the enforcement gap was behind NATO’s decision to 
introduce a MSU in August 1998 in order ‘to bridge the gap between SFOR 
traditional military forces and “civil police type” units.’947 The MSU was a 
battalion-sized international police force of Italian carabinieri (75 percent), 
Argentinean gendarmes and Romanian and Slovenian MPs,948 which was 
‘organised along military lines and equipped to carry out a wide range of police 
and military tasks’.949  
 
The MSU was primarily tasked to ‘promote public security by utilising the unit’s 
ability to serve as a strategic reserve force and to operate throughout the theatre’; 
‘to assist with refugee return’; ‘to perform crisis management to maintain public 
order, including the use of force in crowd and riot control’; and to collect 
intelligence and process information for operational purposes.’950 The MSU 
operated directly under the authority of the Commander of SFOR (COM-
                                               
941 Friesendorf (2009), p. 37 & p. 39. 
942 Brocades Zaalberg (2006), pp. 255-256. 
943 See for example Brocades Zaalberg (2006), p. 263; Friesendorf (2009), p. 39. 
944 Brocades Zaalberg (2006), p. 263. 
945 Friesendorf (2009), p. 40. 
946 Friesendorf (2009), pp. 39-40. See also: Brocades Zaalberg (2006), p. 263. 
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948 Perito (2004), p. 158. 
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SFOR). The MSU battalion headquarters was stationed in Sarajevo from where 
it planned and executed its operations throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
MSU planned its patrols and operations in coordination with the MND in which 
area it deployed. The final approval for deployment was given by COMSFOR to 
whom the MSU also directly reported.951 In that sense, the MSU had a substan-
tial level of operational autonomy within the sector of a MND.952 In case public 
order disturbances were expected in an MND sector, this MND could then 
submit a request for assistance to COMSFOR, who then tasked the MSU to plan 
for an operation. After authorisation, COMSFOR could pass tactical command 
to the MND.953 A battalion commander could also request the assistance of the 
MSU, for example to support him during the visits of and returns of displaced 
persons and refugees or weapons searches. In that case, the MND after making its 
own assessment could pass such a request to COMSFOR for final approval.954 
 
Opposite to the findings of Perito, Dutch officers provided a more negative 
image of the MSU in terms of cooperation, attitude and professionalism. 
Whereas Perito argues that the MSU ran into a wall of misunderstanding and 
unwillingness of regular SFOR troops to cooperate,955 experiences of Dutch 
officers showed the opposite as they encountered a lack of cooperation on the 
part of the Italian MSU Company that deployed in their area of operations.956 
Some commanders for example noted that MSU officials lacked proficiency to 
communicate effectively in English.957 Although Perito states that MSU com-
manders were able to communicate in English,958 Dutch officers reported that 
some of the MSU company or platoon commanders were unable to speak 
English, which impeded smooth coordination and cooperation.959 Other 
battalion commanders also encountered problems in terms of cooperation and 
coordination in case the MSU operated in their area of operations.960 One of 
them reported: 
 
Formally, they operated directly under COMSFOR but they were supposed to 
be under my operational command if they had an assignment within my area of 
operations. Consequently, they had to report themselves but that turned out to 
be problematic; either they did not know where to report or they just pre-
tended to be stupid.961 
 
                                               
951 Perito (2004b), pp. 161-162. The MSU company that operated in the Dutch area of 
operations was of Italian origin. 
952 Interview August 24, 2011. 
953 Perito (2004b), p. 163. 
954 Interview August 24, 2011. 
955 Perito (2004b), p. 161. 
956 Interview July 1, 2011; Interview September 30, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 2011(b); 
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957 Interview August 24, 2011; Interview September 30, 2011(b). 
958 Perito (2004b), p. 159. 
959 Interview July 7, 2011(b); Interview August 24, 2011; Interview September 30, 2011(b). 
960 Interview July 1, 2011; Interview August 24, 2011; Interview October 10, 2011. 
961 Interview July 1, 2011. 
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The professional attitude of the MSU was a third problem. The MSU operated at 
a large social distance from the local population. Some commanders regarded 
them as “machos” unable to deal with the local population respectfully. By 
ignoring local interests, being dismissive regarding private property or causing 
traffic accidents, they did not manage to win the hearts and minds of the 
population.962 One of the battalion commanders recalled: 
 
The MSU created more problems than they solved. They managed to destroy 
the relationships I carefully established, leaving me behind with the damage. De-
escalation was certainly not part of their operational concept.963 
6.3  Operational concept 
6.3.1  Planning and preparation 
International mandates and planning 
Annex 1-A of the Dayton Peace Agreement provided the guidelines for the 
IFOR/SFOR operation.964 As mentioned above, the military tasks of IFOR 
involved monitoring and ensuring durable compliance of all parties with the 
cessation of hostilities, monitoring the withdrawal and redeployment of the 
former warring forces from the agreed cease-fire zone of separation back to their 
respective territories, authorising and supervising the selective marking of the 
Zone of Separation and the IEBL, and assisting in the withdrawal of UN Peace 
Forces not transferred to IFOR.965  
 
In addition to the military tasks, the Peace Agreement also assigned IFOR with 
additional supportive tasks, such as establishing a safe and secure environment in 
which others could perform their tasks: assisting civilian organisations in the 
accomplishment of their humanitarian activities, providing freedom of movement 
of civilians, refugees and displaced persons and monitoring the clearing of 
minefields.966 
 
The Peace Agreement did not explicitly assign IFOR with public security or 
police tasks.967 Nevertheless, the tasks in order ‘to observe and prevent interfer-
ence with the movement of civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons, 
and to respond appropriately to deliberate violence to life and person,’968 left 
some room for an additional public security role, as Brocades Zaalberg notes.969 
As a result, IFOR did not plan to engage in detecting and arresting alleged 
persons indicted for war crimes (PIFWC). These tasks were considered to be the 
responsibility of the local police. Only when IFOR troops would encounter 
                                               
962 Interview July 1, 2011; Interview October 10, 2011. 
963 Interview July 1, 2011. 
964 Ministerie van Defensie - Defensiestaf (1997), p. 11. 
965 GFAP, Annex 1-A, Article VI. 
966 GFAP, Annex 1-A, Article VI. 
967 Kamerstukken II, 1995/96, Aanhangsel, nr. 1085, p. 108. 
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them during the execution of the regular duties, IFOR could decide to engage in 
the arrest of such suspects.970 
 
On December 21, 1996, SFOR replaced IFOR and was tasked to ‘provide 
continued military presence to deter renewed hostilities and to stabilise and 
consolidate the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to contribute to a safe 
and secure environment for ongoing civil implementation plans.’971 SFOR 
thereby wanted to create an environment in which civilian agencies and local 
governments could carry out and accelerate their nation-building efforts.972 For 
example, SFOR was supposed to cooperate with the Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) regarding the organisation of municipal 
elections in 1997 and with the UNHCR to enable the return of refugees and to 
guarantee freedom of movement of citizens all over Bosnia and Herzegovina.973 
 
Like IFOR, SFOR did not want to engage in public security issues. In his initial 
operational plan, SACEUR underlined that ‘SFOR is not a police force and will 
not become engaged in civil police functions.’974 Regarding restoring public 
order, he also noted that SFOR would not engage in riot control.975 He left 
room for some sort of public security assistance, however, noting that ‘SFOR 
should be prepared without engaging in civil police tasks (…) to respond to 
serious threats to civil order arising out of the implementation of the Peace 
Agreement that cannot be managed by IPTF or the local police.’976 The 
detection and arrest of indicted war criminals continued to be an activity of 
secondary order, as he noted that ‘SFOR had no mandate to hunt down and 
arrest indicted war criminals.’ Those arrests he saw as a responsibility of the local 
authorities and police. Only if troops encountered war criminals during their 
normal activities and if the tactical situation permitted, would SFOR detain 
them.977 
 
SFOR’s initial reluctance to engage in public security eased however from early 
1997. Formally, SFOR’s policy regarding the arrests of indicted war criminals 
remained unchanged, but the tone altered. In his SFOR Strategic guidance D+180, 
                                               
970 See for example: Handelingen II, 1995/96, nr. 37, pp. 2963-2963; Kamerstukken II, 
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SACEUR noted that SFOR had clearly had a responsibility to detain indictees if 
troops ran into them, although it had no formal mandate to hunt down and arrest 
them.978 Also regarding public security, SACEUR changed his tone, noting that 
there was ‘an urgent need for renewed emphasis on law and order by the 
international community,’ although ‘[d]irect police action is not and will not be 
an SFOR task.’979 As such, SFOR gradually assumed a greater role in public 
security issues in supporting international organisations, not only in fighting 
serious (war) crimes, but also to enable safe returns of refugees and displaced 
persons, in assisting IPTF in dismantling illegal police checkpoints and in 
confiscating illegal arms.980 
 
National political planning 
National political and strategic planning throughout the operation had been a 
responsibility of the Chief of Defence Staff, while the commander in chief of the 
NL Army had been responsible for the preparation, deployment and maintenance 
of the Dutch troops.981 The national Contingent Commander, finally, monitored 
and tested in theatre whether the operations assigned to the Dutch troops by the 
MND (SW) matched the Dutch national caveats and interests.982 
 
Throughout the mission, the provision of public security by IFOR/SFOR was 
not of major interest of the Dutch government. In February 1996, the govern-
ment mentioned the issue for the first time when Dutch parliamentarians asked 
the government whether IFOR should act against forced evictions of Bosnian 
Serb citizens in Sarajevo. The government underlined that the Dayton Peace 
Agreement had not assigned any police tasks to IFOR. These tasks were 
considered to be a responsibility of the local police.983 The government men-
tioned the issue of interim policing a second time in March 1998, when the 
government informed the Parliament about the preparations of the extension of 
the SFOR mission, underlining that SFOR troops were not supposed to perform 
any police tasks. Again, the government considered these tasks to be a responsi-
bility of the local authorities.984 
 
The point of view of the Dutch government regarding policing did not change 
when on May 27, 2002 Paddy Ashdown declared the rule of law his top-priority 
during his inaugural speech as High Representative.985 He received support from 
NATO and SFOR, which also wanted to invest in fighting corruption and 
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organised crime. For that purpose, NATO and SFOR intended to challenge the 
boundaries of their mandate. The Dutch government disagreed with this change 
of policy and reinterpretation of the mandate. It still considered law enforcement 
a responsibility of the local authorities and not one of SFOR or the international 
community. The government therefore ordered the Dutch troops to stay within 
the framework of the mandate and not to engage in SFOR efforts to improve the 
rule of law.986 
 
Following their formal international assignments, Dutch commanders focused 
their efforts on the implementation of the military aspects of the Peace Agree-
ment, such as the supervision of the former warring parties, monitoring weapons 
storage sites and promoting confidence-building measures. There were some 
commanders, however, who challenged the boundaries of their mandate. These 
commanders wanted to improve public security and tried to disrupt criminality 
when appropriate.987 One of them recalled: 
 
I deliberately explored the limits of my mandate because I wanted to contribute 
to the reduction of crime. That was also what people expected of me for I was 
the big sheriff in town.988 
 
Nevertheless, a wider interpretation of the mandate was not appreciated. The 
Commander of the NL Army, for example, warned that since the SFOR peace 
operation had evolved to nation-building, a conflict of interest between the 
military activities as assigned by the Peace Agreement and additional tasks related 
to law enforcement had to be seen as realistic. He therefore called for caution 
regarding a wider interpretation of the mandate.989 Most commanders complied 
with the formal and strict interpretation of the mandate. To some, the risk of 
mission creep had been an additional reason to refrain from an intensified role in 
public security. One commander, for example, reported in this perspective: 
 
You must always keep men from activities they are not trained for. There is 
always the risk of mission creep. We are no public prosecutors; we are no 
police; and we are not supposed to arrest people. We had to deal with serious 
criminals who just had been involved in a war, which in fact had been the 
most severe kind of war. Are we then supposed to thwart them? I drove 
around there on my own. I often said: “you have to be aware that while you 
are waiting for a traffic light a car stops next to you and telling to mind your 
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own business while shooting at your driver’s knees.” That was not unthink-
able in an environment where people just ended a war. You had therefore to 
be cautious on how far you would go.990 
 
Operational planning and preparation 
Throughout the IFOR/SFOR mission, the NL Army battalions operated within 
the framework of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the operational planning of 
NATO and under the operational control of the commander of the MND 
(SW).991 Generally, the mission of the battalion commanders was to ‘ensure a safe 
and secure environment’ and ‘to observe and prevent interference with the 
movement of civilian populations, refugees and displaced persons and to respond 
appropriately to deliberate violence to life and person.’992 
 
Although this broad mission gave commanders the opportunity to provide 
security to the local population if needed and to assist the local police and the 
IPTF, most battalion commanders followed their formal assignments and did not 
expand their mission by formulating specific public security-related objectives.993 
Commanders concentrated on the military tasks formalised in the Peace Agree-
ment in order to prevent hostilities between the parties and to ensure a safe and 
secure environment. Assistance to civilian organisations, such as support to IPTF, 
the Office of the High Representative (OHR) (governance), UNHCR (refugee 
returns) and the OSCE (elections) was generally seen as a secondary task.994 
Commanders focused on providing and ensuring security at a general level rather 
than a community level, as one commander explained: 
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By promoting a safe and secure environment we ensured everybody could 
move safely and do the things he wanted. It included that everybody should 
accept each other again since that basically defines the condition for security. 
We were there to ensure that people could feel safe and secure. For the popula-
tion we were the insurance that the conflict would not start again.995 
 
In fact, public security had been a blind spot for most commanders in advance of 
their deployment. Although every battalion commander visited the area prior to 
their deployment to acquire some situational awareness, they established a more 
complete picture during their deployment.996 Some commanders responded to 
public security problems as they occurred, for example regarding the return of 
refugees and displaced persons, support to the IPTF or illegal logging. To other 
commanders, public security was not a priority. 
 
As a result, most commanders did not include additional objectives or tasks 
regarding public security in their operational plans. This did not mean that public 
security remained totally unmentioned. One commander mentioned that he had 
made an effort to acquire additional intelligence to get a better picture of the 
local security situation. Based upon this intelligence, he decided to focus on the 
prevention or suppression of public disorder and crowd and riot control.997 Two 
other commanders mentioned the assistance to the MSU, the OSCE (for the safe 
return of refugees and displaced persons) and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (for the arrest of war crimes indictees) as 
possible public security related tasks.998 Another two mentioned the issue of 
public security in their Commander’s Intent. Although they considered public 
security to be a responsibility of the local police and IPTF, they for example 
emphasised that they were willing to use military force to protect the population 
in case of escalation.999 One of them was very explicit in this perspective by 
noting that his battalion would ‘act against every breach of security of the local 
population and deploy [his] resources to achieve a peaceful proceeding of the 
visits and returns of the DPREs and if required with the use of limited force.’1000 
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Initially, public security had not been a focal point in the operational preparation 
of most battalions. The two Dutch IFOR battalions trained for the execution of 
a peace-enforcement operation as described in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
Initially, IFOR 1 had been trained to participate in UNPROFOR as Dutchbat 
4. After the international community had taken steps towards the establishment 
of IFOR, the battalion had to adapt to a more robust mind-set and posture.1001 
IFOR 2 trained and prepared for the execution of a robust operation. In line 
with its formal assignment, the battalion primarily focused on achieving the 
objectives of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Dealing with public security 
problems was therefore not a priority, unless those problems would affect or 
jeopardise the battalion’s overall mission.1002 
 
SFOR 1 initially concentrated on peace-enforcement, but during the training, 
the battalion refocused and put more emphasis on police-like activities such as 
social patrolling and intelligence gathering. It also paid attention to some public 
order issues that could occur in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The battalion com-
mander recalled: 
 
We expected incidents varying from disturbances at the gate of our base to 
clashes of opposing groups. Our focus has always been to solve these problems 
to separate groups through interposition in order to avoid further escalation.1003 
 
Dealing with public order and disturbances had thus been a point of attention of 
the earlier deployments, but was not embedded in the training in a professional 
or structural way. This situation changed when, in 1997, crowd and riot control 
became a focal point in the preparation and operational concept of the SFOR 
battalions. On August 31, a company of Dutch Marines was deployed to assist 
SFOR 2 in maintaining public order during the municipal elections of Septem-
ber 13-14, 1997. Thereafter, the Ministry of Defence decided to continue the 
augmentation of SFOR 2 with CRC capabilities.1004 During SFOR 2 and 3, it 
had been the Marines that provided the additional CRC platoons, but from 
SFOR 4, the NL Army took on responsibility for providing a CRC platoon.1005 
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The Marechaussee provided the basic training for the CRC platoons.1006 This 
training focused on the CRC drills: fire fighting, arrest of individuals, application 
and use of CRC equipment and combined operations with other battalion 
units.1007 After completion, the CRC platoons conducted a joint training with 
the other units of the battalion. During this joint training, the battalion trained 
for all possible public order scenarios they expected to encounter during their 
stay in Bosnia and Herzegovina.1008 The training of the CRC platoon was not 
always synchronised with that of the battalion, however. As a result, the CRC 
platoons were not fully trained at the time of the final integration exercise prior 
to deployment of the battalion. In one case, the battalion commander decided to 
run his integration programme although his CRC platoon was not formally 
certified. In another case, the integration training took place in theatre on Camp 
Butmir in Sarajevo.1009 
 
At the end of 1999, the Ministry of Defence changed its policy regarding the 
deployment of CRC platoons. The Ministry of Defence considered the assign-
ment of CRC capacity to SFOR battalions no longer to be an automatism. 
Deployment had to be based upon an operational necessity in theatre, it noted in 
its policy document Crowd and Riot Control of September 2000. In addition, a 
routine assignment of unrequited CRC capacity was considered to burden the 
limited training capacity of the Marechaussee.1010 From 2000, the Ministry kept a 
trained CRC platoon in reserve in the Netherlands at a notice-to-move of 
twenty days. For immediate CRC support, the battalion now had to rely on 
support from the MSU capacity of COMSFOR. In case of foreseen augmenta-
tion, the battalion commander could request the Chief of the Defence Staff to 
deploy the CRC platoon.1011 In case a deployment lasted less than six weeks, the 
Marechaussee provided the required personnel; if the deployment would involve a 
longer period, the NL Army had to take responsibility for deploying a trained 
platoon.1012 
 
                                               
1006 Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 28 600X, nr. 48, pp. 1-2; Koninklijke Landmacht – Operatione-
le Staf BLS (1999b), p. 7. 
1007 Koninklijke Landmacht – Operationele Staf BLS (1999b), p. 9. 
1008 Interview, June 17, 2011; Interview July 1, 2011; Interview August 24, 2011. 
1009 Interview September 30, 2011(b); Interview October 10, 2011. See also: Planting (2001), 
pp. 23-24 & p. 49. 
1010 Ministerie van Defensie, Defensiestaf, DCBC, Sectie Plannen (September, 2000). Crowd 
and Riot Control (draft, version 4). 
1011 Interview September 30, 2011(b); Kamerstukken II, 2000/01, 22 181, nr. 330, p. 2 & pp. 3-
4). During the increased tensions related to the Bosnian-Croat attempts to establish a third 
entity, the battalion commander of SFIR 9 requested the deployment of a Dutch Crowd 
and Riot Control (CRC) platoon to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The government decided to 
deploy a CRC platoon as of April 23, 2001 in order to reinforce the battalion and to in-
crease the commander’s operational flexibility in case of disturbances and if the local police 
were be unable or unwilling to maintain public order (Kamerstukken II, 2000/01, 22 181, 
nr. 330, p. 2 & pp. 3-4). 
1012 Bevelhebber der Landstrijdkrachten, Operatiebevel nummer 10030 (INZET KL-BIJDAGE 
SFOR), April 20, 2001, pp. 3-4. SSA, 1(NL) Contco SFOR, October 11, 2000 – March 8, 
2001, Box 1023, Orders, bevelen, plannen. 
158
IFOR/SFOR 
 
After a fatal incident during a training of the CRC platoons of SFOR 9 and 10, 
in which one soldier died and three were injured after being hit by a combat 
engineering tank in its forward passage of a CRC line, the government finally 
decided to withdraw the Army-based CRC platoons from Bosnia. It now 
assigned the Marechaussee to provide a CRC platoon on a standby basis.1013 As a 
result, the CRC concept became of secondary order and in essence commanders 
were deprived of an instrument to deal with public order issues immediately and 
effectively. 
 
Apart from training CRC scenarios, the SFOR battalions did not have a separate 
and formal training in providing public security. Several public security aspects 
had been integrated in the training programme but they had not been labelled as 
such. Training for public security basically involved how to deploy social patrols, 
gather information, make arrests, organise a checkpoint and to search persons, 
vehicles and objects. The battalions trained for these activities according the 
standard military curriculum,1014 although in a very basic way, as the battalion 
commander recalled.1015 
6.3.2  Managing the security gap 
6.3.2.1 Public order management 
Social patrolling 
The purpose of social patrolling is that soldiers ‘foster an ambiance of normalcy as 
much as possible’ and ‘become more approachable and therefore better able to 
gather information from locals.’1016 The NL Army started with social patrolling 
when IFOR 1 was halfway into their operation. By deploying social patrols, the 
battalion intended to enhance its communication and interaction with the local 
population and to contribute to improve local security.1017 To increase their 
approachability during social patrolling, Dutch soldiers wore berets, had no flak 
jackets and had their weapons slung over their shoulders. By reducing the level of 
force protection, IFOR also showed the population that it was confident about 
normalisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.1018 A commander reported: 
 
Gradually we intensified our social patrolling. As such we increased the feeling 
of security of the local population and contributed to the reestablishment of 
social and economical processes.1019 
 
                                               
1013 See for example: Klep & Van Gils (2005), p. 373; De Weger, Grashof & Douma (2007), 
pp. 15-16. 
1014 Interview June 17, 2011; Interview August 19, 2011; Interview October 4, 2011(b); 
Interview October 5, 2011(a); Interview October 10, 2011. 
1015 Interview October 5, 2011(a). 
1016 Gawrych (2004), p. 140. 
1017 Interview June 14, 2011; Interview July 6, 2011(a); Kolken, Van Houten, Feijt & 
Cappenberg (s.a), p. 67. See also: Kamerstukken II, 1995/96, 22 181, nr. 148, p. 7. 
1018 Van Houten, Feijt & Cappenberg (s.a), p. 67. 
1019 Interview June 10, 2011. 
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After its introduction by IFOR 1, social patrolling became one of the core 
activities of the NL Army battalions within their Normal Framework Operations. 
The NL Army deployed social patrolling in order to contribute to a safe and 
secure environment. By a 24/7 presence in the villages and towns, the battalions 
offered citizens security and a point of contact to address local security prob-
lems.1020 Social patrolling also served to gather (targeted) information on, for 
example, political, social, economical and (public) security matters.1021 With this 
information, IFOR/SFOR was able to plan further action, for example to 
provide security in sensitive areas, or to inform other international organisations, 
such as to the IPTF on matters concerning the local police or criminality or 
UNHCR on the social circumstances of returnees.1022 Social patrolling also 
focused on establishing local networks and good relationships with the local 
population and key-players.1023 It therefore was often executed in a deconcen-
trated fashion in which patrols were assigned to fixed geographical areas.1024 As 
such, social patrolling shared some sort of the characteristics of community 
policing as explained in Chapter 4. 
 
Freedom of movement 
The Dutch IFOR/SFOR battalions also focused on ensuring the freedom of 
movement of citizens. The freedom of movement of citizens had been a major 
problem in the early years of the mission. To ensure freedom of movement 
patrols focused on illegal police checkpoints.1025 Especially along the IEBL but 
also in other areas in the Federation, the police obstructed the freedom of 
movement of minority groups, notably that of displaced persons and refugees 
                                               
1020 Interview June 10, 2011; Interview July 6, 2011(a); Interview June 14, 2011; Interview 
August 19, 2011; Interview August 24, 2011; Interview September 20, 2011(a); Interview 
October 4, 2011(b); Interview October 5, 2011(a); Interview October 10, 2011. 
1021 Interview June 14, 2011; Interview July 6, 2011(a); Interview October 5, 2011(a); 
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Interview June 17, 2011; Interview July 1, 2011; Interview October 10, 2011; Interview 
September 20, 2011(a). 
1023 Interview June 14, 2011; Interview July 6, 2011(a). See also: Kamerstukken II, 1995/96, 22 
181, nr. 148, p. 7. 
1024 Interview July 1, 2011; Interview August 19, 2011; Interview September 20, 2011(a); 
Interview September 30, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 2011(b). 
1025 Kamerstukken II, 1996/97, 22 181, nr. 184, pp. 8-9; Interview October 5, 2011(a); 
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who wanted to visits their homes of origin.1026 To increase freedom of move-
ment of all citizens, in early 1996 the Commander of IFOR (COMIFOR) 
introduced the so-called 30-minutes policy. This policy entailed that police 
checkpoints were only allowed for thirty minutes and not without prior 
permission.1027 When IFOR ran into a police checkpoint that did not comply 
with the policy, it was allowed to take physical action.1028 One officer noted: 
 
All entities frustrated the freedom of movement of other entities. To change this 
we first got hold of the static checkpoints followed by the mobile checkpoints. 
When we ran into a checkpoint, we gave them a notice to comply. If they did 
not comply with our instruction we sent a negotiator to the checkpoint to make 
clear that if they failed to comply, a tank would clear the checkpoint.1029 
 
According to another officer, this approach worked out effectively. It had not 
been necessary to use force. Just ‘showing the force’ had been enough, he 
said.1030 Nevertheless, it did not solve the problem of the checkpoints entirely. In 
1997, the UN, SFOR and UNHCR reaffirmed the 30-minutes policy. The 
policy prohibited the local police ‘to hold static checkpoints for longer than 30 
minutes, unless prior approval had been obtained from IPTF.’ The policy 
allowed only checkpoints ‘required for the prevention and reduction of crime 
and (…) ‘for emergency purposes, provided that IPTF [was] notified’. The policy 
relied on the cooperation of SFOR, which had agreed to assist IPTF in the 
removal of illegal checkpoints.1031 From September 1997, the IPTF only gave 
permission for fifteen police checkpoints a day, which resulted in a significant 
improvement of the freedom of movement, as the UN Secretary General 
reported.1032 After 1998, commanders did not report any serious obstructions of 
the freedom of movement. One of the reasons for the improvement was the 
introduction by the OHR and the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(UNMIBH) of common and ethnically neutral licence plates in 1998.1033 
 
Support for the return of refugees and displaced persons 
At the end of the war, 1.2 million persons were internally displaced and 900,000 
had fled the country.1034 The Dayton Peace Agreement had assigned UNHCR to 
develop a repatriation plan for ‘an early, peaceful, orderly and phased return of 
refugees and displaced persons.’1035 It also tasked IFOR – and later SFOR – to 
assist the UNHCR to accomplish its humanitarian mission and ‘to prevent 
                                               
1026 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to the Security Council 
Resolution 1035 (1995), UN Doc S/1996/460 (1996), p. 2. 
1027 Interview June 14, 2011; Interview July 6, 2011(a); Kolken et al (s.a.), p. 67. 
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interference with the movement of (…) refugees and displaced persons.1036 In line 
with the mandate, the Dutch IFOR/SFOR battalions provided support to the 
visits and returns of displaced persons and refugees. 
 
In the first two years of the mission, these visits and returns occurred not on a 
large scale and rather ad hoc. During 1996, those visits and returns that took 
place did not result in significant demonstrations or public order disturbances.1037 
A visit of Bosniaks to their homes of origin in Knezevo in May 1996, for 
example, even resulted in emotional salutations between the returnees and the 
Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs who had stayed during the war.1038 During 1998, the 
visits and returns gradually became more structured and frequent character.1039 
Until early January 1998, the visits and returns still proceeded without major 
problems. A visit of Bosniak returnees to Siprage, for example, received full 
cooperation of the local authorities.1040 
 
However, from mid-January, the visits gradually got more problematic. The 
battalion had received information that a visit in Kotor Varos could face 
resistance from the local population. In response, the battalion planned for a 
worst-case scenario. Prior to the visit, the battalion commander of SFOR 3 and 
the commander of MND (SW) met with the mayor of Kotor Varos in order to 
remind him of his responsibilities regarding the safe return of refugees and 
displaced persons. The visit passed off peacefully although shots were fired in the 
vicinity as an expression of discontent. A visit in Kotor Varos in February 
required an intervention by the local police and the IPTF to prevent a crowd 
from assembling in Vrbanjci and moving to Kotor Varos.1041 A visit to Bukavica 
in March resulted in a clash between the returnees and opponents. The local 
police intervened and separated the two groups. During the following days, 
tensions increased and escalated into an attempted arson.1042 In response, the 
battalion deployed a platoon post in the neighbourhood to observe the situation 
more closely. A next visit in May, however, passed off quietly.1043 
 
Although the visits and returns gradually absorbed a lot of its attention, SFOR 3 
initially did not have a fixed strategy to deal with such visits and returns. The 
battalion commander recalled: 
 
We tried different modes of operation to find the best way to protect the 
DPREs. We had to adapt all the time. In the beginning, we operated in close 
proximity of the returnees. Later we provided some sort of area security. Shortly 
before the actual visit, we established a temporary camp nearby from where we 
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1037 Kolken et al. (s.a.), p. 78; Interview June 10, 2011. 
1038 Kolken et al. (s.a.), p. 78. 
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organised intensive patrolling. From a distance, we observed the situation with 
the video equipment of a Leopard tank. I always made sure that the police took 
responsibility for a safe and secure visits and returns. Actually, it never esca-
lated.1044 
 
From June 1998, these visits and returns demanded the full attention of SFOR. 
Visits to Gacice and to some extent in Ahmici, Siprage, and Donji Veceriska 
increasingly resulted in demonstrations and organised resistance.1045 A complicat-
ing factor was that the visits sometimes occurred unannounced, which made it 
difficult to assess the security risks in advance, as the battalion commander of 
SFOR 4 reported: 
 
Sometimes we did not know that there was a return visit and occasions we 
assessed as risky occurred organised and peacefully. On the other hand, returns 
with a low risk profile fully escalated. Afterwards, I think that these escalations 
had been orchestrated, although I cannot prove such.1046 
 
Gacice became the focal point of SFOR 4. In June 1998, several Bosniak families 
announced their plan to return to their homes of origin in Gacice. Initially, the 
international community did not expect problems mainly because returns in 
Ahmici had passed off peacefully. However, after the mayor and chief of police 
of Vitez had received letters of complaint, the international community under-
stood that these returns might not pass so quietly and peacefully. During a visit in 
early June, the Alpha Company of the Dutch SFOR battalion intervened to 
prevent further escalation after Bosnian Croats had created blockades to stop 
returnees. In following days, the situation appeared to calm down especially 
when on July 31, all parties agreed to the safe return of the Bosniaks. However, 
on August 6, after the Bosniaks started to return to their homes of origin, the 
situation deteriorated. An angry crowd of Bosnian Croats blocked the road to the 
Bosniak part of the village and issued an ultimatum to the Bosniaks, forcing them 
to leave within two hours. The international community decided to negotiate 
the situation the next morning in order to find a solution in cooperation with the 
local authorities. Meanwhile, SFOR, IPTF and the local police cooperated to 
develop a security plan and the battalion commander decided to keep his CRC 
platoon on standby near the village.1047 The MND (SW) further reinforced the 
battalion with a combat camera team and a British police dog team.1048 The next 
morning, on August 7, the situation escalated. The battalion commander recalled:  
 
The Croat formed a crowd of over one-hundred aggressive people. They origi-
nated from different places in the region. Their goal was to chase away the 
Bosniaks. Early that morning UNHCR and us were talking to the Bosniaks. 
We had to form a human shield to protect the Bosniaks. When the Croat 
                                               
1044 Interview June 17, 2011. 
1045 Interview August 24, 2011; Vonk et al. (1999). 
1046 Interview August 24, 2011. Vonk et al. (1999), pp. 29-31. 
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crowd stopped, they started to sing nationalistic hymns. At some point, the local 
police and IPTF arrived. However, the police were reluctant to intervene. We 
asked the Bosniaks what they wanted. They disagreed on the question whether 
to leave or stay. Finally, they decided to leave. The image of the Bosniaks 
leaving while the Croats were singing their nationalistic hymns still sticks in my 
memory. It was our ultimate humiliation. We had worked on a safe return for 
weeks. Nevertheless, after an evaluation with all parties involved we tried 
again.1049 
 
In the end, a solution was found. On September 8, 25 Bosnian families returned; 
without major problems, although a group of Croat women blocked the road for 
a short period of time.1050 To guarantee the security of the Bosniaks and to 
monitor the situation, the battalion commander stationed elements of his Alpha 
Company and CRC platoon near the village for a number of weeks.1051 
 
In late 1998, the protests against the return of displaced persons and refugees 
decreased. SFOR 5 (November 1998 till May 1999) encountered a violent 
protest against a return of Bosniaks in Donja Veceriska. After the battalion had 
deployed its CRC platoon, the situation de-escalated.1052 In the following 
months, the situation remained calm, also because the visits and returns more or 
less stopped during the winter.1053 
 
From 1999, the returns increasingly proceeded without major difficulty. The role 
of the Dutch SFOR battalions became more low-profile. Prior to a return, 
commanders proactively coordinated with the local authorities to ensure a safe 
and peaceful process. At all times, commanders were ready to support or to 
remind the local police of their responsibilities.1054 Occasionally the Dutch 
military provided protection for returnees in troubled areas through intensive 
patrolling,1055 although the Minister of Defence had indicated earlier that it was 
not SFOR’s responsibility to protect individual returnees, but that of the local 
police.1056 
 
Crowd and Riot Control 
CRC was supposed to help a battalion commander to prevent or end a conflict 
situation by ‘controlled application of limited force.’1057 The CRC concept was 
                                               
1049 Interview August 24, 2011. 
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based upon the riot squads of the police. As mentioned earlier, the first CRC 
platoon was deployed during SFOR 2 to assist the battalion in providing public 
security during the municipal elections of 1997.1058 As of SFOR 3, CRC became 
a common feature of the Dutch operational concept, first as a standard rein-
forcement of SFOR battalions in theatre and later, from 2000 onwards, as a 
reserve on a notice to move of twenty days in the Netherlands. 
 
Throughout the mission, battalion commanders did not deploy the platoon in its 
original role. They rather kept the platoon on standby in case tension would 
increase or to use it for regular patrolling purposes, for two main reasons. 
First, they did not perceive it an operational necessity to deploy their CRC 
platoons in a “full fledged” manner. They considered the character of a demon-
stration to be too dynamic and unpredictable to decide when to deploy the 
platoon effectively.1059 One commander remarked: 
 
Whether to deploy the CRC platoon depended on the lead-time in the deci-
sion-making and authorisation processes. As a result, the CRC platoon often did 
not arrive in time and the situation escalated. On the other hand, when we had 
the platoon on the spot, the situation did not escalate.1060 
 
Second, commanders feared a confrontation with an armed crowd. Firearms were 
widely available among the population. The risk that a platoon only equipped with 
shields and batons would get involved in a shoot-out made commanders cautious 
regarding potential deployments.1061 One commander reported: 
 
The CRC platoon was an anomaly in our battalion. This influenced the deci-
sion whether to deploy the platoon or not. In addition, in environments like 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, every man owns a gun. If a CRC platoon opposes that 
kind of people, you cannot do much with only a shield and truncheon. As soon 
as one shot has been fired, in no time you have to deploy an infantry unit to 
replace the CRC platoon. That instantly decreases the value of the CRC in-
strument.1062 
 
A commander who did not have a CRC platoon at his disposal had a different 
opinion and perceived the operational options of CRC deployment more 
positively. He assumed that CRC could fill a gap in the spectrum of military 
force: 
 
With the knowledge of hindsight it would have been convenient if we would 
have had a CRC platoon at our disposal. We would have had some alternatives 
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to vary in our mode of operations. Now we only had a rifle end. But you 
cannot replace a truncheon by a riffle end. We seriously would have had a 
problem if we had to operate in a CRC like fashion without appropriate 
equipment.1063 
 
Support for elections 
In line with the Dayton Peace Agreement,1064 Dutch battalions supported the 
OSCE to organise “free and fair elections.” In 1996, IFOR 2 supported the 
OSCE organising the first national elections after the war. In the preparatory 
phase (August and early September 1996) the battalion was engaged in improving 
the freedom of movement of voters, for example by clearing illegal police 
checkpoints, inspecting polling stations, and coordinating with the IPTF to assist 
the local police in their efforts to provide public security. On September 14, 
1996, the day of the national elections, the battalion deployed all its units and 
provided intensive patrolling in the area of operations and had stationary posts at 
sensitive spots. All efforts were focused at creating as safe and secure environment 
and to guarantee freedom of movement of all voters. The elections proceeded 
orderly and peacefully.1065 
 
The next year, on September 13 and 14, 1997 there were municipal elections. 
Like the year before, SFOR 2 assisted the international organisations and local 
authorities to ensure a safe and secure environment. For that purpose, the 
battalion was temporarily augmented with a Marines company, two sections of 
the Special Forces, and a team of the Explosive Clearance Service.1066 If required, 
the Marines could also be used for public order purposes.1067 This had not been 
necessary for the elections proceeded without major problems.1068 
 
The next elections took place on September 12-13, 1998, for various representa-
tive and legislative bodies.1069 In advance of the elections, SFOR 4 supported the 
OSCE, for example by providing additional training for their personnel and 
supplying information bulletins to the local population. During the elections, the 
battalion was tasked to ensure overall security and to guarantee freedom of 
movement of the voters. In case of public disturbances, the battalion was 
supposed to support the international and local authorities. While the local 
authorities were responsible for safe and secure elections and maintaining public 
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order, the battalion operated in the background and deployed patrols on a regular 
basis near the polling stations. The elections proceeded peacefully and without 
major incidents.1070 
 
Finally, SFOR 7 supported the municipal elections of April 8, 2000. Again, 
SFOR supported the local and international authorities by providing an overall 
safe and secure environment. The focus of the battalion was to remind local 
authorities of their responsibilities for keeping the peace and order during the 
elections. Again, these elections passed without major problems or interventions 
of the battalion.1071 
6.3.2.2 Law enforcement 
Law enforcement had not been part of the mandate of IFOR/SFOR. The 
Dayton Peace Agreement held the local authorities responsible for providing ‘a 
safe and secure environment for all persons in their respective jurisdictions, by 
maintaining civilian law enforcement agencies operating in accordance with 
internationally recognized standards and with respect for internationally recog-
nized human rights and fundamental freedoms, and by taking such other 
measures as appropriate.’1072 The Dutch government considered crime fighting a 
responsibility of the local authorities too.1073 Even after the High Representative 
and COMSFOR in 2002 prioritised fighting crime and corruption, the Dutch 
government disagreed with a larger SFOR involvement. It did not want to 
stretch the SFOR mandate and prohibited SFOR battalions from engaging in 
missions that would go beyond it.1074 
 
Nevertheless, Dutch battalions contributed to law enforcement throughout the 
IFOR/SFOR operation, both through independent operations and by support-
ing local and international organisations. The Dutch involvement in law enforce-
ment varied from battalion to battalion and had therefore a differentiated character. 
As a result, the Dutch approach towards law enforcement appeared fragmented and 
discontinuous, with incidental choices based on personal preferences and priorities, 
interpretations of the mandate1075 and situational circumstances. The reason for this 
fragmentation and differentiation could be twofold. First, the limited national 
guidance gave room for personal preferences and interpretations of the mandate. 
Some commanders refrained from any involvement in law enforcement since 
they considered this exceeding their mandate while others were willing to 
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enforcement such as combating illegal possession of firearms. IFOR/SFOR also assisted 
local or international police in their capacity to provide public security. Commanders were 
supposed to test those requests for assistance for compatibility with the mandate. 
167
BEYOND BORDERS 
explore the boundaries of the mandate.1076 Second, the length of the operation 
contributed to a differentiated approach as the security level fluctuated signifi-
cantly during the mission and between rotations. 
 
Arrest of war crimes indictees 
In the early years of the IFOR/SFOR operation, the arrest of indictees had been 
a major international political problem. The ICTY lacked capacity to actually 
apprehend indicted war criminals and therefore had to rely on the Bosnian 
authorities and police.1077 However, the Bosnian authorities and police were 
unwilling to take any action against these alleged war criminals.1078 Also IFOR 
had taken a reserved position towards the arrest of PIFWCs, as Burger explains: 
 
War crimes [were] an issue which was originally not expected by the IFOR 
commanders and staff in Bosnia, but the authority to detain war criminals was 
provided in the IFOR rules of engagement. After some initial difficulty, an 
understanding was worked out as to the circumstances when the IFOR military 
authorities would detain persons accused of war crimes. Basically, they would 
detain PIFWC when they came across such persons in the course of their duties, 
but they would not seek PIFWC out or to carry out an arrest on behalf of 
ICTY.1079 
 
The Dutch government endorsed IFOR’s approach regarding the arrest of 
indictees. In its communication with the Parliament it confirmed that arresting 
them was a responsibility of the local police and that IFOR had no authority to 
arrest them unless during a direct confrontation in the line of duty.1080 The 
government considered their arrest too risky and feared that it would endanger 
the impartiality of the IFOR troops.1081 The reservations towards the arrest of 
indictees remained unchanged after IFOR had transferred its responsibility to 
SFOR,1082 mainly due to the objections of the United States.1083 
However, this policy turned out to be unsustainable. During 1997, the interna-
tional community increased its pressure on NATO and SFOR to review their 
policy on the arrest of PIFWCs, although, at that time the United States still 
                                               
1076 Interview September 20, 2011(a); Interview August 19, 2011. 
1077 Doyle (2007), p. 255. 
1078 Brocades Zaalberg (2006), p. 265; Friesendorf (2009), p. 41. 
1079 Burger (2002), p. 434. 
1080 See for example: Handelingen II, 1995/96, nr. 37, pp. 2962-2964; Kamerstukken II, 
1995/96, 22 181, nr. 148, p. 5; Kamerstukken II, 1995/96, 22 181, nr. 153, p. 3; Kames-
stukken II, 1995/96, 22 181, nr. 156, p. 5; Kamerstukken II, 1995/96, 22 181, nr. 162, pp. 
11-12. Although IFOR/SFOR initially did not actively engage in the search and arrest of 
PIFWCs, every SFOR soldier received a written instruction on how to deal with PIFWCs 
when they encountered one during the execution of their daily activities (SFOR: 
‘Instructies voor SFOR-militairen betreffende het omgaan met personen die zijn 
aangeklaagd wegens oorlogsmisdaden (Persons Indicted for War Crimes: PIFWC),’ March, 
1997). 
1081 Handelingen II, 1995/96, Aanhangsel, nr. 1207, p. 2455. 
1082 Kamerstukken II, 1995/96, 22 181, nr. 173, p. 3; Kamerstukken II, 1995/96, 22 181, nr. 174, 
p. 2. 
1083 Kamerstukken II, 1995/96, 22 181, nr. 174, p. 2. 
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considered these arrests to be a police job. However, the tides turned in mid 
1997 when on July 10 a team of the British Special Air Service (SAS) executed 
Operation Tango to arrest two Serbian indicted war criminals in Prijedor. This 
operation paved the way for other countries to launch Special Forces operations 
to apprehend indicted war criminals.1084 The Netherlands would be one of those 
countries. 
 
In the early morning of December 18, 1997, a Dutch Special Forces team of 
Marines and Commandos was flown in and arrested two war crimes indictees 
during Operation Iron Glance. One of them had allegedly been involved in war 
crimes committed during a Bosnian Croat operation in the Lasva Valley while 
the other had been the commander of a police unit allegedly involved in the war 
crimes in Ahmici in 1993.1085 Operation Iron Glance was authorised by NATO and 
was finally launched after SFOR troops had confirmed the identity and where-
abouts of the suspects.1086 For reasons of security, the battalion had not been 
involved in the planning of the operation, although the battalion commander had 
been informed in advance on what was coming. Only shortly before the special 
operation, the battalion commander informed his company commanders and 
senior staff officers about the operation in order to plan the battalion’s support to 
the operation.1087 This support involved the provision of two security cordons. 
The first cordon involved the provision of a secure area around the targeted 
suspects, in which the Special Forces could operate safely. For this task, the 
battalion commander had assigned his additional platoon of Marines. The second 
cordon involved the provision of an outer shield of security to seal off a wider 
area, for example by roadblocks and security patrols by regular troops.1088 After 
the arrest, the battalion had to intensify its presence in and around the village to 
prevent escalation after the local population started to express its anger and 
frustration. Liaison officers played an important role in keeping the peace, for 
example by informing the local population on the formal proceedings regarding 
the arrested indictees. The battalion also compensated for the damages that 
occurred during the arrest. After a while, the situation in the village returned to 
normal and the situation remained calm during the deployment.1089 
 
In addition to this national operation, Dutch battalions were also involved in 
specific SFOR operations that involved the arrest of indictees. Two battalion 
commanders provided a cordon around the targeted object while the MSU 
executed the actual search. Two of the cases resulted in an actual arrest while in 
the two other cases the suspects were not encountered.1090 Another battalion 
                                               
1084 Friesendorf (2009), p. 42. See also: Rijs, B. (July 11, 1997). Britten arresteren 
kampcommandant in Bosnië NAVO in actie tegen verdachten genocide, de Volkskrant. 
The SAS team arrested one suspect while the other got killed in a firefight. 
1085 Kamerstukken II, 1997/98, 22 181, nr. 193, pp. 1-2. 
1086 Kamerstukken II, 1997/98, 22 181, nr. 193, pp. 1-2. 
1087 Interview June 17, 2011; Brouwer et al. (s.a), p. 21. 
1088 Interview June 17, 2011. 
1089 Interview June 17, 2011. 
1090 Interview August 24, 2011; Interview August 19, 2011. 
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commander received a planning order to prepare a cordon in support of a MSU 
arrest operation. However, this operation was cancelled, to the relief of the 
battalion commander who feared for public security problems afterwards.1091 The 
fourth battalion commander participated in a large SFOR operation to arrest 
indictees,1092 although he had received national instruction to show restraint. He 
recalled: 
 
I did not want to be an outsider within the MND. Therefore, I explored for 
opportunities to contribute to the mission of the MND constructively. Under the 
guise of an action against weapon smugglers, we participated in a large MND 
operation. If we would encounter a PIFWC, we would consider them as by-
catch. However, during the operation we did not run into any PIFWC.1093 
 
During the IFOR period, Dutch troops were involved in the arrest of two 
“high-value targets”. Two Dutch officers reported an arrest of an indictee in 
March/April 1996 in the eastern part of the Vitez Pocket. The second arrest 
involved a Mujahidin warrior in June 1996. He was captured in the north-eastern 
part of the Vitez Pocket between Zenica and the Zone of Separation. Both 
Dutch officers think that the arrests were an IFOR initiative authorised by 
NATO and COMIFOR while IFOR’s Special Forces Command directed both 
arrests. In both operations, the Dutch involvement was limited. The battalion 
had not been engaged in the planning and decision-making of the arrest; the 
battalion commander and his head of operations and head of intelligence had 
been informed only at a later stage of the planning. However, one officer 
reported that Dutch Special Forces might have been involved in gathering 
information on the whereabouts of both suspects. During the operation, the 
battalion was tasked to provide a cordon and area security which it executed by 
operating checkpoints around the target area. The two Dutch officers assumed 
that “Anglo-Saxon” Special Forces actually seized and detained the suspects.1094 
 
Illegal logging 
Fighting illegal logging had not been a priority of the IFOR/SFOR battalions 
during the early years of the operation as they prioritised the implementation of 
the military aspects of the Peace Agreement and freedom of movement.1095 From 
1999, illegal logging increasingly drew the attention of SFOR although, 
according to one commander, the international community and the MND (SW) 
                                               
1091 Interview September 30, 2011(b). 
1092 SFOR 13 participated in Operation Kerberos during the second half of February 2002. 
During the operation, the Alpha team of SFOR 13 manned mobile checkpoints in the 
south-western part of Canton 10 in order to detect smuggle of weapons and ammunition. 
Dutch soldiers checked 766 vehicles and confiscated two riffles with ammunition and a 
pistol (Van Dijk, Hoeberichts, de Leeuw, van Berkel, Romonesco, van de Ven & Nienhuis 
(s.a.), p. 118. 
1093 Interview September 15, 2011. 
1094 Interview June 14, 2011; Interview July 6, 2011(a); e-mail July 2, 2012; e-mail July 3, 2012; 
e-mail July 11, 2012. 
1095 Interview June 17, 2011. 
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still felt reserves about engaging in tackling illegal logging.1096 In the course of 
2000, however, combating illegal logging did become one of SFOR’s priorities, 
as a battalion commander noted: 
 
The MND tasked us to take further action regarding illegal logging. Our con-
tribution involved patrolling and observing, in particular those sites we were 
able to access with our equipment, and others could not. Our attention had a 
preventive effect and engaged the local authorities for targeted action.1097 
 
Another commander showed more restraint and considered fighting illegal 
logging to be a non-military task and therefore beyond his mandate. According 
to him, this kind of operations would ultimately lead to mission creep.1098 
Another was also cautious on exceeding his mandate. He therefore did not want 
to engage in a focused operation to confiscate illegal wood. Instead, he assigned 
his regular patrols to collect information on illegal logging activities in order to 
inform the MND (SE) and EUPOL.1099 One commander, though, made 
combating illegal logging one of his priorities. In line with the new policy of 
OHR and SFOR to fight organised crime and corruption, he considered illegal 
logging one of the main threats to the rule of law: 
 
Illegal logging involved a lot of money. It happened overtly, but nobody took 
any action against it. The local authorities tolerated it and even earned some 
money on it. The international community did not show any interest either. 
Therefore, I took the initiative because this was unacceptable. We had to do 
something about it. You could see that ordinary people were suffering. They 
did not have any money. We tried to rebuild the country in order to go back to 
normality. We therefore had to make sure that the money would go to the right 
people.1100 
 
On October 2, 2003, in cooperation with the local police and EUPOL he started 
the focused Operation Mooirivier, which lasted for three weeks.1101 He recalled: 
 
I never received any formal assignment to fight illegal logging. We received 
intelligence on it and I thought we should do something about it; within the 
framework of our mandate. In this kind of situations, we were not allowed to 
operate independently and needed the assistance of the local police. The police 
therefore had to request our assistance. We then checked these requests against 
our mandate. In ninety percent of the cases it matched. During an operation, 
our contribution was limited to assistance. We supported the local police. We 
set up a roadblock; the police searched the trucks and checked the paper-
work.1102 
                                               
1096 Interview September 30, 2011(b). 
1097 Interview July 7, 2011(b). 
1098 Interview September 20, 2011(a). 
1099 Interview September 15, 2011. 
1100 Interview August 19, 2011. 
1101 Bokodi (s.a), p. 277. 
1102 Interview August 19, 2011. 
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The commander had been positive about the result of the operation, although he 
still perceived his operation as “squeezing the balloon”. It was the corruption 
within the public administration that blocked a structural effect: 
 
It was clear that people within the police force were involved in these illegal 
timber transports. Also mayors and administrators were involved. I remember 
that I spoke with the mayor of Travnik about this issue. He told me that he had 
never heard of these transports. I said: “Please come here and stay next to me; 
from here you can see them! He answered: “No, I think that is not correct.” To 
me it proved that corruption was rooted deeply in society.1103 
 
The fact that at the end of the SFOR operation the international military got 
involved in law enforcement indicates that almost eight years after the start of the 
mission an enforcement gap still existed. 
 
Security operations 
The Dayton Peace Agreement gave IFOR/SFOR the right to ‘create secure 
conditions’ in which international organisations could accomplish their mis-
sions.1104 In line with the Peace Agreement, Dutch battalions provided security 
assistance to various international organisations. For example, on July 10 and 11, 
1996 IFOR 2 provided security assistance to ICTY during the exhumation of a 
mass grave in Bikosi where 37 Bosnian Croats were buried after they had been 
killed during the war.1105 SFOR 3 deployed Operation Oxford in which it 
provided security assistance to ICTY during its investigations in Ahmici in March 
1998. Ahmici turned out to be a hotspot for the ICTY investigations. In 1998, 
both SFOR 4 and SFOR 5 deployed security operations to protect ICTY 
investigators during their work in Ahmici when their safety was challenged 
during their investigations.1106 SFOR 4 also provided security assistance to ICTY 
in Vitez on September 23, 1998 in order to support an investigation in the city 
hall of Vitez and around the building of the Bosnian Croat veteran association 
HVIDRA. For that purpose, it deployed a cordon to create a secure area around 
these buildings in which the investigators could work safely.1107 
 
Another example of a security operation was the support by a Dutch battalion to 
an MND (SW) operation in Vitez. This operation was based on SFOR intelli-
gence that indicated that the office of the mayor in the city hall of Vitez was 
being eavesdropped upon from the post office in Vitez. The MND decided to 
intervene and tasked the Dutch battalion to cordon off the area around the post 
office to enable the Italian MSU Company to deploy a search operation inside 
                                               
1103 Interview August 19, 2011. 
1104 GFAP, Annex 1-A, Article VI, §3. See also: Kamerstukken II, 2000/01, 22 181, nr. 323, p. 
1. 
1105 De Graaf (1997), pp. 84-85. 
1106 Interview July 1, 2011; Interview October 4, 2011(b); Van der Wal (s.a.), pp. 23-24. 
1107 Interview August 24, 2011; Vonk et al. (1999), p. 46. 
172
IFOR/SFOR 
 
the post office. The Dutch battalion commander acted as the commander-on-
scene: 
 
I had the operational command of the operation. I also gave the green light to 
start the operation. I did not know all the ins and outs of the units under my 
operational command, but that often happens in certain operations. The entry 
was executed by the MSU while we provided the cordon. The entry was at 
three o’clock at night. The MSU forced its entrance by blowing up the front 
door. Apart from this initial use of explosives, the operation proceeded in a 
non-violent way. The suspects present in the building surrendered without 
resistance and we found the evidence we needed.1108 
 
Another MND operation that involved security assistance by a Dutch SFOR 
battalion was the search of the Herzegovačka Banka in Vitez on April 6, 2001. 
Against the background of the Bosnian Croat initiatives to establish an independ-
ent third entity, the High Representative decided to search the main office of the 
Herzegovačka Banka and seven of its regional offices around the country. The 
immediate cause of the search had been suspicions regarding illegal transactions to 
finance the Bosnian Croat initiatives. By confiscating the bank’s financial 
administration and computer databases, the international community hoped to 
find evidence. The operation involved the assistance of approximately 500 SFOR 
troops and various international and Bosnian experts.1109 The Dutch mechanised 
battalion was also involved. One of the regional offices of the Herzegovačka 
Banka was located in Vitez. The Dutch battalion commander acted as the 
commander-on-scene: 
 
The entry started at half past seven in the morning. The MND had given me 
the order not to execute a forced entry. I had chosen for an entry with minimal 
means. I kept the rest of our units on standby nearby. The MSU provided a 
cordon. I had two platoons close to the bank and two platoons at a larger dis-
tance. Under the protection of the MSU, specialists entered the bank. They 
were assisted by computer experts and a special police unit of the Federation. 
The action in the bank lasted for a couple of hours. Meanwhile, the city centre 
of Vitez got turbulent. After four and a half hours, the operation was over. It 
proceeded successfully and without any violence; this in contrast to Mostar1110 
where the operation got out of control and had to be cancelled.1111 
 
Search operations and combating illegal possession of weapons 
In line with the Dayton Peace Agreement,1112 Dutch IFOR/SFOR battalions 
played an active role in combating the possession of weapons. In the early stages 
of the operation, the Dutch battalions focused on the containment of (heavy) 
                                               
1108 Interview July 7, 2011(b). 
1109 Interview September 30, 2011(b); Kamerstukken II, 2000/01, 22 181, nr. 332, p. 2. 
1110 In Mostar – in the sector South East – a Bosnian Croat mob attacked the SFOR troops, 
police and international staff of the OHR leading to several casualties (Kamerstukken II, 
2000/01, 22 181, nr. 332, p. 2; Zisk Marten (2004), pp. 132-133.). 
1111 Interview September 30, 2011(b). 
1112 GFAP, Annex 1-A. 
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weapons and weapon systems. Weapons were collected, processed and stored in 
weapon storage sites. Throughout the full length of the operation, the Dutch 
troops checked these and other related sites, such as weapon factories.1113 
 
During the early years of the operation, IFOR/SFOR focused also on firearms in 
the possession of individual citizens and police officers. IFOR 1 executed these 
checks just randomly at checkpoints and during patrolling and involved only a 
small number of confiscations.1114 Late November and early December 1996, 
IFOR 2 participated in a MND (SE) operation to inspect police stations in which 
it confiscated large numbers of non-registered weapons.1115 In the course of the 
mission, the inspections of the police stations became more structured. In August 
1997, SFOR started to cooperate with IPTF to implement ‘an assertive pro-
gramme of weapon inspections in local police stations.’1116 This programme was 
to ensure that the local police maintained only the equipment required to police 
their area: ‘one long-barrelled rifle for every ten police officers and one side arm 
for each officer.’1117 Initially, these coordinated inspections occurred on a 
monthly basis. From mid-1998, these inspections took place once every three 
months.1118 On various occasions, the Dutch SFOR battalions assisted IPTF in 
inspecting police stations.1119 
 
To tackle the possession of illegal arms among the population, the Dutch SFOR 
battalions deployed the so-called Harvest Operations. In early January 1998, 
SFOR 3 started to plan for the Harvest Operations, which were initially 
scheduled as a single two-week operation in March. The Harvest Operations 
aimed to provide amnesty for individuals who voluntarily turned in ‘weapons, 
mines, and ordnance to designated SFOR and IPTF sites.’1120 The Harvest 
Operations turned out to be a success and lasted until the end of the SFOR 
mandate.1121 The operations were organised locally in cooperation with the local 
authorities. SFOR informed the population by a communication campaign or 
information operation. On the day of the collection, SFOR operated stationary 
collection points at prominent locations and deployed patrols to collect weaponry 
at more remote places.1122 Overall, the Harvest Operations were perceived as 
successful. One of the commanders made the Harvest Operations one of his 
priorities. He reported: 
 
The Harvest Operations consisted of campaigns aimed at the collection of 
weapons and ammunition. The battalion approached these operations as a joint 
                                               
1113 See for example: Ministerie van Defensie – Defensiestaf (1997), p. 31; Kamerstukken II, 
1996/97, 22 181, nr. 184, p. 9. 
1114 See for example: Kolken et al. (s.a.), p. 35, p. 37 & p. 39. 
1115 De Graaf (1997), p. 95. 
1116 UN Doc S/1997/966 (1997), p. 3. 
1117 UN Doc S/1997/966 (1997), p. 3. 
1118 UN Doc S/1998/491, June 10, 1998, p. 5. 
1119 Interview August 24, 2011; Van der Wal (s.a.), p. 23. 
1120 UN Doc S/1998/491 (1998), p. 5. 
1121 Bokodi (s.a.), p. 201; Interview September 15, 2011; Interview October 10, 2011. 
1122 See for example: Van Dijk et al. (s.a.), p. 43 & p. 101; Bokodi (s.a.), p. 201. 
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activity of SFOR, local authorities, police and army. We cooperated with our 
local partners based on mutual trust. I choose to make the Harvest Operations a 
campaign of the local authorities, which we only supported. We did not use the 
Harvest Operations to fight illegal possession of firearms as such but rather as an 
instrument to improve security in society. We focused on the safety and security 
of children and civilians by preventing unauthorised persons getting hold of 
weapons and ammunition.1123 
6.3.3  Intelligence 
Collection 
The battalions gathered information to improve their situational awareness and to 
focus their operations and activities. All interviewed commanders reported that 
social patrolling had been the most important instruments for gathering informa-
tion. The battalions also used other sources, such as CIMIC officers, liaison 
officers, interpreters, the international organisations, and – at a later stage – IDEA 
officers.1124 
 
The battalions organised their information-gathering process in a similar way.1125 
Each company was equipped with an intelligence cell of two or three operatives 
that cooperated and coordinated closely with the intelligence section at battalion 
level. Based on an information collection plan, the company intelligence officers 
would list a number of general and specific questions in a Primary Intelligence 
Requirement (PIR). The PIR involved questions on for example the destruction 
of infrastructure in a village, the socio-economic situation and the level of 
criminality. These questions guided the patrols when collecting the required 
information. The company’s intelligence officers briefed the patrols in advance of 
their information-gathering deployment. When the patrols returned to the base, 
the patrol commander drafted a written patrol report and the company’s 
intelligence officers debriefed the patrols, and analysed and validated the 
information obtained. Based upon their analysis and validations the company 
commander could decide to take further action or to develop supplementing 
questions and assignments to acquire additional information. The company 
intelligence cell shared their information and intelligence with the intelligence 
section at the battalion level, which served to complete the battalion’s situational 
awareness and to enable the battalion commander to plan his future actions and 
operations and to prioritise development and reconstruction projects.1126 
                                               
1123 Interview September 15, 2011. 
1124 IDEA stands for Integrated Development of Entrepreneurial Advisors. IDEA officers are 
reservists who for a period of six to eight weeks run projects to support the economic de-
velopment of small and medium-sized businesses. See for example: http://www. defen-
sie.nl/ onderwerpen/cimic/idea/activities; accessed June 5, 2012. 
1125 Some commanders noted that the intelligence organisation had been too small and was 
engaged in a process of professionalisation throughout the full length of the IFOR/SFOR 
operation. 
1126 Interview June 17, 2011; Interview July 1, 2011; Interview July 6, 2011(a); Interview July 
7, 2011(b); Interview September 15, 2011; Interview September 20, 2011(a); Interview 
September 30, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 2011(b); Interview October 5, 2011(a); In-
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Criminal intelligence 
Until 1997, information gathering largely focused on acquiring situational 
awareness about the peace process, mapping the military and administrative 
networks and/or inventorying the weapon storage sites.1127 From 1998, the 
information focus gradually shifted to the civilian environment, for example to 
assess the progress of CIMIC projects, the status of the returns and the level of 
social and economic development in the area.1128 Information regarding public 
security and criminality had not been a specific issue or subject in the information 
gathering processes of most battalions.1129 
 
Nevertheless, Dutch battalions gathered information on public security, for 
example related to reports of crime and theft, presence of war crimes indictees in 
the area of operations, refugee and displaced persons’ visits and returns, ethnic 
tension in communities, illegal logging, (weapon) trafficking and possible 
sabotage activities.1130 
 
Criminal intelligence had not received special attention within the information 
collection activities. However, occasionally troops were involved in intelligence 
operations to gather information on criminality. IFOR 2, for example, ran two 
dedicated intelligence operations. Operation Comet focused on the collection of 
evidence regarding acts of arson against properties of displaced or refugees in and 
around Knesovo.1131 During operation Galaxy 2 Dutch IFOR troops engaged in 
a MND-led joint cordon and search operation to search different locations for 
alleged Serbian “prisoners-of-war” being captured by Bosniaks.1132 Another 
battalion was engaged in a coordinated operation with the Bosnian Border 
Police. During that operation, the battalion’s reconnaissance platoon was tasked 
to collect and share information with the Border Police on the movements of 
                                               
terview October 10, 2011. See also: Koninklijke Landmacht – Operationele Staf BLS 
(1999b). 
1127 Interview June 10, 2011; Commandant 42(NL) Mechbat, Operatiebevel 09/96, Bijvoegsel 
6 bij Bijlage B. May 19, 1996. SSA, Digital Archive SFOR, No. DC-79-011. 
1128 Interview July 1, 2011; Interview August 24, 2011. 
1129 See for example: Ministerie van Defensie – Defensiestaf (2003), pp. 7-8). Ministerie van 
Defensie – Defensiestaf (2004a), pp. 6-7. 
1130 For example: Commandant 42(NL) Mechbat, Operatiebevel 09/96, Bijvoegsel 6 bij Bijlage 
B. May 19, 1996. SSA, Digital Archive SFOR, No. DC-79-011; Commandant 101 (NL) 
Mechbat RHPA; Operatiebevel nr. 05/96, Bijvoegsel 1 (Inlichtingenbehoefte bij Bijlage B 
(INLICHTINGEN), January 20, 1997. SSA, Hard Disk No. 66/SFOR/1(NL) Mechbat 
IFOR 2 juni – december 1996/opplan 05-96/BIJV_B1; Commandant 13(NL) Mechbat 
Regiment Stoottroepen SFOR 7; Operatiebevel No. 01 (UITVOERING SFOR 7), Bij-
lage D (Intenties Commandant). Hard Disk No. 66/SFOR/1(NL)Mechbat SFOR 7 no-
vember 1999–mei 2000/S3/OPPLAN 01 13 Mechbat/Bijl D (INTENTIES COM-
MANDANT). See also: Interview July 7, 2011; Interview August 19, 2011; Interview 
September 15, 2011; Interview September 20, 2011a. 
1131 Klep & Van Gils (2005), p. 367. 
1132 The locations searched had been two buildings in Donji Vakuf; two buildings in Oborci 
and the villages of Slatina and Semin. No alleged prisoners of war were found (De Graaf 
(s.a.), p. 19). 
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smugglers along the Bosnian-Croatian border area by registering licence plates of 
vehicles that crossed the border.1133 Sometimes the gathering of criminal 
intelligence was unplanned. One battalion commander, for example, had not 
specified his demands for criminal intelligence, but receiving single bits of 
criminal information ultimately initiated further action: 
 
Intelligence – for example on illegal logging – became available from our regu-
lar patrols, from the HUMINT channels, which the battalion cooperated with, 
and from our interpreters who worked for the battalion. The information that 
became available was further analysed and ultimately answered the questions: 
where is the wood coming from; who is transporting it; which routes were 
used; and when do these transports take place? Gradually, we discerned a pattern 
that led to further action.1134 
 
Exchange 
The majority of the IFOR/SFOR commanders had been restrictive in sharing 
information and/or intelligence with local authorities and police, not only to 
guarantee operational security, but also because of a lack of trust in the local 
authorities and the police. As a result, information was shared only occasionally 
or on a strictly need-to-know basis, shortly before the start of an operation. This 
policy sometimes caused tensions in the relationship between local authorities 
and officials and the battalion’s leadership. The Dutch commanders therefore 
tried to find a good balance between information security and confidence 
building. The lack of confidence was a theme throughout the operation, 
however, and seemed to have been one of the obstacles to a common proactive 
approach towards public security. Only one commander reported that with the 
benefit of hindsight, he could have confided more in his local civilian partners.1135 
 
The exchange of information and intelligence with international partners was less 
restricted, although until early 1999 there were no clear SFOR procedures in 
place for the exchange of sensitive information between SFOR, IPTF and other 
international organisations.1136 Several commanders reported that they shared 
information with OHR, UNHCR and IPTF on operational matters, such as 
governance, reconstruction projects, return visits, inspection of police stations, 
joint patrolling, etc. This cooperation is the subject of the next section. 
6.3.4  Cooperation 
Local authorities 
Throughout the IFOR/SFOR operation, battalions established liaison with local 
civilian authorities at various political, administrative and social levels. During 
IFOR 1, civilian-military contacts had not been a priority since the focus of the 
operation had been primarily on the implementation of the military aspects of the 
                                               
1133 Interview September 20, 2011(a). 
1134 Interview August 19, 2011 
1135 Interview September 15, 2011. 
1136 Theunens (2001), p. 603. 
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Peace Agreement. The establishment of these contacts was difficult at the time 
since they took place on an ad hoc basis and had to be arranged through the 
commanders of the three former warring parties.1137 During the SFOR opera-
tion, the civilian-military contacts increasingly proceeded through direct lines of 
communication. They gradually became institutionalised.1138 
 
To establish civil-military cooperation, the IFOR/SFOR battalions and 
companies were augmented by a CIMIC liaison unit. In general, the CIMIC 
liaison officers at battalion level were responsible for establishing liaison and 
cooperation with civilian authorities and religious leaders at the regional and 
cantonal level such as the governor, cantonal administrators and religious leaders 
as well as with the mayors of the larger municipalities. The liaison officers 
organised weekly meetings with their civilian counterparts, for example to discuss 
and support projects on local development and reconstruction, to improve local 
governance, and the return of DPREs.1139 
 
At company level, there was a comparable structure. The company’s CIMIC 
liaison officers established cooperation and exchange of information with 
authorities at the local and municipal level, such as mayors, council members, 
religious leaders, leaders of veteran organisations and entrepreneurs in order to 
discuss issues like reconstruction projects, local governance and returns.1140 
 
In addition to the CIMIC liaison officers, battalion commanders had regular 
meetings with individual local authorities.1141 In addition, company commander 
regularly met with relevant local authorities in their sectors, such as mayors and 
religious leaders.1142 These meetings had no fixed frequency and structure but 
generally focused on establishing good relationships and discussing major projects. 
Public security was not a topic that was discussed on a regular basis. These issues 
were primarily a responsibility of the IPTF. Public security was discussed, for 
example, prior to the elections or a large return of displaced persons or refu-
gees.1143 
 
Local police 
Cooperation with and providing assistance to the local police was not part of the 
IFOR/SFOR mandate, but had been the exclusive responsibility of the IPTF. 
Nevertheless, IFOR and SFOR liaised with the local police on various occasions. 
                                               
1137 Interview June 14, 2011. 
1138 Interview July 6, 2011(a). 
1139 Been (2002), p. 426; Brouwer et al. (s.a.), p. 38. 
1140 Interview July 6, 2011(a); Interview July 7, 2011(b); Interview August 24, 2011; Interview 
September 20, 2011(a); Interview October 4, 2011(b); Interview October 5, 2011(a); In-
terview October 10, 2011. See also: Been (2002), pp. 429-430. 
1141 Interview June 10, 2011; Interview June 14, 2011; Interview June 17, 2011; Interview July 
1, 2011; Interview July 7, 2011(b); Interview August 19, 2011; Interview August 24, 2011; 
Interview September 15, 2011; September 30, 2011(b); Interview October 10, 2011. 
1142 Interview August 19, 2011; Interview August 24, 2011; Interview September 15, 2011; 
Interview October 4, 2011(b); Interview October 5, 2011(a). 
1143 Interview September 20, 2011(a); Interview October 10, 2011. 
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Liaison mostly occurred at the company level where the liaison officers or the 
company commanders met with local police chiefs on a regular basis. At the 
battalion level, there had been no liaison with the local police and battalion 
commanders rarely met with local police officials, mainly because the Bosnian 
police lacked a formal structure to liaise with at the battalion level.1144 
 
International organisations 
The CIMIC officers at battalion level were also the point of contact for interna-
tional organisations that operated at regional level, such as OHR, IPTF, OSCE, 
UNHCR, and the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECCM).1145 The 
CIMIC officers were involved in exchanging information, coordinating strategy 
planning and division of responsibilities between the various international 
activities and projects. For this purpose, CIMIC officers participated in the 
Monthly Regional Planning Group (MRPG) and Reconstruction and Return 
Task Force (RRTF) meetings.1146 The CIMIC officers at company level also had 
their international points of contact and liaised with international organisations 
and aid organisations at local level.1147 
 
Two examples illustrate the Dutch military role in the context of international 
cooperation. 
In 1999, SFOR 5 developed a plan for cooperation with other international 
organisations to facilitate the returns of displaced persons and refugees. Instead of 
providing security to returnees during the actual physical return, the plan of the 
international community focused on the longer term. It intended to help the 
returnees to rebuild their houses or to construct new ones. It also intended to 
help the entire community by funding other reconstruction and employment 
projects. The Dutch government supported the plan by financing several 
projects.1148 
In 2000, SFOR 8 initiated a common strategy of the international community in 
the Dutch area of operations. In this strategy, the Strategy Document for Central 
Bosnia Canton, OHR, OSCE, UNHCR, UNMIB and SFOR agreed to 
stimulate local ownership. The local authorities and the population of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were expected to assume responsibility for their own future. In 
order to achieve this, the role of the international organisations would change 
from ‘imposer’ to ‘provider’, for example of expertise and mediation. After the 
local authorities had agreed to the strategy, the international community 
provided assistance by taking on some tasks that the local authorities could not 
achieve with their own means.1149 
 
                                               
1144 Interview June 10, 2011; Interview July 1, 2011; Interview July 6, 2011(a); Interview July 
7, 2011(b); Interview August 19, 2011; Interview September 20, 2011(a); Interview Octo-
ber 10, 2011. 
1145 Been (2002), p. 429; Brouwer et al. (s.a.), p. 38; Vonk et al. (1999), p. 40. 
1146 Been (2002), p. 430. 
1147 Been (2002), p. 430; Brouwer et al. (s.a.), p. 38; Vonk et al. (1999), p. 40. 
1148 Interview July 1, 2011; Van der Wal (s.a.), pp. 33-34. 
1149 Interview July 7, 2011(b); Sleurink, Maijers & Frusch (2001). 
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International police 
Cooperation and consultation between the Dutch battalion and IPTF primarily 
took place at company level. Companies appointed a liaison officer who, for 
example, attended the daily IPTF briefings. Likewise, IPTF liaison officers 
attended SFOR briefings on a regular basis.  
 
The battalions liaised and cooperated with IPTF on several issues, for example to 
provide back-up in cases of serious security threats and for medical evacuation of 
its personnel,1150 to support IPTF in the removal of illegal police checkpoints and 
during return visits,1151 to exchange operational information, to provide assistance 
for weapon inspections in local police stations,1152 and to execute joint patrolling 
if possible or required.1153 
 
The public 
Social patrols were the most important instrument to interact with the public. To 
promote local interaction, and to establish and sustain an effective information 
flow, the battalions intensively patrolled the area of operations, often on a 24/7 
basis.1154 Halfway through the deployment of IFOR 1, the battalion commander 
decided to follow his British colleagues and reduced the level of force protection 
in order to facilitate low-key interaction with the local population. For this 
purpose, he allowed his social patrols to take on a more relaxed posture.1155 This 
meant that the social patrols wore berets instead of helmets and had their 
weapons on their back or with the barrel pointed down.1156 The subsequent 
IFOR/SFOR deployments continued the relaxed and accessible posture. 
 
Although this posture made the soldiers more vulnerable, it made them more 
accessible for interaction and sharing information, which in the end affected the 
image and reliability of the Dutch troops in a positive way.1157 In comparison, the 
US troops operated under a different force protection regime than the British and 
Dutch battalions. The Americans stuck to their strict force protection rules in 
order to reduce every risk or uncertainty. The US troops continued to wear their 
full battle gear. This posture made it more difficult to interact with the local 
population.1158 
 
Platoon houses and temporary patrol bases also contributed to establishing 
contacts in areas that were more isolated, or to gathering information on public 
                                               
1150 Kamerstukken II, 1995/96, 22 181, nr. 145, p. 3. 
1151 See for example: Interview July 6, 2011(a); Interview October 4, 2011(b); Kamerstukken II, 
1996/97, 22 181, nr. 184, p. 8; Vonk et al. (1999), p. 30; UN Doc S/1997/468 (1997), p. 2. 
1152 UN Doc S/1997/966 (1997), p. 3. 
1153 Interview June 17, 2011. 
1154 Interview August 19, 2011; Interview August 24, 2011; Interview September 15, 2011; 
Interview October 4, 2011(b); Interview October 5, 2011(a); Interview October 10, 2011. 
1155 Interview June 14, 2011; Interview July 6, 2011(a); Brocades Zaalberg (2006), pp. 260-262. 
1156 Koninklijke Landmacht – Operationele Staf BLS (2009), p. 10. 
1157 Interview June 10, 2011; Interview June 17, 2011; Interview July 1, 2011; Interview 
August 24, 2011; Interview October 4, 2011(b); Interview October 5, 2011(a). 
1158 Brocades Zaalberg (2006), pp. 261-262; Zisk Marten (2004), pp. 106-107. 
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security in so-called hot spots. In addition to the patrols, CIMIC officers established 
and maintained contacts with local key-players and entrepreneurs. These contacts 
were primarily focused on reconstruction and development projects.1159 
 
To exchange information with IFOR/SFOR, civilians could also address a 
Dutch military official at one of the bases, for example a company base or at a 
platoon house. Although the Dutch bases were well protected and officially had 
no public function or service point, most locations were open to the public, 
provided the necessary security measures in place. Only two commanders 
reported that their platoon houses were not accessible to the public.1160 Civilians 
often preferred to address a patrol if they wanted to share information with 
IFOR/SFOR, basically because they themselves perceived visiting a base as a 
threshold.1161 
6.3.5  Use of force and flexibility 
During the IFOR/SFOR mission, the Dutch forces were equipped and 
authorised to use force in case of an armed breach of the Peace Agreement, in 
self-defence and for force protection.1162 The use of force was regulated in the 
rules of engagement, which applied to both IFOR and SFOR.1163 They defined 
situations or circumstances in which the military were authorised to use force for 
example for self-defence and to protect IFOR/SFOR troops and other persons 
who were threatened with deadly violence. Use of force was also authorised to 
stop a person who tried to steal or destroy goods that could endanger the lives of 
IFOR/SFOR troops and persons with special status. Troops were under no 
circumstances allowed to use more force than strictly necessary to accomplish 
their mission.1164 
 
Instruction on the rules was part of the mission-oriented training, which the 
IFOR and SFOR battalions completed in advance of their deployments.1165 One 
commander recalled: 
 
Usually soldiers are trained to use maximum force to achieve their objectives. 
We went there with an attitude focused on a restrained use of force. In every-
thing we did, the next step was only possible if we squeezed every other alterna-
                                               
1159 Interview July 6, 2011(a); Interview August 24, 2011. See also: Been (2002), p. 430; 
Brouwer et al. (s.a.), pp. 37-38. 
1160 Interview June 10, 2011; Interview June 17, 2011. 
1161 Interview August 24, 2011; Interview October 10, 2011. 
1162 See for example: Kamerstukken II, 1995/96, 22 181, nr. 131, p. 2 & p. 6; Bevelhebber der 
Landstrijdkrachten (1995). IFOR Instructiekaart Geweldinstructie; Bevelhebber der Landstrijd-
krachten (1997). SFOR Instructiekaart Geweldinstructie. 
1163 Kamerstukken II, 1996/97, 22 181, nr. 138, p. 12; Bevelhebber der Landstrijdkrachten 
(1995). IFOR Instructiekaart Geweldinstructie; Bevelhebber der Landstrijdkrachten (1997). 
SFOR Instructiekaart Geweldinstructie. 
1164 Bevelhebber der Landstrijdkrachten (1995). IFOR Instructiekaart Geweldinstructie; Bevelheb-
ber der Landstrijdkrachten (1997). SFOR Instructiekaart Geweldinstructie. 
1165 Interview June 17, 2011; Interview July 1, 2011; Interview August 19, 2011; Interview 
August 24, 2011; Interview September 15, 2011. See also Van Dijk et al. (s.a.), p. 13. 
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tive with a lower impact. We were not allowed to use more force than strictly 
necessary.1166 
 
Finding the right mix between robustness and restrained use of force was a 
challenge during the early stages of the operation. IFOR 1, for example, had 
been trained to deploy as Dutchbat 4 to participate in the peace-keeping mission 
of UNPROFOR. Being trained for peacekeeping purposes, it had a less robust 
mind-set than possibly required for the IFOR mission, which had a peace-
enforcing character.1167 IFOR 2, on the other hand, had trained for operating at 
the higher levels of the spectrum of force. As a result, it had some difficulty 
varying between the various levels of force, as the battalion commander noted: 
 
We started in a robust fashion in order to be more than sufficiently trained 
to operate in the higher echelons of the spectrum of force. This was clearly 
visible in the evaluation of our conclusive exercise. Our monitors were 
worried whether we were sufficiently capable of de-escalating. That was our 
weakness. However, in the area we learned very quickly that we were not 
only capable to escalate but also to de-escalate if required.1168 
 
In addition, other battalions learned in theatre how to combine robustness with 
the principles of restrained use of force.1169 One commander reported: 
During the deployment we really started to learn about the application of force 
and the rules of engagement. The central questions were then: “Where do I 
stand; what is my posture; and how do I behave?” The challenge was to achieve 
a desired effect by varying in attitude and posture, for example in how to carry 
your weapon or to wear the helmet or the beret.1170 
 
In the later stages of the operation, commanders did not report significant 
difficulties in dealing with the principle of restrained use of force or other 
incidents that involved the use of force. Troops were trained in restrained use of 
force, and scenario training had become an inseparable part of the mission-
oriented training. The troops learnt to adapt their posture and responses to 
situations in which the level violence and tension changed quickly or unexpect-
edly.1171 Training not only prepared the troops to deal with various situations; 
they also intended to affect the mind-set of the troops, as one commander 
expressed: 
 
I wanted my commanders, staff officers, and individual soldiers to understand 
each scenario they could encounter. I challenged them to start thinking about 
possible modes of action. There are no blueprints. So, the more you discuss 
                                               
1166 Interview October 5, 2011(a). 
1167 Interview June 14, 2011; Interview July 6, 2011(a). 
1168 Interview June 10, 2011. 
1169 Interview June 17, 2011; Interview October 4, 2011(b). 
1170 Interview October 4, 2011(b). 
1171 Interview October 4, 2011(b); Interview August 19, 2011. 
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these modes of operations, the better prepared you will get for day-to-day 
operations.1172 
 
As such, in the course of the deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina the Dutch 
military experience showed that a combination of a kinetic background and 
activities which required a minimum use of force attitude and mind-set such as 
social patrolling, problem-solving and peace-building was possible, and, more-
over, effective to achieve a safe and secure environment and to gain the support 
of the population. 
6.4  Organisational concept 
6.4.1  Autonomy and individuality 
Autonomy 
Mission-oriented command is the leading concept in the NL Army for com-
manders to command and direct their sub-units.1173 However, during the 
IFOR/SFOR mission there had been some variation in the way commanders 
applied the principles of mission-oriented command. Because the IFOR/SFOR 
battalions operated in large areas, commanders divided their area of operations 
into smaller sectors and assigned those to the company commander.1174 Within 
these sectors, the company commander was authorised to execute the Normal 
Framework Operations independently.1175 Although the company commander 
had been empowered in his area of operations, Vogelaar and Kramer SFOR note 
that the SFOR company commanders generally had less autonomy than their 
IFOR colleagues had. This was explained as a result of bureaucratisation of the 
mission and a lack of operational clarity regarding the actual objectives of the 
mission.1176 In addition, the level of autonomy of the platoon and section 
commander had been relatively low, let alone that of the individual soldier.1177 
One commander reported: 
 
The discretionary powers of the platoon or section commanders were limited. 
With the exception of an imminent threat, as mentioned in the rules of en-
gagement, a section commander was not supposed to act when he ran into a 
situation. The section commander had to inform the company’s Operations 
                                               
1172 Interview October 10, 2011. 
1173 Koninklijke Landmacht (1996), pp. 109-112. 
1174 Interview July 7, 2011(b); Interview September 15, 2011; Interview September 20, 
2011(a); Interview October 5, 2011(a). See also: Vogelaar & Kramer (2004), p. 418. 
1175 Interview June 10, 2011; Interview June 14, 2011; Interview June 17, 2011; Interview July 
1, 2011; Interview July 6, 2011(a); Interview July 7, 2011(b); Interview August 19, 2011; 
Interview September 15, 2011; Interview September 30, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 
2011(b). See also: Vogelaar & Kramer (2004), p. 418. In case of a focused operation (non-
Normal Framework Operation), for example, the execution of a special assignments or 
missions, the battalion level would usually take the lead (Interview July 6, 2011(a); Inter-
view August 19, 2011.) 
1176 Vogelaar & Kramer (2004), p. 418. 
1177 Interview July 1, 2011; Interview July 7, 2011(b); Interview September 30, 2011(b); 
Interview October 4, 2011(b). 
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Room first in order to get his instructions. The lines of communications, how-
ever, were short.1178 
 
Nevertheless, some commanders empowered platoon and section commanders to 
deal with some public security issues independently and to establish local 
networks.1179 This level of discretion was, however, still limited and strongly 
depended on the character and magnitude of a certain incident or operation. 
Patrols had to stay in touch with the operation rooms at all times and had to 
report incidents immediately in order to receive instructions. The Operations 
Room could then decide to just monitor the situation and/or intervene if it 
deemed that necessary, for example to prevent mistakes by junior commanders or 
to exercise closer control.1180 If tension increased or operations became more 
complex, commanders could switch to a more directive leadership style that 
reduced the autonomy of the junior commanders.1181 One commander ex-
plained: 
 
Prior to every operation, also regarding Normal Framework Operations, we 
gave our instructions. These instructions also involved the level of autonomy of 
the section commander. Whether his autonomy would be limited or increased 
depended on the security situation or the tension in the area. In principle, we 
applied a close control. I formulated tight margins and I had been clear about 
my commander’s intents. However, it took some time before those were clear 
to everybody.1182 
 
Individual experience and competences also served to allow the empowerment of 
junior commanders, as some commanders reported.1183 Finally, the size of the 
area of operations also influenced the level of autonomy of junior commanders. 
In some remote areas, platoon commanders operated in a separate area of 
operations and at a relatively large distance from the company base and this 
required a larger level of discretion.1184 
 
Individuality 
While policing can largely be characterised as an individual activity, throughout 
the IFOR/SFOR operation, the smallest operational unit to deploy patrols was 
the section. A section consisted of the standard formation of six to eight soldiers 
under the command of a sergeant or a corporal.1185 The section patrolled on foot 
or motorised, using (two) soft-top vehicles. 
                                               
1178 Interview September 30, 2011(b). 
1179 Interview June 10, 2011; Interview June 14, 2011; Interview August 24, 2011; Interview 
October 5, 2011(a); Interview October 10, 2011. 
1180 Interview June 10, 2011; Interview September 30, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 2011(b); 
Interview October 5, 2011(a). See also: Koninklijke Landmacht – Operationele Staf BLS 
(1999b), p. 9; Vogelaar & Kramer (2004), p. 421. 
1181 Interview September 30, 2011(b); Interview October 10, 2011. 
1182 Interview October 10, 2011. 
1183 Interview June 10, 2011; Interview October 4, 2011(b). 
1184 Interview July 7, 2011(b); Interview September 20, 2011(a); Interview October 5, 2011(a). 
1185 See for example: Koninklijke Landmacht – Operationele Staf BLS (1999b), p. 5. 
184
IFOR/SFOR 
 
 
A majority of the interviewed reported that IFOR/SFOR battalions did not 
further divide the section into smaller deployments. As a result, most sections 
operated as a single unit when patrolling in municipalities and neighbourhoods. 
The commanders involved reported that the force protection rules as promul-
gated by IFOR/SFOR, and the NL Army’s own standard operating procedures 
(drills) had been the prime reasons for refraining from patrolling in duos or 
individually.1186 A few commanders added that the availability of extra radios, 
vehicles and interpreters had also been part of the considerations, but these were 
less decisive.1187 
 
On the other hand, a number of commanders allowed sections to operate in 
smaller teams of three or four troops to patrol in close proximity of each 
other.1188 They enabled a more individual deployment and an extended level of 
organisational autonomy. 
 
Remarkably, the way battalions executed their social patrolling did not show a 
linear development, synchronised with the lessons learnt and the improving 
overall security situation during the course of the mission. Whether commanders 
adhered to the force protection rules and the formal drills or allowed a more 
individual deployment varied between the various rotations and was more or less 
independent of the time and place. It seemed that decisions on autonomy were 
rather based upon a commander’s individual preparedness to ease the standard 
operating procedures and force protection rules than upon the actual security 
situation, which may have allowed a development towards a more individual 
patrolling of local communities. 
6.4.2  Vertical differentiation 
The IFOR/SFOR battalions applied an organisational concept in which the 
company’s Operations Room commanded and controlled the daily routines such 
as the Normal Framework Operations. One commander reported: 
 
During the SFOR mission, the discussion started on the added value of the platoon 
level. In fact, it had been the company commander who directed the sections. The 
platoon commander hardly played any role. We then assigned many of these 
platoon commanders to alternative roles. For example, we employed them in the 
                                               
1186 Interview June 10, 2011 and additional e-mail of April 24, 2014; Interview June 14, 2011 
and additional e-mail of April 22, 2014; Interview June 17, 2011; Interview July 6, 2011(a); 
Interview July 7, 2011(b) and additional e-mail of April 22, 2014; Interview August 19, 
2011 and additional e-mail of April 22, 2014; Interview September 30, 2011(b); Interview 
October 10, 2011 and additional e-mail of April 25, 2014. 
1187 Interview June 10, 2011 and additional e-mail of April 24, 2014; Interview July 7, 2011(b) 
and additional e-mail of April 22, 2014; Interview August 19, 2011 and additional e-mail of 
April 22, 2014. 
1188 Interview of July 1, 2011 and additional e-mail of April 22, 2011; Interview August 24, 
2011; Interview September 15, 2011; Interview September 20, 2011(a); Interview October 
5, 2011(a). 
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CIMIC team. Nevertheless, you cannot disconnect the relationship with the 
platoons entirely. They remained responsible for their personnel, but no longer for 
the direction of the patrols. Those assignments came straight from the company.1189 
 
As a result, the company’s Operations Room directly planned and directed the 
patrols and checkpoints performed at section level. With the exception of 
dedicated platoon operations, most battalions had no executive role vis-à-vis the 
platoon, which was an independent operational level in the execution of the 
daily operations. This had two organisational implications. First, the chain of 
command had shortened as the company directly commanded the section. 
Second, in the Normal Framework Operations the platoon level had become 
redundant. Platoon commanders therefore were assigned to other operational 
tasks, such as liaison officer, intelligence officer or operations officer. Neverthe-
less, the platoon commanders still kept their original role if there was an 
operation to be executed by a platoon and, in organisational terms, they 
remained responsible for e.g. administrative planning, maintenance, training and 
personnel affairs.1190 
6.4.3  Deconcentration 
From the start of the IFOR/SFOR operation in 1996, battalions divided their 
area of operations into separate company sectors. As such, the Dutch battalions 
applied a deconcentrated organisation model by dividing their area of operation 
into separate geographical areas that were assigned to the company level in order 
exercise area responsibility. From the deconcentrated bases, the companies 
deployed their social patrolling and were able to establish local contacts and 
networks. Battalions used different concepts to further divide the company 
sectors. Throughout the mission, there was no uniformity in the geographical 
division of the sectors. To enable local interaction, a company could divide its 
sector into separate sectors in which platoons could deploy their Normal 
Framework Operations.1191 Occasionally, these sectors were further divided into 
smaller areas, for example by assigning a village or community to a section.1192 
One commander noted that he allowed his company commanders to vary the 
division of their sectors. This allowed for a flexible deployment of sub-units and 
experiments in the division of areas.1193 
                                               
1189 Interview August 19, 2011. 
1190 Interview August 19, 2011; Interview August 24, 2011; Interview September 15, 2011; 
Interview September 20, 2011(a); Interview September 30, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 
2011(b); Interview October 5, 2011(a); Interview October 10, 2011. See also: Vogelaar & 
Kramer (2004), p. 421. 
1191 Interview August 19, 2011; Interview September 30, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 
2011(b). 
1192 Interview September 20, 2011(a). 
1193 Klep & Van Gils (2005), p. 364. 
1193 Klep & Van Gils (2005), p. 367. 
1193 Klep & Van Gils (2005), pp. 373-374. 
1193 Interview August 19, 2011; Interview September 30, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 
2011(b). 
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To stimulate social interaction with the local community, the companies also 
deployed semi-permanent platoon locations such as platoon houses or posts from 
where they organised their social patrolling.1194 IFOR 1 started to deploy these 
platoon houses as part of a dynamic concept in the second half of their mission 
(April/May 1996).1195 The location of a platoon house was based on a risk 
analysis or a geographical location of a certain area and/or community. As semi-
permanent bases, the platoon houses could be moved or dismantled when the 
operational conditions had changed. During the length of the operation, 
battalions deployed several platoon houses, including in Jaice, Kupres, Krusevo 
Brdo, Maslovare, Vitez, Knesevo, Obodnic, Jaijce and Šuica. In addition to their 
semi-permanent platoon houses, battalions also deployed temporary platoon or 
section posts, for example to monitor a hot spot or a visit by returnees, or during 
a patrol for more than one day.1196 
6.5 Conclusions 
Security gap 
The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina shows that there was a security gap 
throughout the Netherlands Army's deployment. Politically and ethnically 
motivated violence occurred, freedom of movement was limited and crime and 
corruption flourished and compromised public authorities, including the police. 
There was local police in place but they were divided along ethnic lines and were 
seen as being ethnically biased. The quality and competence of the local police 
were considered inadequate, making them unsuited to perform complicated tasks, 
such as community policing. Ethnic bias negatively affected the trust of the 
public. Consequently, the police were not in a position to provide broad and 
objective services to all citizens. 
 
The IPTF could not close the security gap. Initially, IPTF suffered from a 
deployment gap. It did not reach its authorised strength until September 1996, 
ten months after the start of the mission, which had resulted in a deployment 
gap. In addition, IPTF had no executive powers and could thus not intervene 
and perform operational police tasks in those cases where the local police failed to 
enforce the law and maintain public order. Until 1997, IFOR/SFOR were 
reluctant to fill that enforcement gap, as they considered providing interim 
policing not to be part of their mandate. 
 
                                               
1193 Interview July 7, 2011(b). 
1194 Interview June 10, 2011; Interview June 14, 2011; Interview June 17, 2011; Interview July 
1, 2011; Interview July 6, 2011(a); Interview July 7, 2011(b); Interview August 19, 2011; 
Interview September 15, 2011; Interview September 20, 2011(a); Interview October 5, 
2011(a); Interview October 10, 2011. See also: Klep & Van Gils (2005), p. 367. 
1195 Interview June 14, 2011; Interview July 6, 2011(a); Klep & Van Gils (2005), p. 367. 
1196 Interview June 17, 2011; Interview August 24, 2011; Interview July 7, 2011(b); Interview 
September 30, 2011(b). 
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In order to fill the enforcement gap, in 1997 NATO deployed a gendarmerie-
based MSU, which was supposed to support IPTF and the local police in 
providing public security, for example, in terms of crowd and riot control and 
arresting “high-value targets”. On the ground, however, these units failed to 
interact effectively with regular SFOR troops and local population. The mission 
also suffered from an institutional gap. The local police turned out to be corrupt, 
ethnically biased and not professional.  
 
The closure of the institutional gap was a long-term endeavour, which lasted 
until the end of the Dutch mandate. 
 
Operational concept 
The Dayton Peace Agreement provided the guidelines for the IFOR/SFOR 
operation. IFOR/SFOR had a mandate to establish a safe and secure environ-
ment, to assist civilian organisations in the accomplishment of their missions and 
to provide freedom of movement for civilians, refugees and displaced persons. 
The Agreement did not assign IFOR/SFOR with public security tasks. As a 
result, NATO did not explicitly plan for the execution of these tasks. In addition, 
the Dutch government did not consider the provision of public order and 
security a priority or interest. 
 
On several occasions, the Dutch government underlined that the IFOR/SFOR 
mission did not include the provision of any kind of policing, which it consid-
ered to be a responsibility of the local police. When, in 2002, SFOR and OHR 
made the fight against corruption and crime a priority, the Dutch government 
did not change its attitude towards a wider interpretation of the mandate. The 
government held its position that combating crime was a responsibility of the 
local police, even if they failed to do so. 
 
The security gap had not motivated Dutch commanders to prioritise public 
security directly. During their pre-deployment planning and training, Dutch 
commanders did not pay much attention to public security issues other than 
CRC training, which became part of the training curriculum in 1997. Dutch 
IFOR/SFOR commanders trained their troops for the regular military activities 
in peace support operations, such as social patrolling, executing checkpoints, 
searching individuals, vehicles and objects and collecting information. 
 
Although not necessarily labelled as such, Dutch troops de facto executed tasks 
that under normal conditions are assigned to the police. However, commanders 
did not consult police specialists for advice or assistance.  
In terms of public order, the Dutch troops patrolled their area to create a safe and 
secure environment and developed their interaction with the local population, 
which was also considered an essential part of intelligence-gathering. Moreover, 
they provided support for a safe and secure refugee return and for the elections, 
to mention but a few examples. From 1997, CRC had been part of the opera-
tional concept of the Dutch SFOR battalion. Nevertheless, CRC was seen as an 
anomaly within the Dutch operational concept. Commanders were not familiar 
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with the concept and were therefore hesitant to use it fully. A deadly accident in 
May 2001 during a CRC training in theatre finally ended the deployment of 
Army platoons in a CRC role. Because of this accident, the government assigned 
the Marechaussee to fulfil that role on a standby status. 
As regards law enforcement, the Dutch contributed to the arrest of suspected war 
criminals and engaged in operations to combat illegal arms, smuggling, and illegal 
logging. Tasks such as social patrolling, support for refugee returns, elections and 
combating illegal arms stemmed from the Dayton Peace Agreement. Other law 
enforcement activities, such as the arrest of PIFWCs and combating illegal 
logging were less obvious. These activities were generally avoided when initiated 
by the MND, mainly because of the narrow Dutch interpretation of the 
mandate. After NATO and SFOR prioritised public security, some commanders 
stretched their national mandate and found ways to participate in law enforce-
ment operations initiated by the MND. 
 
Largely, the Dutch operational concept focused on the collection of information 
and intelligence. 
The social patrols were the primary instrument to collect information. Other 
sources were international organisations, CIMIC officers, liaison officers and 
interpreters. The military procedures applied by the Dutch battalion to collect 
and analyse information largely adhered to the principles of intelligence-led 
policing. The company’s Intelligence Cell briefed and debriefed the patrols in 
order to get answers to general or specific questions and to complete their 
security assessment. Collected and analysed information could also initiate further 
inquiry on a specific issue. Information-gathering was problem-oriented and 
enabled commanders to act proactively towards local socio-economic demands. 
The information was not exclusively related to public security, however.  
The majority of the Dutch commanders were cautious in sharing information 
with local authorities and police, mainly because they feared that their operations 
could be compromised if information were to leak to opponents and criminals. 
Information was shared with authorities and police on a need-to-know basis 
only. The exchange of information with international partners was more open 
and based on mutual trust. 
 
Dutch battalions cooperated with local and international partners to implement 
the Peace Agreement. 
Cooperation with local authorities occurred largely through CIMIC liaison 
officers at battalion and company level. These interactions focused on the 
improvement of local governance, development and reconstruction projects. 
Public security was not a priority of these interactions. Cooperation had a semi-
institutionalised structure. 
Although cooperation with the local police was a responsibility of the IPTF, at 
company level, officers liaised with the local police. There was no interaction 
with the local police at the battalion level due to the absence of a counterpart 
within the police at cantonal level. There were no relevant structures or 
platforms to discus cantonal public security issues. Cooperation and coordination 
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with the international police was organised at company level and occurred on a 
daily basis in order to coordinate military assistance to the IPTF. 
Cooperation with international partners was part of the operational concept of 
the IFOR/SFOR deployments and focused on the planning and execution of 
various development and reconstruction projects. These interactions occurred at 
battalion and company level and had a semi-institutionalised structure of weekly 
and monthly meetings. 
Troops interacted with the public, mainly through social patrolling on a 24/7 
basis. In addition to patrolling, CIMIC liaison officers interacted with local 
entrepreneurs and key leaders. To improve local interaction at remote places, 
most battalions deployed platoon houses that could also serve as a point of 
contact for the local population. 
 
The Dutch battalions were trained, equipped and authorised to use force to 
enforce compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement and for self-defence. The 
rules of engagement emphasised the principles of minimum use of force. During 
the first years of the mission, troops still had to find the right mix between 
robustness and soft tactics, such as social patrolling, at the start of their deploy-
ment. According to commanders involved at the time, troops accustomed 
quickly and learned to adjust their mind-set and posture to the demands of the 
situation, to solve incidents efficiently and without the use of force. 
 
Organisational concept 
Throughout the IFOR/SFOR mission, the company was the most junior level 
of decentralisation. Although commanders applied the principles of mission-
oriented command, junior commanders, such as platoon and section command-
ers, had little autonomy to plan their activities and solve public security on the 
spot as they were being closely monitored by the company’s Operations Room. 
The autonomy of junior commanders was further restricted during periods of 
increased tension. Section commanders were not empowered to operate in the 
same way as the police who solve public security issues independently based on 
individual judgements. Unlike policing, the smallest troop deployment to 
provide public security was the section level, consisting of six to eight troops. As 
such, battalions complied with the NL Army’s formal operational concept and 
IFOR/SFOR’s force protection rules. Although the overall security situation had 
been relatively safe, commanders only occasionally allowed smaller troop 
deployment of teams of three or four troops. 
 
In terms of vertical differentiation, the Company’s Operations Room played a 
central role in the command and control structure. During the execution of 
Normal Framework Operations, the company directly controlled the section 
level. The exclusion of the platoon level shortened the chain of command and 
enabled the company level to closely monitor the security situation on the 
ground. On the other hand, the short lines could result in centralisation by 
leaving little discretion for individual junior commanders to solve public security 
issues independently, let alone autonomy for individual soldiers. As such, the 
organisational concept differed from that of the police where the individual 
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police officer is granted substantial autonomy to solve public security problems 
independently and not necessarily with the prior approval of the higher levels in 
the chain of command. 
 
The Dutch battalions in Bosnia and Herzegovina applied the principles of 
deconcentration as they divided their area of responsibility into smaller geo-
graphical company sectors in which company commanders were empowered to 
run their day-to-day operations and to solve public security issues in those areas. 
The extent to which company sectors were further divided into platoon sectors 
differed between battalions. Generally, troops were deployed in a deconcentrated 
fashion in close proximity to the population. Sections patrolled a dedicated area 
on a 24/7 basis and were able to develop local networks in order to obtain 
general and specific information. If required, battalions established semi-
permanent platoon houses in remote areas or at hot spots to improve community 
interaction or, for example, to protect returnees. 
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7 KFOR 
7.1 Introduction 
7.1.1 Background of the operation 
During the presidency of Tito (1945-1980), Kosovo had enjoyed an autonomous 
status within the Serbian Republic, one of the six republics of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This status was further formalised by the 
Constitution of 1974, which provided the province with its own legislative 
assembly, judiciary, police force, and central bank.1197 
 
In March 1989, then Serbian President Milosevic cancelled Kosovo’s status as an 
autonomous province within Serbia. He amended the Constitution, disbanded 
the Kosovo Assembly, placed the police and courts under Serbian control and 
deployed additional Serbian troops and police to maintain order. The Kosovo 
Albanians gradually lost the rights that had guaranteed the preservation of their 
language and culture.1198 Kosovo Albanians responded by establishing an informal 
parallel government structure, education and health care system and a conflict 
resolution mechanism based on customary practices under the leadership of 
Ibrahim Rugova and his Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (LDK; Democratic League 
of Kosovo).1199 
 
After the Dayton Peace Accords had ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in 1995, some Kosovo Albanians thought that the Agreement had failed to 
address Kosovo’s independent status and that violent tactics were needed to 
regain autonomy.1200 The Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UÇK; Kosovo Liberation 
Army) emerged in the early 1990s as an armed resistance group. In February 
1998, it started an insurgency, which escalated into systematic attacks against 
Serbian officials, police posts and patrols.1201 The Serbian government responded 
by launching an offensive in early 1998 using Interior Ministry police and the 
Yugoslav Army.1202 This resulted in accusations of human rights violations and 
atrocities, ranging from arbitrary arrests to looting, rape, torture, kidnapping and 
executions.1203 
 
On March 31, 1998, the UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 1160 to stop 
this violence. The Resolution imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia, 
                                               
1197 See for example: Dziedzic (2006), p. 322; Dziedzic & Kishinchand (2005), p. 25; Klep & 
Van Gils (2005), p. 403; Rausch (2007), p. 272. 
1198 Dziedzic (2006), p. 323; Dziedzic & Kishinchand (2005), p. 25; Klep & Van Gils (2005), 
403; Rausch (2007), p. 272. 
1199 Dziedzic (2006), p. 323; Rausch (2007), p. 272. 
1200 Dziedzic (2006), p. 323; Dziedzic & Kishinchand (2005), p. 26; Rausch (2007), p. 272. 
1201 Dziedzig & Kishinchand (2005), p. 26; Rausch (2007), pp. 272-273; Voorhoeve (2007), p. 
156. 
1202 Dziedzic (2006), p. 323; Dziedzic & Kishinchand (2005), p. 26; Rausch (2007), p. 273. 
1203 Rausch (2007), p. 273. 
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including Kosovo, and called ‘upon the authorities in Belgrade and the leadership 
of the Kosovar Albanian community (…) to enter without preconditions into a 
meaningful dialogue’ aimed at achieving a political solution to the issue of 
Kosovo’s status.1204 The Resolution also underlined that such solution should be 
based on the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ and 
‘expresses its support for an enhanced status for Kosovo which would include a 
substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration.’1205  
 
As UNSCR 1160 did not have the expected outcome, on September 23, 1998 
the UN Security Council adopted another resolution to stop the violence in 
Kosovo. UNSCR 1199 called for parties to ‘cease all action by the security forces 
affecting the civilian population’ and ordered the ‘withdrawal of security units 
used for civilian repression.’1206 The Resolution also called for an effective and 
continuous international monitoring of the situation in Kosovo.1207 In October 
1998, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) sent 
monitors to Kosovo as part of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM).1208 
Meanwhile, NATO issued an Activation Order on October 13, 1998, which 
enabled the execution of an air campaign.1209 
 
The KVM turned out not being the cure for the Kosovo crisis. The crux of the 
matter was the absence of an enforcement mechanism on the ground.1210 The 
massacre at Račak on January 15, 1999, in which over forty Kosovo Albanians 
were killed, became the turning point.1211 The massacre resulted in increased 
international pressure leading to the negotiations in Rambouillet, which were 
launched in France on February 6, 1999.1212 After two weeks of negotiations, a 
plan was presented that called for the disarmament of the UÇK, and the 
withdrawal of the Serbian security forces from Kosovo. The plan also called for 
Kosovo to regain self-governance as it had had before 1989.1213 The Serbian 
delegation refused to sign the agreement,1214 and continued their campaign in 
Kosovo. As a result, an estimated 800,000 Kosovo Albanians sought refuge 
abroad, for example in Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(hereafter called Macedonia) or Montenegro. An additional 500,000 Kosovo 
Albanians were internally displaced.1215 
 
In an attempt to stop the ethnic cleansing, on March 24, 1999 NATO launched 
the air campaign Allied Force against Serbian military and infrastructural targets 
                                               
1204 UN Doc S/RES/1160 (1998), §4. 
1205 UN Doc S/RES/1160 (1998), §5. 
1206 UN Doc S/RES/1199 (1998), §4. 
1207 UN Doc S/RES/1199 (1998), §4. 
1208 Rausch (2007), p. 273. 
1209 Dziedzic (2006), p. 325. 
1210 Dziedzic (2006), p. 325. 
1211 Dziedzic (2006), p. 326; Dziedzic & Kishinchand (2005), p. 27. 
1212 Dziedzic (2006), p. 326; Dziedzic & Kishinchand (2005), p. 27. 
1213 Dziedzic (2006), p. 326; Dziedzic & Kishinchand (2005), p. 27. 
1214 Dziedzic (2006), p. 326; Dziedzic & Kishinchand (2005), p. 27; Rausch (2007), p. 271. 
1215 UN Doc S/1999/779 (1999), p. 9. 
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which would last for 78 days.1216 However, additional diplomatic pressure was 
needed to stop the Serbian military campaign in Kosovo. On June 2, 1999, then 
Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic agreed to withdraw his forces from 
Kosovo. He also agreed to the deployment of an international civilian and 
military peace mission in Kosovo.1217 The international formalisation of that 
mission followed on June 10, 1999 when the UN Security Council adopted 
UNSCR 1244.1218 The Resolution authorised the UN to establish an interim 
civilian administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo could 
progressively acquire autonomy. For that purpose, the UN acquired full 
administrative and governmental authority over Kosovo and its population in 
order to build the foundations for the development of a society and its institu-
tions that recognise and support the rule of law (See Box 3).1219 
 
Box 3: Mandate of UNMiK 
The responsibilities of UNMiK as described in Paragraph 11 of Resolution 1244 
were: 
 
a. Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial 
autonomy and self-government in Kosovo; 
b. Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as 
required; 
c. Organising and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for 
democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, 
including the holding of elections; 
d. Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibili-
ties while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo’s local 
provisional institutions and other peace-building activities; 
e. Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status; 
f. In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional 
institutions to institutions established under a political settlement; 
g. Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic 
reconstruction; Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian 
organisations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid; 
h. Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and 
meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve 
in Kosovo; 
i. Protecting and promoting human rights; 
j. Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to 
their homes in Kosovo.1220 
                                               
1216 NATO launched Operation Allied Force without the consent of the UN Security Council. 
Instead, NATO referred to the urgent need for a humanitarian intervention to legitimise 
the operation. 
1217 See for example: Brocades Zaalberg (2006), pp. 293-295; Dziedzic (2006), p. 319; Dziedzic 
& Kishinchand (2005), p. 28-29; Klep & Van Gils (2005), pp. 408-409 & p. 412. 
1218 UN Doc S/RES/1244 (1999). 
1219 Pauwels (2002), p. 466. 
1220 UN Doc S/RES/1244 (1999), §11. 
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The resolution also listed the responsibilities of KFOR in Kosovo (see Box 4), 
and assigned NATO to deploy an ‘international security presence (…) under 
unified command and control (…) to establish a safe environment for all people 
in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons 
and refugees.’1221 After the UN Security Council had adopted UNSCR 1244, the 
first KFOR troops left their staging areas in Montenegro and entered Kosovo on 
June 12, 1999.1222 
 
Box 4: Mandate of KFOR 
The responsibilities of KFOR as described in Paragraph 9 of Resolution 1244 
were: 
 
a. Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a 
ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo 
of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces; 
b. Demilitarising the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)1223 and other armed 
Kosovo Albanian groups; Establishing a secure environment in which refu-
gees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil 
presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and 
humanitarian aid can be delivered; 
c. Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take 
responsibility for this task; 
d. Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropri-
ate, take over responsibility for this task; 
e. Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the 
international civil presence; Conducting border monitoring duties as re-
quired; 
f. Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international 
civil presence, and other international organisations.1224 
7.1.2  Dutch military contribution to the peace settlement 
The Dutch government formally decided to participate in KFOR on June 10, 
1999.1225 Prior to this decision, the Dutch government had assigned 11 Artillery 
Battalion in February 1999 to prepare for future participation in KFOR. The 
government deployed an advance party to Macedonia in April 1999.1226 The 
advance party was tasked to provide fire support for 12 (GE) Armoured Bri-
gade.1227 The main body of 11 Artillery Battalion would deploy mid June 1999 in 
                                               
1221 UN Doc S/RES/1244 (1999), Annex 2, §4. 
1222 Dziedzic (2005), p. 342; Klep & Van Gils (2005), p. 412. 
1223 In this chapter further referred to as UÇK (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës). 
1224 UN Doc S/RES/1244 (1999), §9. 
1225 Kamerstukken II, 2000/01, 22 181, nr. 331, p. 3. See also: Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), 
pp. 12-13.  
1226 Kamerstukken II, 1998/99, 22 181, nr. 224. See also: Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), p. 10; 
Brocades Zaalberg (2006), p. 299. 
1227 Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), p. 13. 
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three subsequent shifts.1228 In December 1999, 41 Artillery Battalion replaced 11 
Artillery Battalion and served in Orahovac until May 2000. Because the Dutch 
government had already decided in November 1999 to stop its contribution to 
the KFOR mission by mid-2000 in order to concentrate its involvement in the 
Balkans on the SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 41 Artillery 
Battalion was not replaced by another Dutch unit.1229 For the chronology of the 
mission, see Appendix 1. 
7.1.3  Structure of the chapter 
This chapter provides an answer to sub-questions 4, 5 and 6, in relationship to 
the NL Army’s involvement in KFOR from June 1999 until May 2000. This 
chapter first deals with the question whether the KFOR mission encountered a 
security gap. Second, the chapter deals with the operational concept of the two 
battalions and answers the question whether their concept has contributed to 
public security. Third, it describes their organisational concept and answers the 
question to what extent this concept supported the execution of police-like 
activities.1230 
7.2  Security gap 
7.2.1  Public security situation 
Demographic composition of the area 
Given the background of the conflict, the ethnic composition of the area was of 
significance for the security situation. The area of responsibility of KFOR 1 and 
2 covered the villages of Orahovac, Velika Hoca, Suva Reka and Mamusa. 
 
Before the conflict, the total number of inhabitants of the Orahovacs area had 
been 25,000 of which nearly ninety percent had been of Kosovo Albanian origin 
and about 4,000 were Serbian. The Serbian minority lived in a separate quarter 
of Orahovac and in the village of Velika Hoca. The Roma community had been 
a second minority in the area and lived near the Serbian quarter of Orahovac. 
Before the conflict, the size of the Roma population had been between 1,500 
and 2,000. In Mamusa, a village southeast of Orahovac, there was a small Turkish 
community of approximately 5,000 citizens.1231 
 
After the conflict, the ethnic composition of Orahovac had changed significantly. 
The total number of Kosovo Albanian inhabitants increased to 30,000 while the 
                                               
1228 Klep & Van Gils (2005), p. 416. 
1229 Kamerstukken II, 1999/2000, 22 181, nr. 306, p. 2. 
1230 The main body of this chapter is based on interviews with commanders and senior staff 
officers of the two Dutch KFOR battalions. The interviews are complemented with data 
from the Dutch Defence Archives, policy documents issued by the NL Army, documenta-
tion and reports issued by the Dutch parliament, reports issued by the UN in relation to 
their mission in Kosovo and memorial books produced by the two Dutch artillery battal-
ions. 
1231 Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), p. 72. See also Van Loon (2000), p. 660. 
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number of Serbs had decreased to about 2,500. Also the size of the Roma 
community decreased as a result of the conflict and had shrunk to about 800. 
The Turkish community in Mamusa did not suffer from the conflict and largely 
remained unchanged.1232 
 
Crime and criminality 
Following Hansen’s classification of crimes in war-torn societies,1233 the most 
significant types of crime in Kosovo were politically or ethnically-related 
violence and organised crime.1234 
 
Ethnic and political violence emerged often because of unmet or unsatisfied 
grievances related to the conflict.1235 In Kosovo, these emerged in the early 
months of the mission after Kosovo Albanians, who had sought refuge in 
Macedonia and Albania, returned to their homes of origin. After they found out 
their relatives murdered, livestock killed and homes and farms destroyed, several 
Kosovo Albanians sought revenge for the crimes committed by the Kosovo 
Serbs. Revenge varied from intimidation and arson to kidnappings and mur-
der.1236 Although ethnically and politically-motivated violence peaked during the 
first months of the mission, it continued during KFOR 2, resulting in several 
incidents, such as arson and assaults with hand-grenades.1237 For example, on 
December 17, 1999 eight Serbs were injured in an assault in the Serbian quarter 
of Orahovac. A week later, on December 24 1999, two hand-grenades were 
thrown into a Serbian house in Orahovac. Kosovo Albanians were also the 
targets of violent acts. On February 24, 2000, a hand-grenade was thrown into a 
Kosovo Albanian restaurant and on March 17, another hand-grenade was thrown 
into a Kosovo Albanian house.1238 
 
In addition to ethnic and political related violence, Kosovo suffered from 
organised crime that arose immediately after the conflict. Criminal structures 
took advantage of the power and security vacuum and started various forms of 
illegal activities such as trafficking weapons, stolen goods, contraband and 
women.1239 Organised crime also occurred in Orahovac and mainly involved 
smuggling and illegal logging.1240 
 
 
                                               
1232 Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), p. 72. See also Van Loon (2000), p. 660. 
1233 Hansen (2002b), pp. 90-91. 
1234 See for example: Lovelock (2005), pp. 124-125; Rausch (2002), p. 24. 
1235 Hansen (2002b), p. 90. 
1236 Interviews June 29, 2011; Interview June 16, 2011; Interview July 5, 2011; Interview July 
7, 2011(a); Interview August 15, 2011; Interview September 8, 2011. See also: Abels, Van 
Pelt & Jacobs (2000), pp. 93-94. 
1237 Interview August 17, 2011; Interview October 5, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 2011(a). 
See also: 41 Afdeling Veldartillerie (2001), pp. 102-105. 
1238 41 Afdeling Veldartillerie (2001), pp. 102-105. 
1239 Lovelock (2005), pp. 124-125. 
1240 Interview June 29, 2011; Interview July 5, 2011; Interview August 23, 2011; Interview 
October 4, 2011(a); Van Loon (2000), p. 662. 
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Public order 
In terms of public order, there had been a number of demonstrations in the area 
controlled by the Dutch KFOR forces. In the early months of the Dutch 
presence in Orahovac, these demonstrations related to the plans to deploy two 
Russian KFOR battalions in the northern part of the Dutch area of responsibil-
ity. The Kosovo Albanians questioned the neutrality of the Russian troops.1241 
From July to November 1999, they protested on a daily basis against the Russian 
presence.1242 The Serbs in Orahovac also organised demonstrations, though in 
support of the Russians.1243 Overall, these demonstrations had a non-violent 
character and did not require any kind of crowd control.1244 Also during the 
deployment of KFOR 2 there were a number of demonstrations in Orahovac 
and Suva Reka for various purposes. These demonstrations passed off without 
major incidents.1245 
7.2.2  Local police 
After the withdrawal of the Serbian security forces, there were no police left in 
Kosovo.1246 The absence of a local police force resulted in an institutional gap, as 
defined by Dziedzic.1247 The UÇK and in particular its paramilitary police force 
Policia Ushtaraka, initially tried to fill the police vacuum by deploying police 
patrols. However, the UÇK had no authority whatsoever to police Kosovo and 
its citizens.1248 Instead, UNSCR 1244 had settled the demilitarising of the 
UÇK,1249 and in case UÇK patrols appeared in the streets in an attempt to 
maintain law and order, KFOR stopped and removed them.1250 
 
In order to fill the institutional gap, UNSCR 1244 had tasked UNMiK to 
establish and train a multi-ethnic and self-sustaining local police force for 
Kosovo: the Kosovo Police Service (KPS).1251 The process of creating a new 
                                               
1241 See for example Brocades Zaalberg (2006), p. 344. 
1242 Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), pp. 45-47; Kamerstukken II, 2000/01, 22 181, nr. 331, pp. 
13-14. 
1243 Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), pp. 45-47. 
1244 Interview June 16, 2011; Interview July 7, 2011(a). 
1245 Interview August 23, 2011; Interview October 5, 2011(b). See also: 41 Afdeling 
Veldartillerie (2001), pp. 102-105. 
1246 In March 1989, the Serbian President Milosevic had abolished Kosovo’s status as an 
independent province of Serbia. Kosovo Albanians were removed from the public sector, 
including the police and judicial system and replaced by representatives of the Kosovo Serb 
minority who since then had occupied the most important positions within the govern-
ment and public administration (See for example: Rausch (2007), p. 272; Van Loon (2000), 
p. 660). After the arrival of KFOR, Serbian troops left Kosovo, as did Kosovo Serbs includ-
ing police and civil administrators (Interview June 16, 2011; Interview July 5, 2011; Inter-
view August 15, 2011. See also: Van Loon (2000), p. 657; Kamerstukken II, 2000/01, 22 
181, nr. 331, p. 12). 
1247 Dziedzic (1998), p. 14. 
1248 Interview June 16, 2011; Interview July 5, 2011; Interview July 7, 2011(a); Interview 
September 8, 2011; Interview October 5, 2011. 
1249 UN Doc S/RES/1244 (1999), §9(b) & 15. 
1250 Interview July 5, 2011, Interview September 8, 2011. 
1251 UN Doc S/RES/1244 (1999), §11(i). 
199
BEYOND BORDERS 
police force formally started when the Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS) 
opened its doors on September 7, 1999.1252 Initially, the UN planned for 4,000 
KPS officers.1253 In 2002, the target changed to a maximum strength of around 
10,000 police officers.1254 The police training comprised a programme of twenty-
seven weeks, divided over a basic eight-week training course in the KPSS and 
nineteen weeks of field training at a UN police station.1255 The first group of 
KPS police officers trained to perform independent patrolling became operational 
in October 2000.1256 
7.2.3  International police 
With no local police yet in place to enforce the law and to maintain public order, 
Kosovo faced a security gap. To fill this gap, UNSCR 1244 authorised the 
establishment of an international police force: the UNMiK Police. The Resolu-
tion assigned UNMiK Police two main tasks. First, UNMiK Police would be 
responsible for providing interim policing. Second, they would take on the 
establishment and training of the Kosovo Police Service.1257 At the start of the 
mission, the authorised strength of the UNMiK Police had been 3,110 police 
officers. On October 26, 1999, the UN Security Council decided to increase the 
number of UNMiK police by over 1,600 officers resulting in a strength of 
4,718.1258 
 
However, the deployment of the UNMiK Police proceeded slowly and created a 
deployment gap. While KFOR was on the ground in Kosovo already on June 
12, the deployment of UNMiK Police took several weeks, basically because 
potential donor countries were not able to deploy sufficient numbers of qualified 
police at short notice.1259 The first international police officers, twenty-seven in 
total, arrived in Kosovo on June 28, 1999 and originated from the IPTF in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.1260 By late August/early September 1999, UNMiK 
Police had reached about twenty percent of its authorised strength.1261 At that 
time also the first three UNMiK Police arrived in Orahovac.1262 In May 2000, 
when the Dutch mandate expired, UNMiK Police had just reached 77 percent of 
its authorised strength.1263 By February 2001, UNMiK Police had finally reached 
a size close to the authorised force capacity.1264 
                                               
1252 UN Doc S/2000/1196 (2000), p. 6. 
1253 UN Doc S/2000/538 (2000), p. 6. 
1254 UN Doc S/2002/62(2002), p. 8. 
1255 UNMiK Police (2001), p. 31. 
1256 UNMiK Police (2001), p. 32; Dziedzic (2002), p. 50. 
1257 UN Doc S/RES/1244 (1999), §11(i) & 11(j). 
1258 UNMiK Police (2001), p. 34. 
1259 Hawley & Skocz (2005), p. 57. 
1260 UNMiK Police (2001), p. 11. 
1261 UN Doc S/1999/987 (1999), p. 6. 
1262 Interview June 29, 2011; Interview July 5, 2011; Interview September 8, 2011. See also: 
Van Loon (2000), p. 664. 
1263 UN Doc S/2000/538 (2000), p. 5 & p. 7. 
1264 UN Doc S/2001/218 (2001), p. 8. The UN Formed Police Units (FPU) deployed slowly 
too. The UN planned for ten FPUs to provide public order functions, such as crowd con-
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UNMiK Police established its first police station in Pristina. In September 1999, 
the UNMiK Police in Pristina had reached a sufficient force level to assume full 
responsibility for policing. In Prizren, the region where the Dutch KFOR 
battalion operated, UNMiK Police took on full executive responsibility for 
policing on October 27, 1999.1265 In June 2000, finally, UNMiK police were 
able to assume full executive responsibility for policing in all of Kosovo.1266 Until 
UNMiK had been ready to take on complete executive policing powers, KFOR 
had had to fill the security gap and acted as interim police force to ensure public 
security.1267 Until the transfer of that responsibility, UNMiK Police advised 
KFOR on policing matters and established liaison with local and international 
counterparts.1268 
7.3  Operational concept 
7.3.1  Planning and preparation 
International mandates and planning 
UNSCR 1244 anticipated that the international police force would deploy at a 
slower pace than KFOR.1269 To prevent a security gap, UNSCR 1244 gave 
KFOR a legal basis for providing public security ‘until the international civil 
presence can take responsibility for this task.’1270 Hereby and for the first time in 
history, the UN Security Council gave a military force the authority to provide 
public security in a failed state and to execute ‘full tactical policing’ which made 
the mandate of KFOR broader than that of IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.1271 
 
However, NATO had not included the provision of interim policing in its initial 
planning. NATO started its planning for the deployment of ground forces in 
Kosovo in June 1998.1272 This process resulted in Operation Plan 10413 of 
February 1999, which focused on the execution of the Military Technical 
Agreement (MTA) between NATO and the Serbian government on the 
withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo.1273 As such, NATO focused on the 
                                               
trol and area security. The first FPU arrived in April 2000, nine months after the start of the 
UNMiK mission while the tenth FPU arrived not until February 2002 (Perito (2004), pp. 
109-205). 
1265 UNMiK Police (2001), p. 11. 
1266 All executive policing powers were transferred from KFOR to UNMiK Police in Pristina 
on September 19, 1999, in Prizren on October 27, 1999, in Gnjilane on May 12, 2000, 
and in Pec in June 2000 (UNMiK Police (2001), p. 11. 
1267 UN Doc S/RES/1244 (1999), §9(d). 
1268 UNMiK Police (2001), p. 11. 
1269 Dziedzic (2006), p. 340. 
1270 UN Doc S/RES/1244 (1999), §9(d). 
1271 Friesendorf (2009), p. 92. 
1272 Kamerstukken II, 1999/00, 22 181, nr. 331, p. 5. 
1273 Kamerstukken II, 1999/00, 22 181, nr. 331, p. 5. The Military Technical Agreement (MTA) 
involved an agreement between Serbian military leaders and COMKFOR Lieutenant-
General Jackson on June 9, 1999, regarding a coordinated extraction of Serbian forces and 
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military aspects of a land operation. The planning process also took the results of 
the Rambouillet Agreement into account, which assumed that the Serbian police 
and the judicial system in Kosovo would be in place after its ratification and 
could serve as intermediate solution prior to an internationally lead police and 
judicial reform.1274 Nevertheless, the Commander of KFOR (COMKFOR) 
expected that some sort of a security gap could occur noting that he wanted ‘to 
deploy available forces rapidly to establish an initial presence in Kosovo avoiding 
a security vacuum being created.’ For that purpose, he planned to ‘establish and 
maintain a secure environment, including public safety and order.’1275 However, 
COMKFOR did not translate his assessment into specific measures or guidelines, 
as the commander of KFOR 1, Van Loon notes.1276 These measures or guidelines 
would develop incrementally during the first weeks of the operation. 
 
The first important guideline regarding the provision of public security had been 
“Weisung Nr. 8” (Directive No. 8) of June 22, 1999. The German Ministry of 
Defence had been responsible for drafting this guideline to give guidance to the 
German KFOR troops, although the brigade had taken the initiative for its 
development. According to the Dutch battalion commander: 
 
This directive materialised more-or-less bottom-up. Parts of the directive we 
developed ourselves and streamlined it. We did so because we faced problems 
on the ground for which we needed a legal basis.1277 
 
Directive No. 8 provided instructions for the German KFOR troops to arrest 
criminal offenders in order to establish public order and security.1278 The 
directive allowed soldiers to act in more than just the cases of “serious crime” 
mentioned in the KFOR rules of engagement such as murder, manslaughter, 
crimes against humanity, rape, looting, assault deportation, armed robbery, arson 
and intimidation. The Directive authorised troops to search and disarm arrested 
suspects, to determine their identity and to have them examined by a medical 
doctor.1279 The German Directive also became a guideline for the Dutch troops 
operating in the German Multinational Brigade (MNB) sector.1280 Pressured by 
                                               
the deployment of the KFOR forces in Kosovo (Brocades Zaalberg (2006), p. 295; 
Dziedzic (2006), p. 334). 
1274 See for example: Brocades Zaalberg (2006), p. 292; Rausch (2007), pp. 274-275. 
1275 Van Loon (2000), p. 657. 
1276 Van Loon (2000), p. 657. 
1277 Interview June 29, 2011. 
1278 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (June 22, 1999). Vorläufige Weisung Nr. 8 für die 
Behandlung mutmaßlicher Straftäter die durch die Bundeswehr in Kosovo in Gewahrsam 
genommen warden (sollen). SSA, 11 (NL) Artillery Battalion KFOR 1, June 12 – Decem-
ber 7, 1999, Box 7, Correspondentiearchief, No. 6009. 
1279 SSA, 11 (NL) Artillery Battalion KFOR 1, June 12 – December 7, 1999, Box 7, 
Correspondentiearchief, No. 6009. See also: Brocades Zaalberg (2006), p. 319; Van Loon 
(2000), p. 657. 
1280 Ministerie van Defensie – Defensiestaf (October, 6 1999). Aanhouding van verdachten van 
oorlogsmisdaden in Kosovo. (Concept) Aanwijzing CDS Nr. A-19. SSA, 11 (NL) Artillery Bat-
talion KFOR 1, June 12 – December 7, 1999, Box 7, Correspondentiearchief, No. 10019. 
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the Dutch Contingent Commander in Kosovo,1281 the Dutch government finally 
agreed with this directive in October 1999. In a special directive regarding the 
arrest of war crimes indictees in Kosovo, the Dutch Defence staff noted that 
Directive No. 8 gave Dutch KFOR troops the authority ‘to apprehend individu-
als who are suspected of having committed serious criminal offences, or those 
who are caught in the act committing such crime.’1282 Nevertheless, the Dutch 
government still had its reservations against a larger role of Dutch troops in 
public security.1283 According to officers involved, the Dutch Ministry of 
Defence followed a narrow interpretation of the mandate, apparently to prevent 
any kind of mission creep, which resulted into various debates between the 
battalion and the Ministry on the solutions needed to restore law and order.1284 
 
A second guideline on law enforcement and arrests followed on June 25, 1999, 
thirteen days after KFOR’s entry in Kosovo. In Annex R to Operational Order 
004, COMKFOR regulated that his troops had to maintain basic law and order 
in Kosovo until UN arrangements were in place. To enforce the law and to 
maintain public order, he advised his troops to follow the legislation of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as far as practically possible, which could be 
achieved by ‘applying internationally respected standards of behaviour in law and 
order in line with the respective NATO sending nations procedures. The Annex 
authorised KFOR troops to perform preliminary police functions, such as stop 
and search, and arrest and detention of suspected criminals.1285 
 
On July 20, 1999, COMKFOR issued his final guidance on public order and 
security. In a separate directive, he confirmed that in, line with UNSCR 1244, 
KFOR had to ‘establish and maintain a secure environment, including public 
safety and order.’ To perform this task, he underlined that KFOR had the 
mandate and responsibility for law and order until UNMiK Police could assume 
its responsibilities. Meanwhile, he noted, KFOR troops had the ‘right to 
apprehend and detain persons who are suspected of having committed offences 
against public safety and order.’1286 
 
National political planning 
On February 22, 1999, 11 Artillery Battalion received its formal order to prepare 
for deployment to Kosovo from April 2, 1999 with a “notice-to-move” of seven 
days.1287 After 11 Artillery Battalion had completed its training programme, the 
                                               
1281 Van Loon (2000), p. 659. 
1282 Ministerie van Defensie – Defensiestaf (October, 6 1999). Aanhouding van verdachten van 
oorlogsmisdaden in Kosovo. (Concept) Aanwijzing CDS Nr. A-19. SSA, 11 (NL) Artillery Bat-
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1284 Interview June 29, 2011; Interview September 8, 2011. 
1285 COMKFOR (June 25, 1999) OPORDER 004, Annex R. SSA, 11 (NL) Artillery Battalion 
KFOR 1, June 12 – December 7, 1999, Box 7, Correspondentiearchief, No. 6012. 
1286 COMKFOR – Headquarters KFOR (July 20, 1999). COMKFOR Directive 
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1287 Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), pp. 11-12. 
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Dutch government informed the Parliament on April 3, 1999 that it had assigned 
one of the battalion’s artillery platoons (five M-109 howitzers and 120 troops) to 
deploy to Macedonia to augment a German armoured brigade.1288 The decision 
to deploy the remaining part of the battalion (thirteen M-109 howitzers) 
followed on May 26, 1999. Like the artillery platoon, the battalion assignment 
was to provide fire support for the German brigade.1289 When the government 
informed the parliament, it neither mentioned the option of area responsibility 
nor the possibility of providing interim policing.1290 On June 8, 1999, a week 
before the entry in Kosovo, the Minister of Defence emphasised the military 
character of the KFOR mission. Again, he did not mention the possibility of 
changing the battalion’s assignment into area responsibility.1291 
 
The initial assignment to provide fire support changed in the course of the pre-
deployment phase. During his operational planning process in Macedonia, the 
commander of the German armoured brigade learned that he would be responsi-
ble for securing the area around Prizren. He realised that his brigade lacked the 
capabilities to cover that area effectively. He also realised that fire support would 
probably not be required during the execution of the operation.1292 The deputy 
brigade commander Van den Aker explained that the brigade commander 
changed the initial fire support role into a light infantry role after consulting the 
Dutch government. This change implied that 11 Artillery Battalion KFOR 1 
would become responsible for the Orahovac area.1293 The Dutch battalion 
commander Van Loon had strongly endorsed this change. He recalled: 
 
In Macedonia we realised that we had to employ our troops differently. I in-
formed The Hague that our brigade commander did not have enough troops at 
his disposal. Therefore, he wanted to assign me with area responsibility. For that 
purpose, I was going to be augmented with a German infantry company and a 
German reconnaissance platoon. I was going to execute an infantry task. I do 
not know whether there has been formal communication between Germany 
and the Netherlands about this change of assignment, but the government 
agreed with my new assignment.1294 
 
The Dutch government did not report the change in the assignment of KFOR 1 
to the Parliament until August 20, 1999.1295 In the evaluation of the KFOR 
mission, the government reported that during the execution of the KFOR 
mission the necessity for fire support had been considered less obvious and that it 
therefore had ordered the artillery battalion to prepare for the execution of light 
                                               
1288 Kamerstukken II, 1999/00, 22 181, nr. 244. 
1289 Kamerstukken II, 1998/99, 22 181, nr. 276, pp. 3. 
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infantry tasks such as patrolling and operating checkpoints within an allocated 
area of responsibility.1296 
 
Unlike KFOR 1, KFOR 2 immediately got the assignment to provide area 
responsibility. KFOR 2 also knew that they would become the last Dutch 
KFOR battalion. On 26 November 1999, one week before the deployment of 
KFOR 2 to Kosovo, the Dutch government decided not to extend the Dutch 
contribution to KFOR beyond KFOR 2. The government intended to focus its 
involvement in crisis management on the SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina.1297 Consequently, KFOR 2 got the order to prepare for a successful transfer 
of responsibility to another NATO partner.1298 
 
Operational planning and preparation 
Shortly after 11 Artillery Battalion received its order to prepare for deployment 
to Kosovo, it started its training programme. The programme consisted of regular 
artillery training related to the battalion’s main mission and an additional training 
mission-oriented training related to the execution of a peace operation. The 
mission-oriented training programme included training in cultural and situational 
awareness, social patrolling, manning checkpoints, vehicle search and interaction 
with civilians.1299 In that sense, the battalion trained to execute activities that are 
required to fulfil an area responsibility role, although the execution of light 
infantry activities did not belong to the core business of an artillery battalion. The 
battalion did not train for interim policing,1300 nor did it train to deploy crowd 
and riot control, or to arrest criminal suspects.1301 
 
In advance of their deployment, the leadership of KFOR 1 drafted an operational 
plan. The plan was based upon COMKFOR’s initial operational plan. The 
operational plan of KFOR 1 sketched the outlines of the operation. It mentioned 
the importance of public security, since COMKFOR had addressed this issue, 
but without making further interpretations and without specifying what public 
security tasks entailed.1302 The Dutch battalion’s leadership lacked clear instruc-
tions and objectives on the provision of public security,1303 and they did not have 
a clear overview of the security situation in Kosovo and Orahovac.1304 The 
battalion commander explained: 
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We did not have a clear view of what was going on in the area. Nor did Dutch 
government provide me with a concrete assignment. In fact, the order given to 
me was: “Take eighteen M-109s, move to Kosovo, and do something useful.” 
That is how we started.1305 
 
From the moment the advance party arrived in Orahovac “the world started to 
turn” as one officer explained. KFOR 1 de facto became responsible for governing 
Orahovac and for providing public security.1306 After their arrival in Orahovac, 
the leadership of KFOR 1 faced the atrocities of the conflict. It became clear that 
protecting the Kosovo Serb minority and Roma against Kosovo Albanian 
retribution would become a first priority. The dynamics of the local security gap 
forced them to refocus without having a full picture of the situation. One staff 
officer stated: 
 
When we arrived in the area we started thinking about which tasks we had to 
tackle. We started with an assessment of the local security situation and ad-
dressed the tensions between the Serbs and Albanians. We noticed a need for 
policing and we did what was needed.1307 
 
Another officer recalled: 
 
Our operational planning occurred ad hoc. At a certain moment, we got infor-
mation that something could happen to the Serbian minorities in Orahovac and 
Velika Hoca. Immediately they said: “Go there, make an assessment, develop a 
plan and make sure you protect them.” This is how we started. It was very low-
key. We did not have specific objectives for public security. There was just one 
mission: to protect the Serbian and Roma minority and to provide public safety 
and order.1308 
 
Based upon the first impressions in theatre, KFOR 1 identified three priorities 
that defined the focus of the operation during the first three months. The first 
and foremost priority became the protection of Kosovo Serbs and Roma1309 
against retribution by Kosovo Albanians. The collection of evidence against and 
the arrest of alleged war criminals became a second priority. The third priority 
was the protection of mass killing sites until ICTY had completed their investiga-
tions.1310 
 
During the course of the operation, the battalion’s situation assessment improved 
gradually. As the battalion got a better picture of the situation, it could develop 
plans on how to restore law and order in its area of responsibility. The situation 
remained complex and turbulent and KFOR 1 followed an incremental approach 
                                               
1305 Interview June 29, 2011. 
1306 Interview June 29, 2011. 
1307 Interview July 7, 2011(a). 
1308 Interview August 15, 2011. 
1309 The Kosovo Albanians accused the Roma of collaborating with the Kosovo Serbs during 
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1310 Interview June 29 2011; Interview July 5, 2011. 
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to build up its situation assessments. For each step and contingency, the battal-
ion’s leadership developed and issued separate orders to inform and instruct its 
troops. In September, halfway through the operation, the battalion had identified 
and assessed the problems and developed a dedicated operational plan.1311 
 
On 23 June 1999, 41 Artillery Battalion received its formal order to prepare for 
deployment to Kosovo as KFOR 2.1312 The battalion based its mission planning 
and preparation upon the experiences of the colleagues of KFOR 1 and a 
reconnaissance mission prior to their deployment. The battalion’s leadership 
knew that their mission would focus on area responsibility and that fire support 
for the MNB would be a secondary task.1313 
 
The training programme of 41 Artillery Battalion comprised the regular artillery-
training curriculum and an additional mission-oriented training programme that 
prepared them for light infantry tasks related to peace operations.1314 The 
battalion trained for activities such as social patrolling, manning checkpoints, 
search operations and de-escalation of incidents.1315 Since the 41 Artillery 
Battalion was aware of KFOR 1’s experiences regarding public security1316, it had 
included some public security aspects in their mission-oriented training, such as 
the search and arrest of suspects and the search of houses.1317 The battalion did 
not train and equip for crowd and riot control, however, although KFOR 1 dealt 
with demonstrations on a regular basis.1318 Although KFOR 2 trained in making 
arrests and house searches, they did not describe these tasks as police activities, as 
one officer remembered: 
 
In our planning we did not focus on policing, or we did not perceive it as 
policing. We knew that we had to patrol the streets. We knew we had to man 
checkpoints where we had to check civilians and vehicles. We also knew that 
we had to intervene in public disturbances. When we trained for it, we did not 
label these activities as policing. However, looking back, I could say we have 
been involved in policing.1319 
 
KFOR 2 knew that they would be responsible for providing security in the area 
around Orahovac. According to interviews with senior officers, KFOR 2 had 
acquired a relatively good picture of the security situation on the ground. It based 
its assessment on formal intelligence, informal information provided by their 
colleagues of KFOR 1 and their own reconnaissance mission prior to their 
                                               
1311 Interview September 8, 2011. 
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deployment. They were only able to get a complete view after their deployment, 
however. KFOR 2’s leadership were not comfortable with their assignment. As 
an artillery battalion, they were not familiar with infantry tasks. Due to their 
perceived lack of experience in light infantry work, they had decided to adopt a 
more restrained attitude towards public security.1320 
 
There were also other reasons for a more restraint approach towards public 
security. While the commander of KFOR 1 had followed a broad interpretation 
of the UN mandate towards public security,1321 the Dutch Ministry of Defence 
had ordered KFOR 2 to show more reserve.1322 The Ministry of Defence 
considered the execution of public security tasks by KFOR 2 less obvious since 
the security situation had stabilised and the UNMiK Police had reached an 
adequate size.1323 It therefore instructed the battalion to consolidate the success of 
KFOR 1 and to prepare for a transfer of authority to another NATO partner at 
the end of its deployment.1324 The battalion’s autonomy in performing public 
security tasks was thereby limited. One officer reported: 
 
The national instruction was not to act on the edge. The Hague exercised a 
close control. Our autonomy regarding public security was therefore limited. 
The adagio was: “Don’t challenge the success; we don’t want to run a risk a 
second time.” We had to report every incident to The Hague, which caused 
irritation and friction.1325 
 
The planning of KFOR 2 therefore focused on transfer of authority and to ‘help 
the population to help themselves by assisting UNMiK Police and UNHCR in 
our area of responsibility,’ as the battalion commander expressed in his Opera-
tional Order.1326 According to some officers, public security had not been a 
priority. Consequently, the battalion did not develop specific goals or a clearly 
defined end state on this issue: 
 
We had defined our tasks, but we did not link these tasks to specified goals. Our 
assignment given by the MNB did not mention any goals either. And The 
Hague had ordered us to show restraint.1327 
 
The operational concept of KFOR 2 therefore differed from that of KFOR 1. 
Not only had it to take the instructions of the Minister of Defence into account, 
also the security situation on the ground had changed. The UNMiK Police had 
assumed full responsibility for public security in the area of Orahovac and KFOR 
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1327 Interview August 23, 2011. 
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was formally relieved from providing interim policing. Nevertheless, KFOR 2 
had been involved in public security on several occasions, helping to brigade the 
deployment and enforcement gap that both existed until the end of the Dutch 
mandate, as explained earlier. 
7.3.2  Managing the security gap 
7.3.2.1 Public order management 
Patrolling 
According to COMKFOR, a safe and secure environment could only be 
established by operating amongst the people and through a “hearts and minds 
campaign”. He therefore wanted his troops to patrol on foot, creating trust and 
understanding.1328 In line with the commander’s intent, patrolling became the 
first and foremost instrument of both KFOR 1 and KFOR 2 to restore and 
preserve public security. 
 
Immediately after the arrival in Orahovac, the commander of KFOR 1 tasked his 
troops to show their presence in order to prevent widespread crime and disorder. 
By showing robust presence on a 24/7 basis, the KFOR patrols provided 
protection to the Serbian and Roma minorities, especially around the Serbian 
quarter of Orahovac. The patrols had been able to respond to criminal offences 
and to act in case of disturbances to prevent further escalation between ethnic 
groups.1329 On July 30, 1999, the German brigade assigned a platoon Feldjäger to 
strengthen the battalion’s patrolling capacity pending the arrival of the UNMiK 
Police.1330 After the first UNMiK Police had arrived in Orahovac in September 
1999, KFOR continued their patrolling activities in order to maintain public 
security. After some initial procedural discrepancies in terms of operational and 
organisational responsibility and accountability,1331 the two organisations managed 
to coordinate their activities and deploy joint patrols whenever possible to police 
the area effectively.1332 
 
KFOR 2 used patrolling in their area of responsibility as main instrument for 
providing public security. Although KFOR 2 was autonomous in the execution 
of its assignments, it also cooperated with UNMiK Police in the execution of 
their daily patrols.1333 Like KFOR 1, KFOR 2 patrols provided a 24/7 presence 
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to secure the environment, to keep day-to-day contact with the local population, 
and to gather intelligence.1334 
 
Demonstrations & Crowd and Riot Control 
During the deployment of KFOR 1 and 2 several demonstrations took place. In 
the early days of KFOR1 demonstrations occurred in response to the Russian 
military presence in the Orahovac area. The Kosovo Albanians contested the 
Russian presence and organised these demonstrations on a regular basis. The 
demonstrations were peaceful and did not require any kind of crowd control.1335 
KFOR 1 had been able to control these demonstrations by providing a low-key 
presence. One officer recalled: 
 
There were many demonstrations in town, but they were non-violent. During 
one of the first demonstrations, they wanted to have access to our compound. I 
ordered a couple of our soldiers to stand in front of them. That was purely a 
symbolic action for they could have broken through quite easily. However, it 
stopped them. Next, they spoke to Van Loon. From then on, every week they 
organised a demonstration at the square in Orahovac. We made sure we had 
some of our people around, but it never escalated. These demonstrations had a 
peaceful character. People just wanted to voice their disaffection.1336 
 
Demonstrations continued during the deployment of KFOR 2, although the 
focus of the demonstrations changed. They no longer focused on the Russian 
presence but addressed different political issues and objectives. For example, on 
January 23, 2000 two hundred Kosovo Albanians demonstrated against a visit of 
the UN High Representative Kouchner and the Orthodox bishop Artemeije to 
Orahovac, and on February 10, 2000 between 2,000 and 4,000 Kosovo Albani-
ans demonstrated for a release of those whom they perceived as political 
prisoners.1337 To control these demonstrations, KFOR 2 cooperated with 
UNMiK Police and the Feldjäger. During a demonstration in Suva Reka on 
March 9, 2000, KFOR 2 showed presence on the spot and operated checkpoints 
on all access roads to check vehicles and their passengers for weapons.1338 
Although these demonstrations did not escalate into public disorder, one of the 
battery commanders regarded the lack of crowd and riot control capabilities as a 
weakness in the structure and organisation: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1334 Interview August 23, 2011; Interview October 5, 2011(b). 
1335 Interview June 16, 2011, Interview July 7, 2011(a). 
1336 Interview July 7, 2011(a). 
1337 41 Afdeling Veldartillerie (2001), pp. 102-104. 
1338 Interview October 5, 2011(b); 41 Afdeling Veldartillerie (2001), p. 105. 
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In Orahovac we faced a situation where we had to deal with rebellious crowds 
where a Crowd and Riot Control unit could have been a useful asset. Also in 
Suva Reka there were situations where we might have needed CRC capacity, 
such as demonstrations of 2,000 to 3,000 people. I had to deploy all 150 gunners 
of my battery. I had two Quick Reaction Forces stand-by just outside the 
village and had positioned the artillery groups around the demonstration.1339 
 
In cooperation with UNMiK Police, KFOR 2 focused on de-escalation. After 
the first demonstration, KFOR 2 sought for a proactive approach that enabled 
them to operate in the background. KFOR and UNMiK Police agreed with 
local key-leaders that they would report demonstrations in advance. KFOR and 
the international community were then able to take measures to maintain civil 
order. KFOR also arranged the presence of press and representative of interna-
tional organisations such as the UN or OSCE. One officer explained: 
 
We adopted a more passive attitude; we were open to the arguments of the 
demonstrators. We also organised press opportunities. The effect was that the 
demonstrators felt that they could address their arguments and thereby had 
achieved their goal.1340 
 
KFOR 2 also recorded these demonstrations in order to prevent escalation: 
 
We filmed every demonstration. We focused on people that behaved suspi-
ciously or subversively. We let them know that we had noticed them and were 
following them. This had a de-escalating effect on the demonstrators.1341 
 
In addition, KFOR provided operational assistance to MNB North in Mitrovica 
from February 4-8, 2000, and from February 16-24, 2000.1342 The assistance 
fitted into a wider international approach to contain escalating ethnic violence. 
The Ibar River that divided Mitrovica into a predominantly Kosovo Serb part in 
the North and a Kosovo Albanian part in the South had become a flashpoint. A 
Serbian paramilitary group called the “Bridge-watchers” prevented Kosovo 
Albanians living in northern Mitrovica from crossing the river. These Bridge-
watchers also frustrated UNMiK Police in their execution of authority in 
northern Mitrovica and intimidated Kosovo Serbs who wanted to cooperate with 
UNMiK Police.1343 The situation near Mitrovica escalated when on February 2, 
2000 a rocket hit a UNHCR bus carrying 49 primarily elderly Kosovo Serbs, 
killing two and injuring three. Following this attack, Kosovo Serbs in northern 
Mitrovica took revenge, killing eight Kosovo Albanians and wounding close to 
thirty.1344 
                                               
1339 Interview August 23, 2011. 
1340 Interview August 23, 2011. 
1341 Interview August 23, 2011. 
1342 41 Afdeling Veldartillerie (2001), p. 104; Klep & Van Gils (2005), p. 418. 
1343 See for example: Hartz, Mercean & Williamson (2005), pp. 158-159; Dziedzic (2006), pp. 
351-352. 
1344 UN Doc S/2000/177 (2000), p. 5. See also: Hartz, Mercean & Williamson (2005), p. 182. 
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Initially, the Delta Platoon of the Bravo Battery was tasked with protecting one 
of the bridges over the Ibar River. This assignment conflicted with the Dutch 
instructions on deployment of Dutch troops, however. According to the Dutch 
officers involved, the Dutch government refused to deploy its troops in hot-
spots, one reason being that KFOR 2 had no experience in crowd and riot 
control. In consultation with the Dutch government, the Delta Platoon was 
therefore assigned another mission. Instead of protecting one or two bridges, it 
relieved a German unit that was securing a Serbian Orthodox church near 
Mitrovica. The Delta Platoon protected this site and an adjacent battery factory 
during February 4-8.1345  
 
Later, February 16-24, 2000, KFOR 2 again provided security assistance in 
Metrovica and deployed its reconnaissance platoon in order to reinforce a 
German company for patrolling duties.1346 A final Dutch contribution to public 
security in Mitrovica was provided by a platoon of the Alpha Company of 17 
(NL) Armoured Infantry Battalion that was formally assigned to 11 (NL) 
Geniehulpbatalion (Engineers Service Battalion). The platoon deployed to 
Metrovica March 11-17, 2000 to reinforce a German company (Task Force Zur) 
in order to secure a water treatment plant and a pumping-station south of 
Mitrovica and to execute a checkpoint on one of the main roads to search 
incoming traffic for weapons.1347 
7.3.2.2 Law enforcement 
Checkpoints 
In addition to patrolling, checkpoints were another important instrument to 
ensure public security.1348 Initially, checkpoints served to create a secure area for 
Kosovo Serb and Roma minorities and to protect Serbian Orthodox religious 
sites.1349 For that purpose, KFOR operated checkpoints around the Serbian 
quarter of Orahovac and the Serbian village Velika Hoca. Checkpoints also 
served to inspect and monitor in- and out-going traffic on the main roads around 
Orahovac. At these checkpoints, Dutch troops inspected vehicles and citizens for 
weapons and contraband.1350 Van Loon explained that these checkpoints had 
been an essential instrument to prevent and deter other kinds of criminality, such 
as human trafficking and illegal logging.1351 
 
                                               
1345 Interview August 17, 2011; Interview August 23, 2011; Interview October 4, 2011(a); 
Interview October 5, 2011(b); 41 Afdeling Veldartillerie (2001), p. 104; Kamerstukken II, 
2000/01, 22 181, nr. 331, p. 14. 
1346 41 Afdeling Veldartillerie (2001), p. 104. See also: Klep & Van Gils (2005), p. 418. 
1347 Interview October 4, 2011(a); Klep & Van Gils (2005), p. 420. 
1348 Van Loon (2000), p. 662. See also: Interview July 7, 2011(a); Interview August 15, 2011; 
Interview September 8, 2011. 
1349 Interview June 29, 2011. 
1350 Van Loon (2000), p. 662. See also: Interview July 7, 2011(a); Interview August 15, 2011; 
Interview September 8, 2011. 
1351 Van Loon (2000), p. 662. 
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During KFOR 2, checkpoints continued to serve as an important public security 
instrument to monitor in- and outgoing traffic. KFOR 2 also maintained 
checkpoints on a 24/7 basis around the Kosovo Serb quarter of Orahovac and 
Velika Hoca.1352 
 
Investigations 
Pending the arrival of UNMiK Police, KFOR 1 had no other option than to 
assume police duties to provide public security and to protect citizens against acts 
of retribution. Immediately after their arrival, citizens – mainly of Kosovo 
Albanian origin – addressed KFOR troops to provide information on crimes 
committed during the previous conflict. The battalion commander assumed that 
if he provided the citizens a facility to report these crimes, public frustration and 
tension would calm down.1353 
 
On June 20, 1999, a week after the arrival in Orahovac, the battalion com-
mander opened a municipal office in the so-called KFOR Building.1354 This 
building was located near to the Kosovo Serb quarter, which made it accessible 
for all entities.1355 Two senior warrant officers, assisted by local interpreters, 
operated the desk. They recorded the complaints and stored all information in an 
improvised database. By taking community problems seriously, the complaints 
desk soon proved to be a success. The number of reports increased rapidly, 
resulting in a growing flow of criminal intelligence, also from other sources such 
as documents and archives.1356 
 
Gradually, the desk developed from a complaints desk into an investigations desk. 
When the flow of information increased, the Head of Intelligence took charge of 
the municipal office. The office also got support from the Feldjäger, the German 
MP.1357 Van Loon also requested formal assistance from the Marechaussee in order 
to bring in professional expertise on crime investigations. A contingent of the 
Marechaussee provided policing for the Dutch KFOR troops. Van Loon argued 
for a wider mandate of the Marechaussee. Initially, the Commander of the 
Marechaussee in The Hague objected but eventually he agreed to a limited 
advisory role for his law enforcement personnel in Orahovac.1358 Although their 
                                               
1352 Interview August 17, 2011; Interview October 5, 2011(b). 
1353 Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), pp. 32-33; Van Loon (2000), p. 662. See also: Interview 
July 5, 2011; Interview July 7, 2011(a). 
1354 Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), p. 93. See also: Interview June 16, 2011; Interview June 
29, 2011. 
1355 Interview July 5, 2011. 
1356 Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), pp. 32-33. 
1357 Interview July 5, 2011. 
1358 Interview June 29, 2011; Interview July 5, 2011. See also: Brocades Zaalberg (2006), pp. 
329-330; Van Loon (2000), pp. 663-664. Van Loon notes that although the office was 
centrally located, the Serbs feared the confrontation with Kosovo Albanians and decided 
not to engage in the office. KFOR therefore started an office hour in the Serbian quarter 
(Van Loon (2000), footnote 19, p. 672). After UNMiK Police had assumed full responsibil-
ity for policing in October 1999, KFOR 1 transferred its responsibility over the municipal 
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assignment formally had a limited character, in practice some of the Marechaussee 
personnel assumed more policing activities than officially authorised by The 
Hague.1359 One officer explained: 
 
The Marechaussee importantly contributed to the establishment and perform-
ance of the “municipal office”. The contingent commander took a personal risk 
by taking on duties that were beyond his mandate. I do not know whether he 
finally got permission from his headquarters. Nevertheless, the “municipal 
office” got a quality boost by their involvement. The statements reported by the 
locals were now recorded in a more judicial manner.1360 
 
As the intelligence staff and the marechaussees aligned their professional procedures 
and techniques, they discovered that there had been no major differences or 
cultural obstacles. However, the input of the marechaussees importantly contrib-
uted to improve the professional quality of the office’s work. One officer 
explained: 
 
With the Marechaussee we discussed how we had to organise our data collection 
and analysis. We learned that there was not a big difference between collecting 
military intelligence and criminal intelligence. That was helpful. It turned out 
that we spoke the same language. They brought in their police expertise. They 
taught us for example how to prevent manipulation when recording a witness’ 
statement.1361 
 
Despite the success on the ground, the fundamental discussion on the Mare-
chaussee’s involvement in local public security had been frustrating for many 
parties involved. The Dutch deputy brigade commander MNB South, Colonel 
Van den Aker, for example, expressed the frustration of the MNB during a 
meeting with Dutch parliamentarians in Prizren on September 8, 1999. He 
compared the capacity of German Feldjäger with that of the Dutch Marechaussee 
and concluded that the Dutch police contribution had been insufficient and had 
not met the security demands on the ground.1362 The Dutch Minister of Defence 
also acknowledged that the involvement of the Marechaussee in providing public 
security in Orahovac had been unsatisfactory for both UNMiK and the Mare-
chaussee contingent. In his evaluation of the mission, he noted that UNMiK had 
requested a wider employment of the Marechaussee on several occasions. How-
ever, by underlining that the national policing tasks of the Marechaussee had made 
it formally impossible to support KFOR and UNMiK, he did not use the 
opportunity to look for alternatives during future mission.1363 As such, the Dutch 
formal policy differed from those of the governments of Germany, the UK and 
                                               
office and its database to the UNMiK police. The transfer also ended the role of the Mare-
chaussee in this office. 
1359 Interview June 5, 2011; June 16, 2011. 
1360 Interview June 16, 2011. 
1361 Interview July 5, 2011. 
1362 Kamerstukken II, 1999/00, 22 181, nr. 304, p. 6. 
1363 Kamerstukken II, 1999/00, 22 181, nr. 331, pp. 17-18. 
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US that deployed MPs trained in law enforcement to support troops in providing 
public security.1364 
 
Arrests 
In taking the problems of the population seriously, KFOR 1 adopted an 
approach similar to problem-oriented policing. In problem-oriented policing, the 
police focus on the collection of information on root causes and effects of 
community related security problems.1365 To deal with the problems addressed by 
the local community effectively, the following step of KFOR was to arrest those 
who allegedly committed war crimes. The municipal office had collected 
evidence that paved the way for the arrest of eleven alleged war criminals.1366 
The arrest would be a coordinated international effort, as an officer explained: 
 
We had made an agreement with the legal officer of UNMiK on the criteria to 
tests each criminal case in terms of witnesses and level of the crime before mak-
ing an arrest. When we thought we had collected enough evidence, I presented 
the file to the UN’s Legal Officer. After she had agreed, I presented it to the 
local prosecutor. After he had approved the case, an arrest was formalised.1367 
 
The first three indictees were arrested in Orahovac on August 20, 1999. For this 
purpose, the German brigade had assigned a Special Forces Team of the 
Kommando Spezialkräfte, which had been deployed in the Prizren area for this 
very purpose.1368 The German Directive No. 8 served to authorise the detention 
operation. The operation also received the approval of the Dutch Minister of 
Defence, although Dutch troops were not supposed to engage directly.1369 
According to one of the Dutch KFOR’s officers, the Minister “would not be 
amused by this kind of nonsense.”1370 Nevertheless, the Second Battery of the 
Dutch KFOR battalion provided perimeter security in the Serbian quarter, while 
the German Special Forces Team executed the actual arrest after which the 
suspects were transported to the makeshift “base prison” at the Dutch base and 
later to Prizren for detention and prosecution.1371 The arrest caused relief within 
the Albanian community. However, in the Serbian quarter there was frustration 
and confusion.1372 One of battalion’s CIMIC officers visited the Serbian quarter 
shortly after the arrest to ease the situation and to talk to the detainees’ family. By 
explaining the arrest had been KFOR’s initiative and that the detainees would 
receive a fair trial he managed to de-escalate the situation.1373 
 
                                               
1364 See for example: Brocades Zaalberg (2006), p. 331; Jakobsen (2003), p. 144. 
1365 Skogan & Hartnett (2005), p. 430. 
1366 Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), p. 33. 
1367 Interview July 5, 2011. 
1368 Brocades Zaalberg (2006), p. 357. 
1369 Brocades Zaalberg (2006), p. 357. See also: Interview June 16, 2011; Interview June 29, 
2011; Interview July 5, 2011. 
1370 Interview July 5, 2011. 
1371 Interview July 5, 2011. See also: Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), p. 45. 
1372 Interview July 7, 2011(a). See also: Brocades Zaalberg (2006), pp. 357-358. 
1373 Interview July 7, 2011(a). 
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In the course of the mission, KFOR 1 arrested another eight indictees. Five were 
arrested on September 24, 1999 as they were leaving the Kosovo Serb quarter on 
a humanitarian convoy to Serbia. Prior to the departure of the convoy, KFOR 1 
had checked the passenger manifest and identified a number of persons who 
corresponded with a list of suspects from the database. KFOR soldiers stopped 
the bus and ordered every passenger to leave the bus for an identity check. After 
having identified them, KFOR arrested the five suspects and transferred them to 
UNMiK Police.1374 KFOR arrested another indictee at home on October 7, 
1999 after a patrol had spotted him two weeks earlier at the International Red 
Cross post collecting medicines.1375 KFOR arrested the last two indictees on 
October 22, 1999 after they had voluntarily reported themselves at the base after 
having heard that they had been on the list of alleged war criminals.1376 
 
According to officers involved, the Dutch government initially did not agree 
with the arrests of alleged war criminals and did not authorise a Dutch military 
operational involvement during the first arrests.1377 Nevertheless, the German 
brigade, the Dutch battalion commander and UNMiK officials regarded any 
delay as a non-option because it would result in acts of retribution by the Kosovo 
Albanian population of Orahovac.1378 
 
The debate between the Dutch government and its troops on the ground was 
finally settled on October 6, 1999 when the Dutch Ministry of Defence issued a 
separate guideline on the arrest of war criminals in Kosovo. This guideline 
formally authorised Dutch KFOR troops to arrest persons indicted for war 
crimes by ICTY.1379 On November 18, 1999, after UNMiK Police had assumed 
full responsibility for policing in Orahovac, the Ministry of Defence decided to 
adjust its guideline. The new guideline confirmed that KFOR troops were 
authorised to arrest persons indicted for war crimes by ICTY. However, it 
restricted Dutch KFOR from searching independently for and arresting war 
crimes suspects who not had been indicted by ICTY. If the occasion presented 
itself, Dutch KFOR troops were only supposed to assist UNMiK Police when 
they lacked the required capacity for the arrest themselves. The Ministry 
demanded that UNMiK Police would provide a written request for assistance, 
which was to be sent to the Dutch Defence Staff for formal authorisation.1380 
 
The new guideline provoked serious disagreement on the ground. Both the 
(Dutch) deputy commander of the MNB South and the battalion commander 
                                               
1374 Interview July 5, 2011. See also: Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), p. 98. 
1375 Interview July 5, 2011. See also: Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), p. 99. 
1376 Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), p. 99. 
1377 Interview June 16, 2011; Interview June 29, 2011; Interview July 5, 2011. 
1378 Van Loon (2000), p. 665. 
1379 Ministerie van Defensie – Defensiestaf (October 6, 1999). Aanhouding van verdachten van 
oorlogsmisdaden in Kosovo. (Concept) Aanwijzing CDS Nr. A-19. SSA, 11 (NL) Artillery Bat-
talion KFOR 1, June 12 – December 7, 1999, Box 7, Correspondentiearchief, No. 10019. 
1380 Ministerie van Defensie – Defensiestaf (November 18,1999). Aanhouding van verdachten van 
oorlogsmisdaden in Kosovo. (Concept) Aanwijzing CDS Nr. A-19. SSA, 11 (NL) Artillery Bat-
talion KFOR 1, June 12 – December 7, 1999, Box 7, Correspondentiearchief, No. 11193. 
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noted that the new policy would result in operational misunderstandings. The 
deputy commander of the MNB feared that when Dutch KFOR troops ran into 
a suspect, the formal authorisation procedure would cause so much delay that it 
might ultimately result in the release of the suspect. He also wondered on which 
grounds the Ministry of Defence would evaluate a request for assistance. The 
battalion commander argued that the policy could in fact endanger KFOR’s 
mission to establish a safe and secure environment. He feared that any restraint in 
arresting war criminals would immediately result in Kosovo Albanian retribu-
tions.1381 However, the government did not change its policy, arguing that 
making arrests was a responsibility of the UNMiK, which excluded Dutch troops 
from engaging in law enforcement.1382 
 
Despite the formal objections of the Dutch government, KFOR 1 arrested and 
detained 76 citizens who offended the law, particularly in cases of arson, illegal 
possession of weapons, harassment, theft, and illegal policing by UÇK members 
(See table 2).1383 All arrests were executed place with the consent of the UNMiK 
prosecutor and the UNMiK legal advisor.1384 
 
 Types of crime         Number of arrests 
 Illegal policing 18 
 Possession of firearms 20 
 Harassment 7 
 Theft 9 
 Swindle 2 
 Arson 4 
 Assault 5 
 Murder 11 
Table 2: Number of arrests made by KFOR 1 (Source: Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), 
p.33; Van Loon (2000), p.665.) 
 
KFOR 2 was also involved in the arrest of alleged war criminals and criminal 
offenders, although the Minister of Defence instructed them to show restraint.1385 
On December 28, 1999, KFOR 2 assisted UNMiK Police in the arrest of one 
indicted war criminal during an identity check prior to a humanitarian convoy of 
Kosovo Serbs to Mitrovica. These identity checks were part of a formal proce-
dure in which KFOR in cooperation with UNMiK Police checked the 
passenger list of every humanitarian transport for the possible presence of alleged 
war criminals.1386 One KFOR officer recalled: 
                                               
1381 Ministerie van Defensie – Defensiestaf (November 18,1999). Aanhouding van verdachten van 
oorlogsmisdaden in Kosovo. (Concept) Aanwijzing CDS Nr. A-19. SSA, 11 (NL) Artillery Bat-
talion KFOR 1, June 12 – December 7, 1999, Box 3, Bataljonsstaf, Sectie 2/3, Inlichtin-
gen/Operatiën, Intern Memo 06, No. 11156. 
1382 Kamerstukken II, 2000/01, 22 181, p. 18. 
1383 Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), p.33; Van Loon (2000), pp. 664-665. 
1384 Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), p.33. 
1385 41 Afdeling Veldartillerie (2001), pp. 102-106. 
1386 Interview October 5, 2011(b). 
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If possible, we tried to execute such an arrest out of sight of the other passen-
gers, although this was not always possible. To prevent an escalation we placed 
the pick-up points for the busses outside of town, for example near the plastic 
factory in Orahovac. The formal responsibility for the arrests rested with UN-
MiK Police. We supported them with a platoon. After we had apprehended a 
suspect we handed him over to UNMiK Police who took care of further trans-
portation and detention within the formal judicial channels.1387 
 
Brocades Zaalberg mentions a second case in which KFOR 2 engaged in the 
arrest of two alleged war criminals during a routine identity check in Suva Reka 
on January 31, 2000. KFOR had performed the arrest independently from 
UNMiK Police following a flexible interpretation of UNSCR 1244 on the 
assistance of and cooperation with the international organisations in Kosovo.1388 
Furthermore, KFOR 2 was involved in the arrest of six criminal offenders in a 
combined operation of the Alpha Battery, Feldjäger and the UNMiK Police. 
These arrests followed a joint search operation for weapons and ammunition after 
a series of violent attacks with hand-grenades on Roma and Serbian premises in 
Orahovac.1389 The Bravo Battery, stationed in Suva Reka, had not been involved 
in the arrest of criminal offenders, allegedly because the UNMiK police commis-
sioner responsible for those arrests avoided risks associated with making arrests.1390 
 
Detention 
Pending the arrival of UNMiK Police, KFOR had been responsible for the 
detention of suspects. German Directive No. 8 provided provisional guidelines 
for troops regarding the arrest and detention of persons suspected of having 
committed a serious crime. In order to create a facility to detain arrested suspects, 
the German brigade reopened a former Serbian prison in Prizren and assigned the 
Feldjäger to manage it.1391 In case Dutch KFOR troops arrested a criminal 
offender, they first transported the suspect to the Dutch base on the Zrze airfield 
south of Orahovac. The battalion used a twenty feet container as a makeshift 
detention room. The battalion’s intelligence officer and the Marechaussee 
interviewed the detainees in order to assess the seriousness of the crime. After 
defining the level of the criminal offense, the intelligence officer informed the 
legal officer of the German brigade, who decided whether there was a case for 
further prosecution. In case of a serious crime, the Dutch would transfer the 
suspect to Prizren. If not, they would release him.1392 KFOR followed this 
procedure until October 27, 1999 when UNMiK Police assumed full responsi-
bility for policing and de facto became responsible for arresting criminal offenders. 
                                               
1387 Interview October 5, 2011(b). 
1388 Brocades Zaalberg (2006), p. 366; Maas, M. (February 7, 2000). Terugkerende Serviërs zijn 
teken van hoop. de Volkskrant. Avialable at http://www.volkskrant.nl 
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1390 Interview August 23, 2011. 
1391 Interview July 5, 2011; Van Loon (2000), p. 664. 
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Search operations 
The fight against the illegal arms had been another instrument to provide public 
security. KFOR 1 and KFOR 2 both executed actions and operations to 
downsize the substantial arsenal of firearms and ammunition among the popula-
tion and the UÇK. Right from the start of the operation, illegal possession of 
firearms and ammunition had been a concern. Ahead of the formal agreement on 
the demilitarisation and disarmament of the UÇK of June 21,1393 Van Loon had 
ordered the local UÇK commander to withdraw his men south of the Malisevo–
Suva Reka area in order to protect the Kosovo Serb minority in Orahovac and 
Velika Hoca. Any UÇK fighter who would cross that line would be disarmed 
and arrested. Van Loon imposed an overall ban on carrying weapons openly in 
Orahovac.1394 
 
Although the UÇK was gradually disarming, the availability of weapons 
remained a serious problem throughout the mission. Abels, Van Pelt and Jacobs 
report several incidents during KFOR 1 that involved UÇK weapon caches or 
weapon transports. For example, on June 15, 1999 a KFOR patrol ran into a 
building that served as UÇK weapon storage. On August 13, a patrolled stopped 
a minivan transporting 120 Kalashnikovs that belonged to the UÇK. On 
September 13, German KFOR troops arrested the intelligence officer of 126 
UÇK Brigade. When searching his house, German soldiers found a document 
that linked the UÇK commander in Orahovac to a collection of 23 automatic 
rifles, two anti-tank missiles, some hand grenades and explosives. When con-
fronted with this document, he transferred these weapons to the Dutch KFOR 
troops.1395 
 
The possession of firearms among the population also caused concern. After the 
arrests of three indicted war criminals on August 20, 1999, KFOR 1 organised a 
weapon collection action in the Kosovo Serb quarter of Orahovac.1396 KFOR 1 
had learned from the archives who owned a firearm. On the market-square 
KFOR had situated a truck in which the population could drop their firearms 
and ammunition voluntarily. Some people arrived with wheelbarrows full of 
weapons and ammunition. In total, KFOR 1 collected 550 weapons, including 
AK-47s and Dragunov sniper-rifles.1397 The battalion considered the operation 
being a success, which called for a follow-up in Velika Hoca on August 23, 1999,  
 
                                               
1393 The agreement between KFOR and the leadership of the UÇK settled the demilitarisation 
and disarmament of the UÇK within a timeframe of 90 days. June 21 became known as K-
Day and marked the beginning of the demilitarisation of the UÇK and its transformation 
into the Kosovo Protection Force (KPF). See for example: Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs 
(2000), p. 28; Brocades Zaalberg (2006), p. 306; Covey (2006), pp. 106-107. 
1394 Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), p. 27. 
1395 Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), pp. 45-47. 
1396 Interview June 29, 2011; Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), p. 45. 
1397 Interview June 29, 2011; Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), p. 45. 
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leading to the collection of around 100 weapons.1398 Although many deemed the 
actions successful, one officer was less enthusiastic: 
 
The weapons collection programme was no success. It is true that many weap-
ons were turned in, but these were not the weapons we were looking for. 
Nevertheless, NATO called it a success. But, when two days later the Day of 
the Albanian Flag was celebrated, we knew better. It was death defying because 
everybody was shooting into the air.1399 
 
The availability of illegal weapons continued to be a point of concern throughout 
the mission. In September, KFOR organised two larger house-to-house search 
operations to confiscate illegal arms. On September 20, 1999 Dutch and German 
KFOR soldiers in cooperation with UNMiK Police, the Dutch Marechaussee and 
the German Feldjäger searched houses in the Kosovo Albanian village of Danjane. 
A Kosovo Albanian had provided information on the presence of an arms dealer 
and a large collection of weapons in the village. In the early morning of Septem-
ber 20, KFOR troops sealed off the village and started their search. The result 
was disappointing: KFOR found only five firearms and a small number of hand 
grenades.1400 A similar house-to-house search operation was organised in Velika 
Hoca a few days later, on September 28. Again, German and Dutch troops sealed 
off the village and searched the houses with the assistance of UNMiK Police, the 
Dutch Marechaussee and the German Feldjäger.1401 One officer explained the 
process: 
 
From the air we kept a view on the village and we could see if someone was 
going in or out. Next, we paid every single house a visit. We rang the doorbell 
and asked if we could have a look inside, which in fact worked pretty well.1402 
 
KFOR 2, in cooperation with UNMiK Police, also organised a number of search 
actions to confiscate illegal weapons.1403 According to KFOR officers, former 
UÇK fighters as well as Albanian and Serbian civilians still hesitated handing in 
their weapons. On December 10 1999, KFOR 2 organised Operation Crocodile to 
search several UÇK sites for weapons and ammunition. During this operation 
several firearms, explosives and identity cards were confiscated.1404 Two of these 
searches were executed in Suva Reka. An officer involved recalled: 
 
We sealed off and searched both locations at the same time. The battalion 
provided area security for both locations. On one location, the battalion’s re-
connaissance platoon executed the search while an Austrian unit of the MNB 
                                               
1398 Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), p. 45. 
1399 Interview June 16, 2011. 
1400 Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), p. 47 & p. 98. 
1401 Interview August 15, 2011; Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), pp. 47-48 & p. 98. 
1402 Interview August 15, 2011. 
1403 Interview August 23, 2011; Interview October 5, 2011(b). See also: 41 Afdeling 
Veldartillerie (2001), p. 102 & p. 105. 
1404 Interview August 23, 2011; Interview October 5, 2011(b). See also: 41 Afdeling 
Veldartillerie (2001), p. 102. 
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took care of the other site. In addition to weapons, we confiscated a safe and 
several documents.1405 
 
Another search operation involved a combined action of KFOR 2, the Feldjäger 
and the UNMiK Police on March 14, 2000. Troops and police searched ten 
houses in Orahovac for illegal weapons and ammunition. Several firearms, 
ammunition, explosives and documents were confiscated. UNMiK Police 
arrested six people for possession of illegal goods.1406 
7.3.3  Intelligence 
Collection 
During KFOR, patrols had been the main instrument to collect information on 
various subjects. Immediately after their entry, KFOR 1 tasked its patrols to 
collect information on the UÇK. After a few days, the focus gradually shifted to 
collecting information on public security and war crimes.1407 KFOR 2 had a 
different set of demands than KFOR 1. While KFOR 1 largely focused at 
specifically understanding local public security issues, the information demand of 
KFOR 2 was more general in character and aimed at improving its situational 
awareness in terms of the social-economic environment and general security.1408 
As regards the latter, the information demand intended to improve the security of 
the troops rather than that of the citizens, an issue that had become of secondary 
importance.1409 
 
The two battalions followed a standardised procedure to collect their informa-
tion. Prior to and after their mission patrols were briefed and de-briefed by 
intelligence personnel of the Battery Intelligence Cell.1410 Information provided 
by the patrols served as input for further analysis, which could result in additional 
questions and assignments to complete the overall intelligence picture and to 
define further operational action.1411 In comparison, the procedure of collecting, 
processing, and applying information for targeted action resembles the character-
istics of ILP.1412 
 
Criminal intelligence 
Criminal intelligence had been part of the information demand during the 
KFOR mission, although the intensity of that demand varied between the two 
battalions. During KFOR 1, criminal intelligence had been at the heart of the 
                                               
1405 Interview August 23, 2011. 
1406 41 Afdeling Veldartillerie (2001), p. 105. 
1407 Interview July 5, 2011. 
1408 Interview August 17, 2011; Interview August 23, 2011; Interview October 5, 2011(b). 
1409 Interview August 17, 2011; Interview October 5, 2011(b). 
1410 Interview June 29, 2011; Interview August 15, 2011; Interview August 23, 2011; Interview 
October 5, 2011(b). The Battery Intelligence Cell – that consisted of two or three opera-
tors – had not been a formal and standardised feature of the Battery but was created for the 
purpose of the operation. 
1411 Interview August 15, 2011; Interview August 23, 2011; Interview October 5, 2011(b). 
1412 Newburn (2003a), p. 727. 
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information request. What had started as a desk where citizens could report their 
complaints, turned into an investigations office that specialised in gathering and 
analysing criminal intelligence on war crimes committed during the conflict. The 
municipal office developed a database for processing information. Based upon the 
analysis, the desk defined further questions and tasked patrols or checkpoints to 
gather additional information to complete evidence on their criminal files.1413 In 
September 1999, the database contained enough criminal intelligence to plan and 
execute the arrest of several alleged war criminals, as explained earlier. After 
UNMiK Police had assumed full responsibility for public security in Orahovac 
on October 27, 1999, KFOR 1 formally passed on the database to the UNMiK 
Police.1414 
 
KFOR 2 had been involved in collecting criminal intelligence too, although this 
involvement had been limited and occurred only occasionally. One KFOR 2 
officer noted that collecting information could involve mapping criminal 
networks, although these activities had been ‘very rudimental of character’.1415 In 
Suva Reka, for example, the battery collected information on cases of intimida-
tion of shop owners. When it got information on possible suspects, it tasked 
patrols and checkpoint to collect additional information that, in line with the 
national policy, they transferred to UNMiK Police for follow-up. As such, 
KFOR 2 did not use the criminal intelligence to execute independent law 
enforcement activity,1416 basically because the Dutch government instructed them 
to show restraint regarding public security since UNMiK Police had taken on 
their responsibility for law and order. 
 
Exchange 
Both KFOR 1 and KFOR 2 followed a restrictive policy regarding the exchange 
of information with civilian partners. As a rule, they exchanged information at 
the battalion level rather than at battery level, although there were differences in 
the field. With the exception of the local prosecutor, KFOR 1 had not ex-
changed information with local actors or stakeholders either for reasons of 
information security or due to the absence of formal civilian administrative 
structures. The exchange of information with the local prosecutor had been part 
of the formal procedure regarding the arrest of criminal suspects. KFOR 1 also 
shared information with their international partners, such as UNMiK and 
UNMiK Police, although the UNMiK administrator received information on a 
need-to-know basis only.1417 KFOR 2 appeared to have had a diffuse policy 
regarding the exchange of information, as officers reported different courses of 
action within the chain of command. For example, two officers who operated at 
the battalion level noted that they had not shared information with their 
                                               
1413 See for example: Interview June 29, 2011; Interview July 5, 2011; Interview August 15, 
2011. 
1414 Interview July 5, 2011. 
1415 Interview October 5, 2011(b). 
1416 Interview August 23, 2011. 
1417 Interview July 5, 2011; Interview July 7, 2011(a); Interview August 15, 2011; Interview 
September 8, 2011. 
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international civilian partners.1418 One of them considered such exchange too 
risky, especially when interpreters were involved. In order to prevent leakage of 
sensitive information, he reported that UNMiK Police was informed only shortly 
before the start of an operation.1419  
 
Another officer at the battery level had demonstrated a more open attitude 
towards the exchange of information with the local UNMiK administrator and 
local UNMiK police commissioner, as he passed information to them on various 
subjects and activities. However, the exchange of operable information had not 
always happened on a reciprocal basis, as KFOR had adopted a supportive role. 
In addition, he also exchanged information with the MSU, which in practice also 
turned out to be a one-way traffic, as he never received feedback or information 
in return.1420 
7.3.4  Cooperation 
Local actors 
When the advance party of KFOR 1 arrived in Orahovac, the local public 
administration had ceased to exist. Although there had been a few Serbian officials 
left in Orahovac, these people had lost all their credibility as the legitimate 
representatives of the Kosovo Albanian population. As a result, initially there had 
been no other point of contact in Orahovac than the local UÇK commander.1421 
This situation changed after the refugees returned from their exile abroad. 
Among them, there had been informal community leaders who used to have 
played a substantial role in parallel Albanian administrative structures after 1989. 
After their return, KFOR had encouraged them to assume a role in some sort of 
interim local government. Initially, KFOR 1 tried to involve representatives of 
all local entities. This turned out to be unfeasible because of a lack of mutual 
trust. KFOR therefore established separate committees for Kosovo Serbs and 
Kosovo Albanians. Pending the arrival of the UNMiK administrator in August 
1999, Van Loon assumed the role of interim administrator of Orahovac. He used 
the committees to discuss local issues and to promote community participation 
and responsibility, for example for the restart of public services and utilities.1422 
 
The battalion commander empowered his two CIMIC officers to establish and 
maintain the day-to-day communication with local key leaders and individual 
citizens. One focused on the Kosovo Serb minority while the other acted as 
point of contact for the Kosovo Albanian community.1423 The two CIMIC 
officers provided the local population a formal channel to express and discuss 
their most urgent interests and problems. Initially, the CIMIC officers offered aid 
                                               
1418 Interview August 17, 2011; Interview October 5, 2011(b). 
1419 Interview October 5, 2011(b). 
1420 Interview August 23, 2011. 
1421 Van Loon (2000), p. 666. KFOR maintained relations with the UÇK but in accordance 
with UNSCR 1244, these mainly focused on their containment and disarmament. 
1422 Van Loon (2000), p. 667. See also: Interview June 16, 2011; Interview June 29, 2011. 
1423 Interview June 29, 2011; Interview July 7, 2011(a). 
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and organised reconstruction and development projects according their formal 
assignment, but the security gap soon called for other priorities, such as providing 
public security for all entities. Aid and reconstruction assistance activities became 
of secondary order, mainly for two reasons. First, there were sufficient NGOs to 
help the local population effectively. Second, in terms of economic development 
the Kosovo Albanian community did comparatively well. They re-started their 
enterprises and trade relations with, for example, Albania. Apart from some 
reconstruction projects in the hills around Orahovac and supplying the Kosovo 
Serbs with necessities, CIMIC officers largely supported the battalion commander 
in his efforts to provide public security and conflict resolution.1424 
 
Battery and platoon commanders established their own local networks, although 
these had been ad hoc and less institutionalised.1425 Especially the platoon and 
section commanders, who operated directly within the communities, were able 
to develop local points of contact. According to one battery commander, his 
troops invested in establishing good relationships with the local population 
during patrolling.1426 
 
The interaction with the local community changed after KFOR 2 took over 
responsibility for Orahovac. The reasons for the change were twofold. First, 
while KFOR 1 initially operated in a power vacuum, when KFOR 2 arrived in 
theatre, the UNMiK administrator and other officials were in place and exercised 
their formal administrative responsibilities.1427 Second, KFOR 2 had chosen to 
deploy a different operational concept in which the platoons followed a fixed 
programme in which they rotated in a weekly schedule between separate blocks 
of activities, such as patrolling and checkpoints; escorting humanitarian convoys; 
training & maintenance; and recuperation. As platoons rotated between these 
blocks, it had been difficult to establish and maintain lasting and trusted local 
networks with individual citizens. Largely, the development of structural local 
contacts had therefore been the responsibility of CIMIC or other senior officers, 
and was limited to local key leaders and representatives of companies and 
institutions.1428 
 
Throughout the full length of the mission, patrols provided a 24/7 presence in 
the area. The patrols adopted a friendly and open posture. They were accessible 
for the population in order to establish trust, interaction and cooperation. An 
important tactic to decrease possible thresholds between KFOR troops and the 
local population had been the choice not to wear helmets and to carry firearms in 
a non-aggressive way.1429 When needed, KFOR showed force and relayed on 
their basic military skills. For example, on checkpoints KFOR presented itself in 
                                               
1424 Interview July 7, 2011(a). 
1425 Interview June 29, 2011; Interview August 15, 2011. 
1426 Interview August 15, 2011. 
1427 Interview August 17, 2011. 
1428 Interview October 5, 2011(b). 
1429 Interview July 5, 2011; Interview August 15, 2011; Interview August 23, 2011; Interview 
September 8, 2011; Interview October 5, 2011(b). 
224
KFOR 
 
full military garment and enforced their security rules in a strict, non-negotiable 
manner.1430 
 
International organisations 
From their arrival in Orahovac, KFOR cooperated with representatives of ICTY 
and UNHCR, both operating from Prizren. At the central level, these contacts 
initially had been ad hoc and focused on particular issues. After UNMiK assumed 
its full administrative responsibility, cooperation was institutionalised within the 
framework of the UNMiK administration. International cooperation largely 
involved the exchange of information and the coordination of activities between 
international organisations and agencies.1431 At battalion level, KFOR also 
interacted with other international organisations or actors, often on a daily basis, 
for example with ICTY and the UN legal officer on the investigations of war 
crimes, and with UNHCR regarding aid projects and escorting humanitarian 
convoys.1432 
 
KFOR 2 had a different position. While KFOR 1 had been in the lead because 
of the delayed international presence, KFOR 2 stepped into an environment 
with established structures. One officer explained that the input of KFOR 2 had 
therefore been limited to being a “back bencher” in the regular UNMiK 
meetings where general security issues were discussed, basically because the 
battalion focused to become obsolete by helping the international community to 
help themselves.1433 KFOR 2 had decentralised its day-to-day interaction with 
the international organisations to its two CIMIC officers and its two battery 
commanders.1434 One of the battery commanders assigned his platoon command-
ers additional roles as liaison officers, because the platoon level had no operational 
role in the execution of the daily Normal Framework Operations, as will be 
explained later on. One of those platoon commanders focused on the local 
UNMiK administrator and on organising support activities. KFOR 2 for example 
designed, institutionalised and operationalised a formal access procedure for 
citizens who wanted to visit the building in order to speak to an UNMiK official 
and staffed a central information desk in the UNMiK Administration building.1435 
 
International police 
In late August/early September 1999, the first UNMiK police officers arrived in 
the Orahovac area. KFOR informed them about the local security situation and 
their achievements so far to establish a basic level of public security.1436 Initially, 
the cooperation between KFOR 1 and UNMiK Police suffered from operational 
                                               
1430 Interview June 29, 2011; Interview July 5, 2011. 
1431 Interview June 27, 2011: Interview September 8, 2011. 
1432 Interview June 27, 2011: Interview September 8, 2011. 
1433 41 (NL) ArtyBn RA TF Orahovac (November 17, 1999) OpOrder No. 01. SSA, 41 (NL) 
Artillery Battalion KFOR 2, Diversen Operationele Staf BLS, MND South, HQ KFOR, 
BEVO-det, Hrstpel, NL Contco, Box 3. 
1434 Interview August 17, 2011; Interview August 23, 2011; Interview October 5, 2011(b). 
1435 Interview August 23, 2011. 
1436 Interview June 29, 2011; Interview July 7, 2011(a); Interview September 8, 2011. 
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and cultural differences and difficulties. The two organisations differed in terms of 
chains of command, operational concepts and interests. In time, KFOR and 
UNMiK Police succeeded in mitigating the differences, notably by synchronising 
activities and operations, such as joint patrols and common investigations, and 
showing mutual respect.1437 To enhance cooperation and to share information, 
the battalion immediately invited UNMiK Police to join their staff meetings on a 
weekly basis.1438 During KFOR 1, there was no institutionalised consultation and 
coordination at the decentralised battery level.1439 
 
During KFOR 2, the UNMiK Police had been in place and in charge of 
providing law enforcement and public order. Although UNMiK Police had 
increased in capacity, it continued its cooperation with KFOR. This cooperation 
consisted of consultation, coordination, patrolling and assistance.1440 Consultation 
and coordination occurred at both the central battalion level and at battery 
level.1441 At the central battalion level,1442 coordination and consultation had an 
institutionalised and structured character. The UNMiK Police representative 
joined the KFOR staff meetings and interacted with the Head of Operations to 
coordinate joint activities.1443 At the battery level, cooperation and consultation 
had been formalised and institutionalised too.1444 The battery commander in Suva 
Reka met on a weekly basis with the UNMiK Police commissioner and the local 
UNMiK administrator to discuss the local security situation and to share 
information. Later, the OSCE and the local public prosecutor joined the 
meeting. However, as the number of participants grew, the effectiveness of the 
meetings decreased. To shorten the lines-of-communication, the battery 
commander assigned two platoon commanders to liaise bilaterally and daily with 
the UNMiK administrator and the local UNMiK police commissioner, being the 
most important security partners. The liaison officer to the UNMiK police 
commissioner served to coordinate operational assistance to the UNMiK Police, 
such as traffic surveillance and escorts.1445 
7.3.5  Use of force and flexibility 
The rules of engagement applied to KFOR had been part of COMKFOR’s 
Operational Order No. 004 of June 25, 1999. The rules of engagement regulated 
                                               
1437 Interview July 7, 2011(a); Interview September 8, 2011. See for example Abels, Van Pelt & 
Jacobs (2000), p. 47. 
1438 Interview June 27, 2011; SSA, 11 (NL) Artillery Battalion KFOR 1, June 12 – December 
7, 1999, Box 5, Bataljonsstaf, Sectie 5, CIMIC, No. 10028. 
1439 Interview August 15, 2011. 
1440 Interview August 23, 2011; Interview October 5, 2011(b). 
1441 Interview August 17, 2011; Interview August 23, 2011; Interview October 5, 2011(b). 
1442 KFOR 2 operated from Orahovac and Suva Reka. The battalion commander was located 
in Orahovac while the deputy battalion commander was based in Suva Reka. As a result, 
the battalion had two separate command posts with their own external lines of communica-
tion. 
1443 Interview August 17, 2011. 
1444 Interview August 23, 2011; Interview October 5, 2011(b). 
1445 Interview August 23, 2011. 
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and authorised the use of force in cases of self-defence and in designated 
operations, for example ‘against an individual who commits or is about to 
commit an act which endangers life or is likely to cause bodily harm in circum-
stances where there is no other way to prevent the act.’1446 In terms of public 
security, the rules of engagement also regulated the decentralisation of authority 
to disarm individuals or groups, to detain criminal or hostile individuals or 
groups, and to deploy riot control measures.1447 
 
Prior to their deployment, KFOR 1 trained in varied applications of force. 
Nevertheless, the battalion commander questioned whether he had trained his 
troops sufficiently to make them acquainted with the principles of minimum use 
of force. During the operation, he learned that his personnel were able to learn 
and to adapt these principles swiftly, however.1448 Three other officers also 
questioned the battalion’s ability in the application of a restrained use of force.1449 
One of these officers recalled: 
 
We did not anticipate an operation in the lower part of the spectrum of force. 
We only expected that we had to use lethal force or no force at all. We also did 
not have the assets to vary in the application of force. It was either nothing or 
extreme.1450 
 
Another officer noted that the training in restrained use of force had been limited 
to role-play in order to negotiate with local authorities successfully and to 
provide humanitarian and medical aid to civilians. In fact, this part of the training 
emphasised the non-use of force: 
 
You have to be able to communicate with the population with your firearm on 
your back. By communicating, you will avoid an escalation in terms of force. 
When you do this properly, and you are able to build trust, escalation is hardly 
needed.1451 
 
Based upon the experiences of their colleagues of KFOR 1, 41 Artillery Battalion 
knew that it had to operate in the lower ends of the military spectrum-of-force. 
It had adjusted the mission-oriented training to the requirements of the mission 
and trained its troops in applying the principles of minimum use of force. For 
that purpose, it developed several scenarios in which it trained its troops to apply 
appropriate force in accordance with the character of the situation. The training 
also intended to enhance the soldiers’ ability to deal with uncertainty and chaos 
                                               
1446 COMKFOR (June 25, 1999) OPORDER 004, Appendix 1 to Amendment 1 to Annex R, 
pp. R-1-2 – R-1-3. SSA, 11 (NL) Artillery Battalion KFOR 1, June 12 – December 7, 
1999, Box 7, Correspondentiearchief, No. 6012. 
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1448 Interview September 8, 2011. 
1449 Interview July 5, 2011; Interview August 15, 2011; Interview September 8, 2011. 
1450 Interview July 5, 2011. 
1451 Interview August 15, 2011. 
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in a flexible manner.1452 In theatre, the battalion continued to pay attention to 
application of restrained force, for example in advance of certain operations. The 
leadership considered this important, mainly because the battalion was originally 
trained to operate at the higher levels of the spectrum-of-force.1453 
7.4  Organisational concept 
This section deals with the organisational concept of the NL Army as applied 
during the KFOR mission. The question to be answered is whether the 
organisational concept enabled the provision of public security during this crisis 
management operation. To answer this question, this section will analyse three 
dimensions of the organisational concept, which are characteristic for contempo-
rary policing: individuality and autonomy; vertical differentiation; and geographi-
cal deconcentration. 
7.4.1  Autonomy and individuality 
Autonomy 
To some extent, KFOR 1 applied a decentralised organisational concept. In 
terms of Normal Framework Operations, it had empowered battery and platoon 
commanders to plan, prioritise, and execute the daily activities such as patrolling 
and operating checkpoints.1454 According to the battalion commander, the 
platoon had been the lowest junior level to decide on the follow-up to security 
incidents such as arson.1455 Platoon commanders had their own area of responsi-
bility. In line with the principles of mission-oriented command, platoon 
commanders were supposed to have a better situational awareness than the higher 
echelons in the chain of command. According to a battery commander, the 
platoon commanders exercised a close control over their section commanders. 
Their control had been direct and left little room for discretion. However, as two 
officers argued, there had still been some level of discretion for section com-
manders as long this fitted within the margins of the assignment.1456 
 
In case of focused operations, such as search operations or arrests, however, the 
battalion had been in charge and left little room for discretion. The battalion 
commander closely controlled his junior commanders.1457 One officer recalled: 
 
Command and control regarding public security was centralised at the battalion 
commander. Core staff consisting of the Head of Operations, Head of Intelli-
gence and the Head of CIMIC supported him. Under the leadership of the 
battalion commander, this quartet developed scenarios and strategies, and de-
cided upon all the battalion’s actions and operations. In this way, we by-passed 
the regular staffing processes. Due to the need for immediate action and the 
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sensitiveness of the situation, the battalion commander had opted for this struc-
ture.1458 
 
As a result, the battalion level planned, prioritised and directed the execution of 
sensitive public security activities.1459 For the execution of these activities, the 
battalion’s leadership developed and distributed concrete and detailed order that 
did not require any additional proceeding of the battery commanders.1460 A staff 
officer mentioned that their orders often had been so specific that an individual 
soldier could execute them. In that sense, he noted, the battalion’s leadership 
obstructed the principles of mission-oriented command, mainly because the 
dynamics of the situation required a centralised and detailed planning and 
command of activities, as one staff officers replied.1461 
 
In comparison, KFOR 2 adopted a less centralised organisational concept and 
applied the rules of mission-oriented command, as much as possible. As such, it 
followed the principles of situational leadership.1462 During Normal Framework 
Operations, battery and junior commanders applied the principles of mission-
oriented command, leaving room for individual discretion at all levels.1463 
Nevertheless, among commanders there had been differences in the level of 
discretion they granted to their junior commanders, as one officer noted.1464 The 
planning and execution of Normal Framework Operations had been under the 
authority of the batteries while the follow-up of minor incidents, such as a traffic 
accidents or the search of a vehicle or person, had been assigned to the section 
commander.1465 In case of an incident however, the Battery Operations Room 
monitored, coordinated and/or directed the response actions.1466 Discretion was 
further limited during complex and/or risky operations. Consequently, junior 
commanders switched to a more directive leadership style and applied drills and 
Standard Operating Procedures.1467 
 
Individuality 
At the operational level, the batteries performed two main activities to provide 
public security, patrolling and operating checkpoints. The batteries operated their 
checkpoints with a regular howitzer crew consisting of one sergeant, one 
corporal and five soldiers. The crew worked as a team in which every individual 
had its own tasks.1468 
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In terms of patrolling, it had been the section – normally consisting of six troops 
– that had been assigned to patrolling the streets of Orahovac and its surrounding 
villages, in line with the battalion’s standard operating procedures.1469 However, 
in the early days of the deployment, the battalion was temporarily understaffed, 
largely due to a staged deployment of its personnel. In terms of patrolling, the 
deficit urged the battalion to deploy their troops in a more individual deploy-
ment.1470 One senior officer explained: 
 
Due to scarcity of personnel at the start of the operation we decided to patrol in 
smaller formations. We therefore send sections of two soldiers on patrol. In that 
sense we deployed our personnel rather in a police fashion than as a light infan-
try unit, just to create a wider presence in town. Afterwards, we have not 
stopped this kind of patrolling in town.1471 
 
Later during the mission when the battalion had been deployed in full, battery 
commanders could decide to allow dual patrolling occasionally, for example 
when the security situation allowed such.1472. The fact that KFOR 1 temporarily 
deployed its personnel in pairs did not result in empowering individual soldiers to 
solve situations independently. The battalion exercised a top-down command 
and control and close supervision over all public security activities as explained 
above. This left little to no discretion at the lowest echelons in the chain of 
command.1473 
 
KFOR 2 deployed its patrols in different formations, varying from a group of six 
troops to a set of two soldiers.1474 The level of autonomy of the individual soldier 
was limited. As a rule, a section operated as the basic formation for the execution 
of social patrolling. The extent to which troops were deployed in pairs largely 
depended on the soldier’s individual competences and liability, and the leader-
ship’s assessment of the security situation.1475 Dual patrolling was only authorised 
if a section operated in a formation in which pairs could deploy in close 
proximity to one another, for example in the same street or at squares where 
troops could sustain visual contact with each other. Diffused patrolling did 
therefore not take place during the night, among large crowds or in case of 
increased tension.1476 
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7.4.2  Vertical differentiation 
KFOR 1 used the regular chain of command – consisting of the battalion, battery, 
platoon and the section – to communicate up and down the hierarchy.1477 
However, at the battery level there were some changes in the formal reporting 
and commanding structure. One important exception was the procedure of 
briefing and debriefing patrols. The battalion’s Intelligence Section directly 
communicated with the Battery Intelligence Cell about the assignments the 
patrols should carry out. The Battery Intelligence Cell then instructed the patrols 
without further interference of the platoon commander, which in practice 
excluded this level from the operational chain of command.1478 Another 
exception involved the position of the section commander. If a section divided 
into sub-sections, the commander of the sub-section no longer reported to the 
section commander but directly to the platoon commander, which shortened the 
chain of command for reasons of effectiveness.1479 
 
KFOR 2 also reduced the formal chain of command, notably regarding the 
execution of Normal Framework Operations. During these operations, the 
Battery Operations Room directly communicated with the patrols and check-
points on scene. As a result, during Normal Framework Operations, the platoon 
commanders had no executive or commanding role. Instead, he either operated 
as operations officer in the Operations Rooms or as liaison officer to an interna-
tional organisation.1480 In case of a dedicated platoon operation, however, the 
platoon commander operated according to the original chain of command.1481 
7.4.3   Deconcentration 
KFOR 1 applied a deconcentrated troop deployment. From its central base at the 
Zrze Airfield, south of Orahovac, the battalion deployed its sub-units in the 
communities it intended to serve and protect. The First Battery operated in Suva 
Reka, where it was responsible for providing public security by patrolling and 
manning checkpoints. Initially, the battery had its main base at Zrze Airfield from 
where it deployed its troops in Suva Reka on a twelve hours shift schedule. 
Because the daily transfers from Zrze to Suva Reka were long and inefficient, the 
First Battery later moved from Zrze to a separate base in Toplicane, near Suva 
Reka.1482 The Second Battery operated in Orahovac and was based at Zrze 
Airfield. It deployed two platoons in Orahovac and one platoon in Velika Hoca, 
from where the battery operated its patrols and checkpoints. In Orahovac, the 
battery had a permanent presence at the market square.1483 By positioning fixed 
units within the villages on a 24/7 basis, KFOR 1 was able to establish local 
                                               
1477 Interview July 7, 2011(a); Interview August 15, 2011. 
1478 Interview July 5, 2011. 
1479 Interview August 15, 2011. 
1480 Interview August 23, 2011; Interview October 5, 2011(b). 
1481 Interview August 17, 2011; Interview October 5, 2011(b). 
1482 Abels, Van Pelt & Jacobs (2000), p. 59; Interview June 27, 2011; Interview July 5, 2011; 
Interview August 15, 2011. 
1483 Interview June 29, 2011; Interview July 5, 2011. 
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networks and trust and was able to better understand the local security problems 
and to respond rapidly, if needed. 
 
KFOR 2 followed a deconcentrated organisational concept too. It operated from 
two compounds: one in Orahovac where the battalion commander and the 
Alpha Battery were stationed; and one in Siroko where the battalion staff and the 
Bravo Battery had their base.1484 From these two main bases, the battalion 
operated its patrols and checkpoints. In the Kosovo Serbian quarter of Orahovac 
the Alpha Battery stationed a fixed platoon post,1485 while a German infantry 
platoon was assigned to Velika Hoca.1486 
7.5  Conclusions 
Security gap 
Right from the start, the mission in Kosovo had faced a deployment, enforce-
ment and institutional gap. To fill the institutional gap, the UN Security Council 
authorised the UNMiK Police Force to provide public security until it had 
established and trained a new multi-ethnic local police for Kosovo. However, the 
UNMiK Police suffered from a deployment gap as it deployed slowly. In 
Orahovac, it took until October 27, 1999, until UNMiK Police had been able to 
assume full responsibility for public security, while for the rest of Kosovo this 
stage was reached only in June 2000. Meanwhile, ethnically related violence and 
criminality peaked, mostly involving acts of revenge targeted at Kosovo Serb 
minority groups. Like in other post-conflict areas, organised crime, smuggling, 
illegal possession of firearms and theft further increased the level of public 
insecurity. In terms of public order, citizens also organised demonstrations to 
express their discontent with the political and security situation. Because 
UNMiK Police required the support of KFOR throughout the full length of the 
Dutch mission, for example in patrolling, search operations and the arrest of 
suspects, it coud be concluded that Orahovac had also encountered an enforce-
ment gap. 
 
Operational concept 
To fill the deployment gap between KFOR and UNMiK Police, the UN 
Security Council had authorised KFOR to provide interim policing until the 
international police were ready to assume full responsibility for public security. 
However, NATO and KFOR did not define specific assignments and guidelines 
regarding interim policing until the end of June 1999. Two significant docu-
ments eventually provided instructions on how troops should deal with law and 
order issues. German Directive No. 8 of June 22 regulated the search and 
disarmament of arrested suspects of serious crimes such as murder, manslaughter, 
robbery, and arson in the German MNB sector while COMKFOR’s Operational 
                                               
1484 41 Afdeling Veldartillerie (2001), pp. 16-17; Interview August 17, 2011; Interview 
October 5, 2011(b); Interview August 23, 2011. 
1485 Interview October 5, 2011(b). 
1486 41 Afdeling Veldartillerie (2001), p.17. 
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Order 004 of June 25 provided guidelines on law and order issues for all of 
Kosovo. 
 
Initially, 11 (NL) Artillery Battalion KFOR 1 deployed to supply fire-support to 
the 12 (GE) Armoured Brigade. Given the security gap, the lack of infantry 
troops on the ground, and the absence of an immediate requirement for fire 
support, KFOR 1’s mission changed into an infantry role in order to provide area 
responsibility. The security gap also urged KFOR 1 to provide public security 
and interim policing. However, KFOR 1 had not planned and trained for public 
security tasks as it prepared for deploying its original fire support task and 
additional peacekeeping activities. As such, it had to learn on the ground to deal 
with these challenges. Based upon on the experiences of KFOR 1, 41 (NL) 
Artillery Battalion KFOR 2 included some public security aspects in their pre-
deployment training, such as making arrests and search operations, however it did 
not label them as such. Although there had been demonstrations in Orahovac, 
the Dutch KFOR battalions did not train for CRC. 
 
The provision of public security had not been the priority of the Dutch Ministry 
of Defence. The Ministry regarded public security to be a responsibility of the 
UNMiK Police. It therefore wanted to limit the Dutch military involvement in 
public security, although the UN Security Council had authorised KFOR to 
provide interim policing pending the arrival of UNMiK Police. The Ministry of 
Defence, for example, restricted the involvement of Dutch troops in the arrests 
of alleged war criminals, which it considered to be a responsibility of the 
UNMiK Police. The Ministry also restricted the involvement of personnel of the 
Koninklijke Marechaussee in crime investigations. In addition, the Ministry did not 
approve Directive No. 8 until October 6, 1999, although KFOR 1 had been 
working with this MNB directive since June. Finally, the Ministry ordered 
KFOR 2 to show restraint in performing public security tasks because the 
Ministry considered KFOR 1’s interpretation of the mandate too challenging. 
 
Nevertheless, the two battalions de facto executed tasks that are normally assigned 
to the police. In terms of public order, they patrolled the streets of towns and 
villages to keep the peace and to protect citizens against acts of violence and 
retaliation. They also observed and controlled demonstrations. In terms of law 
enforcement, KFOR 1 and 2 set up checkpoints to protect sensitive areas and 
threatened communities and to combat smuggling of weapons and contraband. 
Both battalions deployed search operations to combat illegal possession of 
firearms. KFOR 1 and 2 were also involved in the arrests of criminal offenders. 
In particular, the arrest of war crimes suspects during KFOR 1 had been of 
significance. Information provided by citizens had resulted in criminal intelli-
gence on war crimes, which finally enabled the arrest of eleven suspects. Despite 
restrictions by the Ministry of Defence, KFOR 1 and 2 engaged in the arrest of 
several war criminals. 
 
The Dutch operational concept largely focused on the collection of information 
and intelligence. Patrols and CIMIC officers had been important instruments to 
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acquire local information. KFOR 1 assumed a problem-oriented approach 
towards local security issues by opening a public desk where citizens could report 
serious crimes and other security related problems. Information was collected and 
analysed systematically and served as input for targeted responses, such as the 
arrest of alleged war criminals. As such, acquiring criminal intelligence became a 
core information activity. KFOR 1 and 2 also tasked their patrols to collect 
information. KFOR 1 focused its information gathering on public security while 
KFOR 2 focused on mapping the socio-economic situation of area and its 
citizens rather than the collection of criminal intelligence. Although KFOR 
shared operational information, it did not exchange intelligence unconditionally 
either due to a lack of trust or in order to prevent operations being compromised 
through a leakage of sensitive information. 
 
KFOR 1 and 2 cooperated and coordinated with international security partners, 
such as ICTY, UNHCR, UNMiK, and UNMiK Police to improve public 
security. After the UNMiK Police had taken on full responsibility for governing 
and policing Orahovac, KFOR 2 moved to the background and focused on 
‘helping the international organisations to help themselves.’ 
 
The control of force had been an issue during the pre-deployment planning and 
training of KFOR 1 and 2. KFOR 1 had trained for either the maximum use of 
force or the abstinence of force. During the deployment, the troops learned how 
to deal with a restrained use of force effectively while performing their tasks in 
theatre. KFOR 1 and KFOR 2 both adopted a friendly, open posture vis-à-vis 
the local population. Their patrols were accessible for civilians who could address 
their security or other problems at all times. 
 
Organisational concept 
In terms of decentralisation, discretion of section commanders or operatives had 
been limited within KFOR 1. Based upon the magnitude of the security 
problems on the ground, the battalion commander of KFOR 1 followed a 
centralised model of decision-making. The platoon had been the lowest level of 
autonomy within the context of Normal Framework Operations. During the 
KFOR 2 deployment, decentralisation of decision-making seemed to be larger. 
Section commanders could solve some minor incidents independently although 
they had to report every incident to the Operations Room. In terms of individ-
ual deployment, the Dutch KFOR battalions occasionally employed their troops 
in smaller units than formally prescribed in their standard operating procedures. 
In case of KFOR 1, the choice for dual patrolling was largely related to deficit of 
sufficient troops in the early days of the mission. KFOR 2 occasionally patrolled 
in smaller formations than the section, but only if the security situation allowed 
such and troops were able to sustain visual contact. 
Vertical differentiation formally remained unchanged in both KFOR 1 and 
KFOR 2. In practice, however, battalions could shorten the chain of command 
for reasons of efficiency. KFOR 1 sometimes bypassed the platoon level in the 
briefing and debriefing of the sections and patrols. The company level of KFOR 
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2 bypassed the platoon level from the chain of command during Normal 
Framework Operations as the Operations Room directly supervised the sections. 
 
In terms of geographical differentiation, KFOR 1 and KFOR 2 adopted a 
deconcentrated model of troop deployment. Geographic dispersion enabled 
troops to improve their communication and interaction with the local population 
in order to understand their security related problems and to establish local 
networks. These networks were helpful in identifying local security problems and 
to winning the support of the community. 
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8  SFIR 
8.1  Introduction 
8.1.1  Background of the operation 
 
On March 19, 2003, a US-led military coalition started Operation Iraqi Freedom 
in order ‘to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein’s 
support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people.’1487 Three weeks later, 
coalition troops had defeated the Iraqi forces and removed Saddam Hussein from 
power.1488 On May 1, 2003, President George W. Bush announced the formal 
end of “major combat operations”.1489 The rationale of Operation Iraqi Freedom 
could be found in Saddam Hussein’s reluctance to meet the conditions of various 
UN Security Council Resolutions following the First Gulf War of January and 
February 1991. After the First Gulf War, the UN Security Council adopted 
UNSCR 687 to curtail Saddam Hussein’s military power and weapon produc-
tion programmes.1490 To test Iraq’s compliance with the resolution, the UN 
Security Council authorised the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to 
inspect its nuclear installations,1491 and the United Nations Special Commission 
(UNSCOM) to inspect its biological and chemical facilities.1492 
 
The inspections did not proceed without difficulties, however. The Iraqi 
government frequently frustrated the inspections, for example by providing 
misleading information or rejecting access to installations.1493 Between 1991 and 
1997, several UN Security Council Resolutions condemned the Iraqi violations 
of UNSCR 687, and urged the Iraqi government to cooperate fully with the 
UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors.1494 The situation escalated in November 1997 
when Iraq refused UNSCOM inspectors access to certain locations, such as 
presidential buildings and palaces.1495 In response, the UN Security Council 
adopted UNSCR 1137 to condemn Iraq for its ‘continued violations’ of its 
obligation to cooperate with the inspection programmes.1496 The Resolution 
demanded that Iraq cooperate with UN weapons inspectors immediately and 
                                               
1487 Radio Address by President of the United States G.W. Bush to the American Nation, 
March 19, 2003. Available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030322.html; accessed May 16, 
2007. 
1488 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 37. 
1489 See for example: Woodward (2004), p. 412; Woodward (2006), pp. 186-187. 
1490 UNSCR 687, UN Doc S/RES/687 (1991), §13. 
1491 UNSCR 687 UN Doc S/RES/687 (1991), §12 & 13. 
1492 UNSCR 697, UN Doc S/RES/697 (1991), §9 (b)(i). 
1493 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 26; Klep & Van Gils (2005), p. 468. 
1494 See for example UNSCR 707, UN Doc S/RES/707 (1991); UNSCR 715, UN Doc 
S/RES/715 (1991); UNSCR 949, UN Doc S/RES/949 (1994); UNSCR 1051, UN Doc 
S/RES/1051 (1996); UNSCR 1060, UN Doc S/RES/1060 (1996). 
1495 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 27; Commissie Davids (2010), p. 49. 
1496 UN Doc S/RES/1137 (1997), §1. 
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without conditions or restrictions.1497 Initially, the Iraqi government agreed to 
comply with UNSCR 1137 but on August 5, 1998, Saddam Hussein decided to 
suspend his cooperation with UNSCOM and IAEA.1498 The Security Council 
immediately condemned the suspended cooperation.1499 
 
The situation further deteriorated after October 31, 1998. That day, the US 
Congress adopted the Iraq Liberation Act that supported a ‘regime change’ in Iraq. 
Saddam Hussein responded immediately and ended all cooperation with 
UNSCOM.1500 After the head of the UNSCOM mission had reported to the 
UN Security Council on December 15, 1998 that Iraq had not provided the 
required cooperation, the United Stated and the United Kingdom started 
Operation Desert Fox; an air campaign to destroy Iraqi weapon and military 
facilities and to force Iraq to renew cooperation with the inspections. Desert Fox 
did not have the intended political effect, however.1501 First, the air campaign 
lacked broad international support, as it did not get the consent of all five 
permanent members of the Security Council.1502 Second, the air campaign did 
not result in the return of the UNSCOM inspectors.1503 
 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the US focus on Iraq changed 
significantly.1504 The US government was convinced that Iraq had Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) availability or had the knowledge and technology to 
develop them.1505 Consequently, President Bush ordered the Pentagon and the 
US Central Command (CENTCOM) to plan a pre-emptive war against Iraq.1506 
Meanwhile, the US government increased the political and diplomatic pressure 
on Iraq. In his State of the Union address of January 29, 2002, for example, 
President Bush labelled Iraq as part of the ‘axis of evil,’ which consisted of states, 
such as Iran and North Korea, which were ‘arming to threaten the peace of the 
world.’ He considered the axis of evil to be ‘a grave and growing danger’ and 
underlined that ‘[t]he United States of America [would] not permit the world’s 
most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive 
weapons.’1507 
 
While the US government prepared for war, it tried to raise international and 
public support for its casus belli. A British and American initiative resulted in 
UNSCR 1441 of November 8, 2002. The resolution demanded ‘immediate, 
                                               
1497 UN Doc S/RES/1137 (1997), §3. 
1498 Commissie Davids (2010), p. 51. 
1499 UN Doc S/RES/1194 (1998), §1. 
1500 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 28; Commissie Davids (2010), pp. 51-52. 
1501 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 28; Commissie Davids (2010), p. 53. 
1502 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 28; Commissie Davids (2010), pp. 52-52. 
1503 Commissie Davids (2010), pp. 51-52. 
1504 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 29; Klep & Van Gils (2005), p. 469. 
1505 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 29. See also: Woodward (2004). 
1506 Woodward (2004), p. 30ff. 
1507 The President’s State of the Union Address January 29, 2002. Available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html; 
accessed June 25, 2012. 
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unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted’ cooperation with the inspectors of 
IAEA and the United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commis-
sion (UNMOVIC) that replaced UNSCOM since December 17, 1999.1508 
Furthermore, UNSCR 1441 demanded a ‘currently, accurate, full, and complete 
declaration of all aspects of [the Iraqi weapon] programmes’ within thirty days.1509 
Finally, UNSCR 1441 noted that Iraq would ‘face serious consequences’ if it 
would not comply with the inspections.1510 In response to UNSCR 1441, the 
Iraqi government provided a report on its weapon programmes on December 7, 
2002.1511 However, the IAEA and UNMOVIC regarded the report as a ‘missed 
opportunity,’1512 while the US government perceived it as proof of a ‘material 
breach’ of UNSCR 1441.1513 
 
Because hard evidence on the existence of Iraqi WMD was missing,1514 EU 
Member States and some members of the Security Council disagreed about 
whether there had been a ‘material breach’ of UNSCR 1414 and if the weapon 
inspections should continue.1515 The United States and the United Kingdom 
regarded the unavailability of hard evidence as proof that Saddam Hussein was 
hiding WMD.1516 After it became clear that the UN Security Council would not 
authorise military action against Iraq, the United States and the United Kingdom 
decided to launch Operation Iraqi Freedom without a UN mandate.1517 
 
Dutch political support for Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Like the Bush Administration, the Dutch government took the view that Iraq 
had been in ‘further material breach’ of UNSCR 1441. As a result, the Dutch 
government considered the continuation of the inspections as no longer 
useful.1518 It argued that within the context of UNSCR 1441 there was no other 
option than the use of military force.1519 
 
 
 
                                               
1508 UNSCR 1441, UN Doc S/RES/1441 (2002), §5. 
1509 UNSCR 1441, UN Doc S/RES/1441 (2002), §3. 
1510 UNSCR 1441, UN Doc S/RES/1441 (2002), §13. 
1511 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 33; Commissie Davids (2010), p. 188. 
1512 Commissie Davids (2010), p. 189. 
1513 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 34; Woodward (2004), p. 234ff. 
1514 See for example: UNMOVIC Briefing of the Security Council. An Update on Inspections, 
January 27, 2003 (available at http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/ new/pages/security_ 
council_briefings.asp#5); UNMOVIC Briefing of the Security Council. An Update on 
Inspections, February 14, 2003. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/ 
pages/security_council_briefings.asp#6; accessed June 25, 2012. 
1515 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 34; Commissie Davids (2010), p. 171. 
1516 Commissie Davids (2010), pp. 200-201. 
1517 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 34. 
1518 Commissie Davids (2010), p. 202. 
1519 Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 94, pp. 1-2. 
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However, the government did not decide to provide active military support to 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.1520 Instead, it only gave its consent in political terms.1521 
The government was only willing to deploy troops when Iraqi Freedom had 
reached the stage of stabilisation.1522 This intention was materialised on April 11, 
2003 when the government decided to examine the feasibility of a possible 
Dutch contribution to a stabilisation force in Iraq,1523 ultimately leading to the 
decision on June 6, 2003, to participate in the Multinational Force in Iraq (MFI) 
by deploying a battalion of Marines and additional support units in the province 
of Al-Muthanna under operational command of the UK-led Multinational 
Division South East (MND (SE)).1524  
 
The Dutch military contribution initially involved a deployment of six months. 
The government noted that an extension of the deployment by a further six 
months would require a separate decision and additional consultation of the 
Parliament.1525 The Dutch contribution to the MFI, from this point called the 
Stability Force in Iraq (SFIR),1526 was extended twice. First, on November 28, 2003 
the government decided to extend the mission for another six months,1527 while on 
June 11, 2004 the government decided to extend the mission for a final eight 
months, until mid-May 2005.1528 Altogether, from July 2003 until March 2005, the 
Netherlands deployed five SFIR battalions, of which two from the Marines and 
three from the NL Army.1529 The Netherlands ended its contribution on March 7, 
2005 when the commander of SFIR 5 formally transferred his responsibility to the 
                                               
1520 Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 94, p. 4. The Netherlands provided some military 
support to Operation Iraqi Freedom, for example in terms of host nation support to US 
military transports (Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 84, pp. 1-2) and by deploying 
three Patriot batteries in Turkey to protect the Turkish population in Diyarbakir and Bat-
man (Handelingen II, 2002/03, 43-3023, February 12, 2003). 
1521 Commissie Davids (2010), p. 103 & p. 106. 
1522 Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 94, p. 4. 
1523 Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 105. 
1524 Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 116, p. 1. The Multinational Force in Iraq operated 
under the command of the US Central Command (CENTCOM). CENTCOM had di-
vided Iraq into four MND sectors: MND Central North (CN), MND Baghdad (both un-
der US command), MND Central South (S) (under Polish command), and MND South 
East (SE) (under British command) (Ministerie van Defensie – Defensiestaf (2004b), p. 5; 
Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 116, p. 11). 
1525 Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 116, p. 13. 
1526 Within the Multinational Force, only the Netherlands used the abbreviation SFIR to label 
its troop contribution. All other non-occupying countries addressed themselves as Coalition 
Forces. By presenting themselves as SFIR, the Netherlands intended to express the differ-
ence between the occupying powers (US and UK) and the other force-contributing coun-
tries. (Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), pp. 83-84. The first Dutch Marines Battalion 
did not use the abbreviation SFIR, however. It presented itself as 1 (NL) Battlegroup (Bro-
cades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 66). 
1527 Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 134, p. 2. 
1528 Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 164, p. 1. 
1529 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 9. SFIR 3 operated in Al-Muthanna from March 
14, 2004 until July 14, 2004; SFIR 4 from July 14, 2004 until November 15, 2004, and 
SFIR 5 from November 15, 2004 until March 7, 2005. 
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commander of the British Task Force Eagle.1530 For the chronology of the mission, 
see Appendix 1. 
8.1.2  Structure of the chapter 
This chapter provides an answer to sub-questions 4, 5 and 6 in relation to the NL 
Army’s involvement1531 in the SFIR mission in Iraq from March 2004 until 
March 2005. This chapter first deals with the question whether the SFIR mission 
encountered a security gap. Second, the chapter deals with the operational 
concept of the three NL Army battalions and answers the question whether their 
concept has contributed to public security. Third, it describes their organisational 
concept and answers the question to what extent their concept supported the 
execution of police-like activities.1532 
8.2  Security gap 
8.2.1  Public security situation 
Demographic composition of the area 
The demographic composition of Iraq is of significance to understand the 
insecurity and disorder that occurred during the SFIR mission. In 2003, prior to 
the US-led Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq had an estimated population of 26.2 
million citizens.1533 Approximately 75 percent of population was of Arab origin 
of which 60 percent were Shi’ite Muslims and 40 percent Sunni Muslims. 
Twenty percent of the population was Kurdish, while the other five percent 
consisted of various ethnic minorities. The Sunnis largely lived in Central Iraq 
while the Shi’ite population primarily lived in the South. The Kurds and other 
minorities resided in the in northern and north-eastern part of Iraq.1534 During 
the Saddam Hussein era, the Sunni Ba’ath party had suppressed the Shi’ite and 
Kurdish population. After its defeat, remnants of the old regime tried to 
destabilise Iraq in order to consolidate their influence or to disrupt the recon-
struction of Iraq. On the other hand, Shi’ite groups seized the opportunity to 
retaliate for Sunni repression.1535 
 
The Al-Muthanna province – the Dutch area of operations – had approximately 
450,000 inhabitants, of which the majority lived in three towns located around 
                                               
1530 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), pp. 291-292; 11 (NL) Battle Group SFIR 5 (s.a), p. 
269. 
1531 This chapter does not cover the involvement of the two Marines battalions in public 
security during the SFIR operation. 
1532 The main body of the case description is based on interviews with commanders and senior 
staff officers who served in SFIR during the deployment of three NL Army battalions. The 
interviews are complemented with data from the Dutch Defence Archives, policy docu-
ments issued by the NL Army, documentation and reports issued by the Dutch parliament, 
and memorial books produced by the respective Dutch battalions. 
1533 http://databank.worldbank.org; accessed October 21, 2012. 
1534 See for example Voorhoeve (2006), p. 144; http://www.mapsofworld.com/iraq/iraq-
population.html; acessed October 21, 2012. 
1535 See Chapter 1, Introduction. 
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the Euphrates River in the northern part of the province. As-Samawah, the 
capital of the province, had approximately 130,000 inhabitants; Ar-Rumaythah 
75,000, and Al-Kidr 60,000. Around eighty percent of the province consisted of 
desert and was – with the exception of the villages of As-Salman and Al-Bussayah 
– largely uninhabited.1536 Ninety-eight percent of the population was of Shi’ite 
origin1537 and belonged to various denominations and tribes.1538 Finally, Al-
Muthanna had a small number of Bedouin clans.1539 The Ba’ath party tradition-
ally did not have had a strong popular basis like it had in Baghdad. According to 
the Dutch government in June 2003, the remnants of the old regime were no 
major security threat. In Al-Muthanna, there had been no major incidents so far 
and the population had been open towards the coalition troops.1540 Still, it 
warned that rivalry between various political and religious groups could result in 
violence.1541 
 
Crime and criminality 
During the SFIR mission, public security threats varied from public disturbances 
and crime to insurgency and terrorism. Weapons were widely available, particu-
larly after the demilitarisation of the armed forces when former military personnel 
took their personal weapons home and citizens and gangs looted the abandoned 
weapon storages.1542 Roughly, in Al-Muthanna, three different categories of 
crimes occurred as defined in Hansen’s classification of crimes in war-torn 
societies: petty crimes, organised crime and insurgency.1543 The distinction 
between these security threats was not always clear-cut, however.1544 Although 
their goals differed, criminals and insurgents often used comparable means and 
methods to achieve their respective goals. For example, insurgents were involved 
in smuggling to finance their activities and criminals sometimes used heavy arms 
to support their activities. These threats often influenced or reinforced each other 
so it was difficult to see them as independent phenomena.1545 
 
In terms of petty crimes, criminality in Al-Muthanna in 2003 and early 2004 
often involved theft, murder, carjacking and looting of trucks and public 
buildings.1546 In case of carjacking, criminals blocked the road to stop trucks or 
private cars after which they took the cars, leaving the passengers behind, chained 
                                               
1536 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 63. Ministerie van Defensie – Defensiestaf 
(2004b), p. 3. 
1537 Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 136, p. 6. 
1538 Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 116, p. 9. 
1539 Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 116, p. 9. 
1540 Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 117, p. 13. 
1541 Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 116, p. 12. 
1542 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 78. 
1543 See for example: Lovelock (2005), pp. 124-125; Rausch (2002), p. 24. 
1544 Interview June 21, 2011. 
1545 Interview June 21, 2011; Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 178. See also: Hansen 
(2002b), p. 91. 
1546 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), pp. 65 & p. 78; Interview September 1, 2011(b); 
See also: Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 116, p. 12. 
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and blindfolded, and sometimes even killed.1547 Looting had also been an 
exponent of petty crime. Looting often occurred after a truck accidentally slipped 
off the road due to bad road conditions. Looting also occurred with intent. 
Looters occasionally simulated a traffic accident and forced a truck off the road in 
order to seize its load.1548 Carjacking and plundering continued at least until mid 
2004.1549 
 
Organised crime largely involved smuggling livestock, water, fuel and weap-
onry.1550 In particular, the illegal trade in livestock (sheep) had a major social 
impact. Livestock was often smuggled into Saudi Arabia where the consumer 
prices were higher than in Iraq. Because of the illegal export, the prices of sheep 
in the province doubled within a short period. For many, meat became unafford-
able, which fuelled social unrest.1551 Smuggling fuel and weaponry was another 
security problem. It continued throughout the full length of the SFIR mis-
sion.1552 Smuggling occurred particularly in the border area and in the desert 
between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. 
 
The third obvious type of crime was insurgency; largely inflicted by the Sunni 
religious leader Muqtada Al-Sadr, supported by a relatively large group of 
disappointed, low-educated and unemployed young men, mainly from urban 
areas.1553 Until early 2004, Al-Sadr did not have a strong power-base in Al-
Muthanna. After he gained influence in the larger cities in southern Iraq, he tried 
to expand his influence also to that province.1554 The first significant action of the 
Sadrists occurred in As-Samawah on April 5, 2004, when an armed mob of 
Sadrists entered the local police station and demanded authority over the station. 
An intervention of the mayor, the local chief of police and local clan leaders 
prevented an (armed) escalation.1555 In the following days, the tension in the 
province increased. In urban areas, men increasingly carried arms in public, 
which put public order under pressure.1556  
At the end of April, the Dutch troops also became a target of violence. The 
attacks started in April, when insurgents mortared the Dutch bases in As-
                                               
1547 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 78. 
1548 Interview September 1, 2011(b). 
1549 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 178; Interview September 1, 2011(a); Interview 
September 1, 2011(b). 
1550 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 79. See also: Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, 
nr. 134: p. 10. 
1551 CIMIC Legal Affairs. Letter to S3, August 14, 2003. SSA, Hard Disk 156/SFIR 
51012/Diversen/schapensmokkel. 
1552 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 206; Interview September 20, 2011(b); interview 
October 12, 2011(b); Interview October 19, 2011. 
1553 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 192; Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 154, 
p. 3 
1554 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 194; Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 154, 
p. 5. 
1555 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), pp. 194-195. See also: Jansen & Platenburg (2005), 
p. 36. 
1556 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), pp. 197-198. 
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Samawah on April 22 and in Ar-Rumaythah on April 29.1557 The situation 
further deteriorated in May. On May 11, hand-grenades killed a Dutch first 
sergeant and injured a soldier patrolling a bridge in As-Samawah.1558 The same 
day, Iraqi extremists shot at a Dutch vehicle checkpoint, after which the Dutch 
returned fire.1559 A few days later, armed resistance became more public - on 
May 14, after Friday prayers, a group of armed Sadrists assembled at the Sadr 
building in As-Samawah and threatened to attack the Government building. 
While Iraqi authorities tried to calm down the situation, the local police 
cordoned off the demonstration. SFIR troops took up positions around the 
building and prepared for an intervention. However, that evening the crowd 
[dissolved and] dispersed over town after which the SFIR troops withdrew. 
During the night, elements of the Sadr movement frequently fired at Dutch 
patrols. The following day, the crowd again assembled around the Sadr building. 
The Dutch battalion blocked off areas surrounding the building. The Iraqi police 
and Dutch troops decided to enter and search the building in order to arrest 
insurgents. However, the insurgents had already managed to escape the building 
the night before, unnoticed by the local police.1560 
By the end of May 2004, the situation stabilised, mainly because Al-Sadr and 
Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani reached an agreement.1561 The relative peace, 
however, ended in August 2004 when coalition troops and the Mahdi Army of 
Al-Sadr clashed in Najaf. These fights turned out to be a catalyst for public 
disorder and insurgency in Al-Muthanna.1562 In Al-Muthanna, Al-Sadr had 
acquired support from a small group of sympathisers. The influence of the Sadr 
movement was tangible in the streets; the Dutch troops noticed that citizens 
were more restrained in their daily interactions.1563 The first confrontation 
between Dutch troops and Sadrists occurred during the night of August 6 when 
insurgents mortared a joint vehicle checkpoint of Iraqi Security Forces and SFIR 
on the MSR Jackson near Al-Kidr.1564 The authorities responded by proclaiming 
a curfew from midnight until five o’clock in the morning.1565 On August 12, 
armed Sadrists caused armed incidents around the Sadr building and at the police 
station and the Provincial Joint Coordination Centre.1566  
The armed resistance in Al-Muthanna escalated into an ambush in Ar-
Rumaythah during the night of August 14 and 15. Insurgents attacked a Dutch 
MP convoy, killing one MP first sergeant and injuring three others.1567 After the 
                                               
1557 Handelingen II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 158, pp. 1-2; Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p. 60 & p. 66. 
1558 Handelingen II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 158, p. 1; Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p. 87. 
1559 Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p. 88. 
1560 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 212; Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p. 94 & p. 98; 
Interview June 21, 2011; Interview October 4, 2011(c). 
1561 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 217; Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 168, 
pp. 4-5; Kamerstukken II, 23 432, nr. 179, p. 4. 
1562 Interview June 24, 2011; Kamerstukken II, 23 432, nr. 179, p. 3. 
1563 Interview June 24, 2011, Interview September 1, 2011(a); Matthijssen (2005), pp. 149-150; 
Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p. 189. 
1564 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 223; Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p. 189. 
1565 Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p. 190. 
1566 Interview October 19, 2011; Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p. 190. 
1567 Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 174, pp. 1-2. 
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ambush, the security situation in Al-Muthanna remained unstable. SFIR and 
local police patrols were engaged in a number of shooting incidents.1568 Public 
security returned to a more stabilised situation after August 26 when the crisis in 
Najaf was resolved and resulted into a cease-fire. The agreement on Najaf also 
stabilised the situation in Al-Muthanna.1569 The situation of relative peace and 
stability continued until the end of the deployment of SFIR 5 in March 2005.1570 
 
Public order 
In terms of public order, political and economic instability had been the main 
drivers for public protests. For example, the level of unemployment had been 
high and public services were unable to distribute water, fuel, and electricity 
effectively.1571 The shortage of fuel and electricity resulted in various demonstra-
tions.1572 The shortage of fuel also regularly caused public unrest at petrol stations 
at the Main Supply Route (MSR) Jackson in As-Samawah and Ar-Rumaythah 
where citizens queuing up blocked the main road, got frustrated and accidentally 
started fighting.1573 These problems continued until the end of 2004, by which 
time the distribution of fuel from depots had improved.1574 
 
The high unemployment rates also created public order disturbances, in particular 
after the CPA had temporarily stopped its (ineffective) employment pro-
gramme.1575 During the following months, the protests continued on various 
occasions. On April 7, for example, a small group of citizens organised peaceful 
demonstrations in the three large towns of Al-Muthanna to express their 
frustration with the CPA and the coalition troops.1576 The Sadr movement also 
initiated civilian protests. A demonstration in As-Samawah of around 150 
students on April 14 proceeded quietly and required no intervention by the local 
police.1577 On July 25, around 40 students organised a demonstration in As-
Samawah to protest against unemployment and the political climate.1578 In 
September, citizens organised small demonstrations, for instance to defy terrorism 
and against the authorities who had been unable to improve their quality of 
life.1579 
                                               
1568 See for example: Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 232; Jansen & Platenburg 
(2005), p. 192 & p. 195. 
1569 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), pp. 232-233, Matthijssen (2005), p. 151. 
1570 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview September 20, 2011(b); 1 (NL) Battle Group SFIR 5 
(s.a), p. 207ff. 
1571 See for example: Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 116, p. 12; Kamerstukken II, 
2002/03, 23 432, nr. 122, p. 2; Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 65. 
1572 Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 122, p. 7; Interview September 1, 2011(b). 
1573 Interview October 4, 2011(c); Jansen & Platenburg (2005), pp. 204-206; 11 (NL) Battle 
Group SFIR 5 (s.a), p. 29. 
1574 Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p. 206; 11 (NL) Battle Group SFIR 5 (s.a), p. 29. 
1575 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), pp. 149-150. 
1576 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), pp. 149-150. 
1577 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 201; Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p. 52. 
1578 Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p. 187. 
1579 Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p. 199. 
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8.2.2  Local police 
Police nationwide 
On May 16, 2003, as part of the wider process of de-Ba’athification, CPA 
Administrator Bremer decided to remove the top three layers of the management 
of the Iraqi National Police.1580 He did not dissolve the police force as a whole as 
he did with the Iraqi Armed Forces on May 23, 2003.1581 Nevertheless, after the 
end of conflict the police suffered from an unexpected loss of police officers. 
Within in a few weeks, the capacity of the police had shrunk to about 30,000, 
mostly low-ranking police officers,1582 while the estimated pre-war strength of 
the Iraqi Police Force had been around 58,000.1583 
 
In terms of performance, professionalism and equipment, the quality of the 
remaining Iraqi police was poor.1584 In May 2003, the CPA concluded that ‘the 
Iraqi Police, as currently constituted and trained, [were] unable to independently 
maintain law and order and need the assistance and guidance of Coalition Force 
assets (or some appropriate follow on force) to accomplish this task.’ The CPA 
also concluded that the police had ‘suffered years of neglect, coupled with a 
repressive command structure that prohibited training, pro-activity, initiative and 
stifled attempts toward modernisation of the police.’1585 For example, the police 
were unfamiliar with the principles of community policing. They also displayed a 
reactive attitude towards the public and crime and spent most of their time in 
police stations. When called to an incident, their ‘procedure was to round up 
possible suspects, extract confessions by force, and extort bribes from family 
members for release of the suspects.’1586 
 
Nevertheless, the CPA failed to prioritise police reforms immediately.1587 
According to the RAND Cooperation, this failure resulted in a police force that 
                                               
1580 Coalition Provisional Authority (May 16, 2003). Order No. 1: De-Ba’athification of Iraqi 
Society. CPA/ORD/16 May 2003/01. Available at 
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_CPAORD_1_De-
Ba_athification_of_Iraqi_Society_.pdf; accessed September 26, 2012. 
1581 Coalition Provisional Authority (May 23, 2003). Order No. 2: Dissolution of Entities. 
CPA/ORD/23 May 2003/02, Section 3. Available at 
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030823_CPAORD_2_Dissolution_of_Entitie
s_with_Annex_A.pdf; accessed September 26, 2012. 
1582 Dobbins, Jones, Runkle & Mohandes (2009), p. 71; Inspectors General US Department of 
State and US Department of Defense (2005), p. 9; Perito (2005), p. 4. 
1583 Inspectors General US Department of State and US Department of Defense (2005), 
footnote 3. Perito speaks of a pre-war strength of the INP of 60,000 police officers (Perito 
(2005), p. 3.) 
1584 Dobbins, Jones, Runkle & Mohandes (2009), pp. 71-72; Jones, Wilson, Rathmell & Riley 
(2005), p. 120. 
1585 Coalition Provisional Authority and Iraqi Interior Ministry (2003). Iraq Police: An Assessment 
of the Present and Recommendations for the Future. Baghdad: Coalition Provisional Authority 
and Iraqi Interior Ministry, p. 4. 
1586 Jones, Wilson, Rathmell & Riley (2005), p. 110. 
1587 See for example: Jones, Wilson, Rathmell & Riley (2005), p. 111; Perito (2005), p. 10. 
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became a ‘serious source of insecurity for the next several years.’1588 A sense of 
urgency to reform the Iraqi police reached the CPA only by the end of 2003 
when it started to draft a coalition-wide reform programme to improve the 
quality of the Iraqi police.1589 By May 2004, the CPA was ready to introduce ‘a 
twin-track approach to police transformation,’ which involved a plan for pre-
hiring and training police officers from the Saddam era and recruiting and 
educating new police officers and a schedule to modernise the institutional and 
operational capacity of the Iraqi police.1590 In terms of the modernisation of the 
Iraqi police, the CPA focused on the establishment of a police force of around 
135,000 ‘trained and equipped’ police officers of which 79,000 were to be 
deployed in the regular police,1591 56,000 in the specialised police (Public Order 
Battalions, Special Police Commando Units, and a Mechanised Police Brigade), 
and 40,000 in the Border Police.1592 The CPA based the future capacity of the 
Iraq Police upon the ‘per capita police-to-population ratios in neighbouring 
Islamic countries.’1593  
 
Police in Al-Muthanna 
In line with the observations described above, NL Army officers generally 
perceived the quality of the Al-Muthanna police as insufficient. 
First, many regarded the police as corrupt.1594 They related one of the root-causes 
of police corruption to the fact that police officers were locally rooted and had 
strong affiliation with their clans and families.1595 As such, loyalty to the clan or 
family could be perceived as more important than commitment to the police 
organisation.1596 This loyalty could also make police officers vulnerable to 
corruption or could influence their objectivity. For example, it was not always 
clear what criteria the police used to arrest an individual or not, especially if clan 
or family members or interests were involved. Because police officers were 
supposed to protect the interests of their clans, they often refrained from arresting 
a fellow clan-member.1597 Some NL Army officers perceived the provincial chief 
of police as corrupt.1598 Two of them suspected that he misused allocated funds, 
for example for private or clan purposes.1599 Another officer assumed that clans 
                                               
1588 Jones, Wilson, Rathmell & Riley (2005), p. xxi. 
1589 Jones, Wilson, Rathmell & Riley (2005), p. 116; Perito (2005), p. 10. 
1590 Jones, Wilson, Rathmell & Riley (2005), pp 118-119. 
1591 In October 2003, the Dutch government informed the Parliament that the CPA focused 
on establishing a police organisation of 75,000 police officers in 2005 (Kamerstukken II, 
2003/04, 23 432, nr. 131, p. 5). 
1592 Inspectors General US Department of State and US Department of Defense (2005), figure 
1, p. 10. 
1593 Inspectors General US Department of State and US Department of Defense (2005), p. 9. 
1594 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(a); Interview September 1, 2011(b); 
Interview October 4, 2011(c); Interview October 12, 2011(b). 
1595 Interview June 24, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 2011(c). 
1596 Interview August 29, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(a). 
1597 Interview June 24, 2011; Interview September 20, 2011(b); Interview October 12, 
2011(b). 
1598 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview August 29, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(a). 
1599 Interview August 29, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(a). 
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paid him to recruit relatives in exchange for more influence in the police 
organisation.1600 
Second, the Dutch regarded the attitude of the police of Al-Muthanna as 
problematic, notably regarding the public. Around two-third of the police had 
served in the Saddam era, which also explained their authoritarian and repressive 
attitude.1601 Consequently, the public generally mistrusted and feared the police, 
and hardly felt protected by them.1602 The lack of interaction and trust had 
created a considerable gap between the community and the police, which was, 
considering its long history, difficult to bridge within a short period.1603 Citizens 
rather preferred the Iraqi National Guard (ING), which they perceived as 
professional and objective, in order to protect their interests.1604 
Third, the quality of police officers had been problematic and hampered the 
overall performance of the police.1605 One police advisor explained: 
 
The lack of quality was visible at all levels of the police organisation. The chief-
of-police had no police background; he had his roots in Saddam’s Army. At the 
next level of the chain of command, there were some officers with policing 
experience and expertise. However, further down the chain of command, the 
quality increasingly disappeared. At the operational level many policemen were 
even unable to read or write.1606 
 
The lack of quality was also noticeable in terms of commitment and responsibil-
ity. According to MP personnel of SFIR 3, the Iraqi police officer generally 
lacked a sense of responsibility and initiative. They never questioned the 
background of their orders; they just obeyed them. The MP personnel also noted 
that senior officers failed to motivate their personnel.1607 
Fourth, the police were poorly equipped and housed. This problem was largely 
rooted in the Saddam era in which the police had had a low priority in terms of 
funding and resourcing. They lacked, for example, the necessary assets in terms of 
police gear, vehicles, computers, and weaponry to perform effective and 
professional policing.1608 
 
                                               
1600 Interview June 9, 2011. 
1601 Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 168, p. 4; Interview June 21, 2011; Interview June 
24, 2011; Interview August 29, 2011; Interview October 4, 2011(c). 
1602 Interview June 24, 2011; Interview August 29, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); 
Interview October 4, 2011(c). 
1603 Interview June 24, 2011; Interview August 29, 2011; Matthijssen (2005), p. 146. 
1604 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview June 23, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); 
Interview October 4, 2011(c). 
1605 Interview June 23, 2011; Interview June 24, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(a); 
Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 261; Matthijssen (2005), p. 146. 
1606 Interview September 1, 2011(a). 
1607 Feijt, Jongejan, Verburg & De Vries (2005), p. 83. 
1608 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 261; Dobbins, Jones, Runkle & Mohandes 
(2009), pp. 71-72; Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 168, p. 4; Interview June 24, 
2011, Interview September 1, 2011(a); interview September 1, 2011(b). 
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In Al-Muthanna, the CPA had planned for a police force of 1,400 police officers. 
At the start of the SFIR mission, there had been between 500 and 1,000 police 
officers.1609 In mid-2003, US Army and MP personnel had started a five-day SSR 
programme to train the remaining elements of the Al-Muthanna police force. 
Altogether, they managed to train around 800 police officers in about two 
months.1610 After the Dutch Marines had replaced the US troops, they continued 
training the local police. For that purpose, the Marines assigned a MP platoon of 
25 marechaussees.1611 They drafted a new training programme involving a two-
week basic training course for newly hired police recruits and an additional 
training for police officers from the old Iraqi police force. In addition to the basic 
training course, the Dutch MPs also provided on-the-job training by mentoring 
and monitoring Iraqi police officers during their daily duties.1612 
 
In March 2004, SSR became a top priority of the MND (SE).1613 For that 
purpose, it had developed a SSR Programme which focused on the reform and 
training of all Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),1614 including the police. The objective 
of the SSR Programme was to achieve ‘a secure and stable environment 
                                               
1609 One of the interviewees and Brocades Zaalberg and Ten Cate mention a police-strength of 
around 1.000 police officers at the start of the operation (Interview September 1, 2011(a); 
Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 153), while on June 25, 2003, the Minister of 
Defence speaks of 500 police officers as the actual strength of the Al-Muthanna police force 
(Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 120, p. 27). 
1610 See for example: Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 152; Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 
23 432, nr. 122, p. 6; Interview August 29, 2011. 
1611 Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 122, p. 6. At the start of the SFIR operation, a MP 
platoon of 25 marechaussees was assigned to train and mentor the local police. To reinforce 
those SSR efforts, the commander of SFIR 2 requested the government in January 2004 to 
deploy an additional 28 police trainers to train the Iraqi Police; Iraqi Highway Police en Iraqi 
Border Police. He also asked for six extra trainers for the Police Academy and the Provincial Joint 
Coordination Center (Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 146, p. 7). The government 
granted that request by the deployment of 41 additional police trainers for four months 
(Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 149, p. 1). Twelve trainers were assigned to the 
Iraqi Border Police, sixteen to the Iraqi National Police and Iraqi Highway Police, seven to 
the TSU (Tactical Support Unit) Emergency Battalion, and six to the Police Academy. 
During the mission, the number of police trainers varied (Ministerie van Defensie – Defen-
siestaf (2004b), p. 15. At the end of the mission 35 police trainers were deployed (Ministe-
rie van Defensie & Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2005), p. 24). 
1612 Interview August 29, 2011; Ministerie van Defensie & Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 
(2005), p. 24. 
1613 Matthijssen (2005), p. 146; Ministerie van Defensie & Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 
(2005), p. 24; Mulder (2005), p. 167. Although SSR had become one of SFIR’s priorities, 
staffing of the SSR detachment had been a problem in both qualitative and quantitative 
terms, the Dutch Defence Operational Centre lacked the knowledge to interpret the re-
quired competences. As a result, the Ministry deployed SSR-personnel that did not meet 
the required competences or expertise (Ministerie van Defensie & Ministerie van 
Buitenlandse Zaken (2005), p. 25 & p. 37). 
1614 The ISF consisted of the Iraqi Police Services (IPS), Department of Border Enforcement 
(DBE; Border Police), Facility Protection Service (FPS), Iraqi Correctional Service (ICS), 
Iraqi National Guard (ING), New Iraqi Army (NIA), Iraqi Air Force (IAF), Iraqi Coastal 
Defence Force (ICDF), Criminal Justice System (CJS), and the Permanent Joint Operation 
Centre (PJOC) (Mulder (2005), p. 167). 
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maintained by credible, self confident and capable security structures under Iraqi 
governance.’1615 The SSR Programme not only aimed to establish sustainable and 
functioning security forces; it also intended to create conditions for an exit 
strategy for the multinational forces.1616 
 
The SSR Programme identified three different phases: “local control”, “regional 
control”, and “strategic over-watch”. The three phases were not clearly defined 
stages but rather merging evolutions on a continuum. During “local control”, the 
Iraqi Security Forces were supposed to reach ‘an adequate level of effectiveness to 
maintain law and order in populated dense areas under the direction and 
supervision of the [Multinational Forces]’. During “regional control”, the Iraqi 
Security Forces were supposed to have reached ‘an adequate level of effectiveness 
to maintain law and order within the provincial boundaries under governance of 
the Iraqi Provincial Councils.’ If required, the Iraqi authorities could request the 
Multinational Forces for advice regarding the provision of law and order. During 
“strategic over-watch”, the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Security Forces 
would have established a maximum level of effectiveness. The role of the 
Multinational Forces would be limited to occasional monitoring of the Iraqi 
Security Forces.1617 
 
On April 30, 2004, the Iraqi Security Forces had reached the level of local 
control. If everything had proceeded as planned, the MND (SE) expected that 
the Iraqi Security Forces would reach the level of regional control before the 
Transfer of Authority.1618 However, the attacks on coalition troops in Baghdad, 
Najaf, Falluhaj and Karballa during March-August 2004 slowed down the 
process. The attacks also had an effect on public security in Al-Muthanna and 
delayed the execution of the SSR programme.1619 The poor Iraqi response to the 
security problems in Al-Muthanna proved, for example, that the Iraqi Security 
Forces were not yet able to assume full responsibility for law and order before the 
Transfer of Authority at the end of June 2004. The SSR Programme was further 
delayed after the ambush of August 14 since the Dutch temporarily stopped their 
SSR activities. The ambush had disturbed the relationship between SFIR and the 
local police, in particular, the relationship with the Ar-Rumaythah police.1620 
Although the local authorities and the local police had assumed responsibility for 
public security in Al-Muthanna, and the police had reached the intended capacity 
of 1,400 officers by the end of June 2004, the police were still at the stage of 
local control. As a result, SFIR considered the local police to be still unqualified 
                                               
1615 Mulder (2005), p. 167. 
1616 Mulder (2005), p. 167. 
1617 Mulder (2005), pp. 173-175. 
1618 Mulder (2005), p. 176. 
1619 See for example: Kamerstukken II, 2004/05, 23 432, nr. 179, p. 6; Ministerie van Defensie 
& Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2005), p. 24; Mulder (2005), p. 176. 
1620 Interview June 24, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(a); Kamerstukken II, 2004/05, 23 
432, nr. 179, p. 6. The battalion assumed it unlikely that the Ar-Rumaythah police had not 
been aware of preparations of the ambush, although the ambush happened near the police 
station and had not alarmed the police (Interview September 1, 2011(a); Kamerstukken II, 
2004/05, 23 432, nr. 179, p. 6). 
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to provide public security independently and effectively.1621 Nevertheless, SFIR’s 
prime focus shifted from providing public security to assisting, training and 
mentoring the local police (and other security institutions).1622 For that purpose, 
SFIR 4 evaluated the status of the local police in order to define their future SSR 
activities. The evaluation proved that the development of police leadership 
required further attention. Furthermore, it underlined that the cooperation 
between the security forces required improvement as well as the full commitment 
of local commanders. 
 
To establish the required improvements, SFIR 4 developed a new SSR plan, 
which articulated the need for an intensification of the training and monitoring 
of the local police, including the Tactical Support Unit-Emergency Battalion.1623 
The plan also addressed the need to improve the quality of the police organisa-
tion’s facilities (police stations, prisons and training centre), processes, coordina-
tion mechanisms, management and leadership.1624 Finally, the plan included a 
proposal for a three-week training course in the Netherlands, in police manage-
ment and leadership, for twenty high potential members of the Al-Muthanna 
police. This training finally happened in February/March 2005.1625 
 
At the end of his mission, the commander of SFIR 4 observed some improve-
ment. For example, he noted an increase in coordination and cooperation 
between the police and the other security services, a slight improvement in the 
quality of the police and growing public trust in the police.1626 Nevertheless, he 
thought that the police still had to make some mental changes regarding their 
relationship to the public:  
 
We had focused on reinforcing the public support for the police and tried to 
make police aware that it was helpful to interact with the public in the streets. 
We told them that they should not only focus on catching criminals, but also on 
chatting with the people on the streets and ask them how they were. That 
                                               
1621 Interview August 29, 2011; Mulder (2005), pp. 176-177. 
1622 Ministerie van Defensie & Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2005), p. 24; Matthijssen 
(2005), p. 146; Mulder (2005), p. 174. 
1623 In Al-Muthanna, a Tactical Support Unit (TSU) Emergency Battalion was deployed end of 
October 2004. The mission of the TSU Emergency Battalion was to enhance the quality of 
the local police and to support local authorities to maintain public order. The battalion had 
a capacity of 650 police officers. They were locally recruited and trained and largely had a 
background in the Army. After completion of the two-week training course, elements of 
the TSU Emergency Battalion deployed at vehicle checkpoints in and around the urban 
areas (Jansen & Platenburg (2005), pp. 202-203 & p. 211; Kamerstukken II, 2004/05, 23 
432, nr. 185, p. 7; Matthijssen (2005), p. 144). In comparison with the local police, the 
Dutch officers perceived the TSU Emergency Battalion in comparison with the local police 
as professional, well trained, and reliable (Interview June 9, 2011; Interview October 12, 
2011(b)). 
1624 Matthijssen (2005), pp. 146-147. See also: Kamerstukken II, 2004/05, 23 432, nr. 177, pp. 
35-36; Kamerstukken II, 2004/05, 23 432, nr. 181, p. 3. 
1625 Kamerstukken II, 2004/05, 23 432, nr. 181, p. 3; Ministerie van Defensie & Ministerie van 
Buitenlandse Zaken (2005), p. 24. 
1626 Matthijssen (2005), pp. 147-148. 
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mind-shift was very difficult to achieve. We were after all in a country where 
there was a huge gap between the public and the police. There had been a huge 
aversion to the police due to their relationship with the previous regime.1627 
 
After SFIR 5 replaced SFIR 4 on November 15, 2004, the Section Operations 
again evaluated the status of the Iraqi Security Forces in the province. The 
evaluation showed that these forces were still making progress to reach the 
required level of quality yet and that they were still unable to operate independ-
ently and without support of SFIR. The Section Operations concluded that 
additional training was required, especially in terms of command and control, and 
coordination.1628 As a result, the completion of the SSR required more time to 
reach the appropriate level of provincial control than anticipated and became the 
prime focus of SFIR 5 in order to prepare the police and the other security forces 
to assume full responsibility for public security during the elections on January 
30, 2005.1629 
 
Towards the end of the mission, Dutch SSR efforts started to yield some results 
as the quality of the Iraqi police improved incrementally. Gradually, the police 
were capable of tackling basic, non-complex crime cases, as one police adviser 
had observed.1630 Whether the police had reached an acceptable level of quality 
by Western standards was, however, hard to define as he reported: 
 
To my opinion the implementation of the model of community policing was 
difficult and perhaps it was not a very good choice. The model works well in 
Western society, but is an anomaly within the Iraqi culture. The culture of the 
Arabic world differs from that of the Western society. This is reflected in the 
police. The police operate more aloof from civil society rather than engaging to 
restore disruptions of social values and norms.1631 
 
It was also doubted whether the training of the police finally rooted in the police 
force and would change the attitude of police officers. It seemed difficult to 
change the old police culture. When police trainers were around, Iraqi police 
officers often showed desirable behaviour. However, as soon as the Dutch had 
left, the local police often returned to their traditional habits, as two senior 
officers reported.1632 
8.3  Operational concept 
8.3.1  Planning and preparation 
The planning for the SFIR mission had had a national and international compo-
nent. At the national level, political and strategic planning and preparation and 
                                               
1627 Interview June 24, 2011. 
1628 11 (NL) Battle Group SFIR 5 (s.a), p. 70. 
1629 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview September 20, 2011(b). 
1630 Interview September 20, 2011(b). 
1631 Interview September 20, 2011(b). 
1632 Interview September 20, 2011(b); Interview October 12, 2011(b). 
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overall command and control (“full command”) had been the responsibility of 
the Chief of the Armed Forces. The Chief of the Defence Staff tasked the 
contributing branches to prepare and deploy the SFIR battalions. The Defence 
Operations Centre had been responsible for monitoring the daily operations and 
activities with a specific national interest, such as force protection, intelligence, 
and national civil-military cooperation. The operational planning, and command 
and control in theatre had been a responsibility of the (UK) Commander of the 
MND (SE).1633 
 
International mandates and planning 
The legal basis for the deployment of the Multinational Force (MNF) in Iraq was 
UNSCR 1483, which called for ‘the willingness of Member States to contribute 
to stability and security in Iraq by contributing personnel, equipment, and other 
resources under the Authority.’1634 UNSCR 1483 invited states ‘to assist the 
people of Iraq in their efforts to reform their institutions and rebuild their 
country, and to contribute to conditions of stability and security in Iraq’ under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.1635 UNSCR 1483 offered UN member states 
the opportunity to deploy troops and resources under the command and control 
of the United States and the United Kingdom.1636 The Resolution did not 
specify or authorise the establishment of a Multinational Force. That was covered 
in UNSCR 1511 of October 16, 2003, which authorised the establishment of a 
Multinational Force ‘under unified command to take all necessary measures to 
contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.’1637 
 
UNSCR 1483 recognised the United States and the United Kingdom as 
occupying powers.1638 As such, UNSCR 1483 called on these countries, under 
applicable international law, ‘to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through 
the effective administration of the territory, including in particular working 
towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability and the creation of 
conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political 
future.’1639 The resolution made thus clear that the United States and the United 
Kingdom were responsible for providing public security to the citizens of Iraq. 
This was in line with Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, which notes that an 
occupant ‘shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as 
possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, 
the laws in force in the country.’1640 
 
                                               
1633 Ministerie van Defensie & Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2005), p. 21. 
1634 UN Doc S/RES/1483 (2003), preamble. 
1635 UN Doc S/RES/1483 (2003), §1. 
1636 Ministerie van Defensie & Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2005), p. 9. 
1637 UN Doc S/RES/1511 (2003), §13. 
1638 UN Doc S/RES/1483 (2003), preamble. 
1639 UN Doc S/RES/1483 (2003), §4. 
1640 Hague Convention (IV) concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 
October 18, 1907, Article 43. 
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The (UK) Commander of the MND (SE) took this obligation into account. In 
his Concept of Operations, he defined – among other tasks – a number of tasks 
regarding the provision of public security, such as: 
 
- Restoring and maintaining security and stability; 
- Maintaining public order; 
- Protecting and securing police facilities, and financial and cultural institu-
tions; 
- Enabling the operations of humanitarian organisations.1641 
 
Until the formal Transfer of Authority to the Iraqi people on June 28, 2004, the 
Multinational Force had been responsible for providing public security. From this 
date onwards, however, the Iraqi authorities and security forces would progres-
sively assume full responsibility for public security and stability in Iraq.1642 
Nevertheless, UNSCR 1546 of June 8, 2004 decided that the Multinational 
Force would keep ‘the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to 
the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.’1643 As such, the Resolution 
allowed the Multinational Force to use force or to intervene in public security 
matters when required or appropriate.1644 
 
After the Transfer of Authority, the mission and tasks of (UK) Commander of 
MND (SE) and the units under his command changed from occupation to 
security assistance. In his Commander’s Intent, he underlined the consequences 
of the change of focus: 
 
I see our mission very much as security assistance. The end state can only be 
achieved through a partnership between MNF and the Iraqis. Ultimately, we 
must work alongside ISF to provide a sufficiently secure environment to permit 
free and fair elections. To reach that state of security we must continue to 
establish effective ISF that can neutralise Anti Iraqi Forces (AIF), whether they 
are terrorist, militia, criminals or simply the disenchanted. Our continued pres-
ence and ability to assist ISF depends entirely upon the consent of the Iraqi 
people.1645 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1641 Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 116, p. 10; Ministerie van Defensie & Ministerie van 
Buitenlandse Zaken (2005), p. 11. 
1642 UN Doc S/RES/1546 (2004), §8. 
1643 UN Doc S/RES/1546 (2004), §10. 
1644 Voetelink (2013), pp. 436-437. 
1645 Multinational Division (South East), CONOPS 02/04, June 20, 2004, p. 4. SSA, Hard 
Disk 156/SFIR extra/Sfir 4/operaties/conops/conops MND SE/-NIEUW- Draft 
CONOPS 0204 Main Body Version 2. See also: Commander 13 (NL) BG SFIR 4, Opera-
tion Order No. 002 (SFIR 4), July 20, 2004. SSA, Hard Disk 156/SFIR 
051012/Operaties/contingency plans and operations/NLBG SFIR 4 CONOPS/ OPOR-
DER NR 002/Romp oporder nr 002 draft, p. 2. 
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He further emphasised that: 
 
We must demonstrate that we are no longer occupying forces, but that the 
Iraqis have primacy and in security terms this means ISF primacy. (….) That 
means that we must be prepared to allow the Iraqis to lead.1646 
 
After the Transfer of Authority, the operations of the MND (SE) concentrated 
on two priorities: 
 
- Assistance to the reform of the Iraqi police and other security forces and 
through a programme of recruitment, training, equipping, mentoring, and 
monitoring. 
- Framework operations to disrupt, deter, and defeat threats against multina-
tional forces and the ISF, both as part of force protection and in support of 
ISF. Wherever possible these activities were performed in cooperation with 
the ISF until they had sufficient capability to handle the situation independ-
ently.1647 
 
Public security continued to be a focal point of the MND (SE). Next to the 
establishment of effective Iraqi Security Forces, the commander also targeted the 
reduction of criminality to a level acceptable to the local community as one of 
the conditions to reach the desired end state of an independent and stable Iraqi 
state.1648 How this was to be achieved, he did not mention, however. 
 
National political planning 
UNHCR 1483 had been the political and the legal foundation for the Dutch 
government to deploy troops to Iraq.1649 Although the Dutch forces were de jure 
not occupying forces, the government endorsed the call from the UN Security 
Council ‘to comply fully with the obligations under international law including 
                                               
1646 Multinational Division (South East), CONOPS 02/04, June 20, 2004, p. 5. SSA, Hard 
Disk 156/SFIR extra/Sfir 4/operaties/conops/conops MND SE/-NIEUW- Draft 
CONOPS 0204 Main Body Version 2. See also: Commander 13 (NL) BG SFIR 4, Opera-
tion Order No. 002 (SFIR 4), July 20, 2004. SSA, Hard Disk 156/SFIR 051012/ Operaties/ 
contingency plans and operations/NLBG SFIR 4 CONOPS/OPORDER NR 
002/Romp oporder nr 002 draft, p. 2. 
1647 Multinational Division (South East), CONOPS 02/04, June 20, 2004, p. 5. SSA, Hard 
Disk 156/SFIR extra/Sfir 4/operaties/conops/conops MND SE/-NIEUW- Draft 
CONOPS 0204 Main Body Version 2. See also: Commander 13 (NL) BG SFIR 4, Opera-
tion Order No. 002 (SFIR 4), July 20, 2004. SSA, Hard Disk 156/SFIR 051012/ Op-
eraties/contingency plans and operations/NLBG SFIR 4 CONOPS/OPORDER NR 
002/Romp oporder nr 002 draft, p. 2. 
1648 Multinational Division (South East), CONOPS 02/04, June 20, 2004, p. 4. SSA, Hard 
Disk 156/SFIR extra/Sfir 4/operaties/conops/conops MND SE/-NIEUW- Draft 
CONOPS 0204 Main Body Version 2. See also: Commander 13 (NL) BG SFIR 4, Opera-
tion Order No. 002 (SFIR 4), July 20, 2004. SSA, Hard Disk 156/SFIR 051012/Operaties/ 
contingency plans and operations/NLBG SFIR 4 CONOPS/OPORDER NR 
002/Romp oporder nr 002 draft, p. 2. 
1649 Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 116, p. 2; Ministerie van Defensie – Defensiestaf 
(2004b), p. 6. 
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in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 
1907’ as it had done in every previous crisis management operation.1650 
 
Nevertheless, the Netherlands wanted to avoid the discussion whether it de facto 
operated as an occupying force if it were to assume executive law enforcement 
and public order activities. The Netherlands therefore defined a number of 
caveats. These stated that Dutch forces were not supposed to assume administra-
tive tasks or to execute autonomous ‘executive law enforcement development 
activities’ including the ‘active searching for suspected war criminals.’ The 
government regarded these law enforcement activities to be a responsibility of 
the Iraqis themselves.1651 Merely to acquire a broad parliamentary support for the 
mission and to ease the political and public aversion against the status of occu-
pier,1652 the government underlined that the focus of the operation was to 
transfer responsibilities to the Iraqi population as swiftly as possible. The prime 
responsibility of the stabilisation force was to support rather than to replace Iraqi 
structures. The Dutch troops had to act proactively and as much as possible avoid 
a military presence in the form of, for example, patrolling and operating 
checkpoints.1653 
 
During the deployment of the Marines battalion SFIR 1, these caveats, however, 
turned out to be ineffective and impractical to restore law and order during a 
security gap, mainly because the Iraqis were still unable to provide public security 
independently and effectively. As a result, SFIR 1 was authorised to take on 
public security tasks under the authority of the CPA until the Iraqi authorities 
and police were able to fulfil these responsibilities themselves.1654 When on 
November 28, 2003, the government decided to extend the Dutch contribution 
to the SFIR mission, it again emphasised that the battalions were only authorised 
to execute public security tasks in order to enable a swift transfer of authority. It 
also underlined that these activities were not to be executed independently but in 
cooperation with the local police as much as possible.1655 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Concept of Operations of the Commander of the 
MND (SE) had been the operational foundation upon which the Dutch SFIR 
commanders based their operational plans and activities.1656 Another input to the 
battalion’s operational planning were the reconnaissance missions the three NL 
Army SFIR battalions organised prior to their deployment in their future area of 
operations. These missions helped to acquire additional situational awareness and 
information in order to complete the battalion’s operational planning processes. 
                                               
1650 Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 116, p. 8. See also: UN Doc S/RES/1483 (2003), §5. 
1651 Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 133, p. 8; Ministerie van Defensie & Ministerie van 
Buitenlandse Zaken (2005), p. 10. 
1652 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2012), p. 124. 
1653 Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 116, p. 10. 
1654 Ministerie van Defensie – Defensiestaf (2004b), p. 7; Ministerie van Defensie & Ministerie 
van Buitenlandse Zaken (2005), p. 10. 
1655 Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 134, pp. 13-14. 
1656 Ministerie van Defensie & Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2005), p. 21. 
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The reconnaissance missions made clear that to a large extent the mission would 
have a civilian focus in terms of providing public security, for example by 
supporting the local authorities and police and by training the local police and 
other security forces.1657 
 
However, whereas the Marines battalions SFIR 1 and 2 were largely involved in 
providing interim policing,1658 Army battalion SFIR 3 did not regard itself as an 
interim police force. Instead, SFIR 3 rather focused on ensuring a safe and secure 
environment in which the Iraqi police and other security forces could develop 
towards being self-supporting organisations.1659 As such, the commander of SFIR 
3 articulated that the end-state of the mission became ‘to create the conditions in 
Muthanna that will make the Coalition Forces (CF) presence obsolete.’1660 For 
that purpose, the activities of SFIR 3 increasingly moved from actively providing 
public security into training and mentoring the Iraqi police and the other security 
forces. Nevertheless, SFIR 3 formally kept its responsibility for providing public 
security and stability until the official Transfer of Authority.1661 In this initial 
operational plan, the commander of SFIR 3 therefore had still included a number 
of public security tasks.1662 Also in his Operational Order No. 002 of April 26 – 
which preluded on a controlled Transfer of Authority – he continued to regard 
                                               
1657 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview June 21, 2011; Interview June 24, 2011; Interview 
September 1, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 2011(c); Interview October 12, 2011(b). After 
completing their initial planning processes, battalion commanders did not present their 
operational plans to the Dutch military authorities (in casu the Director of Operations of the 
Defence Staff) for final approval. As a result, national command and control during the 
SFIR operation was rather loosely structured, except when major incidents were involved 
and there had been an intensive national monitoring of events (Ministerie van Defensie & 
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2005), p. 21. See also: Interview June 21, 2011; Inter-
view June 24, 2011). 
1658 See for example: Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 117, p. 28; Kamerstukken II, 
2003/04, 23 432, nr. 133, p. 5 & pp. 8-9; Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 134, p. 13. 
1659 Commander 42 (NL) BG, Provisional Operation Order No. 001 (SFIR 3), p. 2. SSA, Hard 
Disk 156/SFIR 051012/Operaties/contingency plans and operations/NLBG SFIR 3 
CONOPS/OpO 001 (Provisional Version)/oporder 001; Interview June 21, 2011; Inter-
view September 1, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 2011(c). 
1660 Commander 42 (NL) BG, Provisional Operation Order No. 001 (SFIR 3), p. 2. SSA, Hard 
Disk 156/SFIR 051012/Operaties/contingency plans and operations/NLBG SFIR 3 
CONOPS/OpO 001 (Provisional Version)/oporder 001. See also: Kamerstukken II, 
2003/04, 23 432, nr. 163, pp. 2-3; Interview June 21, 2011; Interview October 4, 2011(c). 
1661 Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 163, pp. 2-3; Interview June 21, 2011; Interview 
October 4, 2011(c); Commander 42 (NL) BG, Provisional Operation Order No. 001 (SFIR 
3), p. 2. SSA, Hard Disk 156/SFIR 051012/Operaties/contingency plans and opera-
tions/NLBG SFIR 3 CONOPS/OpO 001 (Provisional Version)/oporder 001. 
1662 These public security tasks included, for example, providing security on the Main Supply 
Routes, conducting independent social and security patrols and vehicle checkpoints; con-
ducting joint security patrols and vehicle checkpoint with MP and local police if necessary 
and/or applicable; and being prepared to detain High Pay-off Targets linked to the former 
regime of Iraq Commander 42 (NL) BG, Provisional Operation Order No. 001 (SFIR 3), p. 
2. SSA, Hard Disk 156/SFIR 051012/Operaties/contingency plans and operations/NLBG 
SFIR 3 CONOPS/OpO 001 (Provisional Version)/oporder 001. 
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reducing criminality and maintaining public order as part of his mission.1663 
However, he did not translate this mission into specific public security tasks in 
order to instruct or at least challenge his company commanders to focus on 
providing interim policing. This omission fitted within the viewpoint that the 
battalion, although responsible for interim policing, did not regard itself as an 
interim police force. 
 
After the Transfer of Authority of June 28, 2004, the focus and mission of the 
subsequent SFIR deployments changed into a support role.1664 This change also 
focused the mission of SFIR 4, which intended to: 
 
[C]onduct security and stabilisation operations in line with MND (SE) lines of 
operation within boundaries in support of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Iraqi 
civil authorities in order to realise the political process and set the conditions for 
Iraq becoming a united and stable, democratic state, integrated within the 
international community.1665 
 
Based upon this assignment, the commander of SFIR 4 formulated his objective 
for the mission. He intended ‘to assist and support the ISF and Iraqi civil 
authorities in executing their responsibility to maintain security and stability.’ In 
his Commander’s Intent, he underlined the importance ‘to establish effective ISF 
to reach a sufficient level of security’, which he regarded as a ‘prerequisite for free 
and fair elections.’1666 As such, SFIR 4 focused its public security efforts on 
training and mentoring the Iraqi Security Forces and improving their coordina-
tion and cooperation mechanisms and processes.1667 The option to provide 
interim policing moved to the background, not only because of the prioritisation 
of SSR but also because SFIR 4 planned to limit its presence in urban areas in 
favour of patrolling and operating in rural and border areas.1668 
 
SFIR 5 also focused its public security efforts on SSR in order to enable the 
police and the authorities to assume full responsibility for public security during 
the elections of January 30, 2005.1669 However, different to SFIR 4, SFIR 5 also 
                                               
1663 Commander 42 (NL) BG, Operational Order No. 002 (SFIR 3), April 26, 2004, p. 2. SSA, 
Hard Disk 156/SFIR 051012/Operaties/contingency plans and operations/NLBG SFIR 3 
CONOPS/OpO 002 (inclusief relevante bijlagen)/Opord 002 (SFIR3). 
1664 Interview June 24, 2011. 
1665 Commander 13 (NL) BG SFIR 4, Operation Order No. 002 (SFIR 4), July 20, 2004. SSA, 
Hard Disk 156/SFIR 051012/Operaties/contingency plans and operations/NLBG SFIR 4 
CONOPS/OPORDER NR 002/Romp oporder nr 002 draft, p. 2. See also: Matthijssen 
(2005), p. 142. 
1666 Commander 13 (NL) BG SFIR 4, Operation Order No. 002 (SFIR 4), July 20, 2004. SSA, 
Hard Disk 156/SFIR 051012/Operaties/contingency plans and operations/NLBG SFIR 4 
CONOPS/OPORDER NR 002/Romp oporder nr 002 draft, p. 2. See also: Matthijssen 
(2005), p. 142. 
1667 Interview June 23, 2011; Interview June 24, 2011; Interview October 19, 2011. 
1668 Commander 13 (NL) BG SFIR 4, Operation Order No. 002 (SFIR 4), July 20, 2004. SSA, 
Hard Disk 156/SFIR 051012/Operaties/contingency plans and operations/NLBG SFIR 4 
CONOPS/OPORDER NR 002/Romp oporder nr 002 draft, p. 2. 
1669 11 (NL) Battle Group SFIR 5 (s.a), p. 252. 
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prioritised active and intensive patrolling of urban areas.1670 Patrolling enabled 
SFIR 5 to re-establish an information capacity that disappeared after the Transfer 
of Authority when SFIR 4 complied with the request of the local authorities to 
minimise their patrols in the urban areas. The withdrawal had resulted in a loss of 
information and intelligence because the interaction with the local population 
had been minimised. SFIR 5 prioritised the restoration of their information 
capacity by intensifying their patrolling.1671 
 
Operational planning and preparation 
During the training and preparation of the three Army-based SFIR battalions, 
public security had played a limited role. SFIR 3 had not specifically trained for 
public security tasks, although providing interim policing had been part of the 
mandate. The battalion commander noted: 
 
We were not trained to execute public security tasks. My troops for example 
did not receive a formal CRC training. In physical terms, we were not pre-
pared.1672 
 
Nevertheless, the battalion had trained to search and arrest individuals. This 
training had been part of the regular mission-oriented training and focused on 
searching, handcuffing and transporting suspects including the use of tie-rips and 
dark goggles to blindfold arrested suspects. This training was not based upon 
specific police instructions but upon the regular curriculum for the treatment of 
prisoners of war.1673 At least one company additionally trained for CRC. This 
had been an improvised training provided by a company official who acquired 
CRC experience during his mission in the Balkans. The unofficial training had a 
basic character and focused on taking up positions and formations, like sealing off 
an area, isolating individuals from a group and manoeuvring in a line.1674 
 
SFIR 4 also trained for arresting and searching suspects as part of the regular 
mission-oriented training.1675 One company commander mentioned that he used 
the expertise of personnel of the Marechaussee to improve the soldiers’ skills. In 
the mission area, this kind of training continued as part of a cross-training in 
which personnel of the Marechaussee trained in so-called contact drills.1676 Within 
the mission-oriented training, company commanders were empowered to 
emphasise issues that they considered important in relation to their future mission 
in Al-Muthanna. One company commander used that opportunity to organise an 
                                               
1670 In addition to SSR, Support to Elections, and Normal Framework Operations, CIMIC had 
been the fourth priority of SFIR 5 (11 (NL) Battle Group SFIR 5 (s.a), p. 252). 
1671 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview June 24, 2011; Interview October 12, 2011(b); 
Interview October 19, 2011. See also: Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), pp. 268-260. 
1672 Interview June 21, 2011. 
1673 Interview June 21, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 2011(c). 
1674 Interview September 1, 2011(b). 
1675 Interview June 23, 2011; Interview October 19, 2011. 
1676 Interview June 23, 2011. 
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unofficial, improvised CRC training to prepare his troops on possible public 
security activities: 
 
Officially, we were not trained in providing public security and we did not 
receive CRC training. I organised an additional training for my company. I do 
not know whether the other company commanders organised such training as 
well. Based upon my experiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I anticipated that 
we might encounter large crowds. My experience was that under these circum-
stances the pressure could increase. What is important then is that you are 
capable of managing that pressure, mainly because your posture affects that of 
the crowd. The CRC training was organised by some members of my staff who 
served in a CRC platoon in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As such, they transferred 
their experience to a new group.1677 
 
Although this company commander provided his troops a makeshift CRC 
training, in theatre he did not deploy them in CRC-like situations. He used the 
training to get his troops acquainted with the pressure of large crowds. In the 
mission area, he clearly recognised the benefits of the training, especially at 
checkpoints during the Ashura marches when situations could get tense and 
required some crowd control.1678 
 
Like its predecessors, SFIR 5 did not label public security as a specific training 
element. The search and arrest of civilian suspects had been an integral element 
of the mission-oriented training. Like SFIR 4, the battalion used the expertise of 
the Marechaussee to support that training. The training focused on the arrest of 
suspects at checkpoints and not on arresting pinpointed suspects, which they saw 
as a responsibility of the Iraqi police.1679 
 
Although Army battalions did not extensively train for public security, they had a 
CRC platoon at their disposal. Initially, CRC had not been part of the Dutch 
operational concept. Early in 2004, the commander of the Marine battalion SFIR 
2 anticipated public disturbances and demonstrations in his area of responsibility 
during the yearly Islamic pilgrimage Hadj and requested additional CRC 
capacity.1680 The government shared his assessment and approved the deployment 
of a dedicated CRC platoon. The platoon was provided by 41 Artillery Battalion 
of the NL Army and was formally tasked to provide force protection, to 
guarantee freedom of movement of coalition forces, to protect the battalion’s 
infrastructure and to protect persons and resources indicated by the Commander 
of the MND (SE). 
 
After the Army battalion SFIR 3 had replaced the Marines of SFIR 2, the 
government extended the deployment of the CRC platoon provided by 41 
                                               
1677 Interview June 23, 2011. 
1678 Interview June 23, 2011. 
1679 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview October 12, 2011(b). 
1680 Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 146, p. 7. 
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Artillery Battalion.1681 The battalion commander of SFIR 3 did not deploy this 
platoon to control demonstrations or public disorder. Instead, he used the 
platoon for Normal Framework Operations, such as perimeter patrolling and 
force protection.1682 He had doubts regarding the effectiveness of the concept, 
especially in a hostile context: 
 
The CRC concept does not work and I do not believe in it. You cannot have a 
platoon on a notice to move of one hour for four months. It could work if you 
would know of a demonstration in advance. That only happened once. Most 
demonstrations occurred spontaneously or were secretly prepared. Besides, you 
should ask yourself whether you should deploy your platoon in those situations. 
I am convinced you should not. As a Westerner, you must never step into that 
trap. We do not speak the language and do not know the culture in order to be 
effective. The CRC concept is not limited to the use of the truncheon, but also 
consists of verbal and non-verbal communication with civilians. You should not 
get involved in situations where you do not speak the language. Moreover, in a 
stability operation you must make the local authorities responsible for public 
security. Your contribution should be limited to training of local police offi-
cers.1683 
 
The commander of SFIR 3 also doubted the effectiveness of CRC in crisis 
management operations: 
 
I had full confidence in the troops, but whether they were prepared well 
enough to operate in chaotic circumstances effectively, I do not know. I knew 
that it was a good team that would be ready when I needed it and that it would 
act considerately and according to its ability. But that does not mean that they 
were well prepared for operating in complex situations.1684 
 
As such, battalion commanders showed serious reservations about deploying the 
CRC platoon if an operational opportunity were to occur. According to the 
commander of the CRC platoon, these reservations were largely based upon a 
lack of knowledge and trust in the organisation. He assumed that commanders 
did not know how to use the instrument in an optimal way. On the other hand, 
he admitted that trust in the effectiveness of the instrument could only increase if 
CRC platoons would have the opportunity to acquire operational experience 
                                               
1681 See for example: Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, 149, p. 2; Ministerie van Defensie – 
Defensiestaf (2004b), pp. 15-16; Ministerie van Defensie & Ministerie van Buitenlandse 
Zaken (2005), p. 29. See also: Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 159. 
1682 See for example: Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, 149, p. 2; Ministerie van Defensie – 
Defensiestaf (2004b), pp. 15-16; Ministerie van Defensie & Ministerie van Buitenlandse 
Zaken (2005), p. 29; Interview June 21, 2011. The CRC platoon assigned to SFIR 3 
joined the battalion in theatre; it did not participate in the battalion’s pre-deployment train-
ing. 
1683 Interview June 21, 2011. 
1684 Interview June 24, 2011. 
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during deployments at home, for example in support of the civilian police,1685 
which had not been the case. 
 
The debate on the effectiveness of the CRC instrument continued during SFIR 
5 and influenced the preparation of its CRC platoon. Although the Marechaussee 
had trained the platoon, it did not receive the formal certification required for 
full operational deployment. De jure, SFIR 5 did not have a CRC capacity.1686 In 
addition, the battalion commander decided to limit the integration of CRC in 
his operational concept to the minimum of what he thought was required. 
Largely, he based his decision on the experiences of his predecessors who had not 
used the CRC instrument for public order purposes. As such, he supposed that a 
full deployment would not be realistic, especially since the local police had 
assumed full responsibility for public order.1687 
8.3.2  Managing the security gap 
8.3.2.1 Public order management 
Patrolling 
Patrolling had been one of the most important activities to promote public 
security throughout the SFIR mission. The subsequent battalions deployed 
several foot patrols in urban areas, often on a 24/7 basis, in order to show 
presence and to interact with the local population as much as possible. In Iraq, 
the Dutch military continued the approach they had successfully applied in the 
Balkans. Unlike the US troops elsewhere in Iraq, the Dutch did not patrol the 
streets in full battle-gear and in heavy armoured vehicles but were, rather, lightly 
armed and on foot or in soft-top vehicles. As a rule, a patrol was executed by an 
infantry section of six soldiers, one corporal, and one sergeant. Patrols could 
deploy independently or in cooperation with the local police.1688 
 
Until the Transfer of Authority, the patrols were largely tasked to create a safe 
and secure environment, for example to keep the peace in turbulent neighbour-
hoods or areas, to observe demonstrations, or to intervene in minor incidents. 
After the Transfer of Authority, the Dutch patrolled in cooperation with or in 
support of the Iraqi police and other security forces. They also reduced the 
number and frequency of their patrols in the urban areas of Al-Muthanna. After 
the ambush in Ar-Rumaythah, the governor requested a reduction in the 
number of patrols in the towns. The governor argued that the presence of SFIR 
patrols would further provoke public resistance against the Dutch troops. 
Although the commander of SFIR 4 had his doubts, he complied with the 
                                               
1685 Interview October 13, 2011(a). 
1686 Commander 1 (NL) Contco SFIR, Evaluatie C-Contco SFIR 5, March 25, 2005, p. 2. SSA, 
Hard Disk 156/SFIR 051012/Evaluaties en verslagen/SFIR5/Eindevaluatie. 
1687 Interview June 9, 2011. 
1688 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(a); Interview September 1, 2011(b); 
Interview October 4, 2011(c); Interview October 12, 2011(b); Interview October 19, 
2011; Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 131, p. 7; Matthijssen (2005), p. 149; Van 
Wijk (2005), pp. 116-117. 
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request and focused patrolling on force protection for some weeks. After the 
fights in Najaf had ended and US troops had reached a cease-fire with Al-Sadr 
end of August, the situation in Al-Muthanna calmed down. The battalion 
gradually resumed its social patrolling activities in cooperation with the local 
police in urban areas as part of the SSR training, although the cooperation with 
the Ar-Rumaythah police did not recover during the remainder of their mission 
and remained tense.1689 
 
The commander of SFIR 5 noticed that by reducing its presence in urban areas 
SFIR 4 had limited its freedom of movement and its ability to collect informa-
tion and intelligence. He therefore decided to intensify the number of patrols in 
order to enlarge its visibility and influence. The battalion commander argued that 
he could only support the Iraqi authorities and police in promoting public 
security if he had full freedom of movement: 
 
I had a different approach. Of course, we were there to support the Iraqis. To 
my opinion, however, we could only be successful if we had absolute freedom-
of-movement. After our arrival, we explicitly focused at the restoration of the 
relationship. To be effective and to know what is going on, we needed to have 
access to the hotspots, also to acquire our intelligence. After we announced that 
we wanted to have access to the neighbourhoods again, we did not receive any 
response. We had chosen for a controlled and incremental approach. We started 
in Ar-Rumaythah, first in the surrounding neighbourhoods and then in the city 
centre. That went quite smoothly while we expected some resistance. We 
applied the same approach in the other towns. In As-Samawah only we en-
countered some resistance, but that was verbal rather than physical.1690 
 
Overall, by patrolling the streets of urban areas, all NL Army battalions had de 
facto taken on interim policing in order to maintain public security. According to 
two Dutch senior police advisers of the Marechaussee, they did this well.1691 One 
of them explained: 
 
The battalion did a good job as interim police providing public order. They 
were the only institution to do that. I think the Marechaussee should have taken 
on these tasks, but we lack the personnel and resources. Deploying the battalion 
had been the only option to promote public security.1692 
 
Demonstrations 
While the Marines had played an active role in controlling demonstrations,1693 
the role of Army battalions had been less significant. In early April 2004, the 
                                               
1689 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(a); Interview September 1, 2011(b); 
Interview October 4, 2011(c); Interview October 12, 2011(b); Interview October 19, 
2011; Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 131, p. 7. See also: Brocades Zaalberg & Ten 
Cate(2012), p. 133. 
1690 Interview June 9, 2011. See also: Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate(2012), p. 133. 
1691 Interview September 1, 2011(a); Interview September 20, 2011(b). 
1692 Interview September 1, 2011(a). 
1693 See for example: Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), p. 125, p. 149 & p. 161. 
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battalion commander, the CPA representative and the governor agreed that the 
Iraqi police and other security services would take the lead in crowd and riot 
control. The idea was that this would enable the Iraqi police to adjust to their 
new responsibilities after the Transfer of Authority.1694 
 
In the new arrangement, police mentors of the Marechaussee liaised with the Iraqi 
police as soon as a demonstration was announced, to assist and advise them in 
their planning and preparation.1695 During a demonstration, the Iraqi police were 
in the lead. The police trainers of the Marechaussee monitored their activities 
while a company liaison officer generally liaised with the mayor and/or local 
chief of police. As a rule, platoons took positions at strategic locations elsewhere 
in town in order to intervene and assist in case of escalation.1696 The new 
approach had been a deliberate choice of the commander of SFIR 3: 
 
We had no role in controlling demonstrations. To my opinion, a larger role 
would only stir up the fire. The trick was to show presence sufficiently. The 
Iraqis knew that we had our platoons on standby at assembly points in the outer 
ring. They also knew if it would escalate, we would intervene.1697 
 
In the following months of the SFIR mission, the Dutch did not need to 
intervene to control demonstrations,1698 except during the events on May 14, 
2004 when Sadr supporters in As-Samawah launched a demonstration that 
escalated and required combined Dutch and Iraqi action, as explained earlier. 
 
Support for elections 
The first free and democratic elections since the Saddam era took place on 
January 30, 2005. They could be seen as the apotheosis of the Dutch SFIR 
mission. In terms of public security, preparations for the elections already started 
during the deployment of SFIR 4 with a crisis management exercise in which the 
security services and Provincial Joint Operations Centre (PJOC) were tested. The 
exercise had been organised by the Dutch SSR trainers and monitors and 
included a number of scenarios and incidents that could occur during the 
elections. These incidents were simulated in a role-play in which the police and 
other services had to take appropriate action while being monitored by the 
Dutch.1699 
 
The preparations continued during SFIR 5. On December 13, 2004, the 
battalion organised emergency exercise Operation Koala. This exercise intended to 
                                               
1694 See for example: Brocades Zaalberg (2010), p. 195; Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 
154, p. 6. 
1695 Interview September 1, 2011(a); Interview September 1, 2011(b). 
1696 Interview June 21, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 
432, nr. 156, p. 6. 
1697 Interview June 21, 2011. 
1698 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview June 21, 2011; Interview August 29, 2011; Interview 
September 1, 2011(a). 
1699 Interview June 23, 2011; Interview October 19, 2011. 
264
SFIR 
 
prepare and train the Provincial Security Committee, the PJOC, ISF, and the 
emergency services (such as such as the fire department and ambulance services) 
to ‘handle any oncoming emergency during the election and afterwards.’1700 The 
exercise involved a multiple incident scenario of a major car crash with casualties 
and a public order incident. These scenarios were executed simultaneously in As-
Samawah, Ar-Rumaythah and Al-Kidr.1701 Although the Iraqi Security Services 
operated in an “Iraqi Style,” the exercise was called a success for ‘the fires were 
extinguished, the casualties were transported and the offenders were caught,’ as 
one officer recalled.1702 On January 18, 2005, the SSR trainers organised a second 
emergency exercise. The exercise consisted of ten different incidents that 
occurred simultaneously in each of the three towns and required a coordinated 
response by the PJOC, the security forces and emergency services. According to 
the battalion commander, the Iraqi Security Forces had made considerable 
progress in comparison to the first emergency exercise. The commanders of the 
Security Forces attended the exercise that, according to the SFIR battalion 
commander, had to be seen as a “major sign of progress”.1703 On January 25, the 
Dutch organised a “full dress rehearsal” for all those involved in providing a safe 
and secure election day. The SFIR companies also participated in the exercise, 
not only to monitor the events but also to train for their role and procedures 
during the elections.1704 
 
In addition to training its personnel, the battalion also assisted the Security Forces 
in their planning and preparation for the election day. Although the Iraqi 
authorities were responsible for organising safe and secure elections, the SFIR 
leadership took de facto control, and coordinated most of these efforts. At the 
strategic level, the battalion commander for example initiated a weekly Security 
Council meeting to be attended by the governor, the provincial chief of police, 
the commander of the ING battalion and the commander of SFIR. Initially, 
some of the Iraqi key-players showed their disinterest and sensed no immediate 
urgency. The governor, for example, did not even show up during the first two 
meetings. However, four weeks in advance of the elections the Iraqi authorities 
assumed their responsibilities. In the following meetings, the participants 
discussed the Security Plan, the division of roles and responsibilities between the 
Security Forces and emergency response services and the staffing of the PJOC. 
The SFIR battalion commander pledged the support of his troops if required. He 
underlined that public security during the elections primarily would be a 
responsibility of the Iraqis.1705 At the operational level, company commanders 
assisted the police chiefs in their area of responsibility to develop a security plan. 
In Ar-Rumaythah, the company commander wrote the plan himself. He 
considered the Iraqis incapable of producing a workable concept themselves: 
                                               
1700 11 (NL) Battle Group, FRAGO 102/04 OP KOALA, December 6, 2004, p. 1 
1701 11 (NL) Battle Group, J3, Chief SSR, Evaluation Emergency Exercise, 972-3109, 
December 29, 2004. 
1702 Interview September 20, 2011(b). 
1703 11 (NL) Battle Group SFIR 5 (s.a), p. 261. 
1704 11 (NL) Battle Group SFIR 5 (s.a), p. 262. 
1705 11 (NL) Battle Group SFIR 5 (s.a), pp. 254-263. 
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I made a planning for the Iraqi security efforts during the elections. In the weeks 
prior to the elections, I made a first draft and presented it carefully to my secu-
rity partners. I gave them the impression that they had a significant input in the 
plan. In the following weeks, I discussed the plan with the commanders of the 
police and the ING at designated meetings. I made sure that they could agree 
with my ideas and that everything proceeded in cooperation and consultation. 
Of course, I tried to control the process, because ultimately I was responsible for 
overall security.1706 
 
On election day, SFIR deployed Operation Kurki to support the Iraqi Security 
Forces.1707 There had been a clear division of tasks between SFIR and the Iraqi 
Security Forces. At the central level, monitors of the SSR team were deployed in 
the PJOC where they mentored the Iraqi officials during their coordinating 
efforts. At the decentralised level, the Iraqi police and ING secured and patrolled 
the area of the 130 polling stations of Al-Muthanna while SFIR1708 was on 
standby at close range in order to assist the Iraqis when required.1709 At the access 
roads to the main towns of Al-Muthanna, SFIR, police and ING operated 
combined mobile vehicle checkpoints, which sealed off these towns for all 
ingoing traffic. At each checkpoint, Iraqi police and ING searched every vehicle 
on weapons or explosives in order to prevent assaults on polling stations in town 
while the Dutch monitored the search process. In the towns, there had been 
prohibition on vehicle movements. To enforce that ban, SFIR deployed mobile 
vehicle checkpoints to stop and search cars if needed. All security preparations 
and measures contributed to safe and secure elections without major incidents. 
The elections were called a success.1710 
 
8.3.2.2 Law enforcement 
Arrests 
During their deployment, troops of the NL Army arrested suspects on various 
occasions and during various operations. This section provides a number of 
examples of these arrests. 
 
In April 2004, the SFIR 3 ran an operation to apprehend those suspected of 
planning and preparing an attack on coalition forces.1711 The operation deployed 
                                               
1706 Interview October 12, 2011(b). 
1707 During the elections a company of eighty Royal Highland Fusiliers augmented the Dutch 
battalion. 
1708 A Company of the UK Royal Highland Fusiliers augmented SFIR 5 during the elections 
and manned checkpoints around As-Samawah from January 26 and February 2 (11 (NL) 
Battle Group SFIR 5 (s.a), pp 262-263 & p. 259). 
1709 Kamerstukken II, 2004/05, 23 432, nr. 183, p. 4. 
1710 Interview September 20, 2011(b); Interview October 12, 2011(b). 
1711 The rules of engagement enabled the Dutch SFIR troops to apprehend criminal suspects. 
However, they were not entitled to formally arrest and detain those apprehended. The 
authorisation to arrest and to detain criminal suspects rested formally with the occupying 
powers and the local police (see for example: Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 117, p. 
32; Kamerstukken II, 200/04, 23 432, nr. 134, p. 13). After being transported to the Dutch 
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independently from the Iraqi police although it was based upon information from 
the local police. Over several days, the companies operated observation posts and 
mobile vehicle checkpoints to survey vehicle movements in the area. The 
operation resulted in the arrest of several suspects. On April 10, for example, 
personnel of the Bravo Company stopped and searched a mini-van, apprehended 
four suspects and confiscated a mortar and several shells. The next day, personnel 
of the Charlie Company stopped a car transporting a RPG and several grenades 
and apprehended the four passengers of the car. They processed the suspects in 
accordance with the Standard Operating Procedure for handling detainees,1712 
and transported them to the base in Ar-Rumaythah from where they were 
delivered into the custody of the British forces in Basra.1713 
 
Another example of the arrest of those suspected of insurgency occurred on April 
24 when SFIR troops stopped a car at a vehicle checkpoint. When searching the 
car, troops discovered nine 107 mm grenades. They arrested the two passengers. 
One suspect was later released; the other was transferred to the British forces.1714 
 
During the night of April 1, 2004, SFIR 3 executed Operation Swatter. This 
knock-talk-search operation was initiated by the MND (SE) and deployed in 
cooperation with coalition forces under operational command and control of the 
Dutch battalion.1715 The operation focused on the arrest of suspects, who 
allegedly were part of a criminal network involved in weapon smuggle, human 
trafficking, and drugs trade. The suspects were perceived as a threat to the 
Coalition Forces.1716 According to the Dutch Contingent Commander, ‘the legal 
basis was found in the Memorandum of Understanding “Command arrangements 
and related matters for the Multinational Division South East (MND SE) within the 
stabilization of Iraq”.’1717 
The operation involved the deployment of SFIR 3’s Alpha, Bravo and Charlie 
Companies. The Dutch battalion was reinforced by Delta Company of 2 (UK) 
Para Battalion. The operation also involved the support of other coalition assets, 
such as a liaison team from the US to arrest the suspects, and a sniper team, five 
                                               
base at As-Samawah, the suspects were submitted to a medical evaluation by a physician 
and a verification of their identity by a lawyer. Next, a team of lawyers and intelligence 
personnel had to decide whether there was a legal ground to transfer a suspect to the British 
forces in Basra. Within 72 hours the Dutch had to determine whether there was sufficient 
evidence that the suspect had threatened or obstructed the security of the operation of that 
of the coalition forces. If not, the Dutch had to release the suspect (Interview June 21, 
2011; Interview June 24, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b)).  
1712 Interview September 1, 2011(b). 
1713 Feijt, Jongejan, Verburg & De Vries (2005), p. 43 & p. 45; Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 
432, nr. 154, p. 6. 
1714 Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 158, p. 2. 
1715 Commander 1 (NL) CONTCO SFIR, Operation Swatter, Letter to J3 DCBC, undated. 
SSA, Hard Disk 156/SFIR 051012/Operaties/Alfabetisch/Swatter/nota Swatter 
1716 Commander 1 (NL) CONTCO SFIR, Operation Swatter, Letter to J3 DCBC, undated. 
SSA, Hard Disk 156/SFIR 051012/Operaties/Alfabetisch/Swatter/nota Swatter; Interview 
June 21, 2011. 
1717 Commander 1 (NL) CONTCO SFIR, Operation Swatter, Letter to J3 DCBC, undated. 
SSA, Hard Disk 156/SFIR 051012/Operaties/Alfabetisch/Swatter/nota Swatter. 
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helicopters (three Pumas, one Lynx and one Chinook) and a Phoenix Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle (UAV) from the UK to provide air-to-ground surveillance.1718 
The battalion executed the operation as a Special Operation. Although its 
purpose was to arrest criminal suspects, the battalion commander did not involve 
personnel of the Marechaussee in the planning process or for additional advice. 
Technical advice regarding the arrest of criminal suspects was provided by the 
Field Liaison Team of the Dutch Special Forces, which was assigned to him for 
intelligence purposes.1719 
The operation consisted of four simultaneous entries at four different locations in 
and around As-Samawah. The British Delta Company concentrated on two 
targets close to Camp Smitty, while the Dutch Alpha and Bravo Company each 
had two targets down-town. The battalion’s Charlie Company had been on 
standby. At the target assigned to the Alpha Company, the company commander 
deployed two platoons to form a perimeter to seal off the area and took positions 
to support the Dutch Special Forces Team and a section of the battalion’s 
Reconnaissance Platoon in the inner ring. As such, he provided freedom of 
movement to the Special Forces to execute the actual entry, to apprehend five 
suspects and to search the target. In the area of operations of the Bravo Com-
pany, the company commander deployed three platoons: one to seal off all access 
roads and two to provide a cordon around the target. A section of the battalion’s 
Reconnaissance Platoon secured the inner ring, while a team of the Special 
Forces executed the entry and seized the suspects present. 
After the Dutch Special Forces seized the suspects, personnel of the US liaison 
team executed the formal arrest. After the arrest, the Chinook helicopter 
transported the suspects to Tallil Air Force Base, and from there a C-130 
Hercules brought them to Baghdad for further questioning and detention.1720  
Operation Swatter was seen as successful and was executed swiftly and without 
armed violence. Altogether, twenty-four suspects were arrested and detained. 
The search of the targets also resulted in the confiscation of weapons, ammuni-
tion, passports, computers and some cash.1721 
 
On September 5, 2004, SFIR 4 executed Operation Kyodo.1722 This “knock-talk-
search” operation focused on the arrest of suspects involved in the ambush in Ar-
                                               
1718 Commander 42 (NL) BG, Briefing Operation Swatter, undated. SSA, Hard Disk 156/SFIR 
051012/Operaties/Alfabetisch/Swatter/Op Swatter Briefing; See also: Feijt, Jongejan, 
Verburg & De Vries (2005), p. 30. 
1719 Interview June 21, 2011. 
1720 Commander 42 (NL) BG, Briefing Operation Swatter, undated. SSA, Hard Disk 156/SFIR 
051012/Operaties/Alfabetisch/Swatter/Op Swatter Briefing; Commander 1 (NL) 
CONTCO SFIR, Operation Swatter, Letter to J3 DCBC, undated. SSA, Hard Disk 
156/SFIR 051012/Operaties/Alfabetisch/Swatter/nota Swatter; Interview June 21, 2011; 
Interview September 1, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 2011(c). 
1721 Commander 42 (NL) BG, Briefing Operation Swatter, undated. SSA, Hard Disk 156/SFIR 
051012/Operaties/Alfabetisch/Swatter/Op Swatter Briefing; See also: Feijt, Jongejan, Ver-
burg & De Vries (2005), p. 30; Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), pp. 185-186. 
1722 The name Kyodo referred to the Japanese Press Agency Kyodo. According to the Dutch, 
the press agency was often well informed and able to publish new items on security issues 
very swiftly, even earlier than known by the Dutch battalion. The battalion wanted to 
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Rumaythah on August 14. It had astonished the battalion commander and his 
staff that the governor – who lived in Ar-Rumaythah – had not been aware of 
the preparations for the ambush and supposedly did not know who were 
involved. The battalion commander had pushed the governor to come forward 
with information on the whereabouts of the possible suspects.1723 
The battalion commander ran the operation independently from the Iraqi 
Security Forces since he considered the purpose of operation to be in accordance 
with the ISAF mandate,1724 which authorised coalition forces ‘to take all 
necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in 
Iraq.’1725 In advance, the commander informed the National Contingent 
Commander on the purpose of the operation while he informed the Dutch 
Defence Staff only afterwards, in order to report the results.1726 Based upon the 
information of the governor the battalion planned an operation to be executed at 
the two identified locations. 
The operation started at 14:00 hrs, during the Iraqi siesta and involved a ground 
move and an air move. Bravo Company executed the ground move, which 
involved forming a perimeter around each of the two targets. The air move 
consisted of a British Chinook, which transported a Task Force of Dutch Special 
Forces team, the battalion’s reconnaissance platoon and a British forensic team. 
The battalion’s Head of Operations commanded the Task Force that took off 
from Camp Smitty in As-Samawah. After landing on the first target PUMA, a 
team of the reconnaissance platoon secured the building in order to search it later 
on, while the Special Forces entered the building and seized the suspects inside. 
After seizing the suspects, the Chinook transported the remaining part of the 
Task Force to the second object TIGER, where the action proceeded according 
to the same procedure. At both locations, a US liaison officer of the Task Force 
executed the formal arrest. Immediately after the arrest, the reconnaissance 
platoon and the forensic team entered the building and searched the place. After 
having completed their search, they moved back to PUMA in order to search it 
as well.1727 
Operation Kyodo resulted in the arrest of eight suspects and the confiscation of 
weapons, ammunition and falsified passports. The battalion transferred the 
suspects to the British forces in Basra for further questioning. After some weeks, 
the British military authorities had to release all suspects due to a lack of 
evidence.1728 
 
                                               
report the official results of Operation Kyodo before the Japanese Press Agency Kyodo 
could get hold of the news (Interview October 19, 2011). 
1723 Interview June 24, 2011; Interview October 19, 2011. A “knock-talk-search” operation 
involves a soft search tactic in which the searcher explains the purpose of his visit and re-
quests a formal permission of the proprietor to search his premises. 
1724 Interview June 24, 2011. 
1725 UN Doc S/RES/1546 (2004), §10. 
1726 Interview June 24, 2011. 
1727 Commander 13 (NL) BG, FRAGO 47/04 OP KYODO,, September 3, 2004. SSA, Hard 
Disk 156/SFIR 051012/Operaties/Alfabetisch/Kyodo/Frago 47.04 KYODO. Interview 
June 24, 2011; Interview October 19, 2011. 
1728 Interview June 24, 2011; Interview October 19, 2011. 
269
BEYOND BORDERS 
Search and anti-smuggling operation 
All Army battalions deployed operations to fight smuggling weapons, drugs, 
contraband and alleged terrorists. These operations were either intelligence-
driven or were part of normal framework operations.1729 
 
During normal framework operations troops could deploy random checks at 
checkpoints or during patrolling.1730 As a rule, SFIR deployed these activities in 
cooperation with the local police and/or ING. Towards the end of the mission, 
SFIR increasingly acted in support of the Security Forces and focused on 
monitoring their activities.1731 
 
Intelligence-led or focused operations against smuggling activities were deployed 
largely in the desert in the southern part of Al-Muthanna, close to the Saudi 
Arabian border. On October 8 and 9, 2004, for example, the reconnaissance 
platoon and Dutch Special Forces of SFIR 4 executed Operation Knock Out in 
cooperation with a team of 40 (UK) Royal Marine Commandos and Iraqi 
Border Police in order to search three locations close to the Saudi Arabian 
border. At these locations, troops had observed concentrations of trucks that 
could be related to the infiltration/smuggling of alleged suicide bombers and/or 
terrorists. The Task Force divided over the three locations: the Dutch covered 
two while the British Marine Commandos covered the other. Three helicopters 
dropped each team on its designated target. Because there was only one forensic 
team to assist the search and to collect the necessary evidence, the three teams 
were supposed to freeze and secure their sites until the forensic specialists had 
arrived. For that purpose, the forensic specialists jumped from location to 
location. The Dutch approached the objects overtly and engaged with the 
Bedouins in a friendly manner in order to show they had nothing to fear. The 
British Marine Commandos, however, did not apply a soft approach. They did 
not wait for the forensic team and immediately searched their site and rip-tied 
every person present. According to the Dutch Head of Operations, who acted as 
the commander-on-scene, the Marine Commandos had disturbed the evidence, 
which according to an officer involved, made further forensic investigation 
redundant.1732 This underlined the importance of troops being familiar with and 
trained in law enforcement procedures, as Voetelink notes.1733 
 
Operation Knock Out had been the prelude for Operation Buzzard that was 
conducted from October 11 until October 16. Operation Buzzard was again a 
joint operation that involved a Task Force of the Dutch reconnaissance platoon 
                                               
1729 Interview June 21, 2011; Interview June 23, 2011; Interview October 4, 2011(c); 
Interview October 12, 2011(b). 
1730 Interview June 23, 2011; Interview October 12, 2011(b). 
1731 Interview October 12, 2011(b). 
1732 Interview October 19, 2011; Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p. 206 & p. 207. See also: 
Commander 13(NL) BG, Frago 04/04 – Operation Knockout, Oct 4, 2004. SSA, Hard Disk 
156/SFIR 051012/Operaties/Alfabetisch/KNOCKOUT/04 10 08 FRAGO 04-04 – OP 
KNOCKOUT. 
1733 Voetelink (2013), p. 444. 
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and anti-tank platoon, a platoon of 40 (UK) Marine Commandos, several Italian 
observers and two American Blackhawk helicopters for medical evacuation. The 
purpose of the operation was to stop and search suspicious individuals and 
vehicles. In case of seized suspects, the plan was to transfer them and the 
accompanying evidence to the Dutch base in Al-Muthanna for further process-
ing. The Task Force used a Forward Operating Base 60 kilometres from the 
Saudi Arabian border. From there, the Dutch platoons deployed in the Al-
Muthanna part of the desert to search vehicles for contraband and weapons, in 
cooperation with the Iraqi Border Police. The British Marine Commandos 
deployed in the province of Najaf in order to show presence and execute search 
operations if required. Although troops searched many vehicles, the operation did 
not result in arrests or confiscated contraband.1734 
 
SFIR 4 also deployed targeted “knock-talk-search” operations to confiscate 
illegal firearms.1735 In Ar-Rumaythah, SFIR 4 ran a search operation after it had 
received information about mortar ammunition boxes in a house in Ar-
Rumaythah. The battalion executed the operation in cooperation with the local 
police, but it did not proceed as planned. The commander-on-scene recalled: 
 
We were supposed to deploy a cordon while the police would search the house. 
After we had quietly organised the cordon, the police arrived in a flying column 
with their blue flashing lights switched on. It looked as if we were in an Ameri-
can TV series. In the house, they were busy doing nothing. Without having 
searched the place, they left. Ultimately, we searched the house. Officially, we 
had to do this together with the police, but at the time, they were not ready for 
it.1736 
 
On September 1, SFIR 4 ran another “knock-talk-search” operation. The 
battalion had received information that in a house close to the Sadr building in 
As-Samawah illegal weapons were allegedly stored. Although the information 
had been single-source, the battalion took the information seriously. After the 
battalion’s reconnaissance platoon had deployed a cordon, a team of Dutch 
Special Forces searched the house. The commander-on-scene had an Apache 
helicopter that provided him with live-stream information. Ultimately, the search 
did not result in the discovery of the alleged weapon cache.1737 
 
SFIR 5 also deployed operations to fight smuggling in the Al-Muthanna desert. 
For this purpose, it deployed its reconnaissance platoon in a number of targeted 
operations. During Operation Phoenix the platoon cooperated with British troops 
to investigate smuggling activities in the desert south of As-Samawah. In 
                                               
1734 Commander 13(NL) BG, Frago 73/04 Operation Buzzard , October 5, 2004. SSA, Hard 
Disk 156/SFIR 051012/Operaties/Alfabetisch/Buzzard/Frago 73-04 BUZZARD; Inter-
view October 19, 2011; Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p. 206 & p. 207. 
1735 Interview June 24, 2011; Interview October 19, 2011; Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p. 193 
& p. 196. 
1736 Interview October 19, 2011, Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p. 193. 
1737 Interview October 19, 2011; Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p. 196. 
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Operation Covert, the platoon focused on weapon-smuggling activities for a week 
at night. The platoon operated observation posts at a bridge in As-Samawah. 
During Operation Achilles, and deployed an intelligence-led area search to record 
illegal border crossings. In Operation Jackboot the reconnaissance platoon cooper-
ated with British and American units to secure the border with Saudi Arabia to 
fight illegal border crossings of alleged insurgents. One Dutch section operated 
on MSR Milwaukee, which ran from As-Samawah to the Saudi Arabia border, 
to seal off the road if required while another team was on standby at Tallil 
Airbase in order to deploy an Air Mobile Checkpoint and to transport arrested 
suspects when required. Finally, the platoon executed Operation Jawhawker. This 
covert operation deployed after the battalion had received information on an 
alleged terrorist camp in the Al-Muthanna desert. The operation did not produce 
any evidence for the existence of such a camp.1738 In addition, the infantry 
companies contributed to the fight against smuggling. For example, Bravo 
Company ran Operation Tiger Watch. During the operation it assigned patrols to 
record smuggling activities and storages of explosives in area around MSR 
Tampa, north of Ar-Rumaythah.1739 
8.3.3   Intelligence 
Collection 
SFIR used various instruments to collect information, such as patrols, the Field 
Liaison Team (FLT), CIMIC and other liaison officers, meetings with key leaders 
and focused reconnaissance operations.1740 
 
The daily patrols were the basic instrument to collect information on a wide 
variety of subjects, such as the social composition of society, socio-economic 
issues and the activities of criminal organisations. To focus and adjust the 
collection of information, the company’s Intelligence Cell briefed each patrol in 
advance of their mission. The patrols received a number of focused questions to 
be answered during the patrol. These questions served to complete the situational 
awareness of the company or battalion. After patrolling, personnel of the 
company’s Intelligence Cell debriefed the patrols and they drafted a standard 
patrol report to be further analysed by the Intelligence Section of the battal-
ion.1741 
 
According to some officers, the information gathered by the patrols rather served 
to complete the company’s and battalion’s situational awareness than to generate 
                                               
1738 11 (NL) Battle Group SFIR 5 (s.a), p. 58. 
1739 11 (NL) Battle Group SFIR 5 (s.a), p.124. 
1740 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview June 21, 2011; Interview June 23, 2011; Interview June 
24, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 2011(c); Interview Octo-
ber 12, 2011(b); Interview October 19, 2011; Ministerie van Defensie & Ministerie van 
Buitenlandse Zaken (2005), p. 22. 
1741 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview June 21, 2011; Interview June 23, 2011; Interview 
September 1, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 2011(c); Interview October 12, 2011(b); In-
terview October 19, 2011; Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p. 52; 11 (NL) Battle Group SFIR 
5 (s.a), p. 157 & p. 192. 
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actionable intelligence. This information largely came from the FLT,1742 which 
directly reported to the battalion’s Head of Intelligence. The FLT was assigned to 
collect HUMINT in order to improve the battalion’s situational awareness. For 
that purpose, the FLT had built and maintained trusted networks and contact 
with all sorts of people within the Iraqi population, such as entrepreneurs, 
teachers, local police chiefs, politicians, shop-owners as well as common citizens. 
They also collected criminal intelligence by contacting weapon dealers and other 
criminals to collect information on possible hostile intentions against SFIR 
forces.1743 Until the Transfer of Authority, the FLT operated from the CPA 
House in As-Samawah. After the CPA had been dismantled, the FLT moved to 
Camp Smitty. At both locations, the FLT had created a facility where citizens 
could report their information discreetly and confidentially.1744 The FLT had also 
introduced a kind of hotline manned by an Iraqi interpreter where Iraqi citizens 
could report information on various issues.1745 
 
In addition to the patrols and the FLT, the battalion also used other instruments 
to acquire information. For example, meetings in which commanders engaged 
with local authorities and key leaders served to complete or adjust the battalion’s 
situational awareness.1746 To be able to process the information acquired during 
those meetings effectively, commanders always brought in one of their intelli-
gence officer to take notes or advise the commander to raise additional questions 
that could serve to complete the overall intelligence picture.1747 
 
However, whether information was collected or processed effectively was 
debated.1748 One officer argued that the lack of information prevented proactive 
action: 
 
Our intelligence organisation was not good enough. We did not have a clear 
picture of what was going on, with whom we had to deal and who was caus-
ing problems. In Ar-Rumaythah, a cleric supported Sadr. We suspected him 
of provoking the population. We could not put a finger on it. In addition, we 
should have known of the attacks in Ar-Rumaytah. These were prepared. 
These were planned. We also had a limited view on what was going on in the 
desert. That was strange because we were not the first to be there. The data-
base happened to be a pile of paper and a stack of CDs. But it was not a real 
database of what was really happening there.1749 
 
                                               
1742 Interview June 21, 2011; Interview October 19, 2011. 
1743 Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p.98. See also: Interview June 21, 2011; Interview October 
19, 2011; Feijt, Jongejan, Verburg & De Vries (2005), p. 40; Ministerie van Defensie & 
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2005), p. 22. 
1744 Interview June 21, 2011; Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p. 98. 
1745 Interview June 21, 2011; Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p. 98. 
1746 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview June 23, 2011; Interview June 24, 2011; Interview 
October 12, 2011(b); Interview October 19, 2011. 
1747 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview June 24, 2011; Interview October 12, 2011(b). 
1748 Interview June 23, 2011; Interview June 24, 2011; Interview October 19, 2011. 
1749 Interview October 19, 2011. 
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Matthijssen, the commander of SFIR, also recognised the limitations of SFIR’s 
intelligence organisation. First, he noted that the SFIR mission revealed that there 
had been a greater need for specialised HUMINT officers, both for gathering and 
analysis of information. Second, he argued that section commanders needed 
additional training in interview techniques in order to acquire more and better 
information during patrolling. Finally, he argued that the company level needed 
structural reinforcement of intelligence personnel rather than adding and training 
staff just for the occasion.1750 In addition, the Ministry of Defence and Foreign 
Affairs concluded too that the intelligence structure lacked quality and quantity in 
order to operate effectively in a large area and against irregular opponents.1751 
 
Criminal intelligence 
The SFIR battalions collected information and intelligence on a wide array of 
subjects. Criminal intelligence had been one of these subjects; although this kind 
of intelligence was not exclusively labelled as such. Collection of criminal 
intelligence, for example on criminal suspects, organisations or activities, had 
been part of the Normal Framework Operations and FLT or had been part of 
observation operations by the companies and reconnaissance platoon, for 
example to map the movements of smugglers and illegal border crossers.1752 
 
Exchange 
In general, the SFIR commanders, both at the battalion and the company level, 
were not keen on sharing information and intelligence with their Iraqi counterparts 
and/or partners. Most commanders showed reserve because they feared that their 
intelligence would leak from the police or other partners to third parties, such as 
criminals or insurgents.1753 In general, information was shared if the Dutch needed 
the support of, for example, the Iraqi police or when there was a common interest 
between parties to achieve progress on certain issues.1754 In case of an operation, 
the Dutch did not inform the Iraqi authorities until the start of an operation, 
because either they did not want any Iraqi involvement, or they feared that their 
operation would be compromised.1755 One commander explained:  
 
I informed the local authorities just before the operation or after it had started. 
Certainly not days ahead otherwise that would all leak. And although the mayor 
could be trusted, he was informed too only just before or during an operation; a 
procedure which he had agreed to.1756 
 
                                               
1750 Matthijssen (2005), p. 154. 
1751 Ministerie van Defensie & Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2005), p. 22. 
1752 See for example: Jansen & Platenburg (2005), pp. 188-189 & pp. 192-193; 11 (NL) Battle 
Group SFIR 5 (s.a), p. 58 & p. 124. 
1753 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview June 21, 2011, Interview June 23, 2011; Interview June 
24, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); Interview October 19, 2011; Interview Octo-
ber 12, 2011(b). 
1754 Interview June 23, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); Interview October 19, 2011. 
1755 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview June 24, 2011; Interview October 4, 2011(c); Interview 
October 12, 2011(b). 
1756 Interview October 12, 2011(b). 
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On the other hand, commanders indicated the Iraqis did not share their informa-
tion or intelligence either.1757 One commander recalled: 
 
I cannot remember that the governor ever told me anything of which I got the 
impression I should have acted to. Our relationship was not strong enough. I 
always had the impression that he had a hidden agenda. That is one of the 
problems when you work in another country where there are different norms 
regarding self-interest or where there is a competition between clans and the 
government.1758 
 
Another commander also had the impression that the Iraqis were reserved in 
sharing information but he also noticed some willingness: 
 
We never knew what we did not get. Nevertheless, I had the impression that 
the chief-of-police, the imam and some sheikhs were willing to share infor-
mation. They sometimes provided useful information that helped us complet-
ing our picture.1759 
 
Sometimes, the willingness to establish good relationships resulted in the 
exchange of information. One commander, for example, explained that his 
liaison officer to the local police worked with them on equal terms and with 
mutual respect, which sometimes resulted in actionable intelligence.1760 
8.3.4  Cooperation 
Local authorities 
Cooperation with the local authorities occurred at both the central battalion level 
as well as at the decentralised company level, although there were differences 
between the companies in terms of the level of decentralisation. 
 
At the battalion level, the battalion commander focused on cooperating with the 
provincial authorities such as the governor, the provincial chief of police, the 
commander of the ING battalion and the commander of the fire department. 
The SFIR battalion commanders met these authorities on a weekly basis in the 
Provincial Security Committee where they discussed current public security 
issues (see below, under Police).1761 Battalion commanders also frequently met 
influential sheikhs, politicians and religious leaders. These contacts had a more ad 
hoc and informal character. Contacts sometimes involved public security issues, 
or merely focused on establishing good relationships.1762 According to one 
battalion commander, meetings with sheikhs had been of importance because 
they could play a crucial role in public security, especially when the local police 
                                               
1757 Interview June 21, 2011; Interview June 23, 2011. 
1758 Interview June 21, 2011. 
1759 Interview June 24, 2011. 
1760 Interview September 1, 2011(b). 
1761 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview June 21, 2011; Interview June 24, 2011. 
1762 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview June 24, 2011; Feijt, Jongejan, Verburg & De Vries 
(2005), p. 14. 
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had a different tribal background than the local clans. During the elections, 
sheikhs even committed to the provincial security plan and assumed responsibility 
for public order and security in their region.1763 
 
The company commanders had similar contacts. They met with the municipal 
authorities and key leaders in their area of responsibility.1764 The company 
commanders – with the exception of the company commander in As-Samawah 
(see below under police) – met with the municipal Security Committee on a 
weekly basis. In these formal meetings, they discussed local public security issues 
with the mayor, council members, the municipal chief-of-police, the ING 
company commander and the fire department commander. Company command-
ers also weekly met with the City Council. These meetings had no public 
security focus, but concentrated on discussing the progress of running reconstruc-
tion and development projects and/or exploring projects that SFIR could 
support.1765 Company commanders also maintained individual, informal contacts 
with local authorities or key leaders, such as the mayors, police chiefs, local 
sheikhs, representatives of political parties and mullahs, to exchange information 
on various subjects, such as development and reconstruction, cooperation, 
security and the mission of SFIR.1766 Some company commanders authorised 
and/or involved their platoon commanders to establish and maintain contacts 
with local key leaders, such as mullahs, sheikhs, directors of public service 
corporations, politicians and community leaders.1767 
 
External communication did not happen at random. Meetings with local key 
leaders were well planned. One of the company commanders, for example, 
drafted a contact matrix to delegate these contacts and to determine the topics he 
wanted them to discuss.1768 Another company commander coordinated the 
upcoming meetings with the local key leaders during his weekly staff meeting in 
order to define and prepare the topics to be discussed.1769 
 
Local police 
Throughout the mission, the police had not been able to provide public security 
without the support of SFIR. That support concentrated on providing assistance, 
mentoring and monitoring of daily policing and management activities and 
enabling and improving of operational coordination between the security sector 
agencies (see also Box 5). To support the cooperation with the police, SFIR 
company commanders appointed liaison officers who, together with the dedicated 
                                               
1763 Interview June 9, 2011. 
1764 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview June 21, 2011; Interview June 24, 2011; Interview 
October 19, 2011. 
1765 Interview September 1, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 2011(c). 
1766 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview June 21, 2011; Interview June 24, 2011; Interview 
October 12, 2011(b); Interview October 19, 2011. See also: Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p. 
129. 
1767 Interview June 23, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 2011(c); 
Interview October 12, 2011(b). See also: 11 (NL) Battle Group SFIR 5 (s.a), p. 34. 
1768 Interview June 23, 2011. 
1769 Interview October 4, 2011(c). 
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police monitors, contacted the police on a daily basis. These contacts served to 
exchange information, to coordinate joint activities such as joint patrols and 
checkpoints and to monitor the overall development and progress of the police.1770  
 
The commander of SFIR 3 had decided to push the Iraqis to assume responsibil-
ity for public security already prior to the Transfer of Authority. The decision 
implied that SFIR’s role in public security moved from being in the lead to 
assistance, mentoring and monitoring.1771 Cooperation between SFIR and the 
local police had been difficult, however. In addition, cooperation was interpreted 
differently within the battalion. The battalion commander, for example, 
described the cooperation as problematic because the Iraqis lacked qualified 
personnel for a smooth cooperation.1772 One of his company commanders 
explained that his unit was not yet ready to accompany and guide the police. 
Cooperation with the police had therefore not been a priority; they rather 
focused on the ING.1773 Another company commander, however, had taken on 
an active role in public security. He actively sought cooperation to engage the 
Iraqi police in public security and to show the public the police was committed 
to protect them. It had been of help that one of his lieutenants had a background 
in the Dutch civilian police. It enabled him to establish some sort of peer-related 
contacts and to acquire more in-depth information, based upon mutual respect 
and understanding.1774 
 
Box 5: Mentoring and monitoring 
Cooperation largely involved monitoring and mentoring of local police officers. 
Monitoring and mentoring had been the prime responsibility of police trainers 
of the Marechaussee. In these efforts, they got the support of Army patrols, for 
example in providing force protection and instructing police personnel.1775 
Monitoring and mentoring occurred on a daily basis in the local police stations, 
central prison and the courthouse and during joint patrolling and/or at 
checkpoints.1776 During mentoring and monitoring, Marechaussee personnel 
advised and provided on-the job training for both the police management and 
junior police officers, for example to improve policing and management skills, 
to stimulate interaction and communication with the local population, or to 
make them familiar with the basic principles of community policing.1777 
                                               
1770 Interview June 23, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 2011(c). 
1771 Interview June 21, 2011; Interview August 29, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); 
Interview October 4, 2011(c). 
1772 Interview June 21, 2011. 
1773 Interview October 4, 2011(c). 
1774 Interview September 1, 2011(b). 
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After the Transfer of Authority, SFIR 4 had to concentrate on training, mentor-
ing and monitoring. As such, it showed restraint towards active participation in 
local policing.1778 In addition, the Iraqis no longer felt subordinate to SFIR.1779 
Assistance remained necessary, however. A lack of quality and capacity required 
SFIR to provide some sort of support.1780 For example, SFIR 4 supported the 
local police in Al-Kidr to prevent fuel being stolen from pipelines and trains by 
criminal organisations. Because they lacked the capacity to fight these gangs, the 
police asked for assistance. SFIR helped the police by redrafting the initial 
operational plan, monitoring the operation and providing backup in case the 
situation would escalate. SFIR also regularly assisted the local police during traffic 
surveillance at checkpoints.1781 This kind of assistance could be part of the 
Normal Framework Operations,1782 or could be deployed upon request when 
situations got tense, for example during the Ashura marches when large numbers 
of vehicles and busses had to be searched on weapons while others tried to avoid 
these checks. SFIR personnel then assisted to help the Iraqis to control the 
situation.1783 SFIR 4 also assisted the police in As-Samawah to patrol and keep 
the peace in troubled neighbourhoods during the fights in Najaf.1784 After the 
ambush in Ar-Rumaythah, the cooperation between SFIR and the police had 
deteriorated for some time; especially with the police in Ar-Rumaythah as SFIR 
4 assumed that somehow they had been involved in its planning or execution.1785 
 
After the rotation, SFIR 5 therefore immediately prioritised the re-establishment 
of the relationships between SFIR and the local police. It invested in improving 
cooperation, in which, according to the battalion commander, they finally 
succeeded. He noted that the renewed collaboration also strengthened SFIR’s 
information capacity as the daily contacts with the Iraqi enabled them to acquire 
information that only the Iraqi police could get hold on because, better than the 
Dutch, they had been able to “read” the security situation and to understand 
underlying emotions. Cooperation therefore had also been essential for reasons of 
force protection.1786 
 
Provincial Security Committee 
In addition to police cooperation, the Provincial Security Committee served as a 
platform to coordinate public security efforts.1787 The Provincial Security 
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Committee was established during the deployment of SFIR 1.1788 The Provincial 
Security Committee consisted of the governor, the provincial chief of police, the 
battalion commander of the Iraqi National Guard, the commander of the Iraqi 
Border Police and the commander of the Fire Department. The SFIR battalion 
commander also attended the meeting and was assisted by the battalion’s Legal 
Advisor, Political Advisor, and the Mentor of the Chief of Police.1789 The 
Provincial Security Committee was scheduled to meet every Monday, either at 
Camp Smitty or at the Governance Building. 
 
Although the committee was supposed to discuss and coordinate public security 
policies at a strategic level, according to SFIR officials, the discussions lacked 
quality and mainly focused on operational and current public security issues and 
incidents.1790 One Dutch police advisor compared these meetings with ‘running 
in a swamp’, underlining their incremental character and lack of focus.1791 
 
In Ar-Rumaythah and Al-Kidr there had been similar security committees.1792 
Like the Provincial Security Committee, these committees met at a weekly 
frequency and served the municipal authorities, such as the major, the chief of 
police, and the local commander of the Iraqi National Guard, allowing discussion 
of the latest security incidents and coordination of upcoming events with a public 
security impact. On behalf of SFIR, the company commander attended the 
meeting.1793 According to one company commander, the mutual trust between 
the municipal authorities had been fragile which affected the effectiveness of the 
discussions. To overcome these problems, he sometimes discussed urgent issues 
informally and bilaterally with the local police chief in order to create an open 
atmosphere and to reduce the resistance to share information.1794 Like his 
colleague who attended the Provincial Security Council meetings, he regarded 
the quality of the meetings as insufficient: 
 
These meetings were about nothing. There was no structure; there were no 
lines. It had nothing to do with security.1795 
 
To improve the quality and effectiveness of the meetings, he suggested that the 
mayor review the number of participants. The mayor accepted his proposal and 
agreed to limit the number of participants to the commanders of the security 
                                               
1788 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2010), pp. 131-132. 
1789 Interview June 24, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(a); Matthijssen (2005), p. 146. 
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forces in town: SFIR, the police, the ING and the (Police) Emergency Battalion. 
He also agreed to prioritise security-related issues, such as the upcoming elections 
and urgent public order and criminality incidents in town, which, according to 
him, worked a lot better because now decisions were taken. Nevertheless, he still 
thought that the quality could be improved, for example in terms of cooperation 
and the commitment of the participants. Considering public security as the prime 
responsibility of the mayor, he decided to invest in the mayor as the chairman of 
the meeting. For that purpose, he and the mayor had frequent bilateral meetings 
in which they discussed the topics in advance in order to focus the quality of the 
meetings and to find ways to enhance the effectiveness of the input from the 
other participants. However, improving the quality of the collaboration of the 
Iraqi security services continued to be of his priorities until the end of mission.1796 
 
The Provincial Joint Operations Centre 
The second provincial structure to coordinate efforts regarding public security 
was the PJOC, located in the provincial Governance Building. In the PJOC, the 
Security Forces and emergency services of Al-Muthanna shared operational 
information and coordinated their efforts to solve current public security 
incidents.1797 After the MND (SE) had initiated the establishment of operation 
centres in the main towns in its area of responsibility,1798 SFIR 2 created a 
provincial coordination facility for Al-Muthanna by the end of December 
2003.1799 Although the centre had initially a rudimentary shape, it was immedi-
ately seen as an important step to improve the joint efforts of the provincial 
security and emergency services.1800 
 
To support the operations of the operations centre, all SFIR battalions assigned 
specialised personnel to train and mentor the local staff. Marechaussees focused on 
the police, Army trainers mentored the ING, while Army reservists in their 
capacity as civilian specialists were hired to train the local fire department and 
ambulance service to improve their operations and performances during 
calamities and crises.1801 SFIR also deployed initiatives to reinforce the commit-
ment of the commanders of the Security Forces to the PJOC, for example to 
involve them in the planning of the PJOC, to further improve its infrastructure, 
to organise joint exercises, and to host a seminar on public security to exchange 
views and experiences on managing public security.1802  
 
All these efforts contributed to a gradual improvement of the quality and 
effectiveness of the PJOC.1803 The effectiveness of the PJOC was further 
improved by giving it additional publicity. Initially, the PJOC had been a new 
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phenomenon in the Iraqi society. It had not been widely known, although SFIR 
3 had run an information campaign to promote the central provincial emergency 
number 115.1804 Still, the number of reports that reached the PJOC had been 
limited.1805 To boost the name of the PJOC, SFIR 5 again had run a media 
campaign to inform the citizens of Al-Muthanna on the purpose of PJOC and 
the central emergency number.1806 
 
However, whether the PJOC was functioning effectively and adequately at the 
end of the Dutch mission was hard to say. The PJOC was shaped along the 
Western model of a coordination centre, which is based upon initiative and 
horizontal communication between the participating services. In the Iraqi 
culture, this had not been obvious, as two interviewees noted.1807 One of them 
explained: 
 
If an incident occurred, a Dutch soldier took his responsibility and tried to solve 
the problem himself while an Iraqi immediately called his superior to ask for 
permission. Everything moved through the chain of command up to the gover-
nor or chief-of-police. If the top brass were not informed, nothing hap-
pened.1808 
 
The public 
Throughout the SFIR mission, cooperation with the local population was largely 
unilateral and focused on establishing local contacts to retrieve information from 
local sources on various subjects.1809 For that purpose, all SFIR companies 
deployed social patrols in the urban areas of Al-Muthanna, largely on a 24/7 
basis.1810 As mentioned earlier, these patrols also served to show presence in order 
to promote public security, public confidence and to win the hearts and minds of 
the population. Some company commanders deployed their platoons and sections 
in fixed and designated areas of responsibilities in order to develop local networks 
of trusted key leaders and key informants.1811 Others had opted for a flexible 
operational deployment of their units, which meant that they rotated between 
the various areas or neighbourhoods. As a result, these units were less able to 
establish fixed local networks and contacts on at the section level; they rather 
developed some sort of network at the platoon or company level that was used 
                                               
1804 Feijt, Jongejan, Verburg & De Vries (2005), p. 26. 
1805 Matthijssen (2005), p. 146. 
1806 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview September 20, 2011(b). 
1807 Interview August 29, 2011; Interview October 19, 2011. 
1808 Interview August 29, 2011. 
1809 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview June 23, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); 
Interview October 4, 2011(c); Interview October 12, 2011(b); Interview October 19, 
2011; Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p. 64 & p. 129; Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 
143, p. 6; Ministerie van Defensie & Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2005), p. 22. 
1810 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(a); Interview September 1, 2011(b); 
Interview October 4, 2011(c); Interview October 12, 2011(b); Interview October 19, 
2011; Matthijssen (2005), p. 149. 
1811 Interview September 1, 2011(b); Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p. 61; 11 (NL) Battle Group 
SFIR 5 (s.a), p. 34). 
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and shared by the various sections.1812 According to two Dutch police mentors, 
the patrols did well in establishing local contacts and networks, largely because 
they showed an open and proactive attitude towards the population, which made 
them approachable and – to some extent – accepted.1813  
 
Interviewees reported that SFIR companies had created some sort of informal 
facility where citizens could report information or discuss proposals for CIMIC 
projects.1814 Iraqi citizens were then supposed to report themselves at the gate 
after which the guard informed the Operation Room in order to call for a 
specialist to deal with the subject in question.1815 According to some SFIR 
officers, Iraqis did not use the opportunity to visit a base very frequently.1816 
They rather addressed a foot patrol to share their information or to raise a 
question,1817 for example to have it solved on the spot or to pass it to a specialist 
later on.1818 
8.3.5  Use of force and flexibility 
The Netherlands had adopted the rules of engagement of the United Kingdom as 
lead nation,1819 which described the level, conditions, and circumstances 
regarding the use of force.1820 According to the Dutch government, the rules of 
engagement served their purpose as they were robust and enabled SFIR to create 
a safe and stable environment and to protect itself effectively.1821 
 
The rules of engagement were further explained in the Aide-Memoire voor SFIR 
Commandanten (Aide-Memoire for SFIR Commanders), issued by the Dutch 
Commander of the Armed Forces. The Aide-Memoire also incorporated the 
national restrictions compared to the British rules of engagement. The Aide-
Memoire explained, for example, that the use of force was authorised only in case 
where alternatives were inadequate and that under all circumstances, troops could 
not use more force than strictly necessary to achieve their mission.1822  
                                               
1812 Interview June 23, 2011; Interview October 4, 2011(c); Interview October 12, 2011(b). 
1813 Interview August 29, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(a). 
1814 Interview June 23, 2011; Interview June 24, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); 
Interview October 4, 2011(c); Interview October 12, 2011(b); Interview October 19, 
2011. 
1815 Interview June 24, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); Interview October 12, 2011(b). 
1816 Interview June 23, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b). 
1817 Interview September 1, 2011(b), Interview October 12, 2011(b); Interview October 19, 
2011. 
1818 Interview October 12, 2011(b). 
1819 Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 116, p. 11; Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 
134, p. 13; Ministerie van Defensie & Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2005), p. 15. 
1820 For the content of the Rules-of-Engagement, see for example: 
http://www.risk.org/article283html; http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/inneriks/3462304.html; 
http://cryptome/uk-roe-1q.htm; accessed November 9, 2012. 
1821 Kamerstukken II, 2002/03, 23 432, nr. 116, p. 11; Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 
134, p. 13. 
1822 Chef Defensiestaf, Aide Memoire voor SFIR Commandanten, July, 24, 2003, cited by 
Gerechtshof te Arnhem, Militaire Kamer, Uitspraak Gerechtshof zaak Eric O, May 4, 
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The rules of engagement had been part of the pre-employment training of the 
Army battalions.1823 For that purpose, each individual soldier received a so-called 
Soldier’s Card comprising the basic elements of the rules of engagement.1824 In 
addition, troops attended a scenario training that confronted them with varying 
levels of violence in dynamic and turbulent situations. Troops were trained to 
deal with uncertainty and to choose the course of action appropriate to the 
situation, in order to control a violent or escalating situation effectively. Troops 
were also trained to shift between escalation and de-escalation and to return to 
normality. According to commanders, the training focused on teaching troops 
that situations could be solved effectively by de-escalation rather than by the use 
of force.1825 Commanders also paid attention to the role of the leadership and for 
example organised sessions with junior commanders, both prior to and during 
the deployment, to discuss the moral implications of the use of force.1826 One 
commander explained: 
 
Switching correctly between the various levels of force is hard. It is a matter of 
leadership. It will make or break as a consequence of the leadership and having 
the right leaders at the right spot. It is namely all about life or death.1827 
 
Other commanders underlined that having shared views on the interpretation of 
the rules of engagement had been of importance to apply force correctly and 
with restraint.1828 One of the company commanders noticed that some junior 
commanders required extra attention: 
 
For the section commanders and occasionally the platoon commanders the 
concept of minimum use of force was a difficult issue. Many of them joined the 
Army to fight rather than to drink tea. To establish a change of attitude it was 
therefore of great importance to have a critical mass of the senior leadership, 
such as the deputy company commander, platoon commanders, and the senior 
warrant officers. (…) However, Iraq has proven that we are able to both fight 
and to drink tea. But, as a leader, you have to communicate this to your per-
sonnel. Therefore, it is of importance that you also have senior and experienced 
leaders in your unit since, the younger the leader, the more difficult this is.1829 
 
                                               
2005. Available at 
http://www.om.nl/algemene_onderdelen/uitgebreid_zoeken/@124387/uitspraak/; 
accessed November 9, 2012. 
1823 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview June 23, 2011; Interview June 24, 2011; Interview 
September 1, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 2011(c); Interview October 19, 2011. 
1824 Ministerie van Defensie – Defensiestaf (2004b), p. 8. 
1825 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview June 23, 2011; Interview June 24, 2011; Interview 
September 1, 2011; Interview October 4, 2011(c); Interview October 19, 2011. 
1826 Interview June 23, 2011; Interview June 24, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); 
Interview October 4, 2011(c). 
1827 Interview June 9, 2011. 
1828 Interview June 24, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b). 
1829 Interview September 1, 2011(b). 
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Although troops were trained to show restraint in the use of force, commanders 
underlined that only during the mission did troops actually become familiar with 
dealing with questions of escalation and de-escalation of a situation. Dealing with 
these issues effectively was a matter of acquiring experience during their 
missions.1830 In practice, troops and junior leaders showed enough flexibility to 
deal with changing levels of violence successfully.1831 One commander explained: 
 
The section commander and his section had to be able to shift from a public 
friendly attitude to combat action. That was difficult, but our people were 
capable of it.1832 
 
Gooren made the same observation, that if Dutch troops were ‘under attack and 
force protection (…) took priority over maintaining friendly relations with the 
local population,’ (…) soldiers persisted in their efforts to gain trust and win over 
hearts and minds.’ Gooren adds that it was important that ‘commanding officers 
remained convinced that it was essential to maintain a good relationship with 
most of the people of Al-Muthanna province.’1833 Nonetheless, commanders 
reported that the concept of minimum use of force and escalation and de-
escalation required continued attention by commanders. Especially after a violent 
incident, the concept needed extra attention, for example in the debriefings, in 
order to focus the troops on the necessity of a “heart and minds” approach.1834 
One company commander explained why: 
 
At some occasions you have to fight, at other occasions you have to wave. After 
we had [an armed] operation, the next day we drove into town again. You may 
then show a long face, but these people do not know what has happened and 
wave. Although you may be angry, you have to wave back.1835 
 
The posture and attitude during patrolling had been another aspect that under-
lined the de-escalating approach of the Dutch troops.1836 The Dutch troops 
patrolled in a “relaxed” and rather “friendly” outfit, wearing the desert hat or 
beret instead of the helmet and carrying their rifles pointed down. The rationale 
of this posture was that the troops had to demonstrate professionalism and that 
they were in control.1837 One company commander underlined that an offensive 
                                               
1830 Interview June 23, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 2011(c); 
Interview October 12, 2011(b); Interview October 19, 2011. 
1831 Interview June 23, 2011; Interview June 24, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); 
Interview October 12, 2011(c). 
1832 Interview June 24, 2011. 
1833 Gooren (2006), p. 59. 
1834 Interview June 21, 2011; Interview June 23, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b). 
1835 Interview September 1, 2011(b). 
1836 Interview September 1, 2011(a); Interview October 4, 2011(c); Interview October 12, 
2011(b); Interview October 19, 2011. 
1837 Interview September 1, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 2011(c); Interview October 12, 
2011(b); Interview October 19, 2011. 
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attitude could stimulate a feeling of insecurity among the local population, which 
in return could affect the security of the troops.1838 
8.4 Organisational concept 
This section deals with the organisational concept of the NL Army as applied 
during the SFIR mission. The question to be answered here is whether the NL 
Army’s organisational concept enabled the provision of public security during 
this crisis management operation. To answer this question, this section will 
analyse three dimensions of the organisational concept that are characteristic for 
contemporary policing: individuality and autonomy; vertical differentiation and 
geographical deconcentration. 
8.4.1  Autonomy and individuality 
Autonomy 
Within the scope of the Concept of Operations, the authority to deploy 
operations in the field of public security was delegated to the company com-
mander. As such, the company commander had the authority to set his own 
priorities and targets in order to establish a safe and secure environment.1839 Most 
commanders applied the principles of mission-oriented command as the leading 
concept to command and direct their sub-units.1840 However, there were 
differences in the level of empowerment of junior commanding officers. 
Differences occurred through variations in style and experience of the com-
mander and the character of the assignment.1841 For example, a number of 
commanders underlined that the character of some assignments required a more 
directive approach and did not leave much room for autonomy.1842 The 
leadership style of the senior commander was another aspect that influenced the 
level of autonomy of the junior commanders. Some commanders applied tight 
control while others fully committed to the principles of mission-oriented 
command.1843 One commander who left room for discretion explained: 
 
You cannot decide for the section commanders what they are allowed to do. 
You have to give them freedom of action. You have to be confident that they 
will act professionally and with the best intentions. Mostly, they do. They have 
their rules of engagement and they will surely act accordingly. Within this 
framework, I expected the section commanders to operate autonomously.1844 
                                               
1838 Interview October 4, 2011(c). 
1839 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview June 24, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); 
Interview October 4, 2011(c). 
1840 Koninklijke Landmacht (1996), pp. 109-112. 
1841 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview June 21, 2011; Interview June 23, 2011; Interview June 
24, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 2011(c); Interview Octo-
ber 12, 2011(b); Interview October 19, 2011. 
1842 Interview September 1, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 2011(c); Interview October 12, 
2011(b). 
1843 Interview June 24, 2011; Interview October 19, 2011. 
1844 Interview October 19, 2011. 
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Another commander noted that he would have liked to grant more discretion to 
his junior commanders, but the situation forced him to adopt a more centralised 
approach: 
 
I did not take away their autonomy, the situation did. This was not only due to 
the security situation, but also because of a lack of capacity. Sometimes, it was 
like “incident hopping”. (…) Given the scarcity of resources, you see that 
everything becomes more centralised. Consequently, there is less autonomy for 
the junior levels and more top-down control.1845 
 
Although the company level was the most junior level to plan and deploy public 
security operations, the execution of the daily Normal Framework Operations 
rested with the section commander.1846 During these operations, the section 
commander had been the commander-on-scene. As such, the section com-
mander could be authorised to solve minor public security incidents, such as 
small disturbances and traffic accidents independently as long as it fitted in their 
assignments.1847 As a rule, the section commander informed the company’s 
Operations Officer in the Operations Room about the character and conse-
quences of the incident.1848 Based upon the information provided, the operations 
officer could decide either to authorise the section commander to solve the 
incident independently or to escalate the incident to the company or even 
battalion level.1849 
 
Individuality 
Whereas policing can largely be characterised as an individual activity, during the 
SFIR mission, the section had been the smallest unit of deployment. Because 
most of the daily activities were assigned to the section, it had been SFIR’s core 
operational element.1850 The fact that the section had been the smallest opera-
tional unit implied that – apart from CIMIC officers, liaison officers and other 
specialists – there had been no individual operational deployments,1851 for a 
couple of reasons. 
The deployment was first of all based on the security situation and the formal 
force protection rules that regulated the minimum force strength for independent 
operational activities. 
                                               
1845 Interview October 4, 2011(c). 
1846 Interview June 21, 2011; Interview June 23, 2011; Interview June 24, 2011; Interview 
September 1, 2011(b); Interview October 12, 2011(b); Interview October 19, 2011. 
1847 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview June 23, 2011. 
1848 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 2011(c); 
Interview October 12, 2011(b); Interview October 19, 2011. See also: 13 Infanteriebataljon 
Luchtmobiel Regiment Stoottroepen Prins Bernard SFIR 4 004), p. 28. 
1849 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); Interview October 12, 2011(b); 
Interview October 19, 2011. 
1850 Interview June 9, 2011 and additional e-mail of April 24; Interview June 21, 2011; 
Interview June 23, 2011; Interview June 24, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); Inter-
view October 4, 2011(c); Interview October 12, 2011(b); Interview October 19, 2011. 
1851 Interview June 21, 2011; Interview June 24, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); 
Interview October 4, 2011(c). 
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Second, the section was the smallest formal troop deployment, which had been 
in accordance with the standard operating procedures of the NL Army. Unlike 
the police, these procedures did not allow individual deployments, since the 
individual is seen as an indispensible element of the section.1852 
Finally, the availability of sufficient communication assets played a role in this 
matter too, but was not seen as a first-order consideration.1853 
 
The section consisted of seven to eight troops commanded by a sergeant. The 
section operated on foot or motorised with two soft-top vehicles.1854 During a 
foot patrol in an urban area, a section could divide in smaller deployments, for 
example when the environment was considered safe. Soldiers could then patrol 
with a distance between them of twenty to thirty meters, as long they were able 
to keep visual contact with each other.1855 In insecure areas, the sections always 
operated in close proximity to other sections in order to provide mutual support 
when required.1856 
8.4.2  Vertical differentiation 
The chain of command of an infantry battalion formally entails five levels from 
the battalion commander to the individual soldier.1857 During the SFIR mission, 
the Army battalions formally maintained their original force structure. In practice 
however, the platoon level had a limited operational role during the execution of 
the Normal Framework Operations. The SFIR battalions had chosen to 
coordinate and control these operations at the company level by Operations 
Room. This procedure implied that the company level directly commanded the 
sections, which excluded the platoon level from the operational chain of 
command.1858 As a result, the platoon level had no added operational value, 
except for QRF purposes or specific assignments. The role of the platoon level 
                                               
1852 Interview June 9, 2011 and additional e-mail of April 24; Interview June 21, 2011; 
Interview June 24, 2011 and additional e-mail of April 25, 2014; Interview October 4, 
2011(c) and additional e-mail of April 22, 2014; Interview October 19, 2011 and additional 
e-mail of April 22, 2014; 13 Infanteriebataljon Luchtmobiel Regiment Stoottroepen Prins 
Bernard SFIR 4 (2004). 
1853 Interview June 9, 2011 and additional e-mail of April 24; Interview June 24, 2011 and 
additional e-mail of April 25, 2014; Interview October 4, 2011(c) and additional e-mail of 
April 22, 2014; Interview October 19, 2011 and additional e-mail of April 22, 2014. 
1854 Interview June 23, 2011; Interview June 24, 2011; Interview October 4, 2011(c); 
Interview October 12, 2011(b); Interview October 19, 2011. 
1855 Interview September 1, 2011(b); Interview October 12, 2011(b). 
1856 Interview October 12, 2011(b). 
1857 Military organisations tend to have long chains of command. The chain of command of the 
Dutch military counts from the Commander of Armed Forces to the individual soldier 
eight levels, while the Dutch National Police from the National Chief of Police to the 
individual police officer entails five levels. See for example: http://www.politie.nl; 
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/politie/nationale-politie; www.mindef.nl. 
1858 Interview June 21, 2011; Interview June 24, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); 
Interview October 4, 2011(c); Interview October 12, 2011(b); Interview October 19, 
2011. 
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was therefore mainly limited to managing administrative and organisational 
processes, such as personnel planning, maintenance, training, and base guard.1859 
 
Because the platoon had become largely redundant in an operational sense, the 
platoon commanders and their deputies no longer had an independent role in 
commanding daily operations. Company commanders therefore assigned them to 
alternative tasks, such as liaison officer, CIMIC officer or operations officers.1860 
One commander reported that shortening the operational chain of command 
evolved incrementally, almost automatically. Afterwards, he realised that had 
reinforced the level of centralisation, which as such conflicted with the type of 
operation SFIR was involved in and which required the empowerment of junior 
leaders.1861 
8.4.3  Deconcentration 
As mentioned earlier, SFIR had divided its area of responsibility into three 
sectors of which each was assigned to a single company: one company in As-
Samawah, one in Ar-Rumaythah, and one in Al-Kidr. As a rule, company 
commanders further divided their company sectors in platoon sectors that 
covered the different neighbourhoods of the towns. Within these sectors, platoon 
commanders were tasked to establish local networks and contacts for intelligence 
purposes.1862 One company commander deliberately chose to apply a different 
concept. He did not decide to assign his platoons to a designated sector for 
reasons of flexibility and practicality. First, he considered the area as too small for 
separate platoon sectors. Second, he wanted to keep his troops eager by deploy-
ing them in different areas and with different assignments. With this choice, he 
accepted that his troops were less effective in establishing local contacts and 
networks. He did not perceive this as a major problem for he considered that the 
patrols often contacted those people known to them.1863 
 
The companies operated from secured and gated compounds that were located 
just outside the urban areas of these towns. The choice to accommodate troops 
in gated and secured compounds was largely based upon force protection 
motives.1864 As such, SFIR did not apply the tactic followed in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to deploy platoon houses when appropriate in order to live and 
work in proximity to civilians.1865 Nevertheless, subsequent companies followed 
some sort of deconcentrated organisation concept as troops frequently patrolled 
                                               
1859 Interview June 21, 2011. 
1860 Interview June 23, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); Interview October 12, 2011(b); 
Interview October 19, 2011. See also: Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p. 64. 
1861 Interview October 4, 2011(c). 
1862 Interview June 23, 2011; Interview September 1, 2011(b); Interview October 4, 2011(c); 
Jansen & Platenburg (2005), p. 53 & p. 64; 11 (NL) Battle Group SFIR 5 (s.a), p. 29, p. 30 
& p. 34. 
1863 Interview October 12, 2011(b). 
1864 Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 143, p. 7; Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 154, 
p. 5. 
1865 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview June 21, 2011; Interview October 19, 2011. 
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the neighbourhoods of the main towns of Al-Muthanna. However, during SFIR 
4, the residential deployment of patrols faced a serious setback after insurgents 
ambushed an MP convoy in Ar-Rumaythah. Troops located in Ar-Rumaythah 
refrained from regular urban patrolling until the end of their rotation, prioritising 
force protection above re-establishing contacts and interactions with the local 
population.1866 As such, the concept of residential troop deployment turned out 
to be vulnerable if challenged by a fatal incident. 
8.5  Conclusions 
Security gap 
Throughout the SFIR mission, Dutch troops operated in a security gap. Like in 
most post-conflict environments, weapons were widely available and crime and 
public disorder endangered society. In terms of criminality, three types of crime 
were largely dominant: petty crime (e.g. murder, theft and plundering), organised 
crime (e.g. looting, smuggling of arms, life-stock, fuel and water and carjacking) 
and insurgency (e.g. assaults on coalition troops). In terms of public order, the 
weak socio-economic situation (e.g. the shortage of water and fuel and unem-
ployment) and the perceived failure of the coalition fuelled civil frustration, 
resulting into demonstrations and disorder, at least until the end of 2004. 
 
An enforcement gap occurred because the Iraqi police were unable to deal with 
these public security issues adequately for at least two reasons. First, the police 
had lost almost half of its strength and had had its top management removed 
because of the de-Ba’athification process. Second, the police lacked professional-
ism and quality and were reactive, repressive, corrupt and non-responsive to 
public needs. 
 
With no deployment of international civilian police, coalition forces had been 
responsible for filling the enforcement gap and providing interim policing until 
the Transfer of Authority on June 28, 2004. After the Transfer of Authority, 
coalition forces continued to support public security but limited their role in 
public security to providing assistance, and mentoring and monitoring the police 
in order to prepare the police take on their responsibilities independently and 
effectively at the time of the elections at the end of January 2005. 
 
In addition to the enforcement gap, the mission also suffered from an institutional 
gap. After the defeat of Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi police largely dissolved, not 
only because of the process of de-Ba’athification, but also because many police 
officers left their posts. The remaining part of the police consisted of low-ranked 
and poorly-trained police officers unable to police society effectively and 
professionally. To reform the Iraqi police, the CPA launched a SSR programme 
late 2003. In March 2004, SSR became the top priority of the MND (SE) in 
order to establish sustainable and functioning security forces. 
                                               
1866 Interview June 9, 2011; Interview June 24, 2011; Interview October 19, 2011. See also: 
Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2012), p. 133. 
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Operational concept 
UNSCR 1483 authorised international coalition troops to reform Iraqi institu-
tions and to re-establish the country’s stability and security until the Iraqi people 
were able to govern their own country. UNSCR 1483 also authorised coalition 
troops to restore law and order. Consequently, the MND (SE) made the 
restoration and maintenance of security and stability and the maintenance of 
public order, a priority in order to enable Iraqi authorities to assume full 
responsibility for public security after Transfer of Authority. After that, the MND 
(SE) focused on providing police assistance and SSR. 
 
UNSCR 1483 and 1511 had also been the legal basis for Dutch troop deploy-
ment in Iraq. The resolution enabled coalition forces to engage in public security 
and to provide interim policing as long the Iraqis failed to do so. Nevertheless, 
the Dutch government initially defined a number of caveats, which prohibited 
the Dutch Marines from engaging in executive law enforcement activities 
autonomously. The effects of the security gap showed however, that these 
caveats were ineffective and unsustainable. As a result, the government reviewed 
its policy and authorised SFIR (including SFIR 3) to engage in public security 
tasks until the Transfer of Authority if these tasks were performed in cooperation 
with the local police as much as possible. 
 
Whereas the Marines, during SFIR, actively engaged in providing public security 
and the UNSCR 1483 authorised interim policing until the Transfer of Author-
ity, the leadership of SFIR 3 showed restraint and did not prioritise public 
security, although it had included reducing criminality and maintaining public 
order as focal points in its operational plan. After the Transfer of Authority, SFIR 
4 and 5 focused on providing assistance and training of the Iraqi police in order 
to make them self-sustainable by the time of the elections at the end of January 
2005. 
 
In their pre-deployment training, the Army battalions followed the regular 
programme for crisis management operations. Apart from incorporating a CRC 
platoon in the force structure and some occasional makeshift CRC training at the 
company level, interim policing did not receive special attention, despite the 
existence of a security gap. Commanders also debated the effectiveness of the 
CRC instrument, which they considered anomalous with the character of a crisis 
management operation in a hostile environment and a different culture. 
 
Although the Army battalions did not explicitly plan and train for interim 
policing, they were involved in several activities that could be related to 
providing public security because under normal circumstances these activities are 
a responsibility of the police. 
 
Patrolling had been the prime activity to contribute to public order. Largely on a 
24/7 basis, battalions provided foot patrols in urban areas, first of all to show 
presence and secondly to interact with the public as much as possible. Until the 
Transfer of Authority, patrols operated autonomously, thereafter mostly in 
290
SFIR 
 
support of the local police, although SFIR 4 temporarily reduced patrolling in 
urban areas after the ambush in Ar-Rumaythah. Regarding demonstrations and 
protests, the Army battalions did not deploy their CRC assets. They had limited 
their role in public order to monitoring and mentoring the local police in the 
execution of their responsibilities. Finally, SFIR 4 and 5 were engaged in the 
preparation of the elections of January 30, 2005. SFIR 5 in particular had made 
the elections one of its priorities. It organised exercises to train the local security 
forces and assisted the local authorities and security forces in their operational 
planning processes. During the elections, SFIR 5 monitored the achievements of 
the Iraqi security forces, deployed autonomous mobile vehicle checkpoints, and 
provided security backup. 
 
In terms of law enforcement, the Army battalions deployed “knock-talk-search” 
operations to help arrest those suspected of offenses related to smuggling, 
insurgency and illegal possession of firearms. Some of these operations were 
executed in cooperation with the local police; others were deployed autono-
mously or in close cooperation with other coalition troops. SFIR also deployed 
observation and "knock-talk-search" operations to investigate places and targets 
where firearms were allegedly hidden or smuggled. 
 
In terms of intelligence, the prime focus had been on acquiring and maintaining 
situational awareness regarding the social composition of society, socio-economic 
issues and the activities of criminal organisations. The main instrument to collect 
information had been the patrol. Information on crime and public order had 
been part of the general request for intelligence. Like in intelligence-led policing, 
patrols were systematically briefed and debriefed and the information collected 
was systematically analysed and used to focus new assignments. In terms of 
criminal intelligence, the FLT of the Special Forces served to gather information 
on the whereabouts and activities of criminals and criminal organisations. In 
general, battalions were reluctant to share intelligence or information with local 
authorities or the local police, largely due to a lack of trust.  
 
The Army battalions cooperated with local authorities, key leaders and local 
police and established local networks. Interaction with local actors largely 
occurred at the battalion and company level. Cooperation could have a formal-
ised, institutionalised character (e.g. in the provincial and municipal Security 
Committees and in the Provincial Joint Operations Centre). The battalions and 
companies also cooperated with local police to provide public security and to 
improve the quality of policing and the police organisation, for example by joint 
patrolling, establishing liaison and exchanging information if appropriate. Also 
after the Transfer of Authority, SFIR still needed to assist the police in their daily 
policing, largely due to a lack of quality and professionalism. Patrols served to 
establish community interaction. During these patrols, troops showed an open 
posture, which contributed to establish public confidence and local networks. 
Units differed in their efforts to establish local networks. Some commanders 
assigned their units to designated areas to establish fixed contacts and networks 
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while others opted for a flexible approach in which units rotated between various 
areas. SFIR did not deploy platoon houses, for reasons of force protection. 
 
The Dutch forces operated under the British rules of engagement. These rules of 
engagement underlined the principles of minimum use of force. Troops were 
trained in the (restricted) use of force for example through scenario training, 
which served to create awareness that incidents could also be resolved by de-
escalating rather than escalating force. However, troops learned how to apply the 
concept of minimum use of force in theatre and by experience. Nevertheless, 
consequent application required continued attention by commanders, especially 
after troops encountered violent incidents. 
 
Organisational concept 
The authority for the execution of public security operations and activities was 
delegated to the company level. As a rule, commanders applied the principles of 
mission-oriented command, although between commanders there had been 
differences in terms of leadership styles and interpretations of contextual 
demands, which influenced the discretion of junior commanders. If tension or 
insecurity increased, discretion generally decreased. Although a section com-
mander was the “commander-on-scene,” at all times he had to report the 
company’s Operations Room on the incidents they encountered on the ground 
to receive authorisation to solve the incident themselves or to hear whether the 
incident had to be escalated to a higher level in the chain of command. The 
SFIR mission showed no individual deployment of troops with the exception of 
certain specialists, such as liaison or CIMIC officers. Unlike in policing, the 
section was the smallest deployment, largely for reasons of security, force 
protection and standard operating procedures. 
 
All Army battalions reduced the level of vertical differentiation, which resulted in 
a flatter chain of command. The company’s Operations Room had been the 
centre of gravity as it directly commanded and controlled the section during the 
daily Normal Framework operations. Consequently, the platoon level lost its 
position as an independent operational level. 
 
The SFIR battalions applied some sort of a deconcentrated organisation model 
that directly followed from the decentralisation of the company level as inde-
pendent operational level. The companies were assigned to geographic areas in 
which they exercised area responsibility. Some company commanders further 
divided the company sector into smaller areas that they assigned to platoons or 
sections in order to establish local networks and contacts. The concept, however, 
showed itself vulnerable after troops in Ar-Rumaythah faced armed violence and 
resulted in a temporary withdrawal of urban foot patrols. 
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9  Syntheses and discussion 
Today, military operations cover a wide range of activities, varying from 
offensive and defensive to stabilisation activities. These activities do not necessar-
ily take place in a certain sequence; they rather occur in parallel and overlap. 
Contemporary operations also lack clear boundaries between military and civilian 
activity. As a result, the difference between overall security in terms of a safe and 
secure environment and public security in terms of re-establishing and preserving 
law and order has faded. 
 
Another characteristic of contemporary military operations is the prevalence of 
security gaps that occur when there are no sufficient local or international police 
to keep order and enforce the law. The structural answer to a security gap is 
police reform. However, this tends to be a long-term endeavour taking months 
or years. Consequently, there is often a demand for interim policing by the 
military. Although this may not be the best solution, there is often no alternative 
to establish a basic level of public order and security. In Dag Hammarskjöld 
famous words: ‘it is no job for a soldier, but only a soldier can do it.’ 
 
Following Hammarskjöld’s adagio, this study is based upon two assumptions. The 
first assumption is that the armed forces will have to deal with public order and 
law enforcement situations when deployed in a (post) conflict environment that 
suffers from crime and disorder and has insufficient police capacity to deal with 
those problems effectively. Under these circumstances, the armed forces will have 
to fulfil duties that are comparable to those of the police. The second assumption 
is that, when confronted with those tasks on a regular basis, the military organisa-
tion will need to act and organise accordingly and has to adopt operational and 
organisational principles comparable to the police in order to deal with these 
tasks effectively and efficiently. 
 
This chapter first discusses to what extent the NL Army faced a security gap 
during IFOR/SFOR (Bosnia and Herzegovina), KFOR (Kosovo) and SFIR 
(Iraq) and analyses the character of the security gaps in order to determine if there 
had been a structural need for military assistance to bridge those gaps. Then, it 
analyses and discusses the operational and organisational concepts applied by the 
NL Army in relationship to relevant aspects of police theory, as discussed in 
Chapter 4. Next, it answers the central research question of this study, followed 
by an explanation of the limitations of this study and some suggestions for future 
research. The chapter ends with concluding remarks. A schematic overview of 
the cross-case analysis is displayed at the end of the chapter. 
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9.1  Discussion 
9.1.1  Security gap 
During all three missions, a security gap was a constant and a long-term phe-
nomenon. In terms of an institutional gap,1867 in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Iraq the police were in place, while in Kosovo the local police ceased to exist 
after the departure of Serbian security forces. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Iraq had a police force in place, these were not able to provide professional 
and adequate policing. In general, the police were poorly trained, perceived as 
biased, corrupt, did not serve all citizens equally and were unable to provide 
community policing. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, police bias had an 
ethnic background, while in Iraq police bias was often related to clan relation-
ships. 
 
To overcome the security gap in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UN deployed the 
IPFT to monitor, train, advise and assist the local police. However, the IPFT 
deployed slowly and had no executive powers to intervene in case the local 
police showed themselves unwilling or incapable to provide public security for all 
citizens equally. In Kosovo, the UN deployed the UNMiK Police, which 
received full executive powers to police Kosovo until they had established a local 
police force that could take on policing independently. However, it took almost 
a year until the UNMiK Police finally reached the capacity required to take on 
full responsibility for policing. In Iraq, the local police had been seriously 
understaffed and suffered from a lack of quality. Initially, the CPA failed to 
initiate police reforms and it took almost a year until it realised that the Iraqi 
police required substantial reform in order to improve the quality of the police 
and policing. Meanwhile and until the Transfer of Authority, coalition troops 
took on responsibility for public security and started SSR programmes to train 
and reform the police. 
 
All three missions suffered from an enforcement gap. An enforcement gap occurs 
when military forces are required to perform public security tasks in support of an 
international or local police force.1868 To overcome those gaps in Kosovo and 
Iraq, the international military provided public security until the international or 
local police were able to operate independently. The international military were 
either authorised to provide interim policing by UNSCR mandates or by 
international law regarding the obligations of an occupying force. In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the international military lacked the mandate to engage in public 
security while on the ground there had been an explicit need for military 
assistance. International pressure urged NATO to stretch its mandate and to 
contribute to bridging the enforcement gap. It therefore established a MSU 
battalion in order to support IPTF and other international organisations when 
required and engaged in arresting alleged war criminals. 
 
                                               
1867 Dziedzic (1998), p. 14. 
1868 Dziedzic (1998), p. 11. 
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To a large extent, criminality was largely affected by availability of weaponry 
used during the conflict. Petty crimes occurred on a large scale and varied from 
corruption and theft to murder. Also organised crime increased significantly 
during all three missions, notably in terms of smuggling (e.g. weapons, cars, 
livestock and contraband). However, the most characteristic criminal phenome-
non had been the expansion of ethnic or sectarian motivated crimes such as 
intimidation, harassment, arson, violence, maltreatment and killings. On top of 
these crimes, the mission in Iraq also suffered from insurgency, which further 
decreased the level of public security. 
 
In terms of public order, several demonstrations or public protests occurred 
during all three missions. In Kosovo, these demonstrations passed without serious 
problems, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Iraq, these occasionally 
became violent, but none of them escalated into widespread disorder. 
 
It can be concluded that the combination of a dysfunctional security sector and 
the expansion of crime and public unrest seriously affected the magnitude of the 
security gap during all three missions. With no or limited numbers of skilled 
civilian police officers available, it placed the international military, including the 
NL Army, in an unfamiliar role that was largely debated in military and political 
circles. 
9.1.2  Operational concept 
International mandates and planning 
In all missions, UN Security Council Resolutions authorised the deployment of 
international military forces to ensure the establishment of a safe and secure 
environment in order to enable civilian authorities and organisations to deploy 
their governance and reconstruction programmes. Whereas the mandates and 
operational instructions of KFOR and SFIR formally enabled the military to 
exercise interim policing to provide public security in case international or local 
police were unable to do so independently, the IFOR/SFOR mandate, as 
formalised in the Dayton Peace Agreement, underlined that the local authorities 
and law enforcement agencies were responsible for providing public security. In 
the early months of the IFOR/SFOR mission, the international military 
followed a strict interpretation of its mandate.  
 
National political planning 
The Dutch national guidelines for IFOR/SFOR were in line with the interna-
tional mandate as defined in the Dayton Peace Agreement. This agreement 
considered the provision of public security a prime responsibility of the local 
police and not that of the IFOR/SFOR. The Dutch government underlined that 
SFOR was not a police force and therefore did not engage in policing, for 
example in the arrest of war crimes indictees. Even after NATO and SFOR 
gradually lifted their initial objections against interim policing, the Dutch 
government largely continued to adhere to the initial mandate. When NATO 
deployed a MSU Battalion, the Dutch government underlined that SFOR should 
not perform police tasks, as these were the responsibility of the local authorities 
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not perform police tasks, as these were the responsibility of the local authorities 
and police. Also, when NATO, SFOR, and OHR increasingly regarded 
corruption and organised crime as a significant threat to a successful end state, 
and agreed to invest in the restoration of the rule of law, the Dutch government 
responded that Dutch troops were not to challenge the interpretation of the 
mandate and not support law enforcement efforts of the international community 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The government continued to regard the mainte-
nance of law and order as a responsibility of the local authorities. 
 
With regards to KFOR, the UN mandate and the operational guidelines of 
NATO and KFOR enabled an active role for KFOR in providing public 
security as long as UNMiK Police were unable to take on their responsibilities 
independently. Nevertheless, the Dutch government showed reserve towards the 
provision of interim policing by Dutch troops, for example in terms of investigat-
ing war crimes and the arrest of alleged war criminals. Although UNMiK Police 
deployed late and required the assistance of KFOR to provide public security in 
order to bridge the enforcement gap for an extended period of time, the Dutch 
government still considered policing to be the prime responsibility of the 
UNMiK Police and wanted their soldiers to refrain from interim policing as soon 
as UNMiK Police was in place, which resulted in a mismatch between political 
views in the Hague and operational demands on the ground. 
 
During the mission in Iraq, the Dutch government also restricted military 
involvement in public security, despite international guidelines authorising such 
involvement. By issuing caveats on the execution of law enforcement activities, 
the first Dutch deployment, provided by the Marines, were not supposed to 
restore law and order independently. The Dutch government considered the 
provision of law and order to be the prime responsibility of the occupying forces, 
i.e. the US and British military, and the local police. Since the latter were unable 
to provide public security effectively, the situation on the ground called for a 
larger engagement of the Dutch troops to close the enforcement gap. The 
government eventually lifted the caveats, enabling Dutch troops to provide 
interim policing under the authority of the CPA until the Transfer of Authority 
had taken place. 
 
The analysis of the three missions shows a pattern in which the Dutch govern-
ment followed a conservative policy towards assigning public security tasks to the 
military, although troops continuously operated in a security gap. Under all 
circumstances, the government regarded public security as a responsibility of the 
local or international police even if those were unable to provide public security 
adequately or independently. In addition, the Dutch government followed a 
narrow interpretation of international mandates, which formally allowed military 
assistance to restoring law and order, such as in Kosovo and Iraq. 
 
As a result, the Dutch government did not support a larger military involvement 
in public security and did not adapt to operational challenges and demands in 
theatre. With the exception of assigning CRC capabilities to the military during 
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during all three missions, the Dutch government avoided taking the initiative to 
close existing or emerging security gaps. It merely focused on establishing a safe 
and secure environment, rather than allowing commanders to engage in 
international initiatives to adequately close the security gap. 
 
Following Jakobsen, the Dutch government can be characterised as minimalistic. 
There are three possible reasons for the government’s restraint in relation to 
engaging on a security gap. 
First, the government feared “mission creep”. This argument was valid for the 
IFOR/SFOR mission, which formally did not have a public security mandate, 
while the mandates of KFOR and SFIR explicitly included public security. 
Second, it could have regarded its military as unsuited for public security tasks, as 
their troops were not specifically trained to perform those tasks, which it possibly 
perceived as a political and/or operational risk. By a minimalist interpretation of 
mandates, the government prevented troops entering the relatively unknown 
territory of policing. 
Third, complying with its general international commitment to deploy troops to 
a multi-national crisis management operation may have been considered of larger 
importance than effectively closing the security gap on the ground. 
 
Operational planning and preparation 
With the exception of the SFIR, planning for public security had not been a 
specific point of attention. 
  
During IFOR/SFOR, planning followed international guidelines as defined in 
the Dayton Peace Agreement. Dutch commanders focused on the military 
aspects of the mandate, rather than on their secondary tasks, for example those 
related to supporting international organisations, such as IPTF and UNHCR, 
which had a security component. 
 
During KFOR, initial planning focused on fire-support and a classical peace-
keeping role and not on providing public security. After taking on area responsibil-
ity, KFOR 1 issued additional operational plans to tackle specific public security 
issues. Being instructed to show restraint towards the provision of public security, 
KFOR 2 refrained from formulating additional objectives in that area, however. 
 
SFIR battalion commanders included public security tasks in their operational 
planning, notably in terms of SSR. Until the Transfer of Authority, SFIR 3 was 
fully responsible for public security. It underlined the importance of crime reduction 
and maintenance of public order as one of its objectives. However, it did not 
prioritise independent interim policing during its actual operations. SFIR 4 and 5, 
who deployed after the Transfer of Authority, largely focused their public security 
efforts on SSR and assistance to the local police in maintaining public security. 
 
In terms of training and preparation, battalions followed the regular military 
curriculum and trained their troops for deployment in a crisis management 
operation. Troops trained for social patrolling, collecting intelligence, searching 
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vehicles and individuals, and arresting and processing detainees. Training was 
generally based on military procedures and instructions, and did not incorporate 
police techniques or principles to supplement this training.SFOR (from 1997) 
and SFIR battalions also integrated CRC in their training programmes. How-
ever, during SFOR the training of the separate CRC platoons was not always 
synchronised with that of the battalions, which obstructed the operational 
integration before deployment in theatre. To some extent, commanders also 
perceived CRC as an anomaly within their operational concept and because 
some platoons were deployed without being formally certificated, CRC training 
seemed of lesser importance. 
 
The deficiency to articulate or prioritise public security during the pre-
deployment training may have been influenced by the fact that Dutch Army 
doctrines do not prioritise the provision of public security as such, despite the fact 
that restoring the law by assisting civil authorities is a core task of the Dutch 
Armed Forces,1869 and that the NL Army has gained substantial experience in 
providing public security during security gaps.  
 
Although some doctrines mention a number of public security tasks as such, they 
remain relatively silent on an issue that affected all recent crisis management 
operations. Notably, the 2013 Army doctrine Land Operations does not mention 
the provision of public security at all. In comparison, in its doctrine Stability 
Operations, the US Army has explicitly included the provision of public security 
as a military task if local authorities fail to perform these tasks. 
 
According to NL Army officers involved in doctrinal planning, the debate on 
public security faces various difficulties.1870 The Army leadership still seems 
hesitant to include policing in its operational framework and training pro-
grammes, despite having acquired substantial experience in this matter.1871 
Resistance possibly exists due to a cultural blockage. Commanders seem to prefer 
conducting traditional operations against a military opponent rather than leaving 
their comfort zone and engaging in the relatively unknown field of policing.1872 
It should therefore prefereably adopt a learning culture as presented by Weick 
and Sutcliffe. Within such culture, organisations learn ‘by means of ongoing 
debate about constantly shifting discrepancies’ in order to find new routines to 
cope with changing demands and environments.1873 Moreover, following the 
concepts of Weick and Sutcliffe, the NL Army should institutionalise a mindful 
culture, in which existing expectations are continuously refined and differentiated 
according newer experiences, and in which there is a willingness and capability 
to invent new expectations that make sense of unprecedented events in order to 
find new ways to deal with them and to identify new dimensions of context to 
                                               
1869 Kamerstukken II, 1999/2000, 26 900, nrs. 1-2, p. 41. 
1870 Interview August 12, 2011; Interview October 13, 2011(b); Interview September 30, 
2011(a). 
1871 Interview August 12, 2011; Interview October 13, 2011(b). 
1872 Interview September 30, 2011(a); Interview January 25, 2013. 
1873 Weick & Sutcliffe (2001), p. 136. 
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improve planning and current functioning.1874 
 
Public security is such new dimension that characterises contemporary crisis 
management operations. By not adopting the right learning culture and not 
explicitly designating public security as one of its main topics in their doctrine, 
the NL Army risks that military commanders will continue to underrate that 
dimension and will not be challenged to incorporate the subject into their 
mission planning and preparation. Consequently, it will further impede organisa-
tional internalisation required for an effective and efficient provision of public 
security when appropriate to contribute to the closure of a security gap.  
 
Managing the security gap 
Despite minor doctrinal attention and a lack of political stimulus from the 
government, this study shows that in all three case studies the NL Army 
increasingly performed tasks that under normal circumstances would be assigned 
to the police. Policing largely involves two main functions: law enforcement and 
maintaining public order, including assistance to the public.1875 
 
In terms of public order, during all missions (social) patrols were deployed in 
villages and towns in order to show presence, provide public security, interact 
with the local population and to collect information about local problems and 
circumstances. Patrolling was the Army’s main activity during Normal Frame-
work Operations. It could be argued that (social) patrolling shares some of the 
characteristics of community policing. 
 
Assistance to civilian international organisations and local authorities could also 
be interpreted as supporting public order, notably the visits and returns of 
refugees and displaced persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the elections in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Iraq. During these events, Dutch troops provided 
overall security, guaranteed freedom of movement, separated opposing groups 
and assisted the police in the planning and preparation of the events. In Kosovo 
and Iraq, troops supervised demonstrations to prevent escalation. Also, the 
protection of minorities in Kosovo could be interpreted as maintaining the peace, 
in casu maintaining public order. 
 
To support the maintenance of public order, the Ministry of Defence deployed 
CRC platoons to the SFOR and SFIR missions. As mentioned earlier, com-
manders were however cautious about deploying these units. They rather kept 
them in reserve for other purposes than experimenting with their CRC capabili-
ties. Battalion commanders questioned the effectiveness of the CRC instrument. 
They regarded it as an anomaly in their regular operational and organisational 
concept, or questioned the fitness or readiness of the CRC platoons to operate 
effectively as a riot squad. They also regarded the deployment of a CRC platoon 
                                               
1874 Weick & Ratcliffe (2001), p. 42 & pp. 137-139. 
1875 See for example: Bittner (1970), Manning (1997), Mawby (2003), Ponsaers, Devroe & 
Meert (2006), Skolnick (1996).  
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as too risky, notably in hostile environments where weapons were widely 
available. Second – and this argument specifically regards SFOR – in 2000 the 
Ministry refrained from deploying a CRC platoon in theatre in order to keep 
one in reserve in the Netherlands on a notice-to-move of twenty days. This 
decision practically deprived commanders from using the instrument effectively 
and adequately in case of imminent public disturbances. 
 
As a result of a lack of confidence in skills and familiarity with the situation on the 
ground, and a lack of availability, the CRC instrument was not fully integrated in 
the Army’s operational concept. By keeping the CRC instrument in reserve, 
commanders missed the opportunity to receive reality checks, which according to 
Adler and Borys, could be seen as key preconditions for adaptive adjustment to 
external influences.1876 As such, the CRC concept was never really challenged in 
order to mature and develop into an adequate and an effective public security 
feature. As experts on the use of force, the military should be able to deal with a 
wide variety of scenarios, including CRC in a dynamic or hostile environment. 
 
In all three missions, NL Army troops were also engaged in various activities and 
operations involving some sort of law enforcement. 
 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dutch troops organised weapon collections in which 
citizens could hand in illegal arms voluntarily. Similar activities occurred in 
Kosovo. During KFOR and SFIR, troops also deployed so-called “knock-talk-
search” operations, during which they asked the occupant for permission to 
search the premises for illegal arms or ammunition. 
 
Troops were also involved in the arrest of criminal suspects. In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Dutch Special Forces executed one targeted operation to detain two 
war crimes indictees while regular NL Army troops provided perimeter security 
during a number of MND operations, although the Dayton Peace Agreement did 
not formally provide IFOR/SFOR troops with a clear mandate to be involved in 
law enforcement activities. In Kosovo and Iraq, troops were formally authorised to 
engage in the arrest of criminal suspects.1877 As a rule, (Dutch) Special Forces or 
international police intervention teams executed pre-planned arrest operations in 
which regular troops provided a perimeter security to seal off the area which under 
normal circumstances, would have been the responsibility of a special police squad 
and the uniformed police. During KFOR and SFIR, troops also executed arrests, 
for example when they encountered serious criminal offences during the execution 
                                               
1876 Adler & Borys (1996), p. 82. 
1877 In Kosovo, UNSCR 1244 authorised KFOR to enforce the law until UNMiK Police had 
been able to take full responsibility for policing. In Iraq, it had been UNSCR 1483 and 
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations that authorised international troops to execute law 
enforcement operations until the Transfer of Authority end of June, 2004. After the Trans-
fer of Authority, it was UNSCR 1511 that authorised the international forces ‘to take all 
necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq,’ which 
as such enabled them to involve in law enforcement when necessary (see for example: 
Voetelink (2013), pp. 436-437). 
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of their Normal Framework Operations. Where appropriate, they stopped, 
searched and processed the arrested suspects. The tactics applied were in accordance 
with the military Standard Operating Procedures for the arrest of detainees. In case 
of planned operations, information flowed from the higher to the lower levels in 
the chain of command. With the exception of KFOR 1, these operations did not 
result from independent (criminal) investigations. 
 
In Kosovo, intelligence personnel and law enforcement personnel of the Mare-
chaussee systematically collected and analysed information, ultimately resulting in the 
arrest of eleven alleged war criminals. In other cases, Dutch troops occasionally 
assisted coalition forces or other (international) partners in their crime investigation 
activities, for example by providing area security or through observation operations. 
 
Although not specifically trained or prepared, this study shows that throughout 
all missions troops executed policing activities as normal or special operations 
based on and in accordance with military procedures and tactics. As such, 
commanders perceived no reason or incentive to evaluate these activities in the 
light of law enforcement and police tactics. Consequently, commanders missed 
the opportunity to add alternative (policing) tactics to their concept of opera-
tions. In addition, commanders did not explore how the police would operate in 
comparable situations, for example in terms of community policing, public order 
management, crowd management, conducting evidence-based operations which 
include criminal investigations, securing crime scenes, collecting and preserving 
forensic evidence, taking witness statements and making arrests.1878 
 
This study shows that during a security gap the operations of the military to some 
extent converge towards the police. Therefore, it can be argued that despite 
various operational and organisational differences, the military can learn from the 
police and thereby improve their operational style and repertoires and find out 
how they best can adapt to different conditions in order to be able to provide 
public security effectively and efficiently. In general, organisations learn from 
other organisations, for example through the transfer of experiences in or the use 
of technologies, procedures and routines.1879 This is especially true if they operate 
in the same institutional environment and produce comparable products or 
services.1880 If organisations share experiences and learn from each other, they 
develop some sort of isomorphism which is a ‘constraining process that forces 
one unit in a population to resemble other units of that face the same set of 
environmental conditions.’1881 Mimetic isomorphism, for example, encourages 
institutional change when organisations operate in an operational field relatively 
unknown to them and which may create some sort of symbolic uncertainty.1882 
                                               
1878 See for example: Voetelink (2013), p. 442. 
1879 Levitt & March (1988), p. 329. 
1880 DiMaggio & Powell (1983), p. 148. 
1881 DiMaggio & Powell (1983), p. 149. 
1882 DiMaggio & Powell (1983), p. 151. 
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Under these circumstances, organisations adapt to proven practices and model 
themselves on organisations that they perceive as legitimate and successful.1883 
 
The question is, however, to what extent the NL Army is willing or capable to 
reach a certain level of convergence with the police. For many organisations, 
adapting to new procedures or routines is not an obvious choice. 
First of all, it is often difficult for organisations to adopt new tactics, procedures 
and routines when the current ones are relatively successful. In such cases, success 
tends to reduce ‘the motivation to initiate seemingly unnecessary adaption’, as 
Sitkin notes.1884 Perceived success may lead to “superstitious learning”, in which 
organisations reinforce routines that are associated with success while other 
learning processes are declined.1885 
Second, organisational learning may be hampered by competency traps. These 
can occur when organisations achieve positive outcomes with inferior proce-
dures. As long as the organisation continues to accumulate experience with 
inferior procedures, it is not challenged to adapt newer and better ones.1886 
 
As this study found no evidence that the NL Army has institutionalised experi-
ences with interim policing in their doctrines and operational routines and 
procedures, the question remains whether the NL Army is open to learn from 
the police about tactics and routines, which may be beneficial within the context 
of a security gap during a crisis management operation. To optimise its perform-
ance in the field of public security, it may have to challenge current routines 
procedures even if those have proven to be relative successful. In the end, 
isomorphism between the police and military could be beneficial to further 
improve its performance during security gaps. 
 
Intelligence 
Collection of information was a core activity during all three missions. Battalions 
systematically collected, assembled, analysed, validated and redistributed informa-
tion for further action and/or to initiate the collection of additional information.  
 
Patrolling was the main instrument to collect information, although other 
instruments, like CIMIC officers, interpreters, liaison officers, and, in case of Iraq, 
the Field Liaison Team, also helped to collect information. 
 
To focus the information collection efforts, intelligence officials at company level 
briefed the patrols in advance and debriefed them afterwards. Patrols received a 
written questionnaire to meet the battalion’s and the company’s intelligence 
requirements. As such, the method used to acquire and operationalise information 
largely resembled that of Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) in which information 
                                               
1883 Braun & Gilardi (2006), p. 310; DiMaggio & Powell (1983), p. 152. 
1884 Sitkin (1996), p. 544. 
1885 Levitt & March (1988), p. 326. 
1886 Levitt & March (1988), p. 322. 
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acquired from patrols and other sources is systematically collected, assembled, 
analysed, and re-used to brief and debrief patrols and/or for further action.1887 
 
However, there are some differences between the police and NL Army in terms 
of focus.   
First, whereas policing is largely problem-oriented through the identification and 
analysis of backgrounds and underlying causes of public security issues,1888 during the 
three missions, intelligence rather served to acquire situational awareness than to 
identify root causes of community-related security problems and respond to those. 
 
Second, in policing, information collection largely focuses on identifying and 
analysis of problems involving criminality and community safety.1889 With the 
exception of KFOR 1, which focused its information collection process largely on 
acquiring intelligence on war crimes, NL Army battalions rather focused their 
information gathering efforts on civilian and political aspects, for example the social 
and economic situation, local politics and local key leaders, the status of CIMIC 
projects, the situation of minorities, and the impact of crime in society,1890 than on 
public security and criminal intelligence as such. Those were just perceived as 
subjects of general interest. As such, information served internal requirements 
rather than to help solving specific public security problems, which affected all 
three missions. 
 
Today, the information focus may have changed. Contemporary counter-
insurgency doctrines underline that information gathering must be problem-
oriented and focus on identifying the root causes of insurgency.1891 The NATO 
counter-insurgency doctrine therefore specifically underlines the need to acquire 
criminal intelligence.1892 As such, it implies that information gathering needs to 
widen its focus, to deepen its analyses and responses, which would then further 
reduce the difference between the police and military concepts. However, 
considering its formal mission in theatre, the military focus must always be wider 
than crime and disorder. 
 
Cooperation 
During all three missions, the NL Army sought cooperation and coordination 
with civilian partners to achieve common strategic objectives. Cooperation and 
coordination was established at battalion and company level and sometimes at 
platoon level too, and involved interaction with local authorities, international 
                                               
1887 See for example: Raad van Hoofdcommissarissen. Projectgroep Visie op de politiefunctie 
(2005), p. 17; Reiner (2000), p. 76; Tilley (2003), p. 313; Tilley (2008), p. 146; Versteegh 
(2005), pp. 19-20. 
1888 Raad van Hoofdcommissarissen. Projectgroep Visie op de politiefunctie (2005), p. 17; 
Versteegh (2005), pp. 19-20. See also: Goldstein (2005) regarding the notion of problem-
oriented policing. 
1889 Versteegh (2005), p. 13. 
1890 See also: Koninklijke Landmacht (1999), p. 118 & p. 178. 
1891 See for example: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2012), p. 3-23 & p. 4-3; US 
Department of the Army – Headquarters (2006), p. 3-35 & p. 4.1ff. 
1892 See for example: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2012), p. 2-16. 
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organisations and the police, local and/or international. When possible, interac-
tion was formalised and institutionalised. 
 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, cooperation largely concentrated on 
issues such as the establishment of a safe and secure environment, political and 
socio-economic developments, and the planning and progress of reconstruction 
projects. The international community did not establish a dedicated platform to 
discuss public security issues with civilian authorities or internally. Overall, public 
security had not been an exclusive subject unless an acute security problem 
required unity of effort, such as during sensitive visits and returns by refugees and 
displaced persons and elections. 
 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dutch IFOR/SFOR battalions had not established 
institutionalised cooperation with the local police. Following the formal mandate, 
this was seen as the main responsibility of IPTF. However, during the course of the 
operation, cooperation with the local police gradually intensified, notably regarding 
specific issues like visits and returns, elections, Harvest Operations, and illegal 
logging. Also, cooperation between IFOR/SFOR and the IPTF was loosely 
structured. While liaison officers of both organisations liaised at company level on a 
daily basis, joint patrolling or common operations occurred only in specific cases. 
 
In Kosovo, cooperation between various institutions, mainly international, 
gradually evolved in the course of the mission, largely because the deployment of 
international civilian organisations occurred at a different pace in comparison 
with KFOR. In the early stages of the mission, KFOR 1 initiated makeshift 
coordination platforms until the international organisations, such as UNMiK 
Police, had sufficient leverage to take over and to institutionalise various 
cooperation and coordination mechanisms. When KFOR 2 commenced its 
mission, it operated in an administrative setting that had been large institutional-
ised, also regarding public security. Following their national instructions to keep 
aloof, KFOR 2 had not been a driving force regarding inter-agency cooperation. 
Formally, it rather took a passive role and assisted international organisations only 
when requested to do so. Nevertheless, at the tactical level, liaison officers of 
both KFOR1 and 2 exchanged information with their international partners and 
coordinated their efforts during regular meetings, while troops and the UNMiK 
Police patrolled jointly on a daily basis. 
 
In Iraq, inter-agency cooperation had been a major instrument to support public 
security. To discuss public security-related problems on a regular basis, the Dutch 
established dedicated Security Councils at the provincial and municipal level 
involving SFIR commanders, local administrators and the commanders of the 
security services. Public security was an important subject of discussion at all 
levels and with all relevant partners. In Iraq, troops also sought cooperation and 
coordination with the local police. During the full length of the operation, they 
assisted the police by deploying joint operations and joint patrolling, and by 
mentoring, monitoring and training police officers at all levels. Companies 
assigned liaison officers to police stations and police commanders to enhance 
cooperation and exchange of information when appropriate. 
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Throughout all three missions, Dutch troops, notably patrols and CIMIC 
officers, also interacted with the local population. Patrols provided a 24/7 
presence in villages and towns and served as a first point of contact for the 
population. To interact with the public effectively, troops adopted a low-key, 
open, and friendly posture. Most company commanders assigned the patrols to 
fixed areas, which enabled troops to build trusted and networks to acquire 
information, although the length of the deployments (four to six months) did not 
always contribute to establishing lasting and effective networks. 
 
It can be argued that the NL Army applied an operational concept, which can be 
compared with the principles of (community) policing, notably regarding inter-
agency cooperation, with SFIR exclusively focusing on the improvement of 
public security. Despite the establishment of networks, the NL Army did not 
explicitly involve or consult the public in solving local security problems. The 
exception in this matter was KFOR 1, which effectively consulted the popula-
tion on the question of war crimes committed during the conflict. Community 
interaction largely involved the collection of general information to improve 
situational awareness and to identify opportunities for reconstruction projects 
rather than to establish community involvement to solve local security problems. 
 
Use of force 
The rules of engagement regulated the application of military force in all three 
missions. The rules of engagement underlined and applied the principles of 
necessity and proportionality. Troops were bound by comparable regulations to 
control the use of police force. In advance of their deployments, troops trained to 
become familiar with the concept of minimum use of force and the principles of 
necessity and proportionality. They learnt to de-escalate a situation by varying in 
posture and applying different communication techniques.  
 
The training had been part of the standard curriculum of mission-oriented 
training. However, in all cases, commanders reported that the understanding and 
internalisation of the concept first matured in theatre. It required continuous 
supervision of commanders, notably in situations where troops face excessive 
violence, requiring a high level of mental flexibility to be able to resolve a 
situation using as little force as possible. Working in a potentially violent 
environment is more demanding, in terms of the application of minimum use of 
force, than during regular policing and requires continuous attention by the 
military leadership at all levels. The level of contextual ambidexterity, as 
identified by Soeters,1893 needs further attention in order to advance individual 
soldiers’ competences in adapting swiftly and effectively to changing situations 
during various contingencies. 
 
 
                                               
1893 Soeters (2008), pp. 121-122. 
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9.1.3  Organisational concept 
Autonomy and individuality 
The evaluation of all three missions shows that, as a rule, battalions applied the 
principles of mission-oriented command. Within the framework of their 
assignments, junior commanders up to the level of section commanders were 
authorised to take decisions independently during the execution of Normal 
Framework Operations. Nevertheless, this study identified differences between 
deployments, for example due to commanders’ personal preferences and 
interpretations and situational circumstances. In case of increased tension, 
battalion and company commanders tended to centralise decision-making, thus 
limiting the authority of junior commanders. In terms of public security, the 
company level was the authorised level to decide independently on public 
security-related matters. In case a patrol encountered an incident, the Company 
Operations Room, directed and coordinated all further action. 
 
In comparison, police officers are generally empowered to solve a situation and 
to enforce the law independently without further instructions from an Opera-
tions Room, unless a situation demands additional support or backup. This is 
another difference between the organisational concepts of the police and the 
military. While in policing the individual police officer is authorised to take 
immediate action based upon his personal assessment of the situation,1895 
soldiering involves collective action.1896 In addition, Weick and Sutcliffe argue 
that especially in times of crisis, it should be the personnel on the ground that 
must be empowered to take all necessary decisions regardless of any hierarchical 
level. They underline that this principle ‘often escapes decision makers at critical 
moments’, but that empowerment is an essential condition for solving problems 
in a flexible and effective manner.1897 
 
Throughout all three missions, the section was formally the smallest troop 
deployment, which was in line with the standard operating procedures and the 
mission’s force protection rules. During KFOR, patrols sometimes consisted of 
two soldiers, mainly due to a lack of resources and only if the security situation 
allowed such. During IFOR/SFOR and SFIR, there were no individual 
deployments, although during SFOR some commanders allowed their sections to 
split up into two smaller groups for patrolling in close proximity to each other. In 
the case of SFOR, smaller deployments could have been feasible, for example, 
                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
1894 Weick & Sutcliffe (2001), pp. 74-75. 
1895 See for example: Bittner (1975), p. 3; Cochran & Broomley (2003), p. 89; Lipski (1980), p. 
3; Soeters (2000), p. 471. 
1896 Auten (1981), p. 72. 
1897 Weick & Sutcliffe (2001), pp. 74-75. 
306
CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS 
 
when the security situation permitted it. In comparison, the unarmed IPTF 
patrolled the streets in duos,1898 while armed troops continued to patrol in 
sections. The reason for this could be twofold. Commanders either preferred to 
stick to the formal organisational concept of the military rather than to experi-
ment with other sizes of troop deployments, or they prioritized force protection 
and avoided risks. 
 
Vertical differentiation 
The implementation of community policing contributed to a reduction of the 
length of the chain of command and improved the police’s ability to respond 
swiftly to local security problems.1899 All three missions shortened the formal 
chain of command. The intention was to increase efficiency and to speed up 
communication. Unlike in the police, the purpose of the NL Army was not to 
improve internal consultation or to reduce the level of hierarchy, however, but 
to increase operational control over the patrols, which as such can be seen as 
conflicting with the assumptions of mission-oriented command, which focuses 
on empowering junior commanders in order to increase operational flexibil-
ity.1900 
 
Deconcentration 
In community policing, the police focus on strengthening the physical decentrali-
sation of its police officers to fixed geographical areas for extended periods in 
order to improve community service and interaction, to facilitate pro-active 
policing and to build trusted networks.1901 In the three missions, battalions 
applied a de-concentrated model by deploying their troops in close proximity to 
the population. As a rule, deconcentration of troops occurred at company level, 
although during IFOR/SFOR de-concentration entailed establishing platoon 
houses in remote areas or hot-spots. During KFOR and SFIR there were no 
platoon houses, since the companies settled and deployed in close proximity to 
major urban areas. 
 
As such, NL Army battalions applied some principles of a residential approach in 
which troops are deployed in or close to populated areas for an extended period 
in order to provide security, to get to know the population and to build trusted 
networks and relationships. This approach is compatible with theories of 
counter-insurgency that emphasise the need for residential deployment of 
troops.1902 The approach is also compatible with the principles of community 
policing although there is one important difference between the two. Whereas 
the police are able to build lasting networks, the military tends to rotate its troops 
                                               
1898 This is based upon the researcher’s personal observations in 1997 during his deployment in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
1899 See for example: Easton (2001), pp. 82-83; Peak & Glensor (1999), p. 21; Skogan & 
Hartnett (2005), p. 429. 
1900 Koninklijke Landmacht (1999), p. 110. 
1901 Easton (2001), p. 83-84; Skogan (2005), pp. 75-76. 
1902 See for example: Dimitriu & De Graaf (2006), p. 626 & pp. 628-629; Fick & Nagl (2009); 
Kilcullen (2006), p. 134 & p. 136. 
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with a frequency of four to six months. Such a turnover rate is too high to settle 
in communities at a more structural level. 
 
In addition, geographical deconcentration involves leaving the secure environ-
ment of protected military compounds, as several authors have noted.1903 It 
requires a tactic of prioritising the security of citizens and taking risks, above the 
standard provisions of force protection. However, as the Iraq case showed, the 
principle of deconcentrated troop deployment is not obvious. For example, the 
decision of the government to station troops in isolated and gated compounds, in 
order to secure troops as much as possible,1904 limited the options for command-
ers to execute a residential approach towards troop deployment. Second, 
geographical deconcentration was seriously challenged when troops were 
confronted with deadly force and retreated into their secure compounds instead 
of continuing to patrol neighborhoods and gather information as the best 
safeguard to increase situational awareness, as Kilcullen notes.1905 
9.2  Answering the central research question 
The syntheses and discussion of the findings of the three case studies provides the 
information necessary to answer the central research question. The question to be 
answered is: 
 
Did the NL Army operate and organise to promote public security during a security gap in 
its crisis management operations and how did the operational and organisational concept 
during these operations compare to those of the police organisation in terms of providing 
public security? 
 
During IFOR/SFOR, KFOR, and SFIR, the NL Army operated in a security 
gap. With the exception of CRC, the existence of such a gap did not influence 
or change the formal planning and preparation at the national political and 
strategic or the operational level, to enable some kind of interim policing to 
improve public security, although international mandates or their interpretation 
would have sustained such an approach. 
 
Throughout all three missions, the Dutch government followed a strict interpre-
tation of the mandates and showed reserve against military involvement in public 
security, even when the mandate supported such activities or the police were 
unable to operate independently. The Dutch government either considered 
policing to be the responsibility of the local or international police, such as in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, or did not want to be viewed as occupying 
forces, such as in Iraq, thereby initially avoiding obligations regarding the 
provision of law and order. In Kosovo and Iraq, however, the formal position of 
                                               
1903 Fick & Nagl (2009); Kilcullen (2006), p. 136. 
1904 Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 143, p. 7; Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 154, 
p. 5; Kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 23 432, nr. 168, p. 5. 
1905 Kilcullen (2006), p. 136. See also: US Department of the Army – Headquarters (2006), p. 
1-27. 
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the government conflicted with reality on the ground. To deal with this reality 
effectively, the commander of KFOR 1 attuned his concept of operations to the 
local requirements for public security, despite the formal objections of the 
government. In Iraq, the Marines largely ignored the formal Dutch policy and 
operated in line with the British divisional guidelines to provide public security 
until the government ultimately lifted its caveats.1906 
 
It can be concluded that within the period of the three missions, the Dutch 
government disregarded political and operational demands on the ground 
required to overcome security gaps, affecting the overall progress of the mission, 
persevering in its policy to avoid military involvement in public security. It can 
also be argued that the formal policy on interim policing in fact contributed to an 
operational stalemate, which created a grey area in which commanders had to 
operate. This grey area had two dimensions. The difference between the national 
and international interpretations of the mandates is the first dimension, while the 
national caveats and the operational realities on the ground regarding security 
gaps is the second. These grey areas thus created a dilemma for commanders: 
either to comply with the formal Dutch policy to focus merely on establishing a 
safe and secure environment or to step into the grey area in order to help closing 
the security gap. 
 
Despite the national restrictions on providing public security, during all three 
missions Dutch troops helped to close the security gap and executed tasks that 
could be labelled as interim policing. In terms of public order, troops patrolled 
populated areas in a way comparable to community policing, monitored 
demonstrations, provided support to local authorities in keeping the peace and 
protected minorities and, regarding law enforcement, troops arrested criminal 
suspects independently or in support of the police or coalition troops and were 
involved in combating smuggling or the possession of illegal arms. 
 
However, battalions did not define these activities as interim policing but merely 
as military assistance, which were in line with the formal Dutch army doctrine. 
As a result, battalions executed these public security tasks along military lines and 
according to military procedures, also when deployed in a civilian environment. 
By not labelling these tasks as interim policing, commanders disregarded the 
opportunity to look into the characteristics and requirements of policing in order 
to learn and adapt and to explore how they could improve their units’ perform-
ances in this area. With no additional training in policing techniques or tactics, 
troops had to learn to perform these activities on the job. In addition, this study 
found no evidence of institutional learning in this area. The provision of public 
security during a security gap was not incorporated into the doctrines as an 
independent aspect. With the exception of SSR during SFIR, the option of 
interim policing was not specifically articulated in the operational concepts of the 
various deployments of the three missions. It has, rather, been approached as an 
incidental issue. 
                                               
1906 Brocades Zaalberg & Ten Cate (2012), pp. 122-124. 
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The NL Army also engaged in other activities related to public security. As in 
policing, the NL Army systematically collected, assembled, analysed, validated 
and re-used (targeted) information collected by patrols and other groups or 
individuals. Although the information collection process applied by the NL Army 
was similar to that of the police, the intelligence requirement by the military was 
different. Whereas the police have a problem-oriented approach to crime and 
disorder, information gathering during the three military missions largely served 
to acquire situational awareness rather than to identify root causes of community-
related public security problems in order to launch a targeted response. 
 
Furthermore, the NL Army sought cooperation and coordination with various 
civilian partners and authorities to support the execution of its activities and 
operations. With the exception of cooperation and coordination with the 
international police, inter-agency interaction did not explicitly involve public 
security issues. These issues became a fully integrated part of the operational 
concept of SFIR where Dutch forces initiated and established administrative and 
operational structures to discuss, plan and coordinate inter-agency activity in the 
field of public security. Dutch troops also interacted with the public on a daily 
basis. Unlike in policing, where cooperation primarily focuses on improving 
public security, interaction during the three missions largely focused on acquiring 
general information in order to improve situational awareness and to initiate 
development projects. 
 
In terms of applying force, the concept of operations showed remarkable 
similarity to that of the police. Both concepts articulate the principles of necessity 
and proportionality. Pre-deployment training emphasised de-escalation and the 
use of force as a last possible option. During all missions, these principles were 
fully integrated in the operational concepts. In practice, however, troops became 
acquainted with these principles only once deployed in theatre. When, like in 
Iraq, violence increased, the issue of minimum use of force required the 
continuous attention of commanders, showing that internalisation of this 
principle had not been an obvious phenomenon. 
 
As regards the organisational concept, this study showed that there had been 
some sort of analogy between the Army and the police, although there are also 
differences. While in policing individual police officers are largely empowered to 
solve situations independently, senior commanders did not empower their 
section commanders, let alone the individual soldier, to deploy public security 
activities autonomously. As a rule, the company level served as the most junior 
level on public security issues. Troops were given specific assignments and if 
unforeseen events occurred, the patrol commander had to consult the Operations 
Room in order to verify whether there were additional instructions. With the 
exception of KFOR 1, there was no individual patrolling. The section was the 
smallest troop deployment, whereas individual patrolling is the rule within the 
police. During IFOR/SFOR and KFOR, patrolling in smaller deployments 
could have been feasible but was not considered appropriate in the formal 
organisational concept or was seen as too risky. 
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Regarding vertical differentiation, this study found that most battalions shortened 
the chain of command by excluding the platoon level during the execution of 
Normal Framework Operations. In both the police and the three military 
missions, the reduction of the chain of command served to improve operational 
communication, but in the military missions the aim was primarily to increase 
command and control over the execution of the Normal Framework Operations. 
 
In terms of geographical differentiation, the NL Army applied a de-concentrated 
organisation model in all missions. Like in policing, troops deployed and staged 
in or in close proximity to towns or villages from where they deployed patrols 
within the communities in order to protect the population and to establish local 
networks. As a rule, de-concentration occurred at company level, while during 
IFOR/SFOR battalions deployed platoon houses in order to improve commu-
nity interaction in remote areas and to improve the protection of population in 
hot-spots. Although the NL Army applied a model analogous with that of the 
police, the duration of the deployment and the frequency of rotations hampered 
the structural establishment of effective and lasting civilian contacts and networks. 
9.3  Limitations of this study 
Although this study applied various methods to safeguard the quality of the 
research, the results of this study must be considered in the context of its 
limitations. 
 
The first limitation concerns the number of respondents. As this study is 
qualitative in nature, interviews have been the most important source to obtain 
data for the empirical part of the research. In total forty key-players – such as 
battalion and company commanders, and senior staff officers – were interviewed 
extensively. To compensate for the relatively small number of interviewees, 
additional document review was used to triangulate the data obtained from 
interviews. Those who were interviewed were commanders and senior staff 
officers and were directly in charge of the planning and execution of the 
operations. In other words, the selection of interviewees has been based on those 
who had exclusive and extensive knowledge and experience and being able to 
provide a viable and reliable account of operational and organisational aspects 
regarding the provision of public security. 
 
The second limitation involves the retrospective character of this study. This 
study involves an historical account of the achievements of the NL Army in past 
crisis management operations. As a result, the accounts of the interviewees are 
based upon experiences that date back from six to fifteen years ago. Therefore, it 
needs to be noted that the use of retrospective accounts may imply the risk of 
retrospective errors. Golden, for example notes that interviewees may have 
attempted to create ‘a socially desirable image by casting a light of rationality 
upon their past decisions.’ They may also have misinterpreted the past ‘as a result 
of either the “hind sight” bias or of subconscious attempts to maintain their self-
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esteem.’ In addition, the need for achievement, security, and social acceptance 
may affect the accuracy of the report of past events.1907 
 
A third limitation concerns the span of the study. Initially, this study also 
intended to describe and analyse the provision of public security during the 
Dutch involvement in ISAF in Afghanistan. For this purpose, twenty-three 
senior Dutch ISAF officers were interviewed and a substantial quantity of 
relevant data was collected. Ultimately, the ISAF mission was not included, 
mainly for reasons of efficiency, as it would have enlarged the research process 
beyond the time available to conduct this study. That the ISAF case has not been 
included implies that no conclusions could be drawn on whether or not the 
accumulation of experience and the lessons learned in the field of providing 
public security in a security gap in previous crisis management operations were 
translated into the NL Army’s operational and organisational concept as applied 
during ISAF. The inclusion of the ISAF case would have extended the number 
of the observations and thereby provided a more complete and additionally-
validated account of the NL Army’s attitude and role in public security during its 
most recent crisis management operations. 
9.4  Future research 
While this study did not incorporate the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, future 
research could focus on the provision of public security by the NL Army during 
its deployment in the province of Uruzgan from 2006 till 2010. Additional study 
of the operational and organisational concepts applied by the NL Army would 
complete a longitudinal inventory of the NL Army’s activities during security 
gaps during crisis management operations since 1995. Further study of the 
Army’s role in public security in Uruzgan could also provide additional insight 
into the learning curve of the NL Army in relation to providing public security 
during crisis management operations. It could also include the question whether, 
over the years, the NL Army has increased its awareness of public security and 
public security gaps. 
 
In the parliamentary debates prior to and during the Dutch troop deployment in 
IFOR/SFOR, KFOR, and SFIR and in the reporting of the government on 
these missions, public security played a minor role. During all these missions, the 
government had shown reserve in terms of authorising Dutch troops to engage in 
interim policing, although mandates (KFOR and SFIR) allowed such interven-
tion or the international community opted for a wider interpretation of the 
mandate in order to reinforce the rule of law (SFOR). Additional research on the 
political decision-making process could explain the objections and reserves 
regarding a larger Dutch military involvement in public security during interna-
tional crisis management operations. 
 
                                               
1907 Golden (1992), p. 849. See also: Moore (2014), pp. 125-126. 
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This study is a descriptive and historical account of the NL Army’s role in public 
security during recent crisis management operations. Although this study 
involved three different cases, it follows a one-nation research approach. 
Therefore it does not provide an international comparison of military involve-
ment in public security. A cross-national study could further increase the insight 
and knowledge on the characteristics and effectiveness of the various operational 
approaches.1908 In terms of public security, such a study could focus on differ-
ences and commonalities in the interpretation of mandates, prioritisation of 
public security operations, planning and preparation, and operational styles and 
procedures. It has to be noted, however, that in a cross-national comparison the 
characteristics of a specific context have to be taken into account. Differences in 
operational styles are not only determined by national identity, culture, or 
operational experience, but also by contextual and situational variables,1909 such as 
variations in time, geography, demographics and security. 
 
This study focused on the character of public security interventions. It defined 
what kind of public security activities were deployed by the NL Army, rather 
than measuring and evaluating the outputs and outcomes of these interventions. 
This leaves open the question whether these interventions were effective and 
successful. To answer this question, a different kind of research is required. In this 
context, Soeters and Heeren-Bogers argue for the introduction of an evidence-
based approach focusing on measuring the effects of future military operations. 
Such an approach could contribute to acquire additional knowledge on patterns 
and cause and effects of chosen interventions. It would help in developing an 
understanding of why certain interventions have been successful and others not. 
As such, evidence based research could support future operational planning and 
organisational learning.1910 
 
Finally, research on institutional learning within the NL Army can be performed 
to improve the incorporation of lessons learnt. This study noted that experiences 
in the area of public security during crisis management operations have not been 
extensively translated into the latest Army doctrines. Future research in this 
matter could provide additional knowledge on the process of institutional 
learning, and in particular on the selection criteria to identify why certain 
identified lessons are institutionalised into lessons learnt and others are not. 
9.5  Concluding remarks 
Policing involves a wider range of activities than only law enforcement and 
public order management as it entails patrolling, keeping the peace, problem 
solving and providing assistance. Largely, this is what NL Army did during their 
deployments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Iraq. If one de facto 
                                               
1908 See for example: Soeters (2013), p. 9; Ruffa & Soeters (2014), p. 225. 
1909 See for example: Brocades Zaalberg (2013), p. 3; Soeters & Heeren-Bogers (2013), p. 128. 
1910 Soeters & Heeren-Bogers (2013), pp. 128-129. 
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provides interim policing, one may need to adapt operational and organisational 
concept accordingly. 
 
When operating in a civilian environment, it may be necessary to extend the 
operational and organisational focus and adjust to the requirements of the 
situation and context. It is not about the operations one wants to conduct, but 
rather those one has to conduct given the operational demands which are faced. 
The success and impact of an international military mission operating in a volatile 
environment can thus be determined by the ability to challenge and stretch the 
operational and organisational boundaries. KFOR 1 is a good example of this. 
The battalion commander challenged his national instructions and changed his 
operational concept in order to provide interim policing when local public 
security was at stake and when no alternatives were available. Also during SFIR, 
the operational concept was aligned to providing SSR, although as mentioned 
above, institution building requires a long-term investment. Military support for 
public security will likely remain an interim solution to security gaps of future 
operations. 
 
The Dutch approach to public security tasks in crisis management operations 
remains ambiguous. The government takes a distant stance towards interim 
policing and, so far, the NL Army has not conceptualised an explicit plan on 
public security. The subject remains at the periphery of its doctrine and training 
curriculum. But, if the military de facto already performs policing tasks, an 
alternative approach would be to accept this reality and adapt to contemporary 
requirements and proven practice. This would entail the NL Army reconsidering 
its operational and organisational concepts in order to explore to what extent 
policing techniques, tactics and procedures could be beneficial to the existing 
military doctrines, and to its operational and organisational concepts. It would 
also require force adaptation in terms of empowerment of junior commanders 
and self-supporting units. By increasing trust in the professional skills and 
judgement of its junior operatives, the military may improve its ability to deal 
with local security problems effectively and to develop dedicated local arrange-
ments. In addition, it could consider incorporating police advice and law 
enforcement capacity, for example at battalion and company level, to support 
commanders and regular troops in executing public security tasks. 
 
In order for the NL Army to leave its comfort zone, a paradigm shift is needed. 
The argument that public security tasks are not military tasks is unsustainable for 
two reasons. First, policing is de facto already part of the operational concept of 
the military. Second, in today’s hybrid crisis management operations, classical 
military tasks are an anachronism. Consequently, the distinction between policing 
and soldiering is blurred. Serious public security problems require immediate 
solutions. If there are only military resources available, the NL Army has to adapt 
and provide context-specific solutions to serve the population and society until 
civilian agencies are in place to take over. It needs to go beyond borders. 
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at
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el
at
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 c
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 d
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at
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 D
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 p
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 d
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 f
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 d
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 c
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 c
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 l
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 p
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pr
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 c
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at
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l p
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 d
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 d
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 p
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 c
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at
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 p
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 b
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 r
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f l
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at
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 m
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m
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 p
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 m
an
da
te
 f
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C
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C
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 o
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at
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ra
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at
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 f
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 m
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 p
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 p
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at
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 m
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l p
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ra
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 r
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ra
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 p
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ra
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 m
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at
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 b
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 p
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 b
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at
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ra
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 p
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at
io
n 
T
ra
in
in
g 
an
d 
pr
ep
ar
at
io
n 
fo
cu
se
d 
on
 r
eg
ul
ar
 c
ur
ri
cu
lu
m
 
an
d 
m
iss
io
n-
or
ie
nt
ed
 t
ra
in
in
g.
 A
pa
rt
 f
ro
m
 C
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 p
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 c
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at
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 c
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 f
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 p
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 p
at
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 d
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 c
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D
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at
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 f
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 m
ai
nt
ai
ni
ng
 
pu
bl
ic
 o
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ro
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 d
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 b
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re
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 m
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. b
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 l
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at
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r l
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 p
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 b
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 o
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re
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 l
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m
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at
io
ns
 
an
d 
ac
tiv
iti
es
, 
ei
th
er
 
in
de
pe
nd
en
tly
 o
r 
in
 c
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ra
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 c
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m
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 c
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itu
at
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at
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l p
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Appendix 1  Chronology 
IFOR/SFOR 
April 2, 1992 Start of the armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
November 21, 
1995 
Presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia 
agree on the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Agreement) 
December 9, 1995 Dutch government decides to participate in IFOR mission 
December 14, 1995 Presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia sign 
the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
December 15, 1995 UN Security Council adopts UNSCR 1031 authorising 
IFOR to ensure the implementation of the military aspects of 
the peace agreement and IPFT to monitor, train, advice and 
facilitate the local police 
December 21, 1995 1 (NL) Mechbat IFOR 1 begins its mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
March 1996 IFOR 1 starts social patrolling in which it adopted a relaxed 
posture focused to achieve interaction with the local popula-
tion 
March/April 1996 IFOR 1 assists the MND (SE) in the arrest of two high targets 
suspects by providing secure perimeters in the Vitez Pocket 
April 1996 COMIFOR introduces 30-minutes rule focused at the 
removal of illegal police checkpoints to improve freedom of 
movement of all citizens 
April 23, 1996 Publication NL Army doctrine Military Doctrine  
April/May 1996 IFOR 1 starts deploying semi-permanent platoon bases and 
houses in remote areas 
June 19, 1996 IFOR 2 replaces IFOR 1 
July 10-11, 1996 IFOR 2 provides security assistance to ICTY during the 
exhumation of a mass grave in Bikosi 
September 1996 IPFT reaches its authorised force level of around 1,700 police 
advisors 
September 14, 1996 First national elections after the war. IFOR 2 provided 
checkpoints and patrols its area of operations to create a safe 
and secure environment and freedom of movement 
December 21, 1996 SFOR replaces IFOR to ‘provide continued military presence 
to deter renewed hostilities and to stabilise and consolidate the 
peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ and 'to contribute to a safe 
and secure environment’ 
December 21, 1996 1 (NL) Mechbat SFOR 1 begins its mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
June 11, 1997 SFOR 2 replaces SFOR 1 
July 10, 1997 A team of the UK Special Air Service executes Operation 
Tango to arrest two PIFWCs in Prijedor. This operation 
implies a change of policy of NATO and SFOR regarding the 
arrest of PIFWCs 
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August 31, 1997 Deployment of a Marines company trained for CRC purposes 
to reinforce SFOR 2 during the municipal elections in 
September The government decides to continue the deploy-
ment of CRC capabilities which are then provided by the NL 
Army 
September 13-14, 
1997 
Municipal elections. SFOR 2 assisted international organisa-
tions to ensure safe and secure elections.  
December 6, 1997 SFOR 3 replaces SFOR 2 
December 18, 1997 Dutch Special Forces deploy Operation Iron Glance to arrest 
two Bosnian Croat PIFWCs  
March 1998 SFOR deploys Operation Oxford to provide security assistance 
to ICTY during investigations in Ahmici  
March 1998 SFOR 3 starts with Operation Harvest focused at collecting 
illegal arms and ammunition from citizens. Harvest Operations 
were deployed until the end of the Dutch mandate 
March 17, 1998 Publication of NL Army doctrines Combat Operations, Part A 
Fundamentals and Part B Combat Operations against a Regular 
Enemy Force (LDP 2) 
May 23, 1998 SFOR 4 replaces SFOR 3 
June 1998 Start of various public order incidents in the Dutch area of 
operations during DPRE visits and returns. These incidents 
continued until the end of 1998 
August 1998 NATO deploys an MSU battalion to bridge the enforcement 
gap between SFOR and IPTF 
September 12-13, 
1998 
Elections for various representative and legislative bodies. 
SFOR 4 ensured a safe and secure environment and guaran-
teed freedom of movement of the voters 
September 23, 1998 SFOR 4 provided security assistance to ICTY during the 
investigation in the city hall of Vitez and around the building 
of the Bosnian Croat veteran association HVIDRA. 
November 15, 
1998 SFOR 5 replaces SFOR 4 
May 16, 1999 SFOR 6 replaces SFOR 5 
June 29, 1999 Publication NL Army doctrine Peace Operations (LDP 3) 
November 7, 1999 SFOR 7 replaces SFOR 6 
December 1999 CRC platoon no longer deployed in theatre but kept in 
reserve in the Netherlands on a notice-to-move of twenty 
days  
April 8, 2000 Municipal elections. SFOR 9 assists international organisations 
to ensure safe and secure elections 
May 7, 2000 SFOR 8 replaces SFOR 7 
November 30, 
2000 SFOR 9 replaces SFOR 8 
April 6, 2001 SFOR 9 deploys security operation to search the Herze-
govačka Banka in Vitez 
April 2001 SFIR 9 requests the deployment of a Dutch Crowd and Riot 
Control (CRC) in relationship to Bosnian Croat initiatives to 
establish a third independent entity. The government decides 
to deploy a CRC platoon as of April 23, 2001 
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May 8, 2001 Deadly incident during a CRC training in Bugojno. The 
government decides to withdraw the CRC platoon and to 
keep a platoon of the Marechaussee on stand-by in the 
Netherlands 
May 9, 2001 SFOR 10 replaces SFOR 9 
November 4, 2001 SFOR 11 replaces SFOR 10 
May 5, 2002 SFOR 12 replaces SFOR 11 
May 27, 2002 High Representative Paddy Ashdown declares the rule of law 
his top priority. Also NATO and SFOR make fighting 
corruption and organised crime a priority. The Dutch 
government continues to regard public security as a responsi-
bility of the local police. 
February 2002 SFOR 13 deploys Operation Kerrebos as part of a MND 
operation. SFOR 13 focuses at combating trafficking of illegal 
arms while the MND’s objective is to search for PIFWCs  
November 3 2002 SFOR 13 replaces SFOR 12 
January 1, 2003 EUPOL succeeds IPFF to mentor and monitor the local 
police 
May 5, 2003 SFOR 14 replaces SFOR 13 
October 2, 2003 SFOR 14 launches Operation Mooirivier in cooperation with 
the local police and EUPOL to fight illegal logging 
November 3, 2003 SFOR 15 replaces SFOR 14 
November 12, 
2003 
Publication NL Army doctrine Combat Operations, Part C 
Irregular Combat (LDP 2) 
April 28, 2004 End of mission of (1) NL Mechbat SFOR 15 as the last Dutch 
battalion to serve in the SFOR mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
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KFOR 
February 1998 Start of an internal armed conflict in Kosovo 
March 31, 1998 UN Security Council adopts UNSCR 1160 to stop the 
violence in Kosovo and calls for a meaningful dialogue aimed 
at achieving a political solution to the issue of Kosovo’s status 
September 23, 
1998 
UN Security Council adopts UNSCR 1199 to stop violence 
by security forces against the civilian population and to order 
the withdrawal of Serbian security forces from Kosovo 
October 25, 1998 Deployment of the OCSE Kosovo Verification Mission 
(KVM) 
January 15, 1999 Massacre at Račak in which over forty Kosovo Albanians were 
killed 
February 6, 1999 Start of peace negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo 
Albanians in Rambouillet, France  
April 3, 1999 The Dutch government assigns 11 Artillery Battalion to 
prepare for deployment to Kosovo as KFOR 1 
March 24, 1999 NATO starts air campaign Allied Force against Serbian military 
and infrastructural targets to force Serbia to stop its violence in 
Kosovo. Allied Force lasts for 78-days 
June 2, 1999 Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic agrees to withdraw his 
security forces from Kosovo. He also agrees to the deployment 
of an international peace operation in Kosovo 
June 10, 1999 UN Security Council adopts UNSCR 1244 authorising the 
UN to establish an interim civilian administration for Kosovo 
and NATO to deploy a military force to establish a safe 
environment in Kosovo 
June 12, 1999 First KFOR troops enter Kosovo  
June 14, 1999 Advance party of KFOR 1 arrives in Orahovac 
June 15, 1999 Main body of KFOR1 deploys for Kosovo in three subsequent 
shifts  
June 20, 1999 KFOR 1 opens an investigations desk where citizens could 
report serious crimes committed during the conflict 
June 22, 1999 The German Ministry of Defence issues Directive 8 authoris-
ing German soldiers to search, disarm and arrest suspects of 
serious crimes. The Directive later applies to Dutch troops 
under the command of the German brigade. 
June 25, 1999 COMKFOR issues Operational Order 004 which authorises 
KFOR troops to perform preliminary police functions 
June 28, 1999 Arrival of the first UNMiK police officers in Kosovo; they 
were deployed on July 3, 1999 to five locations within Kosovo 
June 29, 1999 Publication NL Army doctrine Peace Operations (LDP 3) 
July 20, 1999 COMKFOR issues Directive 1510.7 underlining that KFOR 
has the mandate and responsibility for law and order until 
UNMiK Police would assume its responsibilities 
July 30, 1999 German MNB assigns platoon Feldjäger to KFOR 1 to 
strengthen its patrolling capacity pending the arrival of 
UNMiK Police 
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August 20, 1999 Team of the German Kommando Spezialkräfte arrests three 
alleged PIFWCs in Orahovac based upon investigations 
conducted by KFOR 1. KFOR 1 provides a perimeter security 
August 20, 1999 KFOR 1 organises weapon collection action in Serbian quarter 
of Orahovac  
August 23, 1999 KFOR 1 organises weapon collection action in Velika Hoca 
September 1999 Arrival of the first UNMiK police officers in Orahovac 
September 20, 
1999 
KFOR 1 deploys house-to-house search operation to 
confiscate illegal arms in Danjane in cooperation with UNMiK 
Police and Feldjäger 
September 28, 
1999 
KFOR 1 deploys house-to-house search operation to 
confiscate illegal arms in Velika Hoca in cooperation with 
UNMiK Police and Feldjäger 
September 24, 
1999 
KFOR 1 troops arrests five alleged PIFWCs prior to the 
departure of a humanitarian convoy to Serbia  
October 7, 1999 KFOR 1 troops arrests one alleged PIFWC in his house in 
Orahovac 
October 22, 1999 KFOR 1 troops arrests two alleged PIFWCs when reporting 
themselves at the Dutch base. 
October 6, 1999 Dutch government issues a guideline for the arrest of alleged 
war-criminals in Kosovo 
October 27, 1999 UNMiK Police assumes full executive responsibility for 
policing in the Prizren region 
December 7, 1999 41 Artillery Battalion KFOR 2 takes over from 11 Artillery 
Battalion KFOR 1 
December 10, 
1999 
KFOR 2 assists UNMiK Police to search UÇK sites for illegal 
arms 
January 23, 2000 Demonstration of Kosovo Albanians in Orahovac against a visit 
of the UN High Representative Kouchner and the Orthodox 
bishop Artemeije  
February 2, 2000 Violence erupts in Mitrovica after a it’s a UNHCR bus 
carrying 49 Serbs 
February 4-8, 2004 KFOR 2 provides in security assistance in Mitrovica  
February 10, 2000 Demonstration of Kosovo Albanians for a release of political 
prisoners 
February 16-24, 
2000 
KFOR 2 provides in security assistance in Mitrovica 
March 9, 2000 Demonstration in Suva Reka  
March 11-17, 2000 Alpha Company 17 (NL) Armoured Infantry Battalion KFOR 
2 provides security assistance in Mitrovica 
March 14, 2000 KFOR 2 assists UNMiK Police during search operation in 
Orahovac for illegal arms 
November 26, 
1999 
Dutch government decides to focus its involvement in crisis 
management operations on the SFOR mission. It therefore 
decides to end its contribution to the KFOR mission 
December 28, 
1999 
KFOR 2 assists the UNMiK Police in the arrest of a alleged 
PIFWC 
December 7, 1999 41 Artillery Battalion KFOR 2 replaces KFOR 1 
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January 31, 2000 KFOR 2 arrests two alleged PIFWCs during a routine check 
in Suva Reka 
May 1, 2000 End of mission of 41 Artillery Battalion KFOR 2; Dutch 
troops leave Orahovac 
May 2000 UNMiK Police reaches 77 percent of its authorised strength 
(3,625 police officers) 
June 2000 UNMiK assumes full executive responsibility for policing in all 
of Kosovo 
August 8, 2000 End of Dutch participation in KFOR 
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SFIR 
November 8, 2002 UN Security Council adopts UNSCR 1441 demanding full 
cooperation of Iraq with the inspectors of IAEA and UN-
MOVIC 
December 7, 2002 The Government of Iraq provides a report on its weapon 
programmes. US and UK regard the report providing 
insufficient proof of absence of WMD 
March 19, 2002 US-led coalition launches Operation Iraqi Freedom 
May 1, 2003 President G.W. Bush announces the end of ‘major combat 
operations’ 
May 16, 2003 CPA Administrator Bremer decides to the De-Ba’athification 
of the Iraqi society including the removal of the three top 
layers of the Iraqi National Police 
May 22, 2003 UN Security Council adopts UNSCR 1483 to invite states to 
deploy troops and resources under the command and control of 
the US and the UK 
May 23, 2003 CPA Administrator Bremer decides to dissolve the Iraqi Armed 
Forces 
May 2003 CPA concludes that the Iraqi Police are unable to maintain law 
and order independently and need the assistance of Coalition 
Forces 
June 6, 2003 Dutch government decides to participate in the Multinational 
Force in Iraq 
June 28, 2003 Transfer of Authority to the Iraqi authorities including the 
responsibility for public security 
Augustus 1, 2003 First (NL) Marines Battalion deploys in Al-Muthanna as SFIR 
1 
October 16, 2003 UN Security Council adopts UNSCR 1511 enabling the 
establishment of a Multinational Force 
November 12, 
2003 
Publication NL Army doctrine Combat Operations, Part C 
Irregular Combat (LDP 2) 
November 13, 
2004 
Second (NL) Marines Battalion SFIR 2 replaces SFIR 1 
November 28, 
2003 
Dutch government decides to extend the mission in Iraq for 
another six months 
March 15, 2004 42 (NL) Mechanised Battalion of the NL Army (SFIR 3) 
replaces SFIR 2 
April 5, 2004 Armed Sadrists take control over police station in As-Samawah 
 
June 2004 
 
Police in Al-Muthanna reach their intended capacity of 1,400 
police officers 
March, 2004 MND (SE) makes SSR its priority and launches a programme 
to reform the Iraqi Security Forces including the police 
April 1, 2004 SFIR 3 executes Operation Swatter to arrest suspects of 
weapon smuggle, human trafficking and drugs trade 
April-May 2004 Increasing violence in Al-Mutthana; various hostile acts against 
Dutch troops  
May 11, 2004 Armed attack on a Dutch patrol in Ar-Rumaythah killing a 
sergeant and injuring a soldier 
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May 15, 2004 Armed Sadrists try to attack the Government Building in As-
Samawah 
May 2004 CPA launches a programme to reform, train and equip the 
Iraqi Police 
June 11, 2004 Dutch government decides to extend the mission in Iraq until 
mid-May 2005 
July 14, 2004 13 Air Mobile Infantry Battalion SFIR 4 replaces SFIR 3 
August 14-15, 
2004 
Iraqi insurgents ambush a MP convoy and kill one sergeant and 
injuring three others 
August 26, 2004 Crisis in Najaf comes to an end; security situation in Al-
Muthanna stabilises 
September 5, 2004 SFIR 4 executes Operation Kyodo to arrest the suspects of the 
Ar-Rumaytah ambush 
October 8-9, 2004 SFIR 4 executes Operation Knock Out in order to search 
locations related to infiltration/smuggling of alleged suicide 
bombers and/or terrorists 
October 11-16, 
2004 
SFIR 4 executes Operation Buzzard stop and search suspicious 
individuals and vehicles on contraband and weapons 
November 15, 
2004 
11 Air Mobile Infantry Battalion SFIR 5 replaces SFIR 5 
December 13, 
2004 
SFIR 5 organises emergency exercise Operation Koala to 
prepare and train the authorities and security forces to handle 
emergencies during the elections 
January 18, 2005 SFIR 5 organises a second emergency exercise. 
January 25, 2005 SFIR 5 organises a final exercise to prepare the security forces 
for the Elections Day 
January 30, 2005 National Elections. SFIR 5 provides assistance to the Iraqi 
police in order to enable free and secure elections 
March 7, 2005 End of mission of SFIR 5; Dutch battalion leaves Al-Muthanna 
and transfers its responsibilities to the UK Task Force Eagle 
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Appendix 2  Interview protocol 
Information on referent 
 
Name: 
Function: 
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 
 
1 Introduction 
 
- Subject of the research 
- Central research question 
- Relevance and purpose of the research 
- Structure and length of the interview  
- Use of voice recorder and transcription of the interview 
- Confidentiality of information provided 
 
2 Interview 
 
a Security gap 
- What has been the level of public security in terms of criminality, public order 
disturbances, violence, and/or insurgency? 
- Have the local and/or international police been able to establish a safe and secure 
civil environment in terms of professionalism, reliability, availability, and training? 
- Have the local or international police been able to cover the full spectrum of 
police force or did they need military backup to support or assist them? 
 
b Operational concept 
 
Planning 
- Has restoration of public security been a priority when planning and preparing to 
crisis management operations? 
- Has the public security been part of the mission’s initial operational planning? 
- Have the Dutch troops had a clear view of the local public security situation in 
advance of their deployment? 
- Have the Dutch troops been trained and equipped to provide public security? 
 
Execution 
Managing the security gap 
- What kind of interventions did the NL Army deploy in terms of public order 
management in order to bridge the security gap? 
- What kind of interventions did the NL Army deploy in terms of law enforcement 
in order to bridge the security gap? 
- Were these interventions based upon the mandate and/or initial mission of the 
operation or did they follow from an operational and/or situational necessity? 
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- Could these activities be labelled as interim policing or as regular military 
operations? 
 
Intelligence 
- What instruments did the Dutch military use to collect information and intelli-
gence to support public security? 
- Were public security problems (systematically) inventoried, analysed and 
prioritised and used for proactive interventions? 
- Was intelligence shared with civilian partners and stakeholders? 
 
Cooperation 
- Has the NL Army cooperated with local authorities and stakeholders, interna-
tional partners, and citizens to improve public security; and if so, what form did 
this cooperation take? 
- Has this cooperation been formalised or had it been on an ad hoc basis? 
- At which level of the organisation was the interaction with local partners and 
stakeholders initiated and executed? 
 
Use of force and flexibility 
- Have the Dutch troops been trained in and adopted a “minimum use of force” 
strategy in relationship to crisis management operations? 
- Have troops adapted to changing contextual conditions or operational modalities 
(e.g. to escalate and de-escalate during social patrolling)? 
 
c Organisational concept 
 
Autonomy and individuality 
- Which level within the chain of command has been responsible for the manage-
ment of public security operations? 
- What has been the lowest level within the chain of command authorised to solve 
practical public security issues independently? 
- Has there been any kind of organisational or individual specialisation to provide 
public security 
- Did the organisational concept enable individual action or did it require 
collectivistic action? 
- What has been the smallest troop deployment to provide public security? 
 
Vertical differentiation 
- What has been the length of the military chain of command contribute and how 
did this contribute to the provision of public security? 
 
Geographic differentiation (deconcentration) 
- Have Dutch troops been stationed in the proximity of the population? 
- Have Dutch soldiers established local networks to obtain and share information? 
- Has the population had point of contact for public security issues on a 24/7 basis? 
 
3 Closure 
 
- Suggestions for further research or improving the study? 
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- Suggestions to obtain additional information on the subject of the research  
- Suggestions to contact other persons relevant to be interviewed 
- Procedure regarding sending transcript for verification and authorisation 
- Information on proceedings, next steps in the research, and final reporting 
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Appendix 3  Overview of Interviewees 
 
 
J.P. Askamp A.J.H. van Loon 
M.J.H.M. Bastin J.A. van der Louw 
H. de Boer H.J. Maijers 
H.J. Bos C.J. Matthijssen 
C.J.P. Brouns A. Nijkamp 
J.M.A. Brouns A.C. Oostendorp 
J.T.M. Damen K.H. de Richemont 
F.B. van Dooren M.W.A.M. Roelen 
M. Duvekot P.J. Schaberg 
A.A.G. Goedhart A.J. Schouwenaars 
P.J. Hageman W. Sleurink 
R.H. van Harskamp G.A. Strick 
P.G.F. Hoefsloot J.H.M. Stumpers 
H.A.J.M. Jacobs R.J.F.M. Veltman 
H.J. Keij A.T. Vermeij 
H.J.D.M. Konings T.W.B. Vleugels 
R.T. Kootstra M. van Weerd 
A. de Kruis J. van der Werf 
M.A. van der Laan F.M. de Wit 
O.J.A. Lagas A.A.J.M. Witkamp 
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Appendix 4  List of Abbreviations 
 
 
AIF Anti Iraqi Forces  
ANP Afghan National Police  
AO Area of Operations 
CENTCOM Central Command  
CF Coalition Forces  
CIMIC  Civil-Military Cooperation 
COMIFOR Commander of IFOR  
COMKFOR Commander of KFOR  
COMSFOR Commander of SFOR 
CPA Coalition Provisional Authority  
CRC Crowd and Riot Control  
DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
DPRE Displaced persons and refugees  
ECCM European Community Monitoring Mission  
EU European Union  
EUFOR European Force 
EULEX European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo 
EUPM European Union Police Mission  
EUROGENDFOR European Gendarmerie Force  
FLT Field Liaison Team  
FM  Field Manual  
FPU Formed Police Units 
GE Germany 
GFAP General Framework Agreement for Peace  
HUMINT Human Intelligence  
HV Hrvatska Vojska (Croat Army)  
HVO Hrvatsko Vijeće Obrane (Bosnian Croat Army)  
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency  
ICTY  International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia  
IDEA  Integrated Development of Entrepreneurial Advisors 
IEBL Inter-Entity Boundary Line  
IFOR Implementation Force 
ILP Intelligence Led Policing  
ING Iraqi National Guard  
ILP Intelligence Led Policing 
INTERFET International Force for East Timor  
IPTF International Police Task Force 
IPU Integrated Police Unit  
ISAF International Security Assistance Force 
ISF Iraqi Security Forces  
JNA (former) Yugoslav National Army  
KFOR Kosovo Force 
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KLA Kosovo Liberation Army  
KPS Kosovo Police Service 
KPSS Kosovo Police Service School  
KVM Kosovo Verification Mission 
LDK 
Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (Democratic League of 
Kosovo) 
LtCol Lieutenant-Colonel  
MFI Multinational Force in Iraq  
MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti  
MNB Multinational Brigade 
MND SE Multinational Division South East 
MND SW Multinational Division South West 
MP Military Police 
MRPG Monthly Regional Planning Group  
MSR Main Supply Route  
MSU Multinational Specialised Unit  
MTA Military Technical Agreement  
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation  
NL Netherlands  
NPM New Public Management 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development  
OHR Office of the High Representative  
OPORDER Operational Order 
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe  
PIFWC Persons indicted for war crimes 
PIR Primary Intelligence Requirement  
PJOC Provincial Joint Operations Centre 
RoE Rules of engagement 
RRTF Reconstruction and Return Task Force  
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Central Europe 
SAS Special Air Service  
SFIR  Stability Force in Iraq  
SFOR Stabilisation Force 
SSR Security Sector Reform 
SWAPOL South West African Police  
TSU Tactical Support Unit  
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle  
UÇK Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (Kosovo Liberation Army) 
UK United Kingdom 
UN United Nations 
UNC United Nations Command  
UNDOF  United Nations Disengagement Force 
UNEF United Nations Emergency Force  
UNFICYP  United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus  
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
UNIFIL  United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon  
UNMIBH UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina  
UNMiK United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
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UNMOVIC 
 
United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection 
Commission  
UNOSOM  United Nations Operation in Somalia 
UNPREDEP  United Nations Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia 
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force 
UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission (Iraq) 
UNSCR  United Nations Security Council Resolution 
UNSF  United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea 
UNSPC United Nations Standing Police Capacity  
UNTAC  United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
UNTAG United Nations Transition Assistance Group  
US United States 
VIP Very Important Person 
WEU Western Eurpopean Union 
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Samenvatting in Nederlands 
 
 
Een gewapend regionaal of binnenlands conflict zet vaak de effectiviteit en 
legitimiteit van bestaande politiek-bestuurlijke structuren en instituties onder 
druk of laat deze zelfs ineenstorten. Dit leidt niet alleen tot een machtsvacuüm 
maar veroorzaakt ook een veiligheidsdeficit, zeker wanneer de lokale politie 
desintegreert en niet meer bij machte is om effectief op te treden tegen verstorin-
gen van de openbare orde en veiligheid. 
 
Indien de internationale gemeenschap besluit te interveniëren, bijvoorbeeld door 
de uitvoering van een crisisbeheersingsoperatie, dan staat zij ook voor de keuze 
op welke wijze zij het probleem van het veiligheidsdeficit wil oplossen. De 
hervorming van de gehele veiligheidssector, inclusief de politie, is dan de meest 
voor de hand liggende optie. Echter, een dergelijk herstructureringstraject vergt 
maanden zo niet jaren. De opleiding van capabele politiemensen kost nu eenmaal 
tijd waardoor de structurele effecten van de hervorming pas op termijn merkbaar 
zijn. 
 
Om op korte termijn het veiligheidsdeficit succesvol te bestrijden, kan de 
internationale gemeenschap besluiten een internationale politiemacht te ont-
plooien die dan als opdracht krijgt de restanten van de lokale politie te begeleiden 
en te monitoren of om tijdelijk de gehele politiezorg voor haar rekening te 
nemen tot het moment dat de nieuw opgeleide politieagenten binnen een 
geherstructureerde politie daartoe zelfstandig in staat zijn. 
 
Een snelle ontplooiing van een internationale politiemacht is echter geen 
vanzelfsprekendheid. Vaak is het veiligheidsniveau in een conflictgebied zo laag 
en turbulent dat donorlanden het niet verantwoord vinden om civiele politie-
mensen uit te zenden. Ook de onmiddellijke beschikbaarheid van geschikte 
politiemensen kan een probleem vormen. Deze moeten veelal worden onttrok-
ken aan het nationale politiebestel dat op zich onder druk staat door een schaarste 
aan middelen en een hoge maatschappelijke vraag naar veiligheid. Indien de 
ontplooiing van een internationale politiemacht vertraagt raakt, dreigt er een 
ontplooiingstekort met het risico dat tijdens het gouden uur van een operatie er 
onvoldoende menskracht aanwezig is om de meest acute openbare orde en 
veiligheidsproblemen effectief aan te pakken.  
 
Maar een ontplooiingstekort dit is niet het enige probleem dat de effectiviteit van 
de internationale crisisbeheersingsoperatie kan treffen. Ook een handhavingste-
kort kan een snel herstel van de lokale openbare orde en veiligheid in de weg 
staan. Zo’n tekort doet zich voor indien de civiele politie de capaciteit, middelen 
en/of competenties ontbeert om over het gehele continuüm van politietaken 
effectief te kunnen optreden en daarvoor de assistentie van de internationale 
troepenmacht nodig heeft. 
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Een veiligheidsvacuüm kan tot gevolg hebben dat een internationale troepen-
macht, die vaak wel snel kan worden ingezet, wordt geconfronteerd met acute 
openbare orde- en veiligheidsproblemen. De troepenmacht staat dan voor de 
keuze zich afzijdig te houden en zich te concentreren op haar formele missie of 
buiten het opgedragen takenpakket te treden en tijdelijk politietaken uit te 
voeren die kunnen bijdragen tot een snel herstel van de openbare orde en 
veiligheid. De premisse is wel dat een eenheid zich hierop voorbereidt en haar 
operatie- en organisatieconcept erop aanpast. 
 
De Koninklijke Landmacht opereerde tijdens de missies van IFOR/SFOR, 
KFOR en SFIR in een veiligheidsvacuüm. In al deze operaties had de Land-
macht te maken met een falend of afwezig politieapparaat en ernstige verstorin-
gen van de openbare orde en veiligheid. Echter, met uitzondering van de 
zogenaamde crowd and riot control (CRC) heeft dit niet geleid tot een formele 
aanpassing van het operatie- en organisatieconcept voor de uitvoering van 
interim politietaken. Ook de doctrine van de Koninklijke Landmacht is hier niet 
expliciet op aangepast en besteedt maar beperkt aandacht aan de tijdelijke 
uitvoering van deze taken. Daar komt bij dat de Nederlandse regering zich 
tijdens deze drie missies op dit terrein zeer terughoudend heeft opgesteld, ook al 
boden de internationale mandaten daartoe ruimte (KFOR en SFIR) of bestond 
er naar verloop van tijd internationale consensus over de bredere interpretatie van 
het mandaat (SFOR). 
 
Toch heeft de Landmacht tijdens al deze drie missies taken uitgevoerd die onder 
normale omstandigheden tot de verantwoordelijkheid de politie behoren. Hierbij 
valt bijvoorbeeld te denken aan sociale patrouilles (vergelijkbaar met politiesur-
veillance), het handhaven van de openbare orde, het beschermen van bedreigde 
personen of groepen, het aanhouden van verdachten en het doorzoeken van 
gebouwen en woningen op verdachte personen en goederen. Dit betekent dat 
militairen van de Landmacht de facto politietaken hebben uitgevoerd hoewel deze 
taken niet als zodanig werden geduid. 
 
Ook op andere gebieden vertoonde het operatieconcept van de uitgezonden 
landmachteenheden impliciete overeenkomsten met dat van de politie, bijvoor-
beeld in termen van institutionele samenwerking met civiele partners en 
organisaties, informatiegestuurdwerken en het beheerst en terughoudend omgaan 
met toepassing van geweld. Het verschil met de politie was echter dat bijvoor-
beeld op het gebied van informatiegestuurdwerken en institutionele samenwer-
king de politie zich primair richt op de preventie en oplossing van openbare orde 
en criminalistvraagstukken terwijl de Landmacht hierbij een bredere focus had en 
deze activiteiten plaatste in het kader van het verwerven en versterken van 
inzicht en kennis de een breder terrein variërend van algemene politieke militaire 
en maatschappelijke stabiliteit, sociaaleconomische ontwikkelingen en bestuurlij-
ke en institutionele hervormingen (bijvoorbeeld de hervorming van de veilig-
heidssector). 
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Ook het organisatieconcept van de uitgezonden landmachteenheden vertoonde 
op conceptueel niveau overeenkomsten met dat van de politie en in het 
bijzonder dat van community policing. De Landmacht en de politie leggen beide de 
beslissingsbevoegdheid over operationele aangelegenheden laag in de organisatie 
met een belangrijk verschil dat de politie de individuele agent een relatief grote 
discretionaire bevoegdheid geeft terwijl de landmacht deze in de praktijk voor 
groeps- en pelotonscommandanten clausuleert. Tijdens de drie missies was het 
compagniesniveau de belangrijkste hiërarchische laag met beslissingsbevoegdheid 
op het gebied van openbare orde en veiligheidsvraagstukken en incidenten. Waar 
de politie individueel optreedt, was daar in het organisatieconcept van de 
landmacht vrijwel geen ruimte voor terwijl de veiligheidssituatie dit in bepaalde 
gevallen wel toeliet.  
 
Analoog aan het politieconcept, verkleinden meeste uitgezonden eenheden de 
verticale differentiatie binnen hun organisatie door in de praktijk tijdens de 
uitvoering van de reguliere activiteiten het pelotonsniveau als executieve schakel 
uit de formele commandostructuur te halen. Anders dan bij de politie beoogden 
zij hier niet mee de professionele consultatie van het decentrale niveau te 
bevorderen maar om de grip van het compagniesniveau op de operaties van de 
groepen te versterken. Ook ten aanzien van de geografische decentralisatie was er 
een zekere analogie met het politieconcept. Ook de Landmacht ontplooide haar 
eenheden zo dicht mogelijk in de buurt van bevolkingscentra met het doel 
zichtbaar te zijn, contacten op te bouwen, informatie te vergaren en veiligheids-
vraagstukken op te lossen. Echter, waar de politie erin slaagt structurele en 
duurzame netwerken en relaties op te bouwen, vormde de hoge rotatiesnelheid 
van de landmachteenheden hierin een beperkende factor. 
 
Hoewel de Landmacht gedurende de crisisbeheersingsoperaties in Bosnië en 
Herzegovina, Kosovo en Irak in de praktijk politietaken heeft uitgevoerd, heeft 
zij zich hier niet doelbewust op voorbereid en ingericht. Dat het fenomeen 
‘veiligheidsvacuüm’ als een rode draad door de drie missies heen liep, maakte 
hierin geen verschil. In die zin was er maar beperkt sprake van een institutioneel 
leerproces, mede doordat het thema openbare orde en veiligheid in de landmacht 
doctrine marginale aandacht krijgt. Maar als een veiligheidsvacuüm in een 
crisisbeheersingsoperatie een vanzelfsprekendheid is en eenheden in de praktijk de 
facto politietaken uitvoeren, is het raadzaam eenheden daarop voor te bereiden en 
te trainen. Met andere woorden, de Landmacht moet over de grenzen van haar 
organisatie heen gaan kijken en haar professionele oriëntatie verbreden naar de 
politieorganisatie om zich procedures, technieken en tactieken eigen te maken 
die haar kan helpen een (nog) grotere toegevoegde waarde te hebben. 
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Beyond borders
The role of the Netherlands Army in public security 
during crisis management operations
Peter Neuteboom
 At the beginning of a crisis management operation, the international 
community is often confronted with a poorly functioning or absent local police 
force. Within the chaos that reigns over the crisis area, an inadequate police 
force is a prelude to an explosive growth of crime and public order problems. 
The question then arises who could deal with these problems. In the absence of 
a local police force the only alternative at hand is that the military temporarily 
intervene as interim police, an activity that is not only beyond the primary 
tasks of the military but that is also likely to meet resistance of the troops. 
On the basis of relevant police literature, this thesis has investigated and 
analysed how the Royal Army of the Netherlands has contributed to improving 
public order and security during crisis management operations in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo and Iraq. The thesis draws the conclusion that, although 
the army did do interim policing during these missions, these tasks were 
only to a limited extent institutionalised in the organisational and operational 
concepts of the army. This means that the army to some extent ignored a 
reality typifying contemporary crisis management operations, namely that 
public order and security need to be restored quickly to ensure that the civilian 
reconstruction process can begin and be completed successfully. 
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